34.1 Introduction
Recent developments in DNA technologies and the DNA polymorphisms discovery have led to the formation of DNA databases or DNA data banks for forensic enforcement purposes (Schneider 1998). As a result, a wide variety of options have been opened up for forensic investigation, because if we tend to equate the DNA analysis of the evidence collected at the scene of the crime with the collection of samples that make up the database, we may easily determine who the perpetrator might be and connect them to any other offenses that they might have perpetrated. If there is no arrests until the end credits, DNA profiles generated from samples collected from scenes of crime will be retained in a database which can be used later to find a “matching” perpetrator (Albujja et al. 2018).
Logically, as the number of people who have had their DNA analyzed and included in a repository grows, there is often a greater likelihood of identifying suspects. The permanent retention of DNA from scenes of crime on a repository contributed significantly to prosecutions in high-profile incidents, like the sexual assault and murder of Melanie Road, a teenage girl (17-year-old), A’ level student, in June 1984. In 2006, Christopher Hampton, 67 years, a painter and decorator, pleaded guilty to Melanie Road’s murder (Hayhurst 2016). The aim of establishing forensic DNA databases was to assist the policeman with information on who might have been there at the crime scene, especially where the identity of those involved is unknown (Wallace 2006). A data bank of DNA profiles from crime site scan also offer insight on the existence of links between various crime scenes, potentially identifying serial perpetrators and assisting in the analysis for identifying and analyzing patterns and trends in crime and disorder (McCartney 2006; Butler 2012).
Forensic DNA databases are currently in operation in approximately 69 countries, although others are being extended or developed in at minimum 34 new nations (Interpol 2016). The biggest DNA databases are in China (approximately more than eight million person DNA profiles, <1% of the populace), preceded by the United States (14.3 million DNA profiles, 4.5% of the populace) and the United Kingdom (5.7 million DNA profiles, 9% of the populace). The UK database is one that has decreased in size, deleting records from innocent persons hasn’t had any significant adverse impact on crime clearance rates (DNA Policy Initiative n.d.-a).
34.2 United Kingdom National DNA Database
The UK became the first nation to proceed on the so-called forensic DNA revolution (Jeffreys et al. 1985a; Gill et al. 1985), with the DNA fingerprinting test being first applied for the resolution of the immigration dispute as a result of disputed family relationships in early 1985 (Jeffreys et al. 1985b; Aronson 2005). Soon afterwards, DNA evidence in a paternity dispute was submitted to a civil court in the UK. In October 1986, DNA typing in criminal investigations started with Enderby’s murder trial, an investigation that contributed to the release of a key suspect following subsequent DNA testing proved his innocence. In 1987, DNA typing tests had been submitted as proof in criminal courts in the United Kingdom and the United States, and then in 1988, the United Kingdom Home Office and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office had granted approval for the usage of DNA typing to resolve immigration issues linked to the contested family relationships (Home Office 1989).
It was soon realized that this method was theoretically far more commonly used in the justice system. As a consequence, the application of DNA in the area of law enforcement has expanded, enabled by rapid technological developments, followed by incremental legal reforms, enabling the acquisition and the usage of DNA profiles to become an integral part of the criminal justice cycle. Enthusiast use of the modern methodology has fueled by both political and media hyperboles regarding the effectiveness of DNA profiling in identifying, stopping, and regulating crime. DNA profiling has been celebrated as an uncomplicated success tale, with the National DNA Database set up without any explicit laws, thus evading any focused political or public debate (Wallace 2006).
The UK’s National DNA Database (NDNAD) was established in 1995 utilizing the SGM (second-generation multiplex) profiling method. Since 1998, the SGMPlus methodology are used for DNA profiling comprising of eight CODIS loci (TH01, D8S1179, FGA, D16S539, D3S1358, D18S51, VWA, or D21S11), together with two additional markers, D19S433 and D2S1338, and also the AMELX locus (Butler 2006). However, as of July 24, 2014, samples are profiled using the DNA-17 profiling technique [kits of 17 STR loci (along with gender identifier)]. Only patterns of STRs are stored in NDNAD instead of an individual’s entire genomic sequence.
All information kept on the NDNAD is regulated by a Tripartite Board involving the Home Office, the Association of Police Authorities, and the Association of Chief Police Officers.
More than a year after its launch, the NDNAD has expanded to include DNA samples from 2.7 million people—around 5.2% of the people of the UK—several of whom have never been charged with or convicted of any offence. It is the world’s foremost and largest forensic DNA database of its kind. Under existing legislation, it could be extended to 25% of male population and nearly 7% of female population (Williams and Johnson 2005). It had 3.1 million profiles in 2005, 5.77 million by 2015 and 5.86 million by 2016 (National DNA Database Statistics 2015). The number of DNA profile records kept in NDNAD rose by more than 172,000 in the year up to March 2018, the highest annual rise since more than one million records were removed from the database after the “Protection of Freedoms Act” came into effect. As of March 2018, the NDNAD held 6,196,278 DNA profile, a rise of 2.86% on the total for March 2017. This follows a rise of 2.79% between March 2016 and March 2017 and a rise of 1.63% (to March 2016) and 0.88% (to March 2015) over the preceding 2 years (Statewatch n.d.).
34.3 New Zealand DNA Data Bank
New Zealand was the second nation across the globe to set up the DNA Profile Data Bank (DPD) in 1995 and this constructive approach to crime culminated in a high rate of success in providing useful information for unsolved offences (Harbison et al. 2001). In New Zealand, “the Criminal Investigations (Blood Samples) Act 1995” (“CI (BS) Act”) authorizes the setup of a DNA data bank. In addition to the sex test, 15 STR loci are used in New Zealand to create DNA profiles (Institute of Environmental Science and Research Website 2013). This included the compilation of DNA profiles of registered criminals and volunteers in a national database, which is managed on behalf of the police by the ESR (Environmental Science and Research).
Project DPD includes two repositories: the National DNA Database (individual’s profiles) and the Crime Sample Database (profiles from unresolved crimes). By making comparisons, potential perpetrators can be classified and offences linked.
There is also a stand-alone temporary database (“TD”), comprising DNA profiles from individuals who have been detained by the police or expect to be prosecuted. If such an individual is thereafter convicted, their profile would be passed from the TD to the DPD for permanent retention.
DPD utilizing the SGM DNA profiling system until July 2009 (Sparkes et al. 1996). Since that time, the AmpFlSTR® SGM Plus® system (the six core SGM loci, amelogenin, and four additional loci) has been used (Cotton et al. 2000).
The DPD currently maintains some 189,000 individual DNA profiles and more than 40,000 crime sample DNA profiles. New Zealand dominates the world in DNA matching with almost 70% of all unresolved offences loaded to the crime sample data banks effectively connecting to offenders and 30% to another incident.
34.4 France National DNA Database
French created the national DNA database named FNAEG (Fichier National Automatisé des Empreintes Génétiques) in 1998, which was used by the local gendarmerie and national police. The Guigou Legislation on the Prevention of Sexually Oriented Offences, enacted by the Plural Left Lionel Jospin Administration, established a forensic DNA data bank in 1998. The deployment, initially scheduled for 1999, was eventually accomplished in 2001, with the repository itself housed at Écully, controlled by a sub-directorate of the French police’s technological and scientific divisions.
After the 9/11 attacks, the government of France extended the context of the repository to incorporate DNA linked to other indictable offenses. Yet another “law for interior safety” adopted on March 18, 2003 broadened the spectrum even more to include nearly all acts of abuse, but not traffic violations or crimes perpetrated overseas. Samples are taken from convicted persons as well as simple suspects. The law does not specify a minimum age (Le Monde 2007).
Matthieu Bonduelle, the Secretary General, Syndicat de la Magistrature stated that “nobody defends a universal database, but, in fact, it is being done” in 2009 (Le Canard enchaîné 2009; Ouvrez la bouche 2009).
FNAEG maintained DNA profiles from 2.6 million persons and 2.3 million unknowns remain from crimes by 2014 (DNA Policy Initiative n.d.-b).
34.5 Combined DNA Index System (CODIS)
The CODIS (Combined DNA Index System) is a system of DNA profile indexes established by the FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation). The CODIS combines DNA and computer technologies into a powerful tool for linking crimes. This allows local and state forensic laboratories to digitally share and match profiles, linking violent crimes with each other and with known perpetrators. CODIS consists of three tiers (or levels); National DNA Index System (NDIS) enables states to compare DNA information with each other; State DNA Index Systems (SDIS) allows labs between states to exchange information; and the Local DNA Index Systems (LDIS) where DNA profiles originate.
In 1989, TWGDAM (Technical Working Group on DNA Analysis Methods) first announced the creation of a national DNA database (Budowle et al. 1998). FBI initiated a pilot DNA databased program involving 14 local and state laboratories in 1990 (Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) 2018). Congress enacted the DNA Identification Act in the year 1994 (42 U.S.C. § 14132) requiring the FBI to set up a nationwide DNA repository for incarcerated criminals and also specific repositories for missing people and forensic samples retrieved from crimes (42 U.S.C. § 14132 n.d.). The National DNA Index System or the NDIS become functional in 1998. Presently, all 50 states, the Federal Police, the Army Laboratories, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia are involved in NDIS (Federal Bureau of Investigation 2017).
The CODIS contains a number of specific indices for storing DNA profile information. There are three indexes for assisting in criminal investigations: the offender index, which comprises DNA profiles of people accused of violent offences; the arrestee index, which includes profiles of those arrested of crimes pursuit to the laws of the particular state; and the forensic index, which includes profiles collected from crime scene evidence (Data and Communication Flow in CODIS 2017). Other indexes, like the biological relatives of missing people’s index, the missing persons index, and the unidentified human remains index, are used to help identify missing individuals (Procedure for CODIS 2017).
CODIS-based identifications rely on STRs that are distributed in the human genome and on statistics that are used to measure the prevalence of that particular profile in the population (The Biology Project 2000; Forensics 2017). Similarly, CODIS requires data on mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) to be added to missing person related indexes. Because mtDNA passes from a mother to all of her children, this concept can be used to link people over decades.
CSF1PO, D5S818, D18S51, D8S1179, D7S820, D16S539, D3S1358, D21S11, D13S317, TH01, FGA, TPOX, vWA, D2S1338*, D2S441*, D22S1045*, D10S1248*, D1S1656*, D19S433*, D12S391*.
Although the US database is not explicitly connected to any other nation, many organizations across the globe use the underlying CODIS program. As of 2016, 90 foreign laboratories in 50 countries have been using CODIS software (Forensics 2017).
34.6 CODIS Success Stories (CODIS n.d.)
The following are some CODIS success tales.
34.6.1 St. Paul, MN, November 1994
A person covering his face using nylon stocking and carrying a knife leap out from underneath the bushes and sexually harassed a female walking around. Semen retrieved from the sufferer’s clothing and saliva was tested using DNA technology. The resultant profile was looked up against Minnesota’s CODIS repository. The hunt revealed the offender “Terry Lee Anderson,” who admitted and now is behind bars.
34.6.2 Tallahassee, FL, February 1995
The Florida Department of Law Enforcement correlated semen spotted on a Jane Doe murder victim to a convicted perpetrator’s DNA profile. The perpetrator’s DNA was obtained, assessed, and retained in the CODIS data bank while he was jailed for another sexual assault. The match was informative; it stopped the perpetrators’ from being released on parole, slated 8 days later.
34.7 Australia
The National Criminal Investigation DNA Database (NCIDD), managed by CrimTrac agency, was initiated in 2001. The NCIDD offers police and forensic experts with access to DNA profiles of alleged offenders, which can then be compared with evidence collected from crime scenes and persons. The repository is intra-jurisdictional, implying that all Australian state and territory repositories are interconnected, and DNA profiles may be exchanged (CrimTrac 2014).
The Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission (ACIC) is now running the NCIDD following the integration between the CrimTrac and the Australian Crime Commission in 2016 (Minister for Justice Michael Keenan 2015). ACIC is established under the ACC Act (Cwlth) (Australian Crime Commission Act 2002) (Starling 2018).
Through July 2018, the NCIDD has 837,000+ DNA profiles and is increasing continuously (Commission, Australian Criminal Intelligence 2018; Mobbs 2001). The NCIDD was using nine STR loci and a gender identifier (Amelogenin locus), but in 2013, it was expanded to 18 core STR loci (Curtis and Hereward 2017). The NCIDD was updated in 2015 to include modern technologies. This repository was among the most advanced throughout the globe, with enhanced kinship matching, familial searching, as well as advanced direct matching.
34.8 Canada
The National DNA Data Bank of Canada (NDDB) was founded in 1998 but started operations in the year 2000 (Milot et al. 2003). Federal courts have concluded that the legislation enacted by Parliament to control the usage of this technology in the justice system is mindful of the constitutional and privacy rights of offenders, particularly of individuals alleged to be convicted of serious crimes (National DNA Data Bank 2013).
After the UK’s launch of its data bank (NDNAD) in year 1995, the acquittal of two false convicts (Milgaard case, 1969 and Morin case, 1985) and the adoption of the C-104 bill (to amend the Criminal Code and the Young Offenders Act) acknowledged the need for such a specific data bank in Canada and prompted the establishment of the NDDB via the Identification Act (Law C-37 of December 10, 1998) (Curran 1997). The Government of Canada adopted the DNA Identification Act on December 11, 1999. This would allow the creation and modification of a Canadian DNA data bank for the purposes of the Criminal Code. This law became legal on June 29, 2000. On the basis of 13 CODIS core loci, profiles are managed and compared using CODIS (Bank, Government of Canada 2001; Police 2012).
NDDB comprised DNA profiles in two separated indexes: Convicted Offender Index (COI), biological samples resulting in DNA profiles can only be collected from perpetrators against whom post-conviction DNA data bank orders have been made; and Crime Scene Index (CSI), DNA profiles derived from crime scene investigations.
As of July 15, 2013, the COI had over 237,000 DNA profiles and the CSI had over 87,000 DNA profiles (Milot et al. 2013). Moreover, there were 21,563 matches between crime scene and convicted offender DNA profiles and 2741 “forensic matches” per crime scene.
34.9 Dubai
In 2006, the United Arab Emirates declared that it would create a DNA database for its whole populace. The UK Forensic Science Service (FSS) officially signed contracts to build a database, but the FSS has since shut down due to recession.
In the year 2017, Dubai unveiled an initiative named Dubai 10X, designed to generate “disruptive innovation” in the region (Sutton 2017). DNA database was one of the programs in this initiative that would gather genomes from all three million nationals over a 10-year span. This was expected to use the database to determine the hereditary origins of diseases and to create customized medical therapies (Treviño 2018).
34.10 Germany
Germany established its DNA data bank for the Federal Criminal Police (in German: Bundeskriminalamt, abbreviated BKA) in 1998 (GeneWatch UK 2016; Germany’s DNA Database 2016; National DNA Intelligence Databases in Europe 2016; Peerenboom 1998). At the end of 2010, the database held more than 700,000 DNA profiles, and 1,162,304 DNA profiles in 2017 (Käppner 2016).
In the year 2011, “Stop the DNA Collection Frenzy!” movement and numerous human rights and data security groups submitted a public letter (Ope Letter Stop 2016) to the Minister of Justice of Germany urging her to take steps to avoid the “preventive expansion of DNA data-collection” and the “preemptive use of mere suspicions and of the state apparatus against individuals” and the cancelation of foreign DNA data sharing initiatives at European and transatlantic stage (Schultz 2016).
34.11 Israel
Israel Police DNA Index System (IPDIS) is the Israeli national DNA data bank (Zamir et al. 2012) which was created in the year 2007 and has a database of more than 135,000 DNA profiles and more than 2000 confirmed hits reported. The IPDIS contains DNA profiles of accused, suspect, and convicted criminals.
In order to manage the high-throughput processing and DNA analysis with FTA cards, IPDIS has built a semi-automatic LIMS system that enables a limited number of police officers to complete the collection of a vast number of samples in a fairly short time period and are also liable for the future follow-up of assays.
34.12 Kuwait
Kuwait created its DNA database in 2002 without any relevant legislation on DNA databases. There were renewed calls in 2012 for expansion. In 2015, the Kuwaiti government passed a law (Act No. 78/2015) requiring not only of citizens living in the Persian Gulf state but also of other residents and even country visitors to have their DNA onto a national repository (Visser 2015; Ley 78/2015 de Kuwait 2016). Such a database would have been the first of its kind in the world.
The explanation for this legislation was safety issues following the ISIS suicide bomb attack (Imam Sadiq Mosque), which killed 27 people and wounded several more (ISIL 2015). They planned to finish collecting the DNA from approximately 4.2 million people in a security crackdown to help officers detain suspects by September 2016, which outside analysts felt was unrealistic (Field 2015).
The Ministry of the Interior has allocated $400 million to the project, that is likely to be criticized by human rights defenders for violating the person’s right to privacy. Many that fail to give samples could face a penalty of up to $33,000 or $29, EUR 700, and a 1-year prison term, and those found supplying false samples will be imprisoned for 7 years.
Nevertheless, as the legislation is now scheduled to be implemented soon, several researchers and advocacy groups have voiced their doubts and pleaded with the Government of Kuwait to reconsider its plans. In the New Scientist, geneticist Olaf Riess claimed that the legislation was a “huge attack on genetic confidentiality” which severely jeopardized Kuwait’s global image. The Kuwait Constitutional Court, in 2017, ruled against the statute that there was a breach of personal privacy and that the program had been terminated (Coghlan 2017).
34.13 Brazil
The Forensic DNA Research Institute of Federal District Civil Police in 1998 set up a DNA data bank designed to help resolve serious offences (Ferreira et al. 2015). In 2012, Brazil approved a national legislation creating DNA repositories at national and state levels for the DNA typing of people with criminal convictions (Ferreira et al. 2015).
In 2013, the Brazilian National DNA Database (BNPG) was created. In the first half of 2019, the number of genetic profiles that entered BNPG increased by 70%. In addition to this rise, the number of matches in the same time have risen by 46%.
Following the 2013 declaration of the President of the Republic of Brazil, which governs the 2012 Act, Brazil has started utilizing CODIS as well the DNA database of sexual assault evidence to resolve abuse cases in Brazil (Ferreira et al. 2015).
34.14 Other European Countries
The Netherlands is the biggest gatherer of its people’s DNA profiles compared to other European countries. The DNA database, containing DNA profiles, was established at the National Forensic Institute (NFI) in 1997. The concept “database” in Dutch law involves the collection of autosomal STR profiles that are held in this repository (Beekman et al. 2004). Right now, the DNA repository at the Netherlands Forensic Institute holds DNA profiles of more than 316,000 Dutch people (Veiligheid 2013). In comparison with the situation in most other European nations, the Dutch authorities have wide-ranging rights to collect and preserve DNA samples if an individual is guilty of a recordable crime, except when the conviction only involves paying a penalty.
Throughout Sweden, only the profiles of offenders who have served more than 2 years in jail are kept. In Norway, court orders are necessary. Austria introduced their own DNA database in 1997, which is run by the Ministry of Interior (Hindmash and Prainsack 2010), and Italy also set up a criminal DNA database in 2016 (Negri 2016; Jamaica Observer 2016). Switzerland launched a provisional criminal DNA registry in 2000 and passed the law in 2005 (Haas et al. 2006).
The Government of Portugal suggested the development of a DNA data bank for the whole populace of Portugal in the year 2005 (Newropeans Magazine n.d.). But, after an informed debate, including the view of the Portuguese Ethics Council (CNECV—ConselhoNacional de Éticapara as Ciências da Vida n.d.), only the criminal’s DNA profile were kept in the database (Skinner 2010).
GMI (Genomics Medicine Ireland), a life sciences company, is establishing a genetic registry that will include information from almost 10% of the Irish populace, involving patients with different disorders and normal individuals (Genomics Medicine n.d.; Irish Times n.d.-a). The likelihood of a private company retaining public DNA data posed questions. At present, it appears that Ireland has adopted a fully commercial approach to genomics. This policy jeopardizes the unrestricted access of genomic data for scientific researches which could aid the patient (Irish Times n.d.-b).
34.15 South Africa
The National Forensic DNA Database (NFDD) is the South Africa national DNA data bank used by law enforcement agencies. Sexual abuse was a major burden on the nation, and the country was reported with the maximum rape rate, with a female sexually assaulted every 17 seconds posing massive challenge to the nation and highlighting the severity of the issue. Thus, in 2014, President Zuma approved the legislation “DNA Act” to protect the innocent (The Evolution of Forensic DNA Database Policy 2017; Global Offender Data Base 2014).
34.16 China
In 2004, China set up its DNA database to track abducted and missing children. Since 2001, Hong Kong within China has had a separate database, utilizing the United States CODIS, the FBI’s forensic DNA database system (DNA Policy Initiative n.d.-c).
The 2011 Interpol survey reported that China’s DNA data bank has expanded to 461,513 crime scene DNA profiles, 7,701,745 individual’s profiles, 22,718 missing person’s profiles, 65,115 unidentified human remain profiles and 279,999 other profiles (total: 8,531,099 DNA profiles). Chinese data bank is projected to have 20 million profiles by 2013 and 40 million by 2016, rendering this the biggest in the globe (DNA Policy Initiative n.d.-c).
The Chinese authorities intend to increase their current DNA archive to 100 million records by 2020, according to the Wall Street Journal examination of reports from police departments throughout China (WSJ n.d.). There has been criticism that China can use DNA repositories not only to solve offence but also to monitor dissidents, particularly Uyghurs (The New York Times n.d.).
34.17 DNA Database in India
In India, also, this type of DNA profile database is needed which may help Indian law enforcement agencies. DNA fingerprinting has been a useful tool for law enforcement, as it works both ways to secure correct convictions and also to exonerate the innocent. India’s latest compilation of crime statistics for 2016 from the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) indicates that the rate of conviction for rape is 25%. The 2016 NCRB statistics documented more than 300,000 crimes that directly affect people or property, but the conviction rate remains at around 30%. Only a small proportion of these criminal offences are currently being investigated through DNA testing (Kumar et al. 2016).
The Union Government is focusing on a revised draft of the legislation which aimed at creating a national DNA database for offenders. The proposal to draft a bill authorizing the usage of DNA profiles for crime-related purposes started in 2003 when the Department of Biotechnology (DBT) set up a council named the DNA Profiling Advisory Committee to make guidelines for the drafting of the “2006 DNA Profiling Bill” that ultimately became the “2007 Human DNA Profiling Law” (International Forensic Sciences n.d.; Maguire et al. 2013; Jeffreys 2005; Machado and Silva 2014). The proposed “Human DNA Profiling Bill” was disclosed in 2007, but never presented in Parliament.
There are 17 sites or locations along the DNA strand that we used to identify an individual. However, neither of these sites ever disclosed nothing about an individual’s medical records. They are almost as neutral as fingerprints (Livemint n.d.). Rights activists criticized the law as a potential infringement of the rights of residents and questioned it on legal and technical grounds. Dr. Helen Wallace from GeneWatch, a UK-based not-for-profit organization that advocates against DNA data banks, believes that India needs to learn from foreign experience, especially from the United Kingdom, which in 1995 became the first nation to create a data bank that also prompted retention of DNA records of innocents (The Hindu 2020). The United Kingdom in 2011 adopted the “Protection of Freedoms Act” which would delete an additional one million records from the DNA database. Jeremy Gruber, Executive Director, Council for Responsible Genetics, said that the Indian data bank was troublesome as it would be a Big Brother surveillance tool rather than a crime-solving platform (Livemint n.d.).
The revised 2012 Profiling Bill proposes just incremental changes to its counterpart, the 2007 Draft “Human DNA Profiling Bill.” In a contentious move in 2012 to increase state intervention in the lives of common citizens, the UPA government introduced the DNA Profiling Bill at the Parliament’s Winter Session. If it becomes law, the bill would give the right to obtain vast amounts of confidential DNA information from people even if they are “suspects” in a criminal trial. The information will be retained until the person has been cleared by the tribunal (Sanhati n.d.).
The bill advocates the creation of a National DNA Data Bank to be supervised by an officer who is of the rank of Joint Secretary to the Government of India. For protestors, this will help the government to play the role of an alarming Big Brother gathering a vast amount of sensitive data of citizens. The proposed amendment to the bill states that “DNA analysis offers sensitive information which, if misused, can cause harm to a person or society.” It is not obvious under what conditions “volunteers” will disclose their personal details with the government.
The data, according to the bill, will also be used for the “creation and maintenance” of population statistics and can be used for identification, research, protocols development or quality control. Surprisingly enough, the punishment for “misusing” the DNA profiles is a jail sentence of a few months or a fee of a paltry, Rupees 50,000. In reality, law enforcement organizations like the CBI have lobbied the government to enact the bill early. They referenced the outcomes of a British parliamentary report published by the Department of Science and Technology in February 2006 claiming that prosecutions in crime trials rose significantly after the government decided to retain the details on DNA profiling in future years.
In the meantime, senior civil servants who are associated with the bill and have made detailed briefings to the DoB are unhappy that the bill calls for the deletion of DNA profile data after an individual has been discharged by the courts. They believe that preserving and growing data gradually and progressively would go a fair way in the detection and settlement of offences. Though this is a valid point, the absence of a strict privacy legislation poses questions regarding the obtrusive existence of the proposed DNA Profiling Bill. The proposal has been questioned for not resolving privacy issues. The Citizens Forum for Civil Liberties criticized the bill on privacy and in 2012 submitted a petition to the National Human Rights Commission (The Hindu 2012).
The Bill was further developed by an advisory committee because of concerns about privacy and lack of safeguards. Nonetheless, a new draft bill was presented to Parliament in the summer of 2015 but was opposed by a number of committee members who said their concerns had not been fully addressed. A public consultation was then announced (deadline August 20, 2015). An expert committee was set up by the DoB to address these issues.
A revised version of the bill was sent to the Indian Parliament in August 2018, but it was not implemented before the end of the parliamentary session. As a result, after the 2019 Lok Sabha General Election, the bill was reintroduced again. The Act was approved in the Lok Sabha in January but lapsed because it could not be passed in the Rajya Sabha owing to lack of support from the opposition parties. Soon, after the Cabinet’s approval, a new bill would be presented in Parliament, sources aware of the developments stated.
The Act needs informed consent from individuals to obtain DNA samples from them. Permission shall not be needed for crimes punished by more than 7 years in jail or by a death penalty. The genomic details of 10,000 Indians will be collected in the first stage of “Genome India.” The proposed National DNA Database, or the Indian Database as it would be named, would merge profiles from multiple state-level repositories and retain at no less than six indices: an offenders index, suspects index, missing people’s index, a crime scene index, unknown deceased person’s index, and a volunteer’s index. Those guilty of an offense would have their profiles retained in the data bank. Missing persons eventually identified or accused who have been acquitted in an incident should be removed from the database when a court directs the DNA database bank manager to do so (Livemint n.d.).
34.18 Benefits and Risks
Expansion of forensic DNA data bank poses concerns about the criterion for inclusion and retention and doubts about the effectiveness, affordability, and privacy infringement of such large collections of personal data. Unlike in the past, not just violent crimes but all offences are subject to DNA analysis creating thousands and thousands of DNA profiles, all of which are stored and continually searched in national DNA repositories. As always when big datasets are gathered, new mining procedures based on correlation became feasible. For example, “Familial Searching in which a profile from crime site is intentionally run through the criminal database in the hopes of getting a list of profiles that are genetically identical to the DNA evidence and using this knowledge as an investigation leads to questioning families of the partial matches profiles”.
Finally, the very first familial searching was carried out effectively in the United Kingdom in 2004, which led to the prosecution of Craig Harman for assassination. Craig Harman from Frimley, Surrey, was prosecuted and imprisoned for 6 years on the grounds of a familial DNA search that connected him to the murder scene via a near relative’s DNA profile. Another family search that hit the headlines in the UK was the case of Lynette Deborah White, who was killed on Valentine’s Day in Cardiff, Wales, in 1988. Three locals were falsely jailed for life in 1990 and declared innocent and released after appeal in 1992. In 2009, 13 police officers involved in the case were charged with a plot to pervert the course of justice by jailing three innocents.
In 2000, a DNA profile of the alleged murderer was retrieved, but no match was made in the NDNAD. A family search was undertaken in 2003 and a close resemblance to a 14-year-old child with an identical genetic profile was revealed in the database. Since the child was not yet born when the offense was done, the law enforcement officials searched to his nearest associates or immediate family. This guided the investigators to Jeffrey Gafoor, a 38-year-old paternal uncle of the boy. Gafoor has admitted to White’s assassination and has been sentenced to life in prison. Subsequently, the technique has been adopted in some US states, but it is not enforced at country level.
German police were often also active with Family Search strategies. In Northern Germany, the cops detained a man convicted of raping a woman after they had examined the DNA of his two brothers who had taken part in the dragnet. Owing to partial matches between the DNA profiles of the crime scene and these brothers, the perpetrator was confirmed. In contrast to other jurisdictions, the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany ruled against the potential usage of this sort of evidence by the court in December 2012.
Familial searches are certainly a useful tool in police investigations that can help to solve previously unsolved crimes. The biggest criticism is about how minorities are going to be affected. Ms. Simoncelli claimed that the usage of familial searches would harm a specific group of people—minorities. Simoncelli claimed that African Americans and Latinos should be increasingly targeted by law enforcement; that family members would be put under “genetic surveillance” for offenses they did not undertake and that family members would become “genetic informants”. Simoncelli also stated that if familial searches were carried out on a regular basis, hundreds of thousands of innocent citizens who happen to be relatives of persons in the DNA database will be exposed to lifetime monitoring. Defense Attorney Stephen Mercer claimed that the risk is in the usage of the DNA database to decide if individuals who perform violent actions have genes that tend to lead them to abuse or other disruptive behavior (DNA Forensics n.d.).
Earlier, Alec Jeffreys questioned how the DNA profiles collected by UK police held not only individuals who were wrongfully convicted of crimes but also people arrested without prosecution, suspects acquitted in the inquiry, or also innocent citizens who had never been charged with an unlawful act. He also questioned the fact that large national DNA repositories, such as the NDNAD in the UK, are likely to be socioeconomically biased. It has been reported that most matches are for petty offences; as per GeneWatch in Germany, 63% of the data bank matches are for robbery, and fewer than 3% are for murder and rape. The amendments to the UK database came in 2012s “Protection of Freedoms Act,” after a significant setback at the European Court of Human Rights in 2008. Since 2013, 1.1 million profiles (of about seven million) have been deleted to eradicate profiles of innocents from the data bank.
Despite the risks that such a universal system poses to people’s freedoms, the government may not seem overly worried. A new survey of public opinion on issues related to DNA databases has found that a more censorious approach against wider national data banks is connected to the age and schooling of participants. There is a need to raise awareness of the risks and benefits of very large-scale DNA collections and to follow specific ethical and privacy principles for the creation and regulation of DNA repositories where citizens’ views are taken into account.
34.19 Privacy and Human Rights
The usage of DNA to locate individuals accused of perpetrating an offence has been a big move forward in the world of policing. If profiling is used cautiously, it can serve to prosecute people who have committed atrocious crimes or to absolve others those who are innocence. Nevertheless, issues occur if individual’s tissue samples, computerized DNA profiles, and personal records are retained permanently in a DNA database. It is worried that this knowledge may be used in ways that jeopardize the privacy and rights of individuals and their families. The retention of an individual’s DNA profiles and other information on a computer database thus allows a form of “bio-surveillance” or biological tagging, which can be applied to ascertain where they have been. This assures that DNA repositories may be used to identify people who have not perpetrated a crime or whose “crime” is a nonviolent protest or confrontation. For instance, in a nation where freedom of speech and democratic freedoms are limited, the government or intelligence services might attempt to collect DNA samples from a civil gathering to ascertain whether or not certain people have been involved. DNA repositories link searchable computer records of personal demographics, with the potential to biotag an entity and monitor their position using their DNA profile. Family members of an individual can often be identified through a partial matching of their DNA. There is concern that the Chinese government are using Genetic tests to censor the country’s overwhelmingly Muslim Uyghur population. Human rights organizations claim that China has set up a massive DNA list of Uighurs residing in Xinjiang province, gathering samples without approval from approximately 36 million people as part of a free medical check-up scheme. Chinese scientists in 2014 released a report explaining how to separate Uighurs from other ethnic groups by utilizing DNA testing (Independent n.d.-a). DNA databases therefore dramatically change the balance-of-power from individual to state.
“Bio-surveillance” concerns stretch outside the state to anybody who may breach the system and gain access to the person’s DNA profile. That may involve organized criminal or terrorist organizations, or someone trying to locate a person. People on witness protection schemes, for example, can have their image changed but cannot modify their DNA. When someone is aware of them and gathers their DNA, their identification may be disclosed by comparing it to the DNA profile contained in the database, whether it is available and connected to their old identity. Their families may also be identified through “familial searching” (seeking partial matches with other people’s DNA profiles in the database).
These issues do not apply exclusively to the collection, retention, access, and usage of DNA samples that form the basis of the DNA profile, but rather to other information that may be stored. For example, as DNA is collected on arrest and retained permanently, extra information is preserved in police arrest reports and in samples that might be kept in the DNA research laboratories. Individuals are worried that potential employers, other government departments, or even insurance providers will have access to their genetic records. Medicare providers will have a significant interest in verifying the medical integrity of those needing health care; employers would even have an interest in collecting statistics about the physical fitness or race and heritage of a prospective employee. Access to private details can have an effect on the employability of the individual applying for a position.
Kuwait introduced the world’s first legislation in 2015 allowing both citizens and visitors to submit samples of their DNA, although it was revoked prior to its entry into effect. It was introduced with the intention of acknowledging extremists, but in 2017 the Constitutional Court ruled that the bill breached Kuwait’s fundamental protection of personal liberty. Rwanda also introduced the first country-wide DNA database in the world, a scheme requiring the gathering of samples from all 12 million residents of the region in an attempt to crack down on violence. The program generated questions from human rights activists or human rights campaigners who fear that the database might be misused by the regime to breach international human rights law (Independent n.d.-b).
34.20 Conclusion
DNA databases may be used to track individuals or their families (biological tagging or “bio-surveillance,” so that the DNA database can be misused by regimes or someone else who may breach the system).
DNA databases are connected to certain electronic documents, such as detention reports, which could influence the career prospects of the individual applying for a position or visa or to discriminate against them.
Familial searching may contribute to major violations by enabling investigators or anyone who takes down the data bank to track down or harass political dissidents’ relatives, or identify paternity and non-paternity for private, business, or illegal reasons.
Maintaining national DNA databases ought to pay heed over the adequacy of safeguards to secure privacy rights and prevent adverse social impacts.