Strategic Communication in the Public Administration System and Foreign Policy
In Russia, unlike in the USA, the term “strategic communication” (SC) is not used in official documents. The latter has elevated the concept of strategic communication to state policy at the highest level (National Framework for Strategic Communication, 2010). In spite of an abundance of state institutions,1 documents (Office of the Under Secretary of Defence for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 2004; Office of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, 2010; etc.), and scientific research (Corman, Trethewey, & Goodall, 2008; Fisher, Lucas, & James, 2011; Murphy, 2008; Patterson & Radtke, 2009; Paul, 2011; O’Hair, Fredrich, & Dixon, 2010), it is still in its nascent stages of development there.
Russia tends to use the terms “state information policy”, “information security”, “information support for foreign policy activities”, and some other related definitions, which do not exclude, however, the need for strategic communication, because it is implicit in these terms. At the same time, it is important to avoid abandoning strategic communication in the current state informational policy, that is, relating the tactical unity of acts, words, and images to the strategy for the development of Russia.
The Doctrine of Informational Security of the Russian Federation (2016, Chapter I, paragraph 2c) defines information security as “…the state of protection of the individual, society and the State against internal and external information threats, allowing to ensure the constitutional human and civil rights and freedoms, the decent quality and standard of living for citizens, the sovereignty, the territorial integrity and sustainable socio-economic development of the Russian Federation, as well as defence and security of the State”.
It is not easy to forge alliances in the contemporary international field due to the conflicting interests of governing elites, which are often quite controversial.
The modern realities and interpretations of conflict deliberately blur boundaries between war and peace, between military and civilian systems, and spaces between information and influence or manipulation (Armistead, 2004; Arpagian, 2010; Brunner & Cavelty, 2009). This allows for the development and application of new kinds of informational impact and information weapons.
The majority of Russian and foreign experts quite reasonably consider information and psychological warfare as a clash of opposing parties aimed at limiting the capabilities of the other side in the hope of their destruction (Armistead, 2010; Brusnicyn, 2001; Linebarger, 2010; U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2014; Veprincev, Mnaoilo, Petrenko, & Frolov, 2005). However, in reality, the winner is ultimately the one that not only and not so much destroys, but the one that creates something new and more progressive. If this pattern ceases to work, there will be a general decline of humanity.
In order to usher in a qualitatively new level of development, it is vital for Russia to raise the efficiency of management systems in all domains of society. The increase in Russia’s capacity to utilize strategic communication might become one of its most efficient tools for developing new systems of this sort. It will decrease the burden on the administrative and financial administration organs, have a real impact on the speed of economic growth, and reinforce Russia’s international position and state security. It is worth noting that we are not talking about replacing physical action with communication manipulation mechanisms—Russia needs real progress, not a propagandistic imitation.
In the following section, we attempt to show synchronized deeds, words, and images in the current politics of Russia. Moreover, we use the example of Latin America, where Russia has made significant breakthroughs since the beginning of the century.
Strategic Communication of Russia in Latin America Is on the Rise
Within the vast array of factors that could lead to increasing Russian presence in Latin America, primary attention is rightfully paid to the political, economic, and military factors. However, the growing and dynamically developing system of information and communication support of Russian foreign policy deserves no less attention. It is especially important to highlight the recent progress of Russia’s strategic communication in the region.
After the breakup of the Soviet Union, the system of foreign policy propaganda became poorly coordinated, controversial, low-powered, inefficient, and far from the needs of suiting Russia’s long-term interests; at the time, foreign policy communications were the responsibility of separate bodies, without any strategic context. A Western-backed new elite, steeped in corruption, tried to hold power in the country as the economy declined and the population slid into poverty, intensifying property stratification, and science and education degradation; however, natural resources and substantial nuclear potential remained key assets.
The situation has started to improve since the presidency of Vladimir V. Putin, followed by that of Dmitry A. Medvedev, and continued once again by Vladimir V. Putin, since 2012. However, many strategic solutions of national development have been delayed and the citizens’ well-being is connected to oil prices and other resources; these convey negative images of Russia to Latin America. Nonetheless, as changes have occurred, Russia’s presence has risen in the region. The ideological component does not matter here; Moscow is ready to cooperate with countries which have left–socialistic and right–conservative governments. This approach gives good results. From 2005 to 2009, Russia’s trade turnover with Latin American countries increased to US$18 billion from about US$6 billion in the years prior. Some experts have cited the achievements of Russian foreign policy in Latin America as “the most efficient outcome of Moscow’s international activities in recent years” (Strategic Culture Foundation, 2012).
In the mid-2010s, the dynamics of trade and economic cooperation between Russia and Latin American countries, in a number of areas, lost much initial momentum, and trade turnover began to decline. There was an imbalance between a relatively high level of political trust and relatively weak economic interaction. All this required the activation and expansion of Russian–Latin American cooperation in the economic sphere, specifically in the sphere of Russian exports of technological products. The future of Russian–Latin American relations largely depends on how successfully this task will be solved (Jakovlev, 2017). Finally, the future depends on the global situation and the capacities of Russia for rapid progress under unfavorable international conditions. No less important is how the countries of Latin America adapt themselves to the new conditions of global markets, which seem rather problematic in the short-term perspective. Volatile social conflicts and political instability negatively influence Russia–Latin America ties and cooperation.
A new foreign policy course needs to be charted, in addition to the introduction of more strategically expansive communication support. The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation has a particular provision in their information support for foreign policy activities. It points out that Russia seeks to ensure that the world has an objective image of the country, develops its own effective ways to influence foreign audiences, promotes Russian and Russian-language media in the global information space and provide them with necessary government support, is proactive in international information cooperation, and takes necessary steps to counter threats to its information security (Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, 2016).
A very important role for the development of Russia’s strategic communication in Latin America involves numerous summit meetings. During 2010, official visits of D. Medvedev to Argentina and Brazil contributed to the consolidation of collaboration. Vladimir Putin officially visited the region many times. For example, in mid-July 2014, just after Western sanctions were introduced against Russia, President Vladimir Putin’s tour of the Latin American region was unprecedented in its duration and geographical scope. In six days (July 11–17), the Russian president visited four countries—Cuba, Nicaragua, Argentina, and Brazil—discussing with their leaders a wide range of issues about international life and Russian–Latin American cooperation. In addition, in Brazil, Vladimir Putin made contact at a multilateral and bilateral level with the presidents of almost all South American states within the framework of the BRICS summit in its outreach format.
“Home to our friends, home to people close to us”, “close cooperation”, and “multipolar world” are the key messages of the modern Latin American Strategy of Russia; these concepts have enjoyed broad acceptance among local elites and the general public abroad.
Russia aims to stabilize relations with Latin America and extend the achieved level of collaboration in the region, taking into account mutual interests and material and financial opportunities. An important role is given to cultural and educational exchanges and expanding the system of foreign specialists’ preparation in Russian education.
In 2008, RIA Novosti opened its Cuban bureau. It was a step toward a more complete presence of the leading Russian news agency in the region. In 2010, a further strengthening of the informational presence of Russia in the region took place as Spanish columns from Rossijskaya Gazeta appeared in the biggest Latin American newspapers (Clarín and Jornal do Brasil), and Russia Today began broadcasting in Spanish.
The Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Compatriots Living Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation (Rossotrudnichestvo) plays an important role in the public diplomacy of Russia. It was established in September 2008.2 The agency is subordinated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its head is nominated by the president of Russia. Rossotrudnichestvo operates beyond the Russian Federation through representations or through representatives as part of diplomatic missions of the Russian Federation in 73 countries around the world.
The activities of Rossotrudnichestvo and its foreign departments are aimed at forming and establishing an omni-faceted notion of contemporary Russia, its material and spiritual potential, and the content of its domestic and foreign policy. Rossotrudnichestvo collaborates not only with state authorities, but it has fruitful cooperation with NGOs such as the Russian Association of International Cooperation (which unites over 70 social unions, including funds of friendship with foreign countries), Russkiy Mir Foundation, Andrey Pervozvanny Foundation, Russkoe Zarubezhye Library Foundation, and many others.
Among Rossotrudnichestvo’s media partners are ITAR-TASS, RIA Novosti, channels such as Russia Today, the radio stations Sputnik, MIR, Golos Rossii, and magazines such as Russkaya misl, Russkiy vek, Russkiy Mir, and many other leading Russian, foreign mass media, and compatriot editions in Russian. Only Rossotrudnichestvo has offices in nine Latin American countries. The agency’s events are grouped according to country and direction: international conferences, social events, work with compatriots, Russian language studies, cultural and educational events. For example, “New Generation-2016”, a forum of young leaders from Latin America and Spain, took place in Moscow. Young specialists in the sphere of economics, politics, and scientific and cultural collaboration visited Russia as part of a program of short-term study tours for foreigners, entitled “New Generation”, which has been coordinated by Rossotrudnichestvo since 2011 (Rossotrudnichestvo, 2018).
The Russian Orthodox Church has been a dynamic actor in the process of Russian public diplomacy in Latin America. On multiple occasions, the Church initiated events of regional importance. Among the significant events was the visit of Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and All Russia (head of the Russian Orthodox Church) to Latin America in 2016. During his first ministerial visit to the region, Patriarch Kirill visited a number of countries, including Cuba, Brazil, and Paraguay. The meeting in Cuba between Patriarch Kirill and Pope Francis was the most important event of this trip (Russkiy Mir, 2016).
It is possible and necessary to further develop strategic communication in Latin America. For example, Rossotrudnichestvo can more actively avail of the achievements of modern multimedia technologies; Russian organizations in the sphere of public diplomacy still use social media poorly. Publication of art and academic literature in Spanish and Portuguese is also in dire need of state support. Private publishers can earn money by engaging in such projects. I remember how satisfying it was as a Portuguese person to receive a book in Portuguese entitled “Russian Kitchen” (published by Progress Publishing House); however, that happened 29 years ago and has not happened again since.
It was not easy for Moscow to develop the current relations with Latin America. It had to endure the open hostility of the administration of President Bush and then it faced the almost undisguised unfriendly attitude of President Obama’s conservative team members, that is, the ambassador staff in Latin America which Obama had inherited from the Republicans. Washington stonewalled almost all of Russia’s initiatives on the international arena and especially those which concerned Latin America (Strategic Culture Foundation, 2012). Russian presence in Latin America continues to be unwelcome by the administration of President Trump.
Strategic Communication: War or Peace?
clashes of values, interests, and goals of different political forces at the national level;
friction and tensions between different Latin American countries of different political orientations (e.g., between Colombia and Venezuela, Nicaragua and Costa Rica, etc.);
conflicts of interest between Russia, China, the USA, and its NATO and EU allies (generally only partly related to events in Latin America itself); and
growing rivalry between transnational corporations (TNCs) and transnational banks (TNBs) in the face of growing international competition, declining international trade, and instability in global commodity and financial markets. A transnational oligarchy has accumulated more and more resources, provoking social tensions.
In the presidential republics of Latin America, of course, the role of heads of state in the formation of domestic and foreign policy is great. Presidents and their governments, who must operate within the zone of interests of local oligarchical clans and interests of TNCs, inevitably fall into the epicenter of psychological warfare.
The forecasts for the development of relations between the Latin America and the USA under the new US administration have been very negative. This is largely due to the content and form of President Trump’s statements about the countries in the region. From the very beginning of his election campaign, President Trump spoke disdainfully about Mexicans and the alleged Mexican government policy of encouraging Mexican illegal emigration to the USA (Edelman, 2016). President Trump called the late leader of the Cuban revolution, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba Fidel Castro, a “brutal dictator”, and promised that his administration would do everything possible to ensure that the Cuban people began their path to prosperity and freedom. In August 2017, he did not rule out military intervention in Venezuela’s affairs (Nelson, 2017). Such statements do not add to Trump’s popularity among the left-leaning countries of Latin America.
In many ways, Russia is a natural winner here, because its capital, energy reserves, international influence, and military technology represent an appealing alternative to feeding the politically unpopular perception of American dominance in the region (Fillingham, 2010). So we can say that the roots of the more independent stance of Latin American countries are determined in an increasingly multipolar world by much more fundamental reasons that the aspirations of any one leader of Latin America, or the faults or successes in the geopolitical games of the USA and Russia, if these can be said to really exist. Is it possible to see a way out of the blind alley of rising tension in the relationships between Russia and the USA, for Latin America in particular? We shall try to open some perspectives in this area from the point of view of the strategic communication of two powers.
Once again, we want to repeat that strategic communication is the projection in mass consciousness of some strategic values, interests, and goals. These goals can more or less coincide, coexist, or compete, to be at odds, at war, or to exclude each other. If the strategic communication of Russia and the USA (and, desirably, that of other countries as well) projects a great number of coinciding basic values into the public conscience, this possibility would be the best option for most of Earth’s population, as well as for those countries themselves and for global safety. If we want peace, our main goal should be to obtain a harmonious coincidence of interests, values, and goals, although this does not depend on strategic communication completely. It does not mean defending immoral compromises; it means defending pluralism with regard to the means and models of development based on a dialectical unity of the main laws, as well as national and regional peculiarities of human development.
In order to decrease the tension between and improve the images of the two nations in Latin America, it makes sense to launch joint projects in domains which are crucial to an increase of prosperity and liquidation of the current arrearage of Latin American countries. Thus, an increased involvement of Latin American partners in these projects is needed, especially in hi-tech elements. The projects should be open for participation to other countries and unions, such as the EU, China, India, Japan, and so on. Any possibility of turning Latin America into an object of neo-imperialistic claims or using it to divide the spheres of influence should be excluded. However, consistent acute competition between states does not exclude cooperation and even implies it.
Global joint projects should be undertaken which involve Latin American partners, such as the search for and development of alternative energy sources, life (especially its active period) prolongation, solutions for alimentation and ecological problems, and so on. It is very important to accomplish projects vital for all mankind through joint efforts. A good example is ITER (International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor) (ITER, 2018). In southern France, 35 nations are collaborating to build the world’s largest tokamak—a magnetic fusion device that has been designed to prove the feasibility of fusion as a large-scale and carbon-free source of energy based on the same principle that powers our sun and stars.
There should be maximum possible transparency with regard to the preparation and implementation of joint projects.
A well-thought-out consultation system and meetings of strategic communication experts should be put in place in order to discuss the emerging problems on time. The efficiency of strategic communications as means of collaboration is negligible when strategic interests and goals are drastically mismatched. In this case, strategic communication inevitably becomes a tool of information warfare. Illusions to the contrary should not be harbored.
Thus, compromises are essential, in addition to searching for ways to combine interests. Strategic communication can be very fruitful for the creation of a climate which enables such a search, but it can aggravate the situation as well. To a certain extent, strategic communication itself is an important (and partly autonomous) factor of rapprochement or estrangement of parties, and it is vital to ensure that it serves to accomplish the former.
Such a program of joint optimization of strategic communication in the region is completely impossible to implement in the circumstances of growing tension between Russia and the USA. There is need for serious, revolutionary to its core, economic, technological, social, and political shifts in the two countries, with consideration of their national peculiarities. This is in the common interest in order to overcome the threat of a new world war and to provide conditions for the worthy democratic and progressive development of mankind.
Strategic communication of the countries will have to deal with the ongoing theoretical and practical problems of further integration of “words and deeds” in real policy. It is necessary that strategic communication reach beyond a largely propagandistic level and become not only an element of communication support for foreign policy but also a more equal part of foreign policy management, with the appropriate set of tools for communication management, that is, professional people management via communications.
Conclusions
What are the competitive advantages Russia can use in its strategic communication in Latin America? Russia as a recovering economic power and alternative resource for the supply and production of arms (together with the EU, China, and other countries) symbolizes an alternative for Latin Americans. At the same time, Russia can rely on memory of the mighty force of the former USSR but without the risk of causing fear of communism on the part of right-wing Latin American elites. Neither those who like Russia nor those who hate it, will be able to find communism in this country today.
There is no problematic past shared with Latin America, especially when compared with Russia’s history with the USA. With regard to cultural and interpersonal contacts, Russian culture is closer to multi-active Latin American culture than to linear-active or reactive cultures. There is an evident desire to increase the price of services to the USA on the part of the Latin American elite interested in the USA; there exists a desire to organize swift modernization for those who don’t believe in US support.
There are obvious flaws in US foreign policy during the last two decades in the region and around the world; there exists evident unwillingness for Latin America to remain a “backyard” for the USA. Russia is mainly motivated by its economic interests; however, being a nearly totally self-sufficient nuclear superpower with natural resources, unlike other world powers, gives it an important geopolitical role in Latin America.
The instability of strategic communication of modern Russia is mainly determined by the instability of its economic resource-based situation, scientific and technical inferiority (more serious than in the USSR), and volatile social problems. If the current model of socio-economic and political development was to change in a positive direction it could open new strategic perspectives and consequently revolutionize strategic communication.
From the point of view of theoretical research and practical implementation of strategic communication, Russia seems to be lagging behind the USA. However, this is only on the surface; in fact, they are on the same (propaganda) level. The transition to this new level of strategic communications in the USA is not yet complete and the competitive advantages of communications are neutralized by negative facts of the communication sphere itself, which predetermines a negative perception of the USA in Latin America.
The problem of strategic communication should not be restricted to the field of administrative cooperation, even at the highest level, especially when the theoretical basis of strategic communication is far from well developed. For the civil academic realm there is simply no opportunity to fully accumulate the experience of the strategic communication of the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and other state ministries and structures. At the same time, the dominance of the military structures in developing the concept and practice of strategic communication could have a deforming effect on the strategic communication of Russia in times of peace, making it “over militarized” which, logically, makes them significantly less efficient. A shining example of such an “over militarized” strategic communication was the USA under G. W. Bush Administration.
Consequently, it is impossible to develop an efficient strategic communications concept and strategy using only the experience of the state executive structures, existing academic centers, and interdepartmental coordination. It is necessary, at a minimum, to have a large interdepartmental analytical center on strategic communication with appropriate hierarchy and subordination, an appropriate level of access for the employees to strategic information, and so on. Until there is an understanding of its importance at the highest state level, cardinal changes in the efficiency of strategic communication are hardly possible.
In addition, it is very important to prepare specialists so that they are well versed in all forms of strategic communication, and so they understand these as a system and as an essential part of public management (and to develop the relevant programs of MS, PhD studies, MBA, and EMBA programs). In this way, Russia has a good chance of introducing some innovative solutions; however, it should not simply copy the Western experience.