During the years of the Cold War, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) was a zone of intense geopolitical competition between the US-led and Soviet-led blocks in order to achieve influence in order to control transportation routes, secure energy supplies and to sell armaments. While the bipolar world order up until the final years witnessed the seesawing of the cycle of competition and conflict, the end of this phase could be seen in the First Gulf War of 1990–1991 when the Soviet Union in its final throes was a mere spectator. From this moment until at least 2003, the United States became the sole superpower actor capable of projecting large-scale hard power in the MENA region and was able to act in accordance with its national goals and interests.
Events of the Iraq War in 2003 gave some vague indication of a possible change; Vladimir Putin in his first term as President of Russia had promised to restore at least some of Russia’s international prestige. In the wake of the new path, Russia (plus other countries such as France and Germany) openly opposed the US intentions to invade Iraq. The growing suspicions of US intentions, as well as increasing Russian engagement in international affairs and relations peaked during the period of the so-called Arab Spring, when Russia began to position itself as a counterweight of US-led foreign policy.1 This period of branded revolutions was seen as masked geopolitics that threatened Russia’s then current and future interests and goals in the region (Koromaev, Zinkina, & Khodoonov, 2011; Bazarkina, Vinogradova, Manoilo, Pashentsev, & Simons, 2012; Primakov, 2012). Passive reactions to Iraq in 2003 and Libya in 2011 were replaced by active counteractions in Syria by 2015.
The Middle East region has always been and remains one of the key original purposes of Russian foreign policy. The region has been a zone of increased conflict for many years. Even at the end of the last century, few could foresee the extent to which the situation there would worsen at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Recent years have not led to a normalization of the situation in those countries of the region that lives in state of permanent conflict.2 The development of the situation indicates the need for new ways and mechanisms that could, if not resolve the conflict, at least help to reduce its acute phase. That is why the study of Russia’s public diplomacy (PD) in the Middle East is of special interest. In addition to traditional instruments of diplomacy, “soft power” has become an integral part of efforts to achieve foreign policy objectives. This primarily includes the tools provided by civil society, as well as various methods and technologies, from information and communication, humanitarian and other types.
Middle East as a Zone of Global Competition
Geopolitics is a contested term with regard to its definition and perception. When understanding the politics of geopolitics, it is necessary to point to both perception and outcomes. “Geopolitics is not just a way of seeing. It is also the actions and outcomes that simultaneously transform spaces, places and politics” (Flint, 2017, p. 302). Thus, geopolitics can be seen as both a practice and a representation (Flint, 2017, p. 36). Not long after the end of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, Brzezinski (1997) noted that the United States needed to gain and retain control of Eurasia in order to assure global dominance. Part of the task was therefore to prevent any one particular actor or constellation of actors that would be capable of challenging US global hegemony. At the beginning of the new century, Cohen (2003, p. 33) noted that there is an increase in the number of the world’s major and regional powers, and also a strengthening of global and regional organizations. However, he saw this as not being sufficient to eliminate disturbances in the international system, with global terrorism and irredentist wars causing considerable turmoil.
The first issue to examine briefly is what are Russia’s interests and motivations in the MENA region seen from the perspective of Russia and others? A 2018 Chatham House report on Russian policy across the Middle East put it down to a number of factors, many relating to geopolitical competition. Although some mention is made of economic factors, such as the international oil and gas markets, being drivers of Russian engagement and influence, the majority of factors were in connection with “a challenge to US and EU interests,” the confrontation with the West, as a means to avoid international isolation and as a counter to Western sanctions as well as putting pressure on the West, a Russian suspicion of the Arab Spring and to cater to the domestic political constituency (by increasing Russia’s perceived international prestige) (Kozhanov, 2018). However, this ignores a number of indicators, including the fact that Russian engagement in the MENA region began before the current tensions with the United States and EU.
The above assessment of the factors influencing Russia’s increased engagement in the MENA region differs vastly from Dmitry Trenin’s analysis. Russia certainly sees itself as a global player, which to an extent requires an active presence in key global regions, which MENA is certainly owing to a number of reasons. Trenin states that Russia’s key objectives in the region include containing and reducing Islamic extremism and radicalism in other regions that have the potential to expand into Russia and the post-Soviet neighborhood; building long-lasting geopolitical alliances with friendly regimes and forces in the region by supporting them; establishing a modest Russian military presence in the region; expanding the market opportunities for Russian arms, nuclear industry, oil and gas and food; attempting to attract foreign investment in Russia, especially from the rich Gulf States; supporting and coordinating energy prices through coordinating policies with the primary energy producers in the Gulf (Trenin, 2016). Russia has incrementally increased its presence and activity in the MENA region in the last decade, along the lines suggested by Trenin.
Russia began its diplomatic push into the MENA region from 2008, when, among other things, it offered Syria and Egypt nuclear power stations, and to re-establish its military presence in the Mediterranean Sea through making the Syrian port of Tartus operational again.3 One of the observed net results of Russia’s increased activity and interaction in the MENA region has been noted in the form of increasing influence. Vladimir Putin’s 2017 tour of the Middle East prompted an observation from Ishaan Tharoor:
he exhibited the kind of clever strategic policymaking that the US is simply not doing in the region. […] what you’re seeing is Russia steadily coming in and re-building ties, asserting its influence, being an active player in the region—at a time when US policy in the Middle East is incredibly inconsistent and incoherent.4
Thus, the observation is as US presence and influence wanes, Russia has been successful at opportunistically taking advantage of these specific circumstances and project itself as a consistent, reliable and dependable actor that has a demonstrated willingness to stand by its allies and partners. Unlike in the Soviet era, Russia’s current approach is highly pragmatic in relations with Arab states, and in building an alliance with other rising and regional powers that seek a more pluralistic global order. Putin’s fourth term in office has prompted predictions to “expect more Russian attempts to deepen its political, security and economic ties with the region.”5 The progress and success of Russian re-engagement in the Middle East have prompted some in the United States to strategize on how to counter and pushback the progress.
One such “thought experiment” was on pushing back Russia in the Middle East in 2018. Although they considered an “across-the-board competition” with Russia throughout the Middle East as being a mistake, a number of other steps were considered. One of these was to increase the number of US troops in Syria, increase aid to the “rebel” forces and other “anti-regime” efforts. There was also an attempt to influence countries in Russia’s “Near Abroad” as a mechanism of negotiation for leaving the MENA region as the US sphere of influence. The logic was that this would “force” Russia to accept that any deal must have US backing. Other proposals include the “United States might also try to ingratiate itself with longstanding US allies, warts and all.”6 This implies putting on the backburner such values as human rights, rule of law and democracy. Such reasoning also seems to lack a solid grounding and understanding of the on-the-ground situation that has changed significantly in the last decade.
Russian Diplomacy in the Middle East: Public Diplomacy in Practice
When considering Russia’s public diplomacy in the Middle East, it is first of all necessary to define two key provisions. First, the territorial framework of the “Middle East” concept. As a rule, in Russia, the classic official approach of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with the Department of the Middle East and North Africa being one of the departments, is used. It includes the following countries: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Iraq, Yemen, Qatar, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, United Arab Emirates, Oman, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Sudan and Tunisia. Addressing the topic of Russia’s public diplomacy, the author proposes to analyze the situation in the largest scope (in terms of territorial or political significance) of countries that correspond to the geography of the Middle East.
In this context, it also makes sense to consider some countries of the so-called Greater Middle East7 (it is important not to confuse the term with the notion of the New Middle East).8 Among the countries of the Greater Middle East, Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan, Pakistan (Ottaway & Carothers, 2004, pp. 1–7) as well as Egypt will be taken into consideration. The fact is that in promoting its public diplomacy, Russia applies a unified approach to all these countries, however taking into account the peculiarities of each country. Considering Egypt along with the Middle East countries where Russia implements its public diplomacy, is conditioned, despite the contradictory nature of the current state of bilateral relations, by Moscow and Cairo’s mutual desire to renew and develop a mutually beneficial cooperation. This country, which has a significant political clout in the Arab world, strives to consolidate its leadership within it. Moreover, Egypt’s role in the settlement of tensions in the Middle East9 is increasing. Additionally, Egypt is one of the few countries where there are two Russian Centers of Science and Culture (RCSC).
Secondly, how should one define public diplomacy? The author proposes to stick to a classical approach, according to which soft power is understood as a method of influencing the consciousness of a society with its own values and ideals with the aim of turning a political tool into a means of achieving goals with no coercion (Nye, 2002, 2004). Public diplomacy is understood as a means used by states to form a foreign nation’s view on something in order to achieve the required results.10
In September 2000, with the passing of the Doctrine of Information Security,11 a more consistent and concerted effort to communicate on and about Russia, and to have a greater impact in the global information flows was signaled. One of the results of the discussion and the creation of the doctrine was the establishment of further international broadcasting instruments to compete for global attention and influence. Russia Today (now RT) has been successful in its impact on the international audiovisual landscape, and in some circles has come to symbolize Russian attempts at accumulating soft power.12 Coming back to the topic of this chapter, RT Arabic was launched in May 2007 with some 500 staff (including 100 journalists) that has the mission to focus on Russia’s relations with the Middle East that started with a potential audience of 300–350 million viewers.13 By the stage of its entry in to the Arab satellite TV channel market, RT Arabic was competing with some 280 existing TV outlets. In addition to international communication and broadcasting, attempts have been made to shape relations through physical interaction.
Russia has been able to utilize to some degree its Islamic identity through its centuries-old historical interactions with the Muslim world14 and indigenous populations of Muslims as a cultural identity and relational basis.15 These international relationships and interactions are being enabled through the creation of organizational bodies in and by Russia as well as Russia seeking membership to international bodies in the Islamic world. Organizations that are created in and by Russia have been increasingly engaged since 2005. Government Organised Non-Governmental Organisations (GONGO) such as the Russian International Affairs Council and the Gorchakov Foundation have been engaged in Middle Eastern questions and relations.16 Other groups also exist, such as the think tank Group of Strategic Vision—Russia-Islamic World that was founded in 2006 by former Prime Minister Evgeny Primakov and former President of Tatarstan Mintimer Shaimiev in the wake of Russia joining the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation as an observer.17 These groups are a means of developing relationships between Russia and the MENA region, and as a means to develop information and knowledge on the region. A more formal level of diplomacy and interaction takes place in international organizations, such as the Declaration of Cooperation with Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)18 or the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation where Russia has been an observer state since 2005.19 Russia’s success or failure in diplomacy and influence is often viewed within the lens of a contextual relationship with rivals in the MENA region and especially the United States.
There is no single approach to assessing and measuring the effectiveness of a country’s public diplomacy. Each state uses its own tools and methods of public diplomacy. As a basis for this analysis, the activities of the RCSC (departments of Rossotrudnichestvo—see below) in the abovementioned countries, the digital dimension of Russia’s public diplomacy and the activities of some non-governmental organizations are taken into consideration. Commonly, the activities of all actors of Russian public diplomacy in the Middle East can be reduced to the following main areas of activity: strengthening the position of the Russian language, education in Russia, promotion of Russian culture in the world and support to Russian diaspora (compatriots) abroad. In countries that are in a state of conflict or experiencing economic problems, humanitarian diplomacy is of utmost importance. Humanitarian diplomacy in this context is viewed as the delivery of humanitarian aid. Other main areas of activity are the promotion of international development and sub-state diplomacy initiatives of Russian regions.
The key Russian public diplomacy actor is Rossotrudnichestvo—the Federal Agency for the Affairs of the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad, and for International Humanitarian Cooperation—was established in September 2008.20 The activities of Rossotrudnichestvo and its foreign missions are aimed at implementing the state policy of international humanitarian cooperation, facilitating the dissemination abroad of an objective view of modern Russia.21 Rossotrudnichestvo is viewed as a major instrument of Russia’s current PD arsenal.
The Agency is granted full authority to nurture cultural ties as a strategy to project the country’s soft power abroad. Among Middle Eastern countries, Rossotrudnichestvo has its centers (RCSC) in Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the United Arab Emirates, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia and Egypt (the Russian Center of Science and Culture in Cairo, as well as the Office of the Russian Science and Culture Center in Alexandria). In most of the RCSCs in the Middle East, they encourage the population to study the Russian language. For this, for example, the “brand” of the Russian poet Alexander Pushkin is often used. Other soft topics (i.e. nonpolitical in nature) are used in others to create emotional bonds between Russia and foreign publics in MENA.
The Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society, founded in 1882 by the Decree of Emperor Alexander III22 also plays an important role in the Middle East in the sphere of public diplomacy. In particular, the Public Center for the Protection of Christians in the Middle East and North Africa, which functions within the society, contributes to the creation of a positive image of Russia through the Russian Orthodox Church. This is especially important in Syria, where before the conflict in 2011 more than 10% of the population were Christians. Almost a million Christians left the country because of the terrorist attacks which destroyed temples and the purges carried out on religious grounds. The Russian Orthodox Church called to help the Syrian people, and not only those who are Christian. In 2017, the Interreligious Working Group was established in Russia to provide humanitarian assistance to the population of Syria, which included both Christians and Muslims of the country. In a year, Syria received several large consignments of humanitarian cargo. The assistance is distributed through both local religious communities and directly to the people in need, regardless of their religious affiliation.23 Such actions are usually accompanied by holding round tables with the participation of leaders of Christian confessions and Muslim communities of Syria. Politics and the image of Russia are successfully broadcasted to the local population through representatives of religious communities. For example, in February 2018, a delegation of the Interreligious Working Group visited Syria and Lebanon and a round table was held in Damascus with the participation of representatives of almost all Syrian religious communities.24 The Syrian party particularly noted that the believers of Russia are not indifferent to the tragedy in Syria and try to help its suffering population, adding that Russia’s actions changed the course of events in their country by giving the people hope for complete liberation from terrorists and the restoration of a peaceful life. Statements of this kind form a positive image of Russia for a small but politically significant part of the Christian population. Within the action, along with Syrian Christian and Muslim leaders, 77 tons of humanitarian aid was distributed. A unique feature of the action was that the help was distributed in churches and mosques jointly by Christians and Muslims of Syria and Russia. Weekly Bible lessons take place at the Mission of the Russian Orthodox Church in Damascus. They are free, have an educational character and are open to all. Such interreligious solidarity became the most important part of the project, which has a positive impact on the image of Russia in Syria.
Now, we are going to take a look at the activities of some RCSCs in the Middle East. The Soviet Center for Science and Culture in Syria was opened in Damascus in 1976. In early 2013, due to the intensification of the armed conflict in Syria, the cultural center was closed for visitors. The head of the office was recalled from Damascus on March 5, 2013.25 In early 2014, its activities were partially resumed and a representative from Rossotrudnichestvo was sent. But then in 2015 the center was again closed.
The RCSC in Damascus has always played a significant role in consolidating Russian compatriots, it has contributed to the emergence of local Russian diaspora in Syrian cities and to establishing contacts between compatriots. Its activities have two main directions: humanitarian diplomacy and the promotion of Russian education. According to the concept of promotion of Russian education on the basis of the offices of Rossotrudnichestvo abroad,26 the overseas missions of Rossotrudnichestvo contribute to increasing the competitiveness of the Russian education system. A few years ago, the quota for Syria was 200 places, last year it was increased to 455 places, and in 2018, 500 people could come to study and obtain a degree in Russia. The total number of applications for admission was more than 2000.27 Other forms of PD are practiced in Syria too, which is a long-term and strategic partner in the region.
As for humanitarian diplomacy, which is close to public diplomacy, Russia provides systematic assistance to Syrians, both through international organizations and on a bilateral basis, to the government in Damascus. According to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of the United Nations, since the beginning of the civil war in Syria, Russia has allocated about US$52 million to provide humanitarian assistance to Syria. In 2015, the government signed a decree on the allocation of US$2 million to provide humanitarian assistance to Syria.28 Since 2012, Syria has regularly received humanitarian assistance through the Ministry of Emergency Situations. From 2013 to 2015, the Ministry of Emergency Situations carried out 35 flights to Syria and neighboring Lebanon and Jordan, delivering 600 tons of humanitarian cargo to the Syrians. In 2016, the flights continued. In December, the Ministry of Emergency Situations sent to Syria in the Aleppo region an airmobile hospital with 75 members of medical staff.29 The ongoing conflict in Syria has prompted different forms of Russian help and assistance.
The Russian Center for the Reconciliation of Warring Parties30 is negotiating with the administration of the province of Homs to increase supplies of bread to the previously created de-escalation zone in the area. Given the complexity of the political situation in Syria, the RCSC in Beirut provides assistance to the RCSC in Damascus. Thus, after a long break, a conference of organizations of Russian compatriots, as well as a concert organized by Rossotrudnichestvo with the support of the Ministry of Culture of Syria, at which Russian musicians performed and conducted master classes, were held in the city of Damascus. In the framework of the project “Russia-Syria: basketball, uniting countries”, famous Russian basketball players held a “Match of Friendship” with the Syrian team with the support of the Syrian Olympic Committee. In addition, in December 2017, the RCSC in Damascus hosted a children’s New Year performance and distribution of gifts for the children of Syrian orphanages.31
In addition, the Russian humanitarian mission (RSM) actively participates in the broadcast of public diplomacy in Syria.32 Among the projects of the organization, there are development programs and projects aimed at improving the quality of life, medical programs, educational programs, training courses on the basics of safety and Russian textbooks for Arab schoolchildren. It is important to note that the Russian humanitarian mission positions itself as a non-profit organization set up to carry out humanitarian and charitable activities to help victims of social, national, religious and military conflicts; victims of repression; refugees and internally displaced persons; and to promote strengthening peace, friendship and harmony among peoples, preventing social, national and religious conflicts. Russian Humanitarian Mission (RSM) is the first non-governmental Russian organization that professionally provides humanitarian assistance primarily abroad. Relations with other Muslim countries have been developing as well.
As for Pakistan, apart from the projects related to the dissemination of information about Russian holidays, such as Family Day, Love and Fidelity Day, Victory Day holding thematic meetings, and so on, the emphasis is placed on education and science: selecting foreign citizens to train in the Russian Federation, conducting seminars on Russian education and presentations of Russian universities.33 In 2018, Russia and Lebanon celebrate the 55th anniversary of bilateral diplomatic relations, and the festivities went beyond statements at the level of heads of state. The event coincided with dance and other art groups from Russia touring in Lebanon.34 In 2018, on the basis of the Jordan-Russia House of Friendship, the project of a future park dedicated to Russia in the city of Amman was presented.35
The Russian Center of Science and Culture in Egypt consists of two Russian centers—one of which is in Cairo and the other in Alexandria. The Russian mission’s activities are aimed at developing cultural and humanitarian cooperation with Egypt, popularizing the Russian language and Russian culture, promoting in Egypt the idea of a modern Russia, its material and spiritual potential and informing about the main priorities of the country’s domestic and foreign policy. These tasks are implemented using people’s diplomacy carried out through cooperation with non-governmental public organizations, through cultural exchanges and the broad participation of society in solving political problems.
Another important task of the Russian mission is to strengthen ties with compatriots permanently residing in Egypt and to promote cultural, scientific and business cooperation with Russia. The RCSC successfully develops links with civil society institutions by using public diplomacy. Among such public organizations is the Egyptian Association of Alumni of Soviet and Russian Universities (Headquarters on the territory of the RCSC in Cairo), which includes more than 400 people and actively participates in the activities of the Embassy. The RCSC also cooperates with the Egypt-Russia Friendship Society (currently under reorganization), the Association of Builders of the Aswan Dam, the Journalists’ Syndicate, the Union of Artists, the Association of Businessmen, a number of youth organizations and many others.
The RCSC holds Russian language courses on a regular basis. Thousands of young Egyptians study there. The books are adapted to local specifics. The centers also facilitate the recruitment of foreign students to Russian universities and maintain contacts with their graduates, of which there are several thousand in Egypt. The RCSCs in Cairo and Alexandria play a significant role in the formation of the cultural and aesthetic space of Egypt and continue to hold leading positions among foreign cultural centers and representations in terms of diversity of their work, activity and attendance. The RCSC in Cairo is visited by more than 600 people every day. Other forms of PD include the city-city level, for example, since 2005, Alexandria and St. Petersburg are twin cities.
The RCSCs in the countries of the Middle East are actively working to implement the state program on organizing the voluntary resettlement in the Russian Federation of compatriots living abroad.36 It aims, among other things, to support compatriots who wish to live and work in the Russian Federation, in moving and/or registering their legal status in Russia.
In early February 2018, in the RCSC in Cairo, the “Russian fan house 2018” opened. Thus, numerous fans of the Egyptian soccer team had the opportunity to obtain all the necessary information about the World Cup 2018, the cities of the tournament, tourist routes, technical support and so on. On the basis of the “Russian Fan House,” designed in accordance with all the requirements of Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), meetings with the stars of the Egyptian national team, exhibitions and presentations of Russian regions, lectures and seminars with the participation of representatives of the Egyptian Football Federation and the Ministry of Youth and Sports of Egypt were held.
The Russian Centers of Science and Culture in Cairo and Alexandria, together with the Commission of Ethnography and Anthropology of the Moscow Branch of the Russian Geographical Society, have established a project of virtual exhibitions dedicated to the Russian regions. Moreover, Rossotrudnichestva organizes live broadcasts of the most important events on local television.
Russia’s public diplomacy in Israel deserves special attention. In the Middle East region, the state represents one of the leading countries and claims to be the leader. Moreover, the development of Russian-Israeli relations is the example of pragmatic interstate relations, freed from ideological factors (Morozov, 2015). The Russian Centre of Science and Culture in Israel was opened in Tel Aviv on 10 October 2007. It is one of the youngest RCSCs.
In 2018, a number of young people from Israel received the right to study at Russian universities for free.37 There were 15,000 vacancies for foreigners to study in Russia in the federal budget, and Israel has 60 of these vacancies, although there were many more applications. In the field of higher education in Israel, Russia organizes such events as Graduate Day, exhibitions of Russian higher education institutions, the Day of Russian science abroad. As a whole, Russia is actively working on exporting its education.
In promoting its image, Russia often uses the ties of the peoples of the two countries. Though small in number (about 4500 people), but very authoritative Circassian community of Israel, compactly living in the north of the country, hosts a festival of national culture every summer. Almost every year, teams from Adygea, Kabardino-Balkaria and other regions of the North Caucasus, with which the Israeli Circassians are connected by cultural and historical ties, are invited to the festival. The head of the village administration Zakaria Napso said in his speech at the opening of the festival that one of the goals of this cultural event is to strengthen ties with friends from Russia. The participation of the representatives of the Republic of Adygea in the resonant Israeli event became an important event for Russia’s image.
There were intense humanitarian relations between Russia and Israel in 2017. Russian theaters, ballet and opera, music ensembles, famous actors and writers and journalists, as well as pop artists, satirists and humorists went on tour to Israel. The promotion of Russian theater and cinema is also an integral part of Russia’s public diplomacy. The largest Israeli cities hosted Chekhov Moscow Art Theater, E. Vahtangov Theater, the Taganka Theater, the Theater of Nations, the State Musical Theater led by A. Rybnikov, the Moscow Jewish Theater “Shalom,” the St. Petersburg Grand Drama Theater, the Moscow Circus on Ice and the Circus “Moscow.” It is already a tradition that D. Matsuev’s concerts are held each year with great success.
New Russian films participated in the annual international film festivals in Jerusalem and Haifa. In addition to that, meetings with prominent Russian filmmakers (K. Shakhnazarov, P. Chukhrai, V. Todorovsky, A. Uchitel) were held in the cities of Israel. The annual 16th Festival of Modern Israeli Cinema and the Third Jewish Film Festival took place in Moscow. In 2017, two projects were launched: “Open lecture” and “The Untold Time,” within the framework of which well-known Russian writers appeared before Russian-speaking Israelis. The projects continued in 2018 as well. The same year, the Northern region of Israel hosted many cultural and business events related to “St. Petersburg meeting in Haifa” that was dedicated to the 10th anniversary of the signing of the Cooperation Agreement between the Government of St. Petersburg and the municipality of Haifa. The Russian RCSC organizes two to three new Russian film viewings at least once a month. Exhibitions of artists, sculptors, photographers, designers, as well as music and art evenings are organized on a regular basis. A representative Israeli delegation took part in the World Festival of Youth and Students in Moscow and Sochi, and military cooks from Israel participated in the III Army International Games for the first time.
After approval of the law “On the celebration of May 9th” by the Knesset in June 2017, this significant date was first celebrated in the history of Israel at the state level.38 Memorial and cultural events, the main part of which was held under the patronage of regional authorities, involved a significantly increased (compared to previous years) number of Israelis, mainly representing “the Russian street.” At the same time, they were joined by many Israeli citizens who were not from the USSR-CIS, both Jews and Arabs. It is to be noted that there were many participants from the Israeli Defense Forces (an appropriate decision was made by the education department of the army). Thus, today, it is already possible to talk about the approval of the tradition of mass Victory Day celebration in the North of Israel.
The main symbol of celebrations in all cities of the northern region was the St. George ribbon. Ribbons were distributed during the reception of citizens in the Consulate General, as well as on the streets and in the “Russian” shopping centers of Haifa. There is a social demand for events dedicated to the Great Victory among broad strata of Israelis. It is noteworthy that the ceremonies are becoming more and more consonant with the Russian ones. Every year, the action “Immortal Regiment” gathers momentum. This time it took place in six cities. The action initiated a few years ago by the local “Russian street” is now supported by local authorities.
From the point of view of attracting young people, special attention is paid to sports events held for the last several years with the support of the Consulate General of Russia in Israel. They held a traditional chess tournament with the participation of students of the Haifa Russian-language schools “Mofet-Basmat” and veterans. It is the eighth time that a youth tournament of martial arts has taken place. This year, it was attended by teams from ten cities of Israel. In Haifa, youth and youth competitions in sambo recently took place.
All events with Russian participation were broadcasted online on the page of the Consulate General on Twitter, and covered by several Israeli media. Russia’s image in Israel is formed by the information policy of local media and the opinion of dominant groups of the population. It should be taken into account that, with the total population of Israel in mid-2017, 75.5% of the total population of Israel were Jewish, 20.2% were Arabs and 4.3% were representatives of other national minorities. Among the Jews, 61% were born in Israel and 39% were immigrants, 1.2 million of whom are from the former USSR and CIS countries.
In recent times, due to Russia’s role in the Syrian settlement, the popularity of the country and of leading Russian political figures has started to grow significantly in the eyes of the Israelis. For example, if we talk about the frequency of mentioning the names of Russian politicians and businessmen (based on well-known Haifa sociologist Bocharova),39 then the name Vladimir Putin is mentioned 385 times, which accounts for 43% of all mentions of Russian politicians.
Still, according to a sociological survey conducted recently by the newspaper Maariv, Russia was on the 26th place with the result of 9.6% in the list of friendly countries of Israel. 46.6% of survey participants spoke for strengthening relations with Russia. This indicator should be considered positive, since just a few years ago it did not rise above 32–34%. However, if we try to determine the general attitude to Russia, it is to state that only 14% are really positive toward Russia. That is, they consider her “native, friendly, would like to return,” while 7% refused to answer the proposed questions. The attitude of some respondents was anti-Russian.40
Another dimension of Russian public diplomacy in the Middle East is Russian science. Russia is striving to reintroduce the former Soviet soft power card of people’s diplomacy by enhancing cooperation and awarding scholarships to study in Russia. The Soviet Union was once considered to be the third destination for studying abroad after the United States and France. Many leaders of the Middle East once attended Soviet educational establishments, among them Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, the sixth President of Iran Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas.
The previous glory of the Soviet education system inspires Russia’s current plans to attract more international students. The Russian government is planning to invest US$60 million in bringing more foreign students to the country by 2019. Russia is seeking to maintain its alumni as a cohesive group. Earlier, there were calls for creating an organization for the Soviet and Russian alumni all across the Middle East. By various estimates, there are more than 200,000 alumni of Soviet and Russian universities residing currently in the Middle East and North Africa: 100,000 in Syria, 40,000 in Yemen, 30,000 in Libya, 15,000 in Jordan and 10,000 in Egypt.
One more institution that operates in the sphere of public diplomacy, implemented by Russia through the educational environment and direct contacts between universities, is the World Association of Higher Education Graduates. It is a non-profit organization that unites legal entities, foreign citizens and stateless persons (within the territory of the Russian Federation and abroad) who graduated from higher education institutions of the Russian Federation (USSR). It is based on voluntary membership and was created to represent and protect general, including professional, interests, in order to achieve socially useful goals, as well as other purposes that are not contrary to the law and of a noncommercial nature.41 The organization relies on the development of contacts with graduates of Russian (Soviet) universities and implements joint projects to strengthen the position of the Russian language and culture abroad and to increase the competitiveness of Russian universities as international scientific and educational centers. Active work is carried out in the countries of the Middle East and North Africa—Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Iran, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine and Syria. The largest is the Association in Lebanon, founded in 1970 with 4,000 graduates and which currently has a total number of graduates in the country amounting to 10,000. At the same time, the youngest is the Palestinian Association of Graduates of Russian and CIS Universities, which was founded in 2007.42 The activity of this organization can be seen as part of Russia’s public diplomacy: it allows maintaining contacts with graduates of foreign states who studied in the USSR or Russia. It is important to understand that these people, who return to their country after being educated in Russian universities, tell the population of their own country about Russia, and also participate in the political process with the knowledge that they acquired in Russia or the USSR.
Science in the modern world and effective educational exchanges have been successfully used as an instrument of foreign policy. In modern Russia, within the framework of the Ministry of Education and Science of Russia, more than 12,000 foreign students enter Russian universities every five years. The number of foreign students is gradually increasing. Education in Russia not only contributes to the formation of a positive image of the country in students but also helps with the implementation of the foreign policy objectives. Not all RCSCs in the Middle East were established simultaneously. For example, the RCSC in Amman (Jordan) was opened only in 2009, while the Russian Center for Science and Culture in Rabat (Morocco) has been operating since 1968.
As for Palestine, there special projects are aimed at counter-terrorism activities. A distinctive feature of the RCSC website in Palestine is the existence of a link to the “Together Against Terror” website,43 designed to inform about safety measures, and the need to fight against terrorism as a nationwide task.44 The fact is that “hard” force turned out to be unsuccessful. The United States is currently losing the struggle for the minds and hearts of people in the Muslim world, according to a number of researchers (Pesto, 2010), and the role of “soft power” appears to be more efficient (Panova & Lebedeva, 2018). However, the educational component in the RCSC in Palestine is also important. For example, there is a library with 3500 books, which are available to all. Public diplomacy in Palestine is an important part of Russia’s policy. This state is in a state of conflict, and in order to solve its problems, efforts at the state level are not enough. Developing compromises options, involving citizens in the settlement process requires the use of public organizations. NGOs of various countries, including Russia, that are able to monitor the situation on the ground, contact with conflicting parties and provide channels of influence. For example, civil diplomacy in parallel with the specially established authoritative UN Commission could make population support compromise solutions (Fedorchenko, Krylov, & Morozov, 2018).
One of the youngest RCSC in the Middle East is in Turkey. It was founded only in 2014.45 In addition to the traditional activities of the RCSC in the Middle East, there is an Electronic Reading Room of the Boris Yeltsin Presidential Library, the Information and Educational Center “Russian Museum: Virtual Branch.” The RCSC provides access to Russian educational resources with a program for supporting educational activities based on the use of multimedia electronic training modules in various disciplines. So, public diplomacy in Turkey uses new information technologies. As for the other countries of the Greater Middle East, there are no Russian centers of science and culture neither in Afghanistan nor in Iran.
Overview of Russian and US digital diplomacy in MENA
Twitter (thousand) | Facebook (thousand) | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
Russia | US | Russia | US | |
Bahrain | 1.7 | 8.3 | – | 36.6 |
Egypt | 5.2 | 121 | 7.7 | 1000.0 |
Israel | 4.1 | 53.9 | 1.3 | 90.7 |
Jordan | 4.5 | 42.4 | 6.9 | 542 |
Iraq | 6.5 | 75.8 | 6.4 | 1500.0 |
Yemen | 0.6 | 51.1 | 0.6 | 82.9 |
Qatar | 1.9 | 30 | 1.8 | 38.3 |
Kuwait | 4.8 | 22.9 | 2.5 | 19.9 |
Lebanon | 3.1 | 36 | 1.2 | 79.7 |
Libya | – | 418.1 | – | 449 |
UAE | 1.1 | 19.3 | 2.5 | 68.4 |
Oman | 0.02 | 13.7 | – | 14.6 |
Palestine | 0.9 | 14.3 | 1.5 | 305 |
Saudi Arabia | 3.2 | 109.8 | 0.2 | 137 |
Syria | 0.4 | 78.4 | 4.7 | 90.3 |
Turkey | 14.1 | 88 | 4.2 | 204 |
The analysis shows that Russia is lagging behind in the digital space: the number of subscribers to US embassy accounts exceeds the number of subscribers to the pages of Russian offices tens and hundreds of times: maximum—234 times. This is, for example, the case of Iraq, where the number of subscribers to the account of the American Embassy amounts to 1.5 million, while the number of subscribers to the Russian embassy is only 6000. A huge gap in Facebook is also evident in countries such as Syria (both on Facebook and Twitter), even despite the large supply of humanitarian aid from Moscow and the generally friendly opinion of the population about Russia. There is no country where the number of subscribers to Russian missions exceeds the number of subscribers to American ones. Moreover, unlike the United States, Russia does not have any accounts either on Facebook or on Twitter in Libya.
This analysis is not the only indicator of the state of Russia’s digital diplomacy in the Middle East, but it shows the need to strengthen work in this direction. However, it should be taken into account that Russian digital diplomacy is young compared to America’s. Russia decided to try to influence other countries with soft power later than the Americans did. The reason for such a “delay” in many respects was that the political goal to restore Russia’s influence in the world arena appeared only in the 1990s (Lebedeva, 2018).
Although the Russian Foreign Ministry has not been among the pioneers of digital diplomacy, in a few years it was able to become one of the prominent figures in this field. Russian diplomats have understood the advantages of this new practice and how it helps to achieve foreign policy goals and seem to feel quite experienced on the Internet, so now their main task is find a way to make digital diplomacy more effective. This is very important for Russia, since it has, with its 243 missions abroad, the fourth largest diplomatic network in the world.48 The problems that Russia has to face include a formal approach, little attention to the visual component and insufficient use of the language of the local audience. Some accounts are inactive or are updated infrequently, indicating either disinterest or lack of resources.49
It can be argued that some instruments of public diplomacy, like the Russia Today channel, are more effective in the Middle East and the North African region. RT Arabic, which began broadcasting in May 2007, marks its ten-year anniversary on the air. Over the years, RT Arabic journalists have provided exclusive, live reporting from some of the most conflict-ridden areas around the world, including Syria, Tunisia, Libya, Yemen and Egypt. According to an Ipsos study, RT’s audience in the Middle East and North Africa is ten million people weekly. On Facebook and YouTube, RT Arabic is more popular than the Arabic-language versions of BBC, CNN, Sky News, Deutsche Welle, France 24 and Al Hurra.50 The work of RT Arabic has been praised internationally. Palestinian National Authority head Mahmoud Abbas said, “We have a lot of TV channels in the Arab world, but we watch RT, because it provides accurate information.” Nabil Fahmy, who served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt from 2013 to 2014, said that RT Arabic “plays an active part and works professionally, impartially and effectively.” During his visit to Russia, Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, President of Yemen from 2012–2015, thanked RT for its work in the Arab world in general and in Yemen in particular.51
During its time on the air, RT Arabic has won a number of international awards, including AIB, the New York Festivals and the BD Awards, and is a three-time winner of the Al Ghadeer International Festival held in Iraq. In 2012, the RT Arabic website was recognized by Forbes as one of the top three best news outlets in the Arab world. It is recognized as one of the authoritative channels of the alternative information by regional audience.
Thus, the analysis of Russia’s public diplomacy in the Middle East shows the following. While Russia’s activities in this direction appear largely to be successful, difficulties are also apparent—a comparatively small audience, the lack of a target audience, financing issues and so on. However, it is necessary to understand that all the shortcomings can be dealt with. In order to achieve this goal, it is necessary to better adjust the mechanisms and institutions related to the international information policy to the realities of today’s world. At the same time, according to the author, the basic directions of public diplomacy and its ideological content should remain the same as it is especially effective in the countries of the Middle East.
Conclusion
With the removal of a number of secular regimes that held the varied ethnic and religious communities of the countries and region in a relatively stable state through the application of hard power, large swathes of the region have collapsed in economic and security terms. This has created a vacuum that is being filled by local, regional and international actors vying for influence. Russia is one of those international actors in the region, which has found itself defending its interests (such as in Syria) and seeking to expand its military, diplomatic, political and economic influence. The shatter belt is most noticeable in Syria, which has seen a US-led coalition seeking to regime change a Russian ally, and almost succeeded in doing so in the summer of 2015. This prompted Russia to become overtly and directly involved in the conflict.
Although Russia has been increasingly engaged in the MENA region from 2006 to 2008, the process of preparing for that engagement is through the establishment of means of international broadcasting (such as RT Arabic) and mechanisms for creating and maintaining political, economic and diplomatic relationships (such as Organisation of Islamic Cooperation). This has laid the groundwork for establishing dialogue and relaunching diplomatic efforts to influence actors and events. Russia’s success has to some extent been a product of serious mistakes made by the United States and the European Union (EU), which set the scene for competition and conflict.
Russia is engaged in a broad variety of public diplomacy programs with many countries of the Middle East. These are managed by agencies and institutions in Russia that are responsible for specific aspects; some of those institutions and agencies have their origins from the period of the Soviet Union or even Imperial Russia. This is testimony to the long history of interaction with the Middle East and North Africa. Some countries do feature more prominently in terms of their priority status that is confirmed by the quantity and quality of the relationship and engagement. One of those countries is Syria, which Russia not only invests hard power in but soft power too (e.g. through humanitarian aid, interreligious dialogue and education). To some extent, Russia and other countries too have been able to opportunistically capitalize on blunders made by the United States that has seen it lose influence in the region.