In the context of globalization, the escalating crisis in international relations and the threat of new local and world wars, there is a demand for social technologies that, on the one hand, would help to create a favourable image for world politics actors (primarily states) and spread their influence through non-military methods. On the other hand, such mechanisms would facilitate the building of more trusting relations between countries and institutions. A question of non-military influence, it implies the popularization of values and lifestyles, which, being introduced into the consciousness of the population, form stable images of the friend and the foe, the “consumer paradise” or “prison of nations”. These images become a necessary basis for justifying (legitimizing) the chosen foreign policy course inside the country and for getting support from the international audience.
An active pursuit of these goals—holding events where the achievements of science, culture, education, sport, economic and technological development are used—is the realization of the so-called soft power (Nye, 2004). However, this “soft power” can be used spontaneously and randomly, or it can be a focused strategy, with clearly defined subjects of activity and a target audience. The latter means that “soft power” becomes a part of the state’s foreign policy potential and a kind of multilateral dialogue with the use of modern information and social technologies, aiding “public diplomacy” to develop (Cull, 2006). However, it is crucial to understand that public diplomacy becomes a working and effective tool only if all actors understand the need for their participation and the nature of their tasks, as well as the importance of opportunities.
Consequently, government entities should first create specialized institutions dealing with this issue; secondly, understand the characteristics of the target audience and how to communicate with it; thirdly, provide legal opportunities for a broad and open dialogue, both within the country and with the foreign audience. Since the target audience is the entire population of foreign countries (taking into account, of course, the differences between social groups and strata), the effective use of “soft power” is also possible with the involvement of representatives of different social and professional strata of the domestic civil society: this helps establish broad contacts and dialogue on political, cultural and humanitarian problems. Without the participation of civil society institutions, all efforts of public diplomacy of any country acquire the character of propaganda and lose the resort of “soft power”.
In Russian politics, the understanding of this interconnection took place gradually, as the need for public diplomacy was being recognized as part of the foreign policy strategy and the creation of a more favourable image of the Russian Federation. However, the concept of civil society and its institutions required conceptual and practical adaptation to the Russian realities.
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the possibilities and successes of the civil society of the Russian Federation in the sphere of public diplomacy. To achieve this goal, we first point out the potential of the main structures of civil society: non-governmental organizations (NGOs), including those in the field of global communications. Next, we consider the specifics of the formation of civil society and NGOs in Russia and in the post-Soviet space in the 1990s and up to the present day. We believe this is necessary for a fuller understanding of the current difficulties of non-governmental organizations. Then, we focus on the legal status of NGOs in Russia and the problems arising from it. In the end, a review of the activities and problems of modern Russian NGOs in the field of public diplomacy is presented. Finally, a conclusion is drawn about the peculiarities of the domestic project of public diplomacy and the role of civil society in its implementation.
Possibilities for the Development of Civil Society as a Domain for the Implementation of Tasks of Public Diplomacy: Current Trends in the Area
Discussions on non-governmental organizations are always centred on the development of civil society, what structures constitute it and how they interact with government and business. Without going into theoretical disputes about the formation of the concept of civil society, let us focus on a simple definition: civil society is a system of institutions and relationships independent of the state aimed at providing conditions for personal self-realization. Often, the aggregate of these institutions is also called the “third sector”, while the other two are government and business. In this perspective—identifying civil society with the third sector—the emphasis in research is placed on the possibility of providing social services. The latter approach is not only more pragmatic but also more popular in modern studies, as it allows one to develop (to a certain extent) a methodology for studying civil society, and it is based on legal and economic analysis as well as on the methods of small group analysis and management organizational analysis (Stetsko, 2015, p. 50).
However, in our view, the understanding of the possibilities of NGOs as subjects of public diplomacy is more conducive to another definition of NGOs given by a Russian political scientist, Alexander Sungurov, “[…] civil society can be imagined as a certain type of communication process between the state and the citizen. As practice shows, such communication is only possible with discursive, dialogue relations between its subjects” (Sungurov, 2007, p. 16).1 During the Soviet period, there was no dialogue with civil society. And the very question of the existence of civil society at that time is debatable. Communication was based on the state’s monologue. However, as early as in the 2000s, it became clear that the dialogue between the state and civil society structures is not only a technology that maintains social balance and blunts protest activity but also an opportunity to use the potential of civil society to solve political problems. The flourish of public diplomacy and the use of “soft power” by Western countries in the 1990s and the 2000s have become an excellent “case” for study and application in Russian conditions.
There are several possibilities and reasons for adopting the idea of NGO for the domestic and foreign policy of the Russian state (Stetsko, 2003). (1) Neutral status of NGOs: they can be used as a platform for meetings and dialogues of different formats; (2) opportunity for the realization of social and political activism, which includes involving citizens in meaningful projects and a filter for selecting experts, political scientists and officials; (3) Ability to monitor projects and utilization of funds; (4) Their importance for internal cohesion and the formation of a new institution of the “gathering of the Eurasian lands”—the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU)2—and the interaction of the public in this direction means mending destroyed bridges and building new ones; and (5) interaction with non-neighbouring countries in the framework of sustainable and understandable ideas, projects and venues—implementation of the Russian “soft power”.
Features of the Formation of Civil Society and Non-governmental Organizations in Russia (and the Post-Soviet Space)
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, one of the main manifestations of “soft power” in the post-Soviet space was the activity of foreign non-governmental organizations, aimed primarily at helping the population create an effective system of civil self-administration, responsibility and self-help—that is, institutions of civil society. Despite the totalitarian past, as well as cultural and ethno-confessional differences in different post-Soviet states, the idea of NGOs as the basic structure of civil society had taken root: national non-governmental and non-profit organizations began to appear and increase in number annually. Their development can be considered not only as a manifestation of civic activity but also of the existence of the “third sector” in the economy of these states. However, this “good deed” also revealed numerous weaknesses of the state systems of power and government, the relations between elites and subjects, as well as determined internal threats to the stability of the states, potentially emanating from the new institutions.
As early as during perestroika in the USSR, it became clear that the existing public organizations did not meet the democratic principles and needs of the population; created for top-down, they were imbued with the ideology of the ruling party and controlled by it. Numerous public organizations of the USSR were, rather, mere props of voluntariness and social motivation. How and by what principles other organizations were built, and whether they could be effective enough in the human rights and social sphere—were the questions that were impossible to answer independently, without studying the external experience. There was only the experience of party institutions, which, according to the apt expression of former Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, boiled down to the fact that “whatever public organizations we create, we always get the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)”.3 Moreover, we should not forget that under the conditions of perestroika and the subsequent disintegration of the USSR, people not only gained hope for democratic transformations but were also impoverished, faced with an unprecedented unemployment and economic crisis.
Under these conditions, civil initiatives, and indeed citizens, needed financial support and the acquisition of skills for public participation, as well as establishing human rights organizations, socially oriented NGOs and charity structures. These were the two directions (financial donation and training) in which the overseas non-governmental and charitable organizations and foundations that had opened their representative offices in Russia and former Soviet republics began to work. And no matter how much we now talk about ideological expansion, subversive activities of “foreign agents”, the formation of the “fifth column” and the promotion of “colour revolutions”, at the first stage (in the late 1980s–early 1990s), activities of foreign NGOs had a rather humanitarian nature. They helped the people survive and learn self-organization and create civil society structures. Russia and other post-Soviet states simply did not have the resources or the means to help their citizens during this period (Stetsko, 2016).
One of the first organizations in our country (starting in 1988) to carry out a number of humanitarian programmes was the Open Society Institute founded by George Soros. Since 1991, the European Community (subsequently the European Union) has been providing technical and financial assistance to Russia within the framework of the Tacis—Enhancing Cetacean Habitat and Observation (ECHO) programmes and the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). Since 1992, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which was implementing democracy development programmes in partnership with non-governmental organizations, has been operating in Russia. Since 1993, the development of civil society in Russia has been supported by the British Charities Aid Foundation (CAF) that has been providing grants, funded training and consulting.4 Given the transitional nature of society at the time, some core areas were focused upon by the emerging organizations.
As part of this activity, a large number of human rights, women, educational, environmental and small business-promoting organizations have emerged. Some of the funds were engaged in giving grants to students, young scientists and researchers to continue their work abroad. The latter is rightly estimated now as an organized “brain drain”, although for specific people at that time it was the only chance to continue studying science and research. The Soros Foundation, which was active in the post-Soviet space until 2004 and provided the largest support for non-state non-profit organizations, spent nearly US$1.3 billion “to support local scientists”. Also, Russia turned out to be the largest recipient of the Soros Foundation grants: in the period from 1987 to 2003, it received US$721 million (by comparison, Ukraine got US$142 million and Belarus got US$27 million).5
This represents a large financial investment, for which one should expect a return on investment.In 1992, the US Congress passed ‘The Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets Support Act’ under which funds were allocated to support post-Soviet states (the Baltic countries were not included in the scope of this law). In total, during the period from 1992 to 2006, the US allocated US$27.7 billion as aid to the post-Soviet states (excluding the Baltic States). Of these, approximately US$3 billion was spent on ‘supporting democratic institutions’, ‘helping the media, public organizations’, etc. Russia has also received the most money for this item US$1.1 billion (Ukraine’s share was US$600 million and Belarus got US$114 million).6
Were these actions of the Western countries a manifestation of “soft power”? By all means, but they were also intended for gradual “democratic transit” of post-Soviet countries with predictable policies and the preservation of leverages. However, in the late 1990s, the situation began to change. Western countries and relevant institutions faced increasing difficulties. In our opinion, they were caused by three groups of factors. The first one included political, economic and structural changes in the post-Soviet states themselves. First of all, there was a redistribution of power and financial resources and the rise of national elites. These elites, in order to avoid the risks of being overthrown from the outside, had to conduct a more independent policy. That means that the criteria for the legitimacy of the authorities were to be determined by the very authorities themselves, rather than be indicated from abroad, even on the basis of the most democratic principles. This prompted national governments to respond harder to the “challenges” of the NGO community, especially those financed from abroad.
The second group of factors was related to problems in the structure and activities of the non-governmental organizations themselves, established in the Russian Federation and other former Soviet republics. These problems were due to both political and economic realities in the countries, and the peculiarities of national mentality and the remaining stereotypes of “Soviet” thinking. As a result, the established national NGOs were very dependent on donors, many were unable to continue their activities when the funding ended. “One of the weakest points of the NGO sector is financial stability”.7 Paternalistic expectations and fears of independent initiatives contributed to the development of corruption schemes. “Some “NGO-holdings” are almost always “feeders” for local officials, often personally friends with them”.8 At the same time, national governments could and only provided very modest financial support to NGOs. “The legislation regulating NGOs’ activities was for a long time poorly developed and enabled the authorities, if necessary, to “broadly interpret” the letter of the law”.9 “NGOs have also been suffering from the lack of professionalism of staff that is ready to deal with any topics, should there be funding”.10 Another group of factors need to be considered also.
The third group of factors includes changes in the political and economic situation in the Russian Federation and the formation of its new status in the world arena. President Vladimir Putin’s coming to power and the improvement of the economic situation at the beginning of the 2000s contributed to the strengthening of Russia’s position and its independent and resolute foreign policy. New strategic vectors and instruments were also sorted out: the post-Soviet space and the active use of soft power mechanisms. In fact, the Russian Federation entered the geopolitical game and defined anew its traditional spheres of influence. The priority areas of the soft power of the time were propaganda of Russian culture and the Russian language as a means of international communication; dialogue and assistance to compatriots; and the promotion of the idea of the “Russian world”. “The natural sphere of our interests remains the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] space.” 11 In the institutional and economic sense, soft power was to be realized through a new idea of uniting the “lands” (now the economic one—the EAEU), as past integration projects (the USSR, the CIS, etc.) had failed. Also, in connection with the new positioning of Russia, it was necessary to present the new image on the international arena. This required a strategy of public diplomacy and implementation structures (institutions). The civil society’s support for all these projects was to be ensured, among other things, by using the potential of non-governmental organizations, both those operating at the time and those to be newly created. As part of this process, the legislation on NGOs was also altered (Stetsko, 2016).
Russian Legislation on Non-governmental Organizations
Russian legislation on the activities of NGOs is perhaps the most stringent. The legal status of non-governmental organizations is regulated by the Civil Code of the Russian Federation and also—mainly—by the law on “public associations” (‘Ob obshchestvennyh ob’ ‘edineniyah)12 and “non-profit organizations” (‘O necommercheskih organizaciyah’).13 Almost every year, these laws are amended and supplemented. The most important additions to these fundamental laws were—in a brief—the laws on “Foreign Agents” (‘O vnesenii izmenenij)14 and “the activities of foreign and international non-governmental organizations that are undesirable on the territory of Russia”,15 adopted, respectively, in 2012 and 2015.
The Law on “Foreign Agents” is aimed at strengthening the state control over the activities of political non-profit organizations receiving financing from abroad. The complexity of the registration and reporting procedures, audits and penalties, all these seriously hinder the ability to conduct “subversive” activities. The official register of these organizations ensures that they have a certain image in society: depending on the angle of view, either the fighters for democracy or the “fifth column”. Public attitude towards them is one of the makers of public opinion. Despite a real reduction of NGOs funded from overseas in Russia, those who remain continue working.
The law on “undesirable activities of foreign or international NGOs” was adopted not only as an addition to the previous one but also as a preventive measure in relation to the spread of possible religious extremist organizations. The decision on “undesirable status” is taken by the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation in agreement with the Russian Foreign Ministry. Violation of this law provides for administrative and criminal liability.
At the same time, along with the aforementioned restrictive measures in relation to NGOs, one of the priorities of the Concept of Long-Term Socio-Economic Development of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2020 approved by the Federal Government on 17 November 2008 № 1662-p16 is the development of civil society institutions. As a result of proper legal registration and some practical steps, the term “socially oriented non-profit organization” was filled with real content. Its activities are aimed at addressing social problems, the development of civil society in the Russian Federation and the types of activities provided for in Art. 31.1. FZ “On non-profit organizations”. The Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation has launched Unified Automated Information System Portal to support socially oriented non-profit organizations, which serves both as an information base and as a form of mechanism to ensure transparency of state policy towards NGOs. Socially oriented NGOs (SO NGOs) can count on government grants, subsidies and, in some cases, direct financing. Such socially and state-oriented NGOs, undoubtedly, include organizations working in the sphere of public diplomacy.
Non-governmental Organizations, Their Activities and Problems in the Sphere of Public Diplomacy of the Russian Federation
The need for and the development of public diplomacy is mentioned in the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (2016), in the section on humanitarian cooperation. Since the middle of the 2000s, the government of the Russian Federation began to invest in this area of activity. Thus, the Russian news channel “Russia Today” (RT) was established in 2005, and the Russkiy Mir Foundation was founded in 2007. In 2008, Roszarubezhtsentr was transformed into Rossotrudnichestvo (The Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation). In 2010, The Alexander Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund and the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) were established. Such organizations and foundations have status of NGOs, funded mainly by the state. The founder of the Gorchakov Fund on behalf of the Russian Federation is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. The RIAC has several founders in addition to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs—they include the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation; The Russian Academy of Sciences; the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs; and Interfax Information agency.
The conceptual foundations of Russia’s public diplomacy are the traditional (in this context) idea of creating and promoting an attractive image of the Russian Federation in the international arena, as well as the idea of the “Russian world” as an interstate and intercontinental community united by affiliation with Russia and adherence to the Russian language and culture. The concept of the “Russian world” allows one to reach a wider audience of compatriots, people with Russian roots and lovers of the Russian language and culture. At the same time, the “Russian World” contains a certain messianic and civilizational component. These are theoretically and emotionally vulnerable points. The very phrase “Russian world” is perceived as a multivalued and contradictory symbol, which can be widely interpreted as the “us/them” dichotomy: “what belongs to Russia” and “everything else”, as some kind of identification model offered to people. The corresponding value connotations are brought in by the citizens themselves. The multi-vector nature of these concomitant meanings and the crudity of this concept were also noted in the study of the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, based on various interpretations of the concept of the Russian world.
The relative majority of respondents—33%—perceive the Russian world as a special civilization with its own values historically formed in Russia, which emphasizes the civilizational perspective of Russia’s perception as the most adequate, as well as the viability of the very idea of the Russian world. At the other extreme, a quarter of the respondents, which is also a lot, believe that there is no Russian world, demonstrating immunity to this political and ideological construction. For a considerable number of Russians, political meanings are important: 16% of the respondents say sympathizing with Russia is what makes one a member of the Russian world; the presence of Russian citizenship is important for 13%; another 13% distinguish sharing a common history and political past; 8% identify the Russian world with the Soviet model of society. And only 8% understand the Russian world as a kind of formation, fastened by Orthodoxy.17
In our opinion, the concept of the “Russian world” will not be further developed, as originally it had the goal of serving as a unifying slogan into which everyone can put their own nuances of understanding.
All institutes involved in public diplomacy projects as a whole can be divided into the following: (1) implementing the political agenda and training professional experts and (2) participating in international projects, in accordance with their professional activities (schools, colleges, museums, theatres, scientific centres, other NGOs). Institutes, whose founders are government structures and ministries, belong to the first category. In their activities, two dimensions can be distinguished: internal and external. This is due to the two main objectives of Russia’s foreign policy: (1) the revival of the Eurasian unity and the construction of a large regional association—the Eurasian Economic Union and (2) building relationships with the rest of the world. These directions are equal in their importance, but the internal one, according to our estimates, is developing more actively.
First of all, the Russian language, which has historically formed a unified communication field, contributes to it. Second, the Eurasian direction of public diplomacy allows to use and (re-)create many regional NGOs—think tanks—which in itself contributes to a more objective analysis of information and the development of the expert community. Among them, the following organizations should be singled out: the Eurasian Movement of the Russian Federation; Centre for Eurasian Studies, Byzantine Club, Eurasian Communication Centre, Workshop of Eurasian Ideas, Eurasia. Expert, Eurasian Development, Eurasian Analytical Club, Business Eurasia and others. There is certainly a gap in the possibilities (financial, information, publication) between regional and capital centres though.
Third, the Eurasian direction provides ample opportunity for attracting young people: the idea of integration requires personnel for its promotion and realization. In addition, it is worth mentioning that the subject of public diplomacy is, basically, the entire civil society. Each person, building connections with near and far abroad, becomes a representative of their country, a people’s diplomat. As these links (in tourism, student exchanges and business) become an integral part of life, there is a need for skills in public diplomacy. This direction is handled by the Gorchakov Fund. A good example of such activities was the holding of the Summer Diplomatic School in the Chelyabinsk region in the summer of 2018. The Fund’s traditional and very successful programmes on developing public diplomacy in the regions of the Russian Federation and the post-Soviet space are the Baltic Dialogue, the Caucasian Dialogue, the Caspian Youth School, the School for Central Asia, the Russian-Georgian Dialogue of Young Experts and others. The International Education Forum “Eurasia” is the project that unites young people from different countries. Other areas of research and project activities are the countries of the Euro-Atlantic and Asia-Pacific region, the Middle East and the Balkans. Projects aimed at “far abroad” are also dealt with by the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC).
We must certainly mention here the activity of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) (Moscow Patriarchate) in the sphere of public diplomacy. Holding the legal status of a public religious association, the ROC has been actively participating in international life in the last decade, defending Orthodox believers and compatriots, establishing a dialogue with the Vatican, other Christian faiths and religious institutions, with international organizations such as United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the Council of Europe. “Since 2003, the working group for cooperation between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been successfully operating”.18 ROC representatives participate in the annual meetings organized by Rossotrudnichestvo on the issues of supporting non-profit organizations in the implementation of humanitarian projects.19 Despite an active public debate about whether the church should participate in secular life, its international activities contribute to the formation of Russia’s image, expanding the opportunities for Russian spiritual and religious influence.
The Russian Foreign Ministry actively supports relations with non-governmental organizations in the development of public diplomacy. Two areas can be distinguished here: (1) the creation and maintenance of a departmental organization “Council of Young Diplomats”, whose members may be employees of the Foreign Ministry and foreign missions under the age of 35 and (2) annual meetings of Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov with representatives of non-profit organizations. In addition to completing professional tasks, “the Council of Young Diplomats participates in the Forum of Young Diplomats of the Eurasian Space, as well as in the Forum of Young Diplomats of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) countries, developing partnership relations with colleagues, which will become the basis of joint work in the future”.20 Foreign Minister Lavrov’s meetings with representatives of non-profit organizations usually assess the international political situation and the opportunities and problems that non-governmental organizations working in the international arena have. In this regard, it must be said that the activities of any non-governmental organizations implementing international projects and participating in networks and coalitions of international organizations fit into the sphere of public diplomacy; by solving professional and humanitarian problems, these NGOs translate the Russian vision and readiness for joint work at different levels. At the last meeting with NGO representatives, Sergey Lavrov noted that the participation of our civil society organizations in multilateral platforms is not yet very developed.
Only 70 domestic NGOs have consultative status with ECOSOC, while more than 4,000 organizations are represented there. Speaking about the Conference of International Non-Governmental Organizations of the Council of Europe, only four Russian NGOs are permanent participants. At UNESCO, only three of our public structures have achieved the status of a partner.21
Among other reasons for this, material and financial aspects were named. This is quite true; although, in our view, other reasons can also be given: the relatively short history of the development of domestic NGOs as well as the continuing unpreparedness and weakness of human resources. The latter problem affects a broader range of issues related to the legal status of NGOs, the possibility of permanent work in them, public prestige, the ratio of amateur performance and external regulation.
Assessing the problems of the development of Russian public diplomacy and NGOs working in this area, it is necessary to turn to the experts’ opinions. In particular, very fair assessments are presented by Natalia Burlinova, President of the Centre for Support and Public Initiatives “Creative Diplomacy” (Kreativnaya Diplomatiya). The main problems, in her opinion, include the spontaneity of the development of this direction, as well as the lack of consistency and any development strategy, as well as a lack of officials’ understanding of this field of activity (Burlinova, 2014). The remaining problems, which Burlinova notes, can be attributed, in general, to the development of civil society and Russian NGOs: insufficient funding, weak development of the civil sector, lack of professionalism and strong NGOs’ dependence on the interests of donors and grantors (in the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s).
NGOs’ funding and dependence on donors in the Russian Federation, in our opinion, will remain serious problems related to each other. What has historically contributed to this fact is the cautious attitude towards organized civic activism and paternalistic sentiments. Dependence on foreign donors was eliminated by the Law on Foreign Agents, and the role of the global donor was assumed by the state and some domestic non-state funds. However, it is still too early to talk about sufficient funding. The dependence, with fairly limited opportunities for diversification of fundraising, is preserved. We shall admit, however, that at least there is a clear and uniform understanding of the tasks of the main grantor now. For the development of state-created institutions of public diplomacy, this is common practice. For the development of other non-governmental organizations, it is just a change of donor, although with the understanding of the inevitability of this fact in modern realities. Overcoming this dependence is possible with the encouragement of civic initiatives and the development of trust between various social groups, organizations as well as power structures.
In our opinion, in general, the main problem of Russian civil society now (as in the past) is a lack of public initiative or confidence that it can be effective. A high degree of centralization of power and the desire to control not only the issues of economics, politics and security but the process of forming even the most grass root regional public institutions leads either to social apathy or to the desire to capture the state trend, fit into it and make it part of one’s career. (This remark does not apply to organizations created for reasons of survival or shared disasters, such as the Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers, various societies for the disabled or for support for people with addictions, and so on. However, these organizations do not exhaust all potential opportunities for public activity.) For the effectiveness of public diplomacy, a wide degree of freedom of public life, the simplicity of creating non-governmental organizations and a variety of opportunities for fundraising are important. After all, public diplomacy is not only the institutions created by the state in this sphere, it is also thousands of public organizations that have the opportunity to interact freely with their foreign counterparts and directly translate values and modus vivendi. Public diplomacy is not just propaganda of achievements and the inspiration of sympathy, it is the establishment of trust. Institutions of public diplomacy created by the state alone cannot fully achieve this goal. If one limits oneself to them, then it will be not more than a light version of official diplomacy.
Conclusion
Summing up, we can say that, for Russian foreign policy, the need for the development of public diplomacy has been a successful, albeit not a trouble-free, project aimed not only at implementing “soft power” and promoting the image of the Russian Federation but also at creating and developing the existing structures of civil society. The initiator of this project is the state, which is quite natural within the framework of implementing the foreign policy strategy of any country. The difference of the domestic project from Western analogues is greater centralization of the institutions of public diplomacy and the predominance of government funding. This is due to the traditionally large share of the state in all sectors of public life, the legal status of NGOs as well as a certain paternalism of public consciousness. Such features largely do not coincide with the historical ideas of civic engagement; however, in the modern world, NGOs are a social technology that is flexible and successful enough to be used by countries with different political regimes.
In general, ideas and activities in the sphere of public diplomacy are shared by active subjects of civil society of the Russian Federation, reaching eventually all citizens, even if they are not well versed in terminology and institutions. The need to demonstrate the best features of the national character, the achievements of science and culture, to develop a dialogue with other countries and peoples is a coinciding trend of state policy and public sentiments and demands. The main task for the public diplomacy of Russia (and other states) in the context of the growing information war is to maintain an open dialogue both with the foreign target audience and with the institutions within their own country, and also not to overstep the boundary where public diplomacy ends and propaganda begins.