The MVD also disposes of the Interior Troops (Vnutrennye voiska, VV), a substantial security force numbering some 140,000 officers and men. This is in effect a parallel “army,” with military organization, ranks, and culture; it is distributed around the country, and is responsible primarily for public order and security, with a secondary disaster-relief function. The commander-in-chief of the VV also holds the appointment of deputy interior minister. He controls the force from Moscow, although operational command is exercised by the commanders of the seven VV MVD Districts, and local police chiefs (see accompanying panel).
The VV played a secondary but significant role in the First Chechen War (1994–96); in the initial year of the conflict, for example, 366 men were killed and 1,786 wounded. However, in many cases they were unenthusiastic; coordination with the regular military was poor, leading to a large number of “friendly-fire” incidents, and they often adopted a passive and reactive stance. Subsequent inquiries placed much of the blame for the rebels’ recapture of Grozny in 1996 on the VVs’ reluctance to launch aggressive patrols in and around the city, thus allowing the insurgents to mass in force away from the immediate environs of VV garrisons and checkpoints.
However, lessons were learned. After the initial assault they bore the brunt of the fighting during the Second Chechen War (1999–2009), since Moscow had recognized that the mechanized Russian Army, designed largely for conventional operations on the plains of Europe or Eurasia, was poorly prepared for counterinsurgency. To this end, the VV had by then received better training and equipment and, more to the point, adopted a more aggressive posture, which saw them using coordinated attacks, including artillery and air support, to take the war to the rebels. Although the latter had the advantage of local knowledge, a combination of war-weariness and internal divisions, coupled with the sheer size of the forces Russia was willing to deploy, meant that the insurgency was slowly ground down. By 2005, when Chechen rebel president Aslan Maskhadov was killed in a Russian attack, it was already on the wane.
VV forces vary considerably in size, effectiveness, and mission. They range from the elite Spetsnaz counterterrorist commando units of the various Special Purpose Detachments (Otryady spetsialnogo naznacheniya, OSNs), and the so-called “Dzerzhinsky Division” (1st ODON) garrisoning Moscow (both described below), through to local, relatively low-readiness units that are usually only employed in support of the police at sports fixtures and public events. Nonetheless, despite some suggestions in the 1990s that the force was a relic of Soviet authoritarianism that ought to be disbanded, the VV remains a key element of the Russian security forces. Although it has shrunk from its previous strength of 200,000, its future is not in doubt.
The Interior Troops are divided between a range of formations, each with slightly different roles and status. Most VV divisions are essentially just paper command structures, with the exception of the 1st Independent Special Purpose Division (Otdelnaya diviziya osobennogo naznacheniya, ODON).
The frontline elements of the VV are the Special Designation units, typically brigades or regiments. An Independent Special Purpose Brigade (Otdelnaya brigada osobennogo naznacheniya, OBrON) is a force of some 4,400 effectives, mainly motorized infantry, with around a third of its strength mechanized with BTR-80/80A armored personnel carriers; some serving in the North Caucasus have the newer, more heavily armed BTR-90 APCs and BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles. Unlike the regular military, which is phasing-in Italian Fiat Iveco M65 light armored vehicles, the VV use only GAZ “Tigers.” They are trained for a wide spectrum of missions, from counter-insurgency (many have been rotated through Chechnya and the other North Caucasian republics) to riot-control and maintenance of public order. The VV also has its own aviation branch, largely equipped with Mi-8 transport and assault helicopters and Mi-24P/V gunships, which saw extensive action in Chechnya. They wear military-pattern camouflage battledress and are equipped to Army light infantry standards, using AKS-74 and AKM-74 assault rifles, machine guns, RPG-22 and RPG-29 grenade-launchers, and other support weapons.
The bulk of the VV, however, are lower-status troops confined to guard and public-order duties. They are predominantly equipped as motorized infantry, but in practice spend much of their time as glorified static security guards. The 622nd VV Bn, for example, provides additional security for Moscow’s Lefortovo prison, while the 620th VV Regt protects the Beloyarsk nuclear power station. The size of such units can vary considerably; while Moscow’s elite 1st Independent Special Purpose Division is around 11,000 strong, the capital’s 55th Division has an establishment strength closer to 6,500.
There are also Special Motorized Police Battalions (Spetsnialnye motorizovannye batalony politsii, SMBP), modeled on Moscow’s Operational Regiments. Technically part of the VV, they generally wear police uniforms and work most closely with local police commands, especially in providing additional manpower during times of particular need. These units are of no more than moderate quality; they are typically deployed in support of the police’s own OMON – who are considered more skilled and determined – but they do provide quickly mobilized backup during disturbances or major public events.
The 1st Independent Special Purpose Division (1aya Otdelnaya diviziya osobennogo naznacheniya, ODON) is a “Praetorian Guard” based in Moscow, with its own tank and artillery assets. Still widely known by its Soviet-era name of the “Dzerzhinsky Division,” after the founder of Lenin’s secret police, its history dates back to 1918, when the fledgling Bolshevik government formed the 1st Armored Car Squad to defend the leadership alongside the infamous Latvian riflemen who formed the core of their guards. From numbering fewer than 50 men, with two armored cars, some trucks mounting machine guns, and miscellaneous cars and motorcycles, this unit grew during the tumultuous era of the Russian Civil War (1918–21) until it numbered over a thousand men, including three infantry companies and a cavalry squadron. In 1921 it came under the control of the Cheka, the Bolshevik political police, and it remained part of that apparatus – in its successive incarnations – until the unit was transferred to the MVD after Stalin’s death in 1953.
The MVD Interior Troops
Abbreviations: unit designation acronyms as in text and Glossary.
Also:
Bde = Brigade
Bn = Battalion
Comms = Communications
Det = Detachment
Div = Division
Ind = Independent
Mar = Maritime
MW = Mountain Warfare
Recon = Reconnaissance
Spec = Special
unident = unidentified
Note: The order of the listing within each District, and the indenting of a few unit titles, follows the original Russian sources.
Central VV MVD District (HQ Moscow)
1st Ind Spec Designation VV Div (Moscow)
604th Spec Purpose Center (Moscow)
95th VV Div (Moscow)
622nd Ind VV Bn (Moscow)
67th Ind VV Bn (Obolensk)
551st VV Regt (Moscow)
687th VV Regt (Moscow)
503rd VV Regt (Reutov)
unident Ind VV Bn (Dubna)
447th Ind VV Bn (Dubrovka)
164th Ind VV Bn (Desnogorsk)
165th Ind VV Bn (Udomlya)
21st OBrON (Sofrino)
unident Ind SMBP (Kostroma)
55th VV Div (Moscow)
102nd SMBP (Moscow)
104th SMBP (Moscow)
109th SMBP (Moscow)
107th SMBP (Moscow)
681st SMBP (Moscow)
547th SMBP (Elektrostal)
33rd VV OSN Peresvet (Moscow)
414th Ind SMBP (Yaroslavl)
unident Ind SMBP (Tver)
423rd Ind SMBP (Lyubertsy)
12th VV Div (Tula)
128th SMBP (Voronezh)
649th VV Regt (Bryansk)
597th SMBP (Kursk)
667th SMBP (Tula)
129th SMBP (Lipetsk)
591st VV Regt (Obninsk)
341st SMBP (Ivanovo)
518th SMBP (Vladimir)
426th Ind SMBP (Kaluga)
71st Ind VV Bn (Kurchatov)
unident Ind VV Bn (Novovoronezh)
683rd Ind VV Comm Regt (Moscow)
16th VV OSN Skif (“Scythian”) (Rostov)
25th VV OSN Merkury (Zhornovka)
Northwestern VV MVD District (HQ St Petersburg)
63rd OBrON (St Petersburg)
124th VV Regt (Sosnovy Bor)
2nd Marine VV Det (Murmansk)
33rd OBrON (Lebyazhye)
110th Ind SMBP (St Petersburg)
2nd SMBP (St Petersburg)
406th Ind SMBP (Kaliningrad)
614th VV Regt (Koryazhma)
418th Ind SMBP (Pankovka)
422nd Ind SMBP (Cherepovets)
420th Ind SMBP (Petrozavodsk)
421st Ind SMBP (Pskov)
28th VV OSN Ratnik (“Warrior”) (Arkhangelsk)
North Caucasian VV MVD District (HQ Rostov)
46th OBrON (Grozny)
424th OBrON (Grozny)
248th Ind Spec Mot VV Bn Sever (“North”) (Grozny)
249th Ind Spec Mot VV Bn Yug (“South”) (Vedeno)
140th VV Artillery Regt (Grozny)
34th VV OSN (Grozny)
358th Ind VV Bn (Shelkovsk)
94th VV Regt (Urus-Martan)
96th VV Regt (Gudermes)
352nd Ind VV Recon Bn (Grozny)
353rd Ind VV Comms Bn (Grozny)
360th Ind VV Bn (Shelkovskaya)
743rd Ind VV Bn (Vedeno)
744th Ind VV Bn (Nozhai-Yurt)
359th Ind SMBP (Grozny)
22nd OBrON (Kalach-na-Donu)
50th OBrON (Novocherkassk)
7th VV OSN Rosich (Novocherkassk)
133rd SMBP (Novocherkassk)
2nd Ind Spec Designation VV Div (Krasnodar)
47th Ind VV Bde (Krasnodar)
15th VV OSN Vyatich (Armavir)
139th SMBP (Krasnodar)
127th SMBP (Sochi)
413th Ind SMBP (Elista)
378th Ind VV Bn (Labinsk)
215th Ind SMBP (Cherkessk)
346th Ind VV Recon Bn (Blagodarny)
49th Ind MW VV Bde (Vladikavkaz)
unident Ind MW VV Bn (Nalchik)
unident Ind MW VV Bn (Nazrak)
unident Ind MW VV Bn (Kartsy)
383rd Ind VV Bn (Vladikavkaz)
121st VV Regt (Zvezdny)
674th VV Regt (Mozdok)
126th VV Regt (Nazran)
98th SMBP (Kislovodsk)
17th VV OSN Edelveys (Mineralnye Vody)
362nd Ind VV Bn (Chermen)
372nd Ind VV Recon Bn (Zelenokumsk)
102nd OBrON (Makhachkala)
376th Ind VV Bn (Kizlyar)
450th Ind VV Bn (base unident)
375th Ind VV Bn (Astrakhan)
398th Ind VV Recon Bn (Astrakhan)
Volga VV MVD District (HQ Nizhny Novgorod)
94th VV Div (Sarov)
43rd VV Regt (Sarov)
unident VV Regt (Sarov)
561st VV Regt (Dzerzhinsk)
34th OBrON (Nizhny Novgorod)
86th SMBP (Kazan)
26th VV OSN Bars (“Panther”) (Kazan)
428th Ind VV Bn (Kazan)
79th VV Div (Kirov)
739th Ind SMBP (Izhevsk)
488th Ind SMBP (Gamovo)
379th Ind VV Bn (Zeleny)
419th Ind SMBP (Kirov)
unident SMBP (Ufa)
29th VV OSN Bulat (Ufa)
54th OBrON (Perm)
35th Ind VV Bde (Samara)
113th SMBP (Samara)
unident VV Regt (Tolyatti)
589th VV Regt (Zarechny)
738th Ind SMBP (Cheboksary)
unident SMBP (Volgograd)
20th VV OSN Viking (Saratov)
Ural VV MVD District (HQ Yekaterinburg)
93rd VV Div (Chelyabinsk)
42nd VV Regt (Chelyabinsk)
545th VV Regt (Ozersk)
546th VV Regt (Tryekhgorny)
562nd VV Regt (Snezhinsk)
95th VV Regt (Kopeiisk)
23rd VV OSN Mechel (Chelyabinsk)
928th Ind VV Bn (Prezerny)
96th VV Div (Kalinovka-1)
543rd VV Regt (Novouralsk)
18th VV Regt (Nizhniy Tagil)
138th VV Regt (Lesnoi)
12th VV OSN Ural (Nizhniy Tagil)
620th VV Regt (Yekaterinburg)
395th Ind SMBP (Yekaterinburg)
131st SMBP (Persyabinsk)
Siberian VV MVD District (HQ Novosibirsk)
19th VV OSN Ermak (Novosibirsk)
397th Ind SMBP (Novosibirsk)
98th VV Div (Kemerovo)
592nd VV Regt (Seversk)
41st VV Regt (Seversk)
555th VV Regt (Novosibirsk)
27th VV OSN Kuzbass (Kemerovo)
82nd Ind VV Bde (Barnaul)
656th Operational Designation VV Regt (Rubtsovsk)
563rd VV Regt (Byysk)
42nd Ind VV Bde (Angarsk)
91st Ind VV Bde (Krasnoyarsk)
556th VV Regt (Krasnoyarsk)
557th VV Regt (Pogorny)
unident VV Regt (Zheleznogorsk)
407th Ind SMBP (Krasnoyarsk-45)
Eastern VV MVD District (HQ Khabarovsk)
1st Mar VV Det (Khabarovsk)
21st VV OSN Taifun (“Typhoon”) (Khabarovsk)
111th Ind VV Bde (Khabarovsk)
unident Ind SMBP (Khabarovsk)
107th Ind VV Bde (Vladivostok)
unident SMBP (Vladivostok)
24th VV OSN Svyatogor (Vladivostok)
388th Ind VV Bn (Elban)
374th Ind VV Bn (Chuguevka)
150th Ind SMBP (Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk)
unident VV Regt (Magadan)
Its primary role remained the protection of the Kremlin and the senior Communist Party leadership, but it also acted as an elite military strike force for the suppression of resistance to the state. In the 1920s and 1930s, for example, detachments from what had then become a division-strength force were involved in suppressing peasant risings in the Ukraine, and fighting against the basmachi rebels of Central Asia. During World War II the division participated in the defense of Moscow in 1942, and later in the extermination of Ukrainian nationalist partisans.2
In 1953 the Dzerzhinsky Division moved across to the MVD, becoming a factor in Moscow’s military balance of power. The KGB (as the political police became known in 1954) had the Kremlin Guard; the regular Army, the 2nd Guards Tamanskaya Motor Rifle Division and 4th Guards Kantemirovskaya Tank Division; and the MVD, the Dzerzhinsky Division. In 1977, out of concern that the 1980 Moscow Olympics might attract an attack, a specialized antiterrorist unit was formed within the division; in 1989 this Special Purpose Company (RSN) would become Vityaz, discussed below. The 1980s were turbulent years for the decaying USSR, and the division had to send detachments to deal with crises across the country, from the aftermath of the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster to taking part in crackdowns in Tbilisi, Georgia, in 1989 and Baku, Azerbaijan, in 1990.
The division has a reputation for rigid adherence to orders. During the short-lived August 1991 coup in which hard-liners sought in vain to reverse Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev’s liberalizing reforms, it obeyed Interior Minister Boriss Pugo, who was one of the plotters, and was almost deployed against the crowds supporting opposition leader Boris Yeltsin. Conversely, after the end of the USSR, in 1993 the division had no qualms in obeying Yeltsin’s orders to assist in the violent dissolution of a Communist-dominated parliament. In 1994 it was renamed the Independent Special Purpose Division (or technically, the even more cumbersome “Independent Special Purpose, Orders of Lenin and the October Revolution, Red Banner Division,” reflecting its past battle honors), and also acquired its current insignia of a panther. It has sent troops to Chechnya and other Caucasus flashpoints, as well as carrying out public-order duties in Moscow.
As an MVD unit, the 1st ODON escaped the reductions from division to brigade strength which took place within the regular Army. It is unusually large for a VV division, with some 11,000 men – although at its peak in the 1980s and 1990s it numbered almost 18,000 – and currently comprises four motor rifle (mechanized) regiments, a smaller special motorized police regiment (whose members wear police rather than VV uniforms), an artillery battalion, an engineer battalion, a chemical and biological protection battalion, a firefighting battalion, a field hospital, a Commandant’s Service military police company, and associated specialist, training, and logistics elements. It is based at a sprawling complex in Moscow’s eastern Balashikha suburb, with an additional training facility at Noginsk further to the east along the Vladimir road. The majority of its officers and men are professionals, but it is presently anticipated that it will continue to take some conscripts – typically, the pick of the draft pool – until at least 2018.
The VV also disposes of a number of spetsnaz special-purpose detachments (Otryady spetsialnogo naznacheniya, OSN). In the Russian military lexicon the term “detachment” implies no fixed size or organization, and OSNs range from 30-man platoons up to the Central District’s reinforced-company Peresvet unit based in Moscow. Each VV District has at least one OSN attached to it, largely responsible for counterterrorist operations but also occasionally detailed to support the police in extreme cases.
Each OSN has its own name and distinctive symbol, in part as a way of strengthening esprit de corps, since almost all are creations of the post-Soviet era and thus lack unit traditions. Nonetheless, they enjoy an exalted status within the VV. One of the USSR’s first specialized antiterrorist units was the Dzerzhinsky Division’s Special Purpose Company, later renamed the 6th VV OSN Vityaz (“Knight”). It was joined in 1994 by a sister unit, Rus’, and both saw considerable action in Chechnya. In 2008 both were transferred out of the division to form the MVD’s 604th Special Purpose Center (Tsentr spetsialnogo naznacheniya, TsSN), a counterterrorism force under the direct control of the central ministry apparatus. As such, it works with the Central Region TsN but is not ultimately subordinated to it.
VV Spetsnaz are specially trained in small-unit operations, especially hostage rescues, forced entries, and detaining or eliminating armed suspects. Some units also have particular forms of expertise. For example, Edelveys (“Edelweiss”), the 17th VV OSN based in the southern upland town of Mineralnye Vody, is known for its mountain-warfare skills. Likewise, the 28th VV OSN Ratnik, “Warrior” from the northern port city of Arkhangelsk, has experience in Arctic operations. All recruits receive rigorous physical training in unarmed and armed combat, and develop specialities such as sniper, scout, and negotiator skills. Many of these units have also rotated through Chechnya, both to acquire combat experience and to provide a sharper edge to the existing VV forces deployed there. The only exception is Peresvet, which is always kept in Moscow in case of emergencies in the capital.
The true “elite within an elite” will have gone through the grueling tests that can lead to the award of the prized red beret (actually, closer to maroon in color). Award of the red beret is on an individual basis, distinct from membership of any particular unit; the more genuinely elite units will typically be largely or wholly made up of “red berets,” but for even half of a unit’s personnel to enjoy this status is impressive.
The test is divided into three main stages, which are run with minimal opportunity for rest in between. The first is a test of fitness and stamina, with candidates required to run an 8km (5-mile) cross-country race followed by a sprint, under exceedingly arduous conditions (including fording deep water, crossing an obstacle course, and running through a simulated contamination zone while wearing a gas mask). Meanwhile, instructors will be trying to distract the candidates with everything from verbal abuse to pyrotechnics. The second stage is a test of marksmanship with a variety of weapons, concluding in a simulated hostage rescue in which the candidate must “double tap” two targets representing hostiles without harming the target representing their captive. The final test is of unarmed combat skills; in four 3-minute rounds, the candidate will face four separate, fresh assailants, all “red beret” experts. The rules are brutally simple: no blows to the groin, spine, elbows or knees, but beyond that everything is fair game, and broken bones and concussion are not unusual. All the candidate has to do is make it through these 12 minutes conscious and mobile, but most find this the most demanding stage of all. Less than half the candidates succeed in passing all three stages with flying colors, and it is not unusual to find men retaking them several years in succession before finally qualifying.
In order successfully to combat the Chechen resistance Moscow eventually had to rely on local auxiliaries, who came to dominate the republic. Former rebel Akhmad Kadyrov, who was effectively the Chechen leader from 2000 (although he was only elected president in 2003), started this process, taking over the Grozny OMON and granting his personal guard the status of a government security force. When he was assassinated by rebels in 2004, his fiery son Ramzan became increasingly powerful, and assumed the presidency in 2007. Ramzan Kadyrov, having led his father’s private militia, essentially turned the republican security forces into his personal retinue. In 2004 his father’s bodyguards were formally made part of the Chechen Republic MVD, and by 2006 the so-called Kadyrovtsy (“Kadyrovites”) dominated the local security apparatus. Although they were officially rolled into the local MVD structures, they were personally loyal to the younger Kadyrov rather than to Moscow. At that point they numbered over 5,000 men in two MVD units – the 141st “Akhmad Kadyrov” Special Purpose Police Regiment (also sometimes called PPSM-2), and the Oil Regiment (Neftepolk), formally tasked with guarding local pipelines – as well as several still-unofficial ex-guerrilla units euphemistically described as Anti-Terrorism Centers. The latter were inducted into the MVD as the Sever (“North”) and Yug (“South”) battalions.
Although Moscow was happy to pass a growing share of the counterinsurgency burden to the Chechens, who as a force of “turned” ex-guerrillas were best able to take on the rebels on their own terms, it was not especially comfortable with the autonomy that the volatile Ramzan Kadyrov had acquired. One response was to try to maintain alternative Chechen forces as counterweights, largely by supporting in parallel the Yamadayev brothers. These were also former rebel commanders who had switched sides to the Russians. Two special units had been founded by the GRU (Military Intelligence) in 1999: the Vostok (“East”) and Zapad (“West”) battalions. Also made up of former rebels, these were kept apart from the Chechen MVD and subordinated instead to the Russian Army.
However, enemies of the Kadyrovs rarely seem to prosper. Dzhabrail Yamadayev, commander of the Vostok Bn, was killed by an unexplained bomb attack in 2003, after which his brother Sulim took over the unit. A third brother, Ruslan, was murdered in Moscow in 2008 while in Sulim’s car; Sulim blamed Kadyrov’s agents for being behind the attack. After gunmen from the Vostok Bn and the Kadyrovtsy clashed outside the Chechen town of Gudermes, leaving 18 dead, Ramzan successfully demanded that Sulim Yamadayev be dismissed. He fled to Dubai, where he was murdered in 2009; the local police accused a cousin of Kadyrov’s of the killing.
With the demise of the Yamadayevs, Kadyrov’s control over Chechen forces became unchallenged. The Vostok and Zapad units, which had largely stayed out of the political fray, were disbanded at the end of 2008, although the former had just fought in Georgia during Russia’s three-day invasion of that country. Meanwhile, the Kadyrovtsy have been equipped to regular OMON and VV standard, though their discipline is often questionable, and they have been accused of numerous human-rights abuses by international observers. Nonetheless, their ferocity has never been in doubt, and they have been successful in grinding away at the resolve and numbers of the remaining insurgents. At the time of writing, although there are still sporadic terrorist attacks in Chechnya, the days of a sizable, coherent insurgent force that could challenge the authorities for control of territory are over.
2 See MAA 412, Ukrainian Armies 1914–1955