At that time, early September [1862], the weather was hot, the limestone turnpike dusty, water scarce away from streams, and marching was fatiguing. The army seemed to be huddled together. Marching on parallel roads did not seem to be practiced in that army as it was afterwards with Sherman’s armies; but in that particular locality the turnpike was the only first-class road. But the troops suffered considerably from that point all the way back to Louisville, Kentucky, in consequence of having to march all on the same road. It was understood by the army generally and known positively to Buell that Bragg was moving into Kentucky on his right flank, but till we had gone far north of Nashville, or northeastward rather, we did not approach so near Bragg as to render a conflict possible. This junction with Buell’s army was gratifying in some respects. It enabled me to meet old acquaintances—[Major General Alexander M.] McCook, [Brigadier General] J. M. Palmer, [Brigadier General] R. W. Johnson, Colonel [William B.] Hazen, and many others whom I had known before. I also met [Major General Don Carlos] Buell himself, and his distinguished chief of staff, Colonel James B. Fry, whom I had known from boyhood. I had often heard John M. Palmer pleading a case in the court-house at Carrollton, Illinois, long before I ever expected to see myself or him engaged in a great civil war and in command of United States troops.
Andrew Johnson was at that time military governor of Tennessee. Buell was preparing to cut loose from Nashville and strike out for Kentucky, in order to head off Bragg or to fight him. This was a question that concerned Governor Johnson very deeply. It was rumored that he was very bitter against Buell, for taking the greater part of his army out of the state and leaving him cooped up in Nashville. But Buell did not talk to outsiders about his affairs, and all we could know was what leaked out through his staff or through Governor Johnson, who was by no means a reticent or forbearing man. I have no doubt Buell left as large a force at Nashville as it was safe for him to leave.
Ohio and Indiana Militia Pouring into Cincinnati to Challenge Bragg’s Advance into Northern Kentucky (Loyal West)
Well, we commenced our march to Louisville from Nashville, and I must say that of all the many thousand miles of hard marching that I have done with troops, that from Nashville to Louisville in September 1862 with Buell’s army was the hardest. The road was so crowded with troops, artillery, supply trains, and ambulances that troops would frequently be compelled to halt for hours in order to let the road be cleared. Sometimes we had to march at night. Sometimes we had to leave the turnpike and march on the railroad. The road was very dusty, water scarce, and the worry caused by halts made everybody nervous and some ill-natured. Shortly before reaching Munfordville, we met the paroled command of Colonel [John T.] Wilder, who had surrendered to Bragg only that morning. These were the first Federal prisoners my command had ever seen, and it was a rather dispiriting sight. When we approached the Green River, it was understood that Bragg’s army was drawn up in line of battle awaiting Buell, and as a challenge to him to fight. Buell’s army was halted and, impatient as I then was, I thought the halt unreasonably long. Presuming on old acquaintance with Colonel Fry, I asked him why General Buell didn’t fight Bragg right there. Having absolute confidence in my brigade and their ability to drive any equal force before them, I longed to give them a chance and believed this our opportunity. The Rebels were between us and our homes, and I thought our men would fight all the better from knowing this fact. Colonel Fry told me that Buell did not wish to fight there, or anywhere, until he had reached Louisville and received reinforcements of new troops that were assembling there; that on receiving this accession to his numbers he would move south in pursuit of Bragg and attack him.
Remaining at that point near Green River until Bragg had moved out of his way, Buell resumed the march to Louisville. At a point about twenty miles above Munfordville, the name of which I do not remember, unless it was Hodgensville, Bragg turned eastward towards Bardstown, and left the Louisville and Nashville Turnpike to Buell. It was along about Munfordville that some of the soldiers told a ridiculous story, but not too ridiculous for some of them to believe, that while Bragg and Buell were marching on parallel roads, only six miles apart, they were in the habit of visiting each other at night, while their respective armies were in camp, and of sleeping in the same tent. It is strange that such stories could in any way be started or believed; but at that particular time there were men in high civil positions and perhaps some in the army who could believe them.
It was about October 1 or the latter part of September that we arrived at Louisville and went into camp on the outskirts of the city. As soon as possible the new troops were assigned to brigades, and the army was reorganized. To my command was assigned the One Hundred First Ohio, Colonel Leander Stem of Tiffin, Ohio, commanding. This regiment was composed of fine young men, nearly, if not all, being natives of Ohio. Lieutenant Colonel [Moses F.] Wooster and Major I. M. Kirby were the other field officers. None of the officers or men, so far as I can remember, had ever seen service before, but they lacked only experience to make them efficient soldiers.
It was about October 1 that Buell’s army was put in motion from Louisville towards Bragg’s army, which was then occupying the country about Frankfort, Bardstown, and near Perryville. He in person was at Frankfort, performing the farce of inaugurating a Rebel governor of Kentucky—a Mr. [Richard] Hawes—at the point of the bayonet.
There was much clamor during and after Reconstruction times about the presence of United States troops at Southern state capitals and at the polls; but I believe the inauguration of Mr. Hawes at Frankfort by General Bragg was the first instance in the war, or during the existence of the United States, when the inauguration of a governor was a purely military proceeding.
Before leaving Louisville, Buell had organized his army into corps. Major General Alexander McDowell McCook commanded one corps, Major General T. L. Crittenden, one corps. C. C. Gilbert was assigned to the command of the Eighteenth Corps, to which [Brigadier General Jefferson C.] Davis’s division, commanded then by Brigadier General R. B. Mitchell, was assigned. My brigade was still in his [Davis’s] division and consisted of the Twenty-first and Thirty-eighth Illinois, Fifteenth Wisconsin, One Hundred First Ohio, and the Second Minnesota Battery. The One Hundred First Ohio at this time numbered nearly one thousand men—raw, utterly inexperienced young fellows, just from their homes in Ohio, but excellent materials for soldiers, which they became during the next three months—at least, those that remained with the regiment. The other three regiments I regarded as veterans, though none of them had ever suffered loss in battle. We had been marching and campaigning in search of the enemy for nearly a year and had met him face to face only at Fredericktown, Missouri, and in the little skirmish at Doniphan, Missouri. The sudden retreat of Beauregard from Corinth and the avoidance of battle near Munfordville, where battle seemed imminent, had rendered officers and men (myself not excepted) impatient to see some real fighting.
I omitted above to attach any title to General Gilbert’s name, because it soon appeared that the question of his actual rank was a problem that was difficult to solve. General Buell’s order of assignment designated him as major general, and as such he was obeyed and respected accordingly. He commanded the Eighteenth Corps for about two weeks as major general, including one battle, before any question was raised in the army about his rank. It seems strange that so intelligent and law-respecting an officer as Buell should not have taken steps to ascertain what his rank actually was before assigning him to the command of a corps. It turned out afterwards that the only evidence for Gilbert’s claiming to be a major general was an order from General [Major General Horatio G.] Wright, commanding the Department of Ohio, designating him as provisional major general. President Lincoln very properly refused to recognize this appointment, but elected to nominate him as a brigadier general. Even this nomination the Senate refused to confirm, and after holding it for some months and commanding a brigade under this nomination, he was compelled to revert to his rank as captain or major in the Regular Army [he had been captain since 1855 but earned a brevet as major following the Battle of Shiloh in April 1862]. But he commanded the Eighteenth Corps all the same as major general, and many brigadier generals obeyed his orders and served faithfully under him during the campaign and through the Battle of Perryville on October 8. Among them was Brigadier General Philip H. Sheridan, now lieutenant general commanding the U.S. Army.
The Battlefield of Perryville (Century)
The march southward was slow and tedious, the weather being still warm and the country very dry. There was nothing distinguished in the country till we had passed Perryville and entered the Blue Grass region. It was a pleasant afternoon on October 7 that Gilbert’s corps arrived at a point about one and a half miles north of Perryville. There had been some skirmishing during the day between the cavalry of Captain Ebenezer Gay, of Buell’s army, and the Rebel rear guard, and occasional cannonading between them, which reminded us that we were approaching an enemy.
On the right of the road at the point described above was a ridge with rather a steep side on the east. General Buell and staff had ridden to the top of the ridge and halted. They dismounted, and I was ordered to place my brigade on the ridge facing southward, about sixty yards in rear of Buell and his staff. Having here placed my brigade in bivouac, I approached the staff, and entered into conversation with Colonel Fry, [Captain R.] Loder, and Lieutenant [Charles] Fitzhugh. Colonel Fry remarked to me, “Well, Carlin, tomorrow you will have all the fighting you want.” This remark referred evidently to my question at Munfordville, when I asked why Buell didn’t fight there. General Buell was viewing the country to the south, which his position overlooked, through a telescope, and scanned it long and carefully, sweeping it around from west to east through a semicircle, and taking in the whole field. I supposed from his careful observation that Bragg’s army occupied the field he was scanning, but I could see nothing but the woods and open fields that were in the lower lands along the creek or stream lying just north of Perryville, and the highlands beyond that place. The town itself I could not see. To the southwest the land fell off, as well as to the southeast, as if we occupied the high land bordering the valley of a stream. Suddenly Buell lowered his telescope and turned around and addressed me this question: “Have you confidence in your troops?” Without hesitation I replied, “Yes, General; I will trust them anywhere.” Nothing more was said. The impression on my mind was that my opportunity had come at last when I could lead my brave regiments against the enemy and justify the great confidence I had in them.
Before night fell I took a long walk to the southwest in search of water, but found hardly enough to afford a drink for a horse. I had understood that [Major General George H.] Thomas, with Crittenden’s corps, had marched some miles to the southwest of my position in search of water for a camp.
The morning of October 8 was marked by a bright sun and hazy atmosphere. Away off to our left we could see the head of McCook’s column approaching Chaplin’s Creek. My position was so commanding that from it we could see over the lower ground in that direction for two miles, and I knew that McCook was approaching Perryville on a road running somewhat southwesterly to Perryville. Some artillery firing began perhaps as early as 9:00 A.M., near Chaplin’s Creek. No orders had come to me to be prepared to move into battle, and it seemed strange in view of Fry’s remark and Buell’s question the day before.
It was about 10:00 A.M. when the cannonading became quite heavy. Soon afterwards musketry firing began, and from that time on for several hours each minute seemed to increase the uproar. Up to that time I had not heard such continuous firing of artillery or such incessant volleys of musketry. We could see the smoke of the battle in and through the woods and at the outer edges, but could not see the lines of troops actually engaged. But all the signs and proofs of terrific fighting were visible to us on that high ridge, where both sight and hearing were unobstructed by other ridges or obstacles to the passage of sound or sight.
Yet no orders came for us to go in. I saw General Mitchell, my division commander, several times, and asked him to send my brigade into action. He replied that he had spoken to General Gilbert about it, and was told by him that he could not move his troops without orders from General Buell. It was all a mystery to me. Mitchell was eager to take a part in the battle also, and desired particularly to put my brigade into it. McCook had sent several times to Gilbert for reinforcements, but at first I understood they were refused for the same reason—that he (Gilbert) had no orders from Buell. But finally a brigade of our division, [Colonel Michael] Gooding’s, was sent over to McCook’s support, and [Captain William A.] Hotchkiss’s battery, or part of it, from my brigade to accompany it. This brigade was pretty badly cut up in a short time, as it was rushed into the conflict without knowing well where it was going.
The Perryville Battlefield (Century)
Finally, about 3:30 P.M., Mitchell came to me and told me he had orders from Gilbert for me to go into action at once. Before this time Sheridan’s division had been placed in line to the right of McCook, apparently to hold the ground and prevent the advance of the enemy towards McCook’s right. What Sheridan’s instructions were I do not know, but his line was skirmishing briskly with the enemy when I was ordered forward. In order to get a good position I marched my brigade by flank through a gap in Sheridan’s line, and then formed the Thirty-eighth and Twenty-first Illinois in line, and left the One Hundred First Ohio and Fifteenth Wisconsin in column marching by the flank. On the right of the line formed by the Twenty-first and Thirty-eighth Illinois was Hotchkiss’s Second Minnesota Battery. We had no sooner formed line than the Rebels in our front were faced about and marched leisurely to the rear at right shoulder arms.
But they had a battery that fired at us incessantly. To draw that fire away from the infantry, I directed Hotchkiss’s battery to advance with the infantry line and seize every opportunity to open fire on the opposing battery. The infantry and the battery advanced steadily without halting, except when the battery came to a convenient knoll or ridge it unlimbered and opened fire on the Rebel battery, which continued to recede until it had passed through the town of Perryville and taken position on the high ground beyond, where it continued its fire for some time after dark.
During this advance it became so dark that it was difficult to see what was in front or on either flank, but I continued the advance till we reached the garden stone fences on the north side of Perryville, where my line was halted. I threw out a strong picket to the left of my line, which reached a road running from the town back northeasterly to the main Rebel army, which had fought McCook all day. This picket there captured two or more caissons belonging to the Washington Artillery of New Orleans, with an escort of nearly one hundred men. The caissons were loaded with ammunition, and were going to their front, which was to our rear and left. Several surgeons were with these caissons and escort. The prisoners were all sent to the rear and reported to General Buell.
Soon afterwards an order was received from General Buell directing me to return the horses and arms taken from these surgeons. It was now so dark that we could see the campfires of the Rebels to our rear and left, and their men walking to and fro along their line, and could hear their talk. Some of my officers and men went down to a spring under a house, and there found Rebel soldiers getting water from the same spring. After I had passed the Rebel line and saw myself far in his rear, I longed to wheel my brigade to the left and sweep up his line, then in their bivouac and unconscious of danger. How I longed for two or three thousand more men. I felt perfectly sure that if I could have had eight thousand men at that point I could have wheeled to the left and taken the main body of Bragg’s army then on the field on the left flank and rear, and could have driven it up against Dodd’s Fork, the high, steep bluffs of which they could not easily have crossed, and could have captured them all.
That was a great disappointment to me—not to have that opportunity. About 9:00 P.M. General Mitchell came to me and ordered me to return towards my former position about a mile and to remain there till morning, which was done at once, without opposition from the enemy. During the night I received orders, through Captain J. Edward Stacey of General Gilbert’s staff, to be ready to advance against the enemy the next morning at seven. The hour came, but no further orders. Now and then a bullet would drop near me, but whence it came I could not tell. About 10:00 A.M. a long line of Rebel cavalry was seen on the heights south of Perryville moving southeastwardly; still no orders to advance reached me; but about 11:00 A.M. I was ordered to move to my left, and we passed over ground occupied by the Rebel line of battle on the previous day and saw the dead of both armies—the Federals in line as they fell.
At one point we marched by a line of muskets lying on the ground in a straight line, as if the troops (Confederates) to which they belonged had formally thrown them down to an enemy. How they happened to be abandoned there I never learned. About a mile from my bivouac of the night before we found the Rebel hospital, with their wounded, abandoned on the field. We moved on in the direction of Harrodsburg, and to within about four miles of that place, as well as I remember, apparently trying to beat up Bragg’s army in the fields or woods of that region. But we couldn’t find them or even hear of them. The people there seemed utterly astonished when asked if Bragg’s army was lying around in their neighborhood. They hadn’t seen or heard anything of it.
A few days afterwards my brigade began to think we had got on a hot trail, and came close enough to produce considerable sickness and fatigue among many of the new troops who had joined the army at Louisville, causing them to fall out of ranks in large numbers. It was in the vicinity of Lancaster that we had some skirmishing with Rebel cavalry, said to be John [Hunt] Morgan. They held us back more than seemed reasonable; there was heavy lively dueling between batteries, and lively skirmishing—the cavalry dismounted and fighting, apparently, for every inch of ground, but constantly giving way before us.
It was at Lancaster that the Rebel cavalry disappeared from our front entirely, and was not seen or heard of again on that campaign. They had followed Bragg to Crab Orchard, and out of Kentucky. Buell’s army, after he had learned certainly that Bragg was escaping from the state, was headed toward Crab Orchard, and marched vigorously to that point. A division under [Brigadier General] W. Sooy Smith was beyond Crab Orchard, on the road toward Cumberland Gap. But it was too late to attempt to overtake Bragg or to intercept his march to Eastern Tennessee.
The result of the Battle at Perryville was not quite so great a disappointment to me as the evacuation of Corinth without any fight at all; but still it was a disappointment. I have read about all that has been published on the history of this battle, and especially General Fry’s book on Buell’s campaign, and I believe I understand how it happened that Buell did not concentrate his army on October 7 and attack Bragg on the eighth. General Buell’s headquarters were in a hollow; the sound from McCook’s battle passed over the ridges on either side of his headquarters without being distinctly heard there. He had been thrown from his horse the day before and was stunned, being compelled, consequently, to keep to his tent. Thomas had gone far from the point where he was needed, in order to find water for his troops. McCook had brought on the fight under the plea of getting water for his troops, and had neglected to notify Buell that he was engaged in a life and death struggle. He sent to Gilbert for reinforcements, but not to Buell. Finally, when he was thoroughly used up, he reported the situation to Buell. It was, perhaps, too late then to make new dispositions for battle. But, as I looked at it then, if Gilbert’s entire corps had been wheeled to the left and attacked the enemy in front of McCook, after the latter was beaten, Bragg’s army—at least, all that was on that field—would have been thoroughly routed, and probably captured.
It is not intended as a reflection on General McCook to say that at that time some of his friends desired to see him elevated to the command of the Army of the Ohio, and it was pretty evident that nothing but a victory of that army under Buell’s command could save the latter from supersedure [sic]. It is not going beyond the probabilities of the situation to say that McCook’s ambition accorded with this view of his friends. It is probable that these influences account for the Battle of Perryville on October 8, 1862, which was fought without Buell’s knowledge, though within cannon shot of his headquarters.
The hostility to General Buell was growing rapidly, and it required a great victory to turn the tide that was swelling up against him. I do not intimate that this hostility was just or well founded. But it was fostered by leading governors and politicians of the Northwestern states. McCook was the most conspicuous of the many brothers and cousins who entered the service from Ohio with high rank. His brother, George W., was an intimate associate of Secretary [of War Edwin M.] Stanton, and a prominent politician. He visited the army immediately after the Battle of Perryville, and that change of command of the Army of the Ohio was certainly hinted at during that visit.
The failure of McCook to notify Buell of the state of affairs was certainly inconsiderate toward Buell. But, in light of many campaigns and battles since that of Perryville, I was never able to understand why Buell did not find out in some other way that a fight was in progress near his person that might defeat [his] own plans, and might have resulted in general disaster to his army. Believing always in the pure integrity, patriotism, and ability of Buell as a commander, I still have never been able to satisfy my own mind for the mistake he made on October 8, 1862, which consisted chiefly in not watching his corps commanders through his staff, and thus preventing any partial engagement that might inure to the glory of one subordinate at the expense of the commander, of the army, and of the country. There is hardly a doubt that if McCook had been entirely successful in his fight he would have been appointed Buell’s successor without loss of time. Taking all things together, it may be said that Gilbert, who was not a general at all, commanded his corps quite as well as any corps commander who was a real major general and, in my opinion, was right in refusing to move without orders from Buell.
