ON THE NIGHT of June 25, 1996, two men drove a tanker truck into the Saudi compound that surrounded the American sector at the al-Khobar military establishment near Dhahran. Earlier the truck had tried to get into the foreigners’ compound, where U.S. soldiers lived, but was rebuffed because of the late hour. The men parked the truck against the external barrier some 80 to 100 feet from Building 31. They got out of the cab and drove away in a waiting white Chevrolet Caprice, a common car in Saudi Arabia. Three to four minutes later the truck exploded.
The enormous explosion killed dozens, including nineteen American servicemen, and wounded hundreds, many of whom were badly burned and blinded. The entire front of the nearby high-rise building collapsed, and buildings up to a quarter of a mile away sustained minor structural damage and broken glass windows.
The Dhahran bomb was a sophisticated directional charge constructed with 5,000 pounds of military-class high explosives reinforced by tanks of incendiary material that created a secondary blast and also shock and heat waves. The bomb was constructed by expert bomb makers who not only knew how to shape the explosives and incendiary materials to achieve maximum effect but also were able to perfectly place and install a very sophisticated electronic fuse system. The bomb was installed in an ordinary Mercedes Benz tanker truck that had been stolen a few days beforehand.
DURING THE FIRST MONTHS of 1996 Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri were involved in a host of logistical and organizational activities that would later prove of immense strategic and political importance. In Iran the prudent and sophisticated Islamist leaders were absorbing the lessons of the 1995 operations. In the early months of 1996 Tehran started laying the foundations for the next phase in the terroristic jihad, establishment of the HizbAllah International, with bin Laden in a senior position. The significance of this organization for the prevailing terrorist threat was demonstrated in its first strikes: the bombing of the U.S. barracks in Khobar, Saudi Arabia; the downing of TWA800; and the assassination of a U.S. intelligence officer in Cairo. The Iranians now clearly acknowledged not only the importance of the “Afghans” and the other Sunni Islamist radicals but also the distinction of their chosen leaders—specifically, bin Laden and Zawahiri.
International terrorism, like any other human endeavor requiring personal sacrifice, is driven by theological zeal and/or nationalist fervor. Leaders decide to bomb a certain place, logistical masters get the explosives into place, and the expert bomb makers design and build the bomb. But ultimately, in human terms, the few individuals on the spot face the greatest challenge. They risk life and limb, they risk capture and most likely torture and execution, and, in the case of suicidal operations, they face death without flinching. The individual perpetrator-terrorist can overcome these challenges only through psychological tempering and immense conviction in the righteousness of the acts to be performed. That others consider the terrorist act evil is irrelevant, for the martyr-to-be driving the bomb-loaded vehicle is convinced that he is doing God’s work.
At the beginning of the 1990s, as the terrorist campaign picked up speed, its leaders paid little attention to this human element. At the root of the problem lay the simple reality that Iran was Shiite, whereas the bulk of the Islamist terrorists were Sunni—in other words, Khomeini’s incitement was not enough to inspire and energize these Sunni terrorists. They looked for inspiration from their own Sunni Islamist world beliefs. And although the abstract and intellectual issues concerning the use of force had been resolved by Turabi and contemporary Sunni intellectuals in the early 1990s, bringing Sunni radicalism and militancy closer to the Khomeinist Shiite doctrine, communication of these important theoretical-theological developments to the rank-and-file terrorists was slow and incomplete. As the campaign of Islamist terrorism picked up momentum and a growing number of terrorists were committed to action, the issue of how a high command dominated by Shiite Iranians could inspire and energize the Sunni expert terrorists could no longer be ignored by the high command and leading ideologists.
The question of Shiite-Sunni inspiration and cooperation came up just as the international community was paying closer attention to Iran as a leading terrorist state. Events in the 1990s led to the West’s “rediscovery” of Iran: First came the widespread fear of Iraqi-sponsored terrorism during the Gulf War, followed by spectacular terrorist strikes, such as the World Trade Center bombing and the assassination in Western Europe of “enemies of the Revolution,” traced to Tehran. The aggregate impact of these events was an increase in Western awareness of and willingness to fight terrorism, whether sponsored by Iran, Iraq, or any other nation or group. Although Tehran was able to carry out a few spectacular operations during this period, most notably the two bombs in Buenos Aires in 1992 and 1994 and the World Trade Center bombing in 1993, Tehran was aware of the urgent need to thoroughly reexamine the modalities of its terrorism sponsorship. After Iran addressed these two issues—the growing prominence and importance of the Sunni Islamists, mainly the “Afghans,” and the need to reduce the profile of its direct operations—Islamist international terrorism took a jump in quality the West is only beginning to face.
During 1995, while Iran and other nations sponsored the series of spectacular terrorist strikes throughout the Middle East, the Iranians thoroughly studied the role of intelligence and the organization of intelligence services required for contemporary operations. They also fully investigated the question of the human element, in particular theological motivation, as it pertained to the new generation of terrorists. Senior Iranian officers and officials conducted lengthy discussions, sometimes spanning several days, with the leaders of the Islamist jihadist trends to better understand their beliefs, motivations, emotions, and fears. The results were implemented in the first half of 1996 in the most profound change in Iranian intelligence since Khomeini’s Islamic Revolution. The establishment of the HizbAllah International reflected this new direction in state-sponsored international terrorism.
Central to the April 1996 reorganization of the Iranian intelligence system was the establishment of the Supreme Council for Intelligence Affairs directly under President Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani. The two main areas allocated funds and assets were internal security and the export of the Islamic Revolution—that is, foreign intelligence and terrorism sponsorship. The major expansion of the system for the export of the Islamic Revolution included the destabilization of the West as a primary challenge.
A critical aspect of this reform was that Dr. Mahdi Chamran Savehi, who was nominated chief of the organization External Intelligence, took over the entire system of international terrorism, including the al-Quds Forces. Over the last decade Chamran has been in charge of Tehran’s primary venue of confrontation with the Great Satan, the United States. His selection as chief demonstrates how crucial the whole issue of international terrorism was for Tehran.
Dr. Mahdi Chamran Savehi, who was born around 1940, is one of the key intellectuals serving the Islamic Revolution. The brother of Mostafa Chamran Savehi, father of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards, who was killed in 1982, Mahdi Chamran has impeccable revolutionary credentials. He was a physics student in California in the late 1950s. In 1965, still in California, the Chamran brothers established a guerrilla organization, Red Shiism, to prepare Iranian fighters for the revolutionary struggle. In 1968 the Chamran brothers established the Muslim Students’ Association of America, which attracted a large number of members, including future leaders of the Khomeini revolution.
When Mostafa moved to Lebanon in 1971 to join a Palestinian terrorist organization, Mahdi remained in the United States and assumed command of the organization. Since 1968 he had served as an active Islamist terrorist and intelligence operative for radical Palestinians and their Soviet sponsors. In the meantime he received a Ph.D. in nuclear physics.
Mahdi Chamran returned to Iran soon after the revolution and joined the IRGC high command. In the late 1980s he was assigned primary responsibility for formulating contingency plans for the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf, including the confrontation with the United States in 1986–88, when the U.S. Navy destroyed Iranian oil installations in the Persian Gulf with the excuse that the United States was protecting Arab oil exports. In reality the United States provided tremendous assistance—military, moral, and financial—to the Iraqi war effort, a situation not lost on Tehran. Mahdi was made the senior official in charge of planning in the Iranian General Command Headquarters. He was also involved with various programs in electronic intelligence and advanced military production, which put him in touch with the Soviets and acquainted him with their military technology. Until 1996 Mahdi Chamran remained a senior official of the General Command Headquarters in the planning branch, drawing war plans, and concentrated on the integration of nuclear weapons into Iran’s contingency plans, especially those concerning the struggle against the United States for dominance of the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula. In summer 1993 he surfaced with a high position in Iranian intelligence, with responsibility over illegal technology acquisition for strategic programs such as military nuclear projects; he also had responsibility for weapons development and production.
By mid-1995 Chamran had become increasingly involved in Iran’s subversive and terrorist operations. Key HizbAllah leaders from Lebanon met him during their working visits to Iran, in particular to coordinate training and operational preparations. In retrospect, these meetings were held to help Chamran prepare for his next major assignment—his April 1996 nomination as chief of External Intelligence. Since mid-1996 Chamran has maintained a public profile. His official title is head of the general staff of the Armed Forces’ Office for Cultural Affairs. He has a higher political and media profile, which may indicate a growing interest in a public political office.
If in late 1995 Tehran needed any reminder of the importance of the Sunni Islamists and especially the up-and-coming “Afghan” leaders, the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina over implementation of the U.S.-sponsored Dayton Accords or retention of the Muslim character of Bosnia’s government provided one. The Dayton Accords was the U.S.-inspired and -imposed agreement aimed at ending the fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina and establishing a unified, ostensibly multinational state shielded by the presence of U.S.-led NATO peace enforcement units. The timid reaction of the Clinton administration to the eruption in early April of the “Iran-Bosnia scandal,” when the Clinton White House looked the other way as Iran shipped weapons and fighters to the Muslim forces in Bosnia in violation of U.N. sanctions, emboldened Tehran. Washington’s reluctance to confront both Tehran and Sarajevo over the remaining Iranian intelligence and military personnel in Bosnia-Herzegovina convinced Tehran that the Clinton administration would not retaliate firmly to a major terrorist strike. This Iranian assessment was confirmed in early June when Washington used numerous international venues to entice Tehran into entering “a full and frank dialogue” with the Clinton administration. Tehran interpreted this initiative as a demonstration of America’s weakness and lack of resolve.
By now the Islamist elite forces established by bin Laden and Zawahiri in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1994 were fully organized and well deployed. The terrorist forces were concealed as elite units of the Bosnian army or as members of Islamist “humanitarian work” and “charity” organizations. One of the principal terrorist forces ready to strike at American forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina was made up of bin Laden’s Saudi “Afghans.” Because these veteran “Afghans” had served with Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan, he felt particularly responsible for their well-being. Bin Laden directed resources to them and ensured that they were assigned some of the most difficult and lethal missions in the Bosnian jihad so that they had the best chances for heroism and martyrdom.
Back in late 1995, once it had become clear that I-FOR, enforcing the implementation of the Dayton Accords, was to be deployed to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Ayman al-Zawahiri moved his headquarters to a Sofia suburb and started using the name Muhammad Hassan Ali. Soon after he activated a rear senior headquarters for anti-West/anti-U.S. operations in the Balkans. Bulgaria became the key headquarters for deniable operations so as not to embarrass Sarajevo. In mid-November 1995 some twenty to twenty-five senior Islamist commanders met in Sofia to discuss the new wave of operations in the aftermath of Fuad Talat Qassim’s August arrest in Zagreb and extradition to Cairo, where he was tortured and probably executed. They also discussed the inevitable deployment of I-FOR to Bosnia-Herzegovina. On November 20, 1995, these Islamists “announced” the emergence of their center in Bulgaria, sending a gunman to open fire on the Egyptian Embassy—a reminder to the Egyptian government not to look too closely at the Islamists’ activities in Sofia.
In early 1996, confident in his ability to maintain secure, solid lines of communication to the Islamist terrorist forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Zawahiri ordered the deployment of key experts capable of planning, overseeing, and leading major terrorist strikes against such objectives as U.S./ I-FOR facilities. The arrival of forty Egyptian terrorists was the first major forward deployment for this purpose. Additional Iranian and other Islamist expert terrorists continued to arrive in Bosnia-Herzegovina in April 1996 in anticipation of a possible resumption of war when Muslim Bosnians threatened to reclaim Serb-held lands.
Tehran could not ignore the fact that the terrorist elements ready to strike and deter the United States on its behalf were Sunni “Afghans.” Committed and dedicated as these terrorists were, they were also fiercely loyal to their own spiritual leaders and commanders. Through this devotion they were integrated into the international Islamist terrorist movement. With the role of the Sunni Islamists so central, it became imperative for Tehran to demonstrate to the devout and overcommitted Sunnis that their spiritual authorities and direct leaders, the people who told them to kill and die, were indeed respected. Tehran resolved to promote the rising stars of Sunni Islamist terrorism—the charismatic commanders, especially those with extensive experience in Afghanistan, Kashmir, Bosnia, and the Middle East, such as Zawahiri and bin Laden—to key and distinct leadership positions in the international Islamist movement that Tehran sponsored. Tehran was adamant about avoiding any schism and mistrust just as the new strategy of spectacular terrorism was being formulated.
It took a few months for the Iranians to complete the modification of their intelligence system and bring it into operational status. In early June the highest authorities in Tehran were confident of their capabilities. Tehran made a major decision to markedly escalate the Islamist armed struggle—spectacular terrorism—all over the world under the banner of a rejuvenated HizbAllah. In his Friday sermon on June 7, 1996, Iran’s spiritual leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, declared that the HizbAllah must reach “all continents and all countries.”
In early June Tehran resolved to transform the HizbAllah into “the vanguard of the revolution” in the Muslim world. Toward this end Tehran organized an important terrorist summit whose primary objective would be setting up an international coordination committee to oversee the anticipated escalation. Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, known to be close to Ayatollah Khamenei and very active in terrorism-related issues, emerged as the official spokesman for the new HizbAllah International. The HizbAllah International was established during a terrorist summit held in Tehran on June 21–23, 1996, organized jointly by the Supreme Council for Intelligence Affairs and IRGC high command. Tehran invited a large number of senior leaders of Iranian-sponsored terrorist organizations to discuss the establishment of a joint working committee—the HizbAllah International—that would come under the jurisdiction of the IRGC and Chamran’s External Intelligence. Tehran was determined to ensure global cooperation, and the conference was attended by delegates from terrorist organizations throughout the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and North America. After lengthy discussions and deliberations the participants at the summit issued a joint communiqué in which they agreed to set up a coordinating committee to better unify their actions and attacks.
Most important were the senior commanders who attended and agreed to integrate their forces into the new HizbAllah International framework. They included Ramadan Shallah (head of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad); Ahmad Salah, also known as Salim (Egyptian Islamic Jihad); Imad Mughaniyah (Lebanese HizbAllah’s Special Operations Command); Muhammad Ali Ahmad (a representative of Osama bin Laden); Ahmad Jibril (head of the PFLP-GC, or Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—General Command); Imad al-Alami and Mustafa al-Liddawi (HAMAS); Abdallah Ocalan (head of the Kurdish People Party, the terrorist organization fighting against Turkey); an envoy of Turkey’s Islamic Party, Refah; and a representative of George Habbash (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine). Leaders of the Islamic Change Movement also participated in the conferences as part of a small group of key organizations, including the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and HAMAS, that were identified as operating under Tehran’s “inspiration.” In other words, Iran gives these organizations the highest level of trust even though the groups are Sunni. Leaders of other Arab Islamist organizations with close ties to Tehran also attended the summit.
The summit participants agreed on the unification of their financial system and the unification and standardization of the training of HizbAllah supporters in more than thirty countries to establish interoperability of both individual terrorists and strike forces. That way a force from any country would be able to deploy at the last minute to any part of the world, operating and interacting effectively with the local Islamist forces. This flexibility would increase the surprise factor. Supervision of the new training system would be conducted through al-Quds Forces and Iranian intelligence, and there would be a marked expansion of the high-quality, expert training provided through al-Quds Forces to foreign operatives and terrorists all over the world.
A vital step was the establishment of the Committee of Three directly under Mahdi Chamran for the “coordination, planning, and attacks” by the new HizbAllah International. The committee members were Imad Mughaniyah, Ahmad Salah (Salim), and Osama bin Laden. Two of these three—bin Laden and Salah—are Sunnis. Their nomination to such high positions served as clear proof that Tehran recognized the centrality and importance of the Sunni Islamists. But Tehran did not relinquish control. The summit resolved that the Committee of Three would meet every month to go over operational proposals from the various Islamist terrorist organizations, decide on the most appropriate ones, and submit these to Chamran for Iran’s approval. Special emphasis would be put on “operations designed to destabilize the [Persian] Gulf area and to weaken the countries of the region.”
The first operational decision of the new Committee of Three was to recommend the execution of three terrorist operations, all of them already in the last phases of preparation. These operations represented the personal priorities of the three principals of the committee: First, the bombing of the U.S. barracks in al-Khobar, Dhahran, for Osama bin Laden; second, the fatal stabbing of a U.S. female diplomat for Ahmad Salah (Salim); and third, the downing of TWA800 for Imad Mughaniyah. The ideological justification of these operations reveals the overall logic of the perpetrators. All the related communiqués stressed the regional justifications for the operations in the context of the ongoing escalatory dynamics of the global anti-U.S. jihad.
The importance of the emergence of the HizbAllah International was its doctrinal and command roles. Virtually all major and spectacular terrorist strikes are state sponsored, and they are not hasty undertakings. The key perpetrators of these terrorist strikes are dedicated and disciplined operatives, completely under the control of the intelligence services of the terrorism-sponsoring states.
Although formally conducted under the leadership of the HizbAllah International, these three operations had actually been in preparation since at least mid-1995. Their implementation and execution were conducted, however, as the responsibility of the leadership of the HizbAllah International, specifically the Committee of Three. The new mechanism for decision making concerning worldwide spectacular terrorist strikes introduced under the banner of the HizbAllah International had already given the go-ahead order for the execution of these strikes. Enabling the Committee of Three to formally authorize the carrying out of major operations—even if the technical and operational aspects of the strikes themselves had been prepared well in advance—proved Tehran’s commitment to the new era of cooperation with the Sunni terrorist elite.
THE KHOBAR TOWERS BOMBING near Dhahran was a highly professional operation, reflecting meticulous preparation. Lengthy collection of intelligence and on-site observations led to the selection of primary (inside) and fallback (perimeter) sites for the placement of the tanker bomb. The availability of a getaway car and ready concealment for the perpetrators also showed the professionalism of the network. The mere accumulation of such large quantities of military-grade high explosives and incendiary materials, the availability of sophisticated fuses, and the actual design and construction of the bomb itself all pointed to a highly sophisticated, expert network. All these preparations were completed in great secrecy by a security-conscious network. Not even a general warning was given about the operation, despite the spreading tentacles of the Saudi police state, with its numerous, overlapping, competing internal security organs, and the ruthless dragnets against real and suspected Islamists that had taken place since fall 1995.
As is true of the overall convoluted policies and political developments in Saudi Arabia, the circumstances that led to the Dhahran bombing were dominated by the drive to consolidate tangible power in the post-Fahd era. The spasmodic and dramatic eruptions in this complicated process, such as spectacular terrorist strikes, were the outcome of the symbiotic relationship between the two main currents in the Saudi power structure: (1) the internal succession and power struggle within the House of al-Saud and (2) the escalating indigenous, widely popular Islamist quest for an Islamic revolution in Saudi Arabia and the establishment of an Islamist government. Although in essence indigenous, all the key players sought and profited from a web of foreign sponsors and supporters. Because of the high strategic stakes involved, the key foreign sponsors, in particular Iran and its allies, assumed dominant roles in manipulating the indigenous developments in Saudi Arabia.
The series of developments leading to the June 25 explosion in Dhahran were all phases in the intensifying struggle for the shape of a post-Fahd Saudi Arabia. The two players who acted as the primary catalysts for this escalatory process were Osama bin Laden and Ayatollah Khamenei of Iran. Although the power-struggle machinations within the House of al-Saud had created conditions conducive to a spectacular terrorist strike, the actual perpetrators came from the ranks of Saudi Islamist “Afghan” and “Balkan” networks, sponsored and sustained by Osama bin Laden but tightly controlled by Tehran through Iranian and allied intelligence services. The Saudi Islamists, their sponsors and allies, could not and would not have carried out the operation without specific and explicit orders from Tehran, orders that were ultimately determined on the basis of Iran’s own strategic interests.
The immediate crisis began with the debilitation of King Fahd in late 1995. The nomination of Prince Abdallah, the crown prince, as acting ruler of Saudi Arabia exposed deep mistrust in his leadership throughout vast segments of the House of al-Saud. In late February 1996 King Fahd formally resumed power, not only refusing to abdicate and go into exile but also insisting on holding on to power even though his lucidity was limited at best. The already uncertain position of Prince Abdallah as heir apparent deteriorated further, and the succession struggle intensified with growing anticipation of King Fahd’s death.
Three distinct factions within the House of al-Saud were fighting for the Saudi throne in 1995–96: (1) the increasingly isolated Prince Abdallah; (2) the younger-generation Sudairis led by Prince Bandar and enjoying the support of his father, Prince Sultan, a full brother of the king; and (3) the Salman-Nayif group, led by two other full brothers of King Fahd, who offered Prince Salman as a compromise king instead of the other two candidates. The Sudairis are the seven children King Ibn Saud had with his beloved wife Hassa al-Sudairi. The sons, King Fahd and his six full brothers, are very close to one another.
In December 1995, once the gravity of King Fahd’s debilitation had been ascertained, the king’s Sudairi brothers—Sultan, Salman, and Nayif—tried to form a coalition to bolster their joint position. With Prince Abdallah, only a half brother of King Fahd, formally in power, the Sudairis decided to join forces in a conspiracy to undermine the prospects of Crown Prince Abdallah’s faction. By early 1996 the efforts to thwart the Abdallah faction had markedly intensified, but the gap between the two Sudairi factions continued to grow.
The first shot in this campaign had been fired when, exploiting a visit by Prince Abdallah to the Gulf Summit in Muscat in December 1995, Prince Sultan, the defense minister, summoned members of the Supreme Council of the ulema and demanded their support for what Islamist sources call “a peaceful coup leading to his [Sultan’s] proclamation as heir apparent.” The issue of Islamist terrorism as a factor in the succession struggle was first brought up in this context. Prince Sultan also asked the ulema to support his effort to dismiss Prince Abdallah from the position of head of the National Guard because the November 1995 bombing in Riyadh, an inside job, proved Prince Abdallah’s inability to ensure the loyalty of the Guards.
This was an audacious if not desperate move by Prince Sultan. Prince Abdallah is a devout Islamist and a staunch supporter of the ulema’s political power. He is also a staunch supporter of pan-Arab and pan-Islamic causes, including worldwide jihads, and moreover is anti-Western and mistrustful of the United States. The Abdallah faction is convinced that the United States is conspiring to empower Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the Saudi ambassador to Washington, because of his close relations with official Washington. The official ulema is therefore a natural ally of Prince Abdallah. Members of the ulema not only refused to support Prince Sultan, citing his close ties to the United States as the reason for his unsuitability for the throne, but also reported the conspiracy to Prince Abdallah.
In fact, the Abdallah faction felt shamed by the November 1995 Islamist terrorist attack against the National Guard in Riyadh and was increasingly worried by Salman-Nayif’s widely publicized struggle against Islamic terrorism and the political gains that resulted. In February 1996, with King Fahd refusing to abdicate and leave the country, Prince Abdallah needed to find a drastic solution to the growing threat to his power and posture from the Sudairi brothers.
Salvation came from Damascus. Prince Abdallah has unique and close relations with Damascus, in particular the Assad clan, the family of Syria’s president, Hafiz al-Assad. In early spring 1996 some members of Prince Abdallah’s inner circle developed a plan to bring about the downfall of the Sudairis. Syrian intelligence would run a series of low-level anti-American “terrorist operations” that would be attributed to an assortment of Islamist organizations. The conspirators concluded that such a wave of terrorism would shame the Sudairis because they are responsible for internal security (Nayif) and defense relations with the U.S. (Sultan) and reduce American support to the point that they would no longer be eligible for the Saudi throne. Meanwhile Prince Abdallah’s own Royal Guard would “solve” these “terrorist crimes” and destroy the Islamist networks—all provided by the Syrians—further enhancing Abdallah’s popularity and posture. After consulting with his closest military and intelligence aides, President Hafiz al-Assad authorized the beginning of these operations in February 1996.
There was little benevolence in President Assad’s support for the anti-Riyadh terrorism. Beyond repeated and profound conflicts with King Fahd’s Riyadh over relations with Tehran and Baghdad and the extent of Iranian influence in the Persian Gulf, Damascus was receiving special aid from Prince Abdallah. Beginning in the early 1990s, Abdallah had arranged for the tacit transfer of a few billion American dollars from the Saudi treasury for construction of a huge chemical warfare plant at Aleppo, in northern Syria; acquisition of ballistic missiles from North Korea and the People’s Republic of China; and construction of a vast system of underground tunnels to ensure the safety of these surface-to-surface missiles and their chemical warheads. In early 1996, still the acting king, Abdallah promised President Assad to increase Saudi support for the Syrian strategic effort by orchestrating formal Saudi pressure on the Clinton administration to prevent Israel from bombing the Aleppo facilities and the Syrian missile bases and increase Saudi financial assistance to the Syrian strategic buildup.
Preparations for the Syrian special operations began immediately. Syrian experts recommended that emphasis be put on striking U.S. military facilities under the Islamist banner because it would be killing two birds with one shot. The Salman-Nayif faction, whose leaders are responsible for internal security and claim to have suppressed Islamist militancy in the aftermath of the 1995 Riyadh bombing, would be shamed by the fact that there was Islamist terrorism in Saudi Arabia, and the standing of the Sultan faction in both Riyadh and Washington would be badly hurt. Initial preparations had begun by early spring 1996, a joint effort by Syrian and Iranian intelligence. The Syrians had to rely on the excellent Iranian terrorist assets in the Bekáa Valley in Lebanon as well as on their superb networks in Saudi Arabia. It is not clear whether Damascus bothered to inform Prince Abdallah about the close cooperation with the Iranians, whom he both hates and fears. The Syrians and Iranians began running initial operations inside Saudi Arabia, however, ranging from investigation and selection of possible sites to doing what was necessary to bring in terrorists and explosives.
In the meantime, by early 1996, the violence in Karachi, Pakistan, had reached the level of rebellion, and Islamabad was apprehensive that it might spread and escalate to the point of overthrowing the Bhutto administration. For several years Islamabad had blamed the MQM—Muhajir Qaumi Movement, the organization of the Muslim emigrants from India who arrived in Pakistan in 1947–50—for the violence. In January 1996 the ISI learned that MQM leaders had arrived in Mecca to perform the Umra, a minor pilgrimage to Mecca that does not take place during the formal Hajj season, and asked for asylum on the basis of the Bedouin sacred code of hospitality. The Pakistani interior minister, Nasirullah Babar, immediately traveled to Riyadh to meet with his Saudi counterpart, Prince Nayif. Islamabad offered to trade the MQM leaders for a Saudi Islamist leader, Hassan al-Saray, who had been involved in the November 1995 Riyadh bombing and sought refuge in Pakistan. The deal was completed in the first days of February. After torture by both the ISI and Saudi intelligence, Hassan al-Saray betrayed a few of his supporters in the Riyadh area, including the four Saudis arrested and beheaded for the Riyadh bombing. The interrogation exposed the trail by which the Islamists smuggled explosives and terrorists from Syria via Jordan.
In trying to expedite the flow of terrorists and explosives to the Saudi Islamists, Syrian intelligence found it difficult to rely solely on assets and operatives from Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf States. By now, however, Syrian and Iranian intelligence were also markedly intensifying their “Palestinian” operations in and via Jordan against both King Hussein and Israel. Back in the spring of 1995 Syrian and Iranian intelligence had established the joint Jihadist Consultative Council for the entire Palestinian Islamist terrorist movement as well as other Palestinian terrorist organizations sponsored by Tehran and Damascus to ensure sophisticated operations and efficient use of existing assets. By late 1995 these “Palestinian” networks were running large-scale operations so effectively that in early 1996 Damascus and Tehran decided to rely on them to bolster the logistical support for the fledgling operations in Saudi Arabia.
But in March 1996 Jordanian security forces began cracking down on these Syrian operations. Before long the Jordanians learned about the use of their territory for the transfer of terrorists and explosives into Saudi Arabia. From material extracted from al-Saray and other Islamists and data provided by Jordan, the Saudi security forces were able to intercept a Saudi car with more than 84 pounds of various types of high explosives at a Saudi-Jordanian border-crossing point. The car was traveling from the Bekáa, Lebanon, via Syria and Jordan.
In late April 1996 Princes Sultan, Salman, and Nayif decided to use these incidents to bolster their power posture through a heightened scare about Islamist terrorism and subversion. On April 20 Prince Nayif called an unprecedented press conference and warned that additional sabotage attempts could not be ruled out. “We are within the circle of terrorism. We are part of this world and we are being targeted. We cannot rule out the possibility of other attacks,” he said. “But we are alert and our eyes are open to confront any attempt.” He also stressed that all suspects in both the November 1995 bombing in Riyadh and the seizure of explosives at the Jordanian border were Saudis, excluding the possibility of external involvement in terrorism in Saudi Arabia.
A few days later Prince Nayif announced the arrest of the four young Saudi conspirators ostensibly responsible for the Riyadh bombing. That evening Saudi TV aired their confessions. (They claimed that Yemen provided the explosives, despite evidence to the contrary from Hassan al-Saray.) One of them “confessed” to having met Osama bin Laden and to being one of “his men.” This mention, whether correct or not, served to boost the power of the Salman-Nayif faction. Prince Salman had been maintaining clandestine contacts with bin Laden on behalf of Riyadh to channel Saudi support for Islamist jihads worldwide. Riyadh’s approach was cynical and pragmatic—better to keep Saudi militant Islamists and “Afghans” engaged in faraway jihads, even at Riyadh’s expense, than have them return home and agitate the Saudi population. In Riyadh, Prince Salman used these contacts as a proof of his ability to negotiate the cessation of Islamist subversion with bin Laden.
In late April 1996 the Sultan faction was alarmed by the surge in the popularity and power posture of the Salman-Nayif faction within the House of al-Saud. Using King Fahd’s name, Prince Sultan approached the Sudanese president, General Bashir, then in Mecca for the Hajj, and offered Sudan a supply of oil at low prices, a large sum of hard currency, and support in Washington to fight accusations of terrorism sponsorship in return for the expulsion of bin Laden. The deal seemed to have been completed in early May, but Khartoum and bin Laden actually cheated the Saudis. Meanwhile Saudi media affiliated with the Sultan faction, including the main United Kingdom-based Arab periodicals, hailed bin Laden’s “eviction” from Sudan as a major achievement of Saudi diplomacy and a crucial contribution to Saudi internal security.
By April 1996 the Sultan faction had embarked on a bold initiative to ensure its hold on power. In the aftermath of his confrontation with the ulema and because of the widespread popular hostility toward the older generation of the House of al-Saud, Prince Sultan virtually gave up his claim to the throne and began concentrating on ensuring that his son, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, would become the next Saudi king. Prince Sultan invited all the senior and junior members of the Sudairi faction to an urgent session in Riyadh to discuss the transfer of power to the younger generation. Sultan warned the younger princes that unless they formed a solid united front behind him, they would all lose their power and perks. Prince Sultan informed the gathering that Prince Abdallah would soon be coming to power and would surely reduce the Sudairis’ power. Given his own advanced age, however, Abdallah’s reign would be transitional, and the real challenge facing the Sudairi clan was seizing and maintaining power for the younger generation of princes. Prince Sultan virtually demanded support for a next-generation leadership to be formed around Prince Bandar.
Prince Sultan succeeded in gaining King Fahd’s support for this maneuver. Soon afterward Prince Bandar bin Sultan and Prince Muhammad bin Fahd, the king’s son, struck a deal on joint control of the second-generation princes. The secret agreement was blessed by both fathers—King Fahd and Prince Sultan. Prince Bandar started to endear himself to increasingly incapacitated King Fahd to obtain concessions in the bitter power struggle and a royal guarantee of a high-ranking position in the imminent Abdallah Court, from which Prince Bandar should be able to ultimately seize the throne. With Prince Sultan, Bandar’s father, all but secured as the new crown prince to Abdallah’s throne, Prince Bandar’s position was basically secure. In May the Sultan faction was virtually able to guarantee Bandar’s position as the top prince in the second generation of the Sudairis at the expense of Princes Saud al-Faisal, the Saudi foreign minister, and Turki bin Faisal, the Saudi director of intelligence, both sons of Prince Faisal bin Abdul-Aziz, the former king. But later that month Princes Bandar and Muhammad were compelled to accelerate their plans because of the rise in power of the Salman-Nayif faction.
Israeli elections took place in late May 1996, and the rise to power of the security-conscious Likud-led bloc shocked the Arab world. On behalf of King Fahd, Prince Abdallah immediately called for a minisummit with President Mubarak of Egypt and President Assad of Syria. During this summit in Damascus, Prince Abdallah had several quiet meetings with President Assad to discuss the situation in Saudi Arabia. They decided that the resumption of their recently stalled effort to launch a wave of ostensibly Islamist terrorism was urgently needed. Given the inner tensions in Saudi Arabia, even symbolic terrorist strikes would cause mayhem in the country. Abdallah and Assad wanted to ensure that the widespread anger would be directed at the Americans and their “lackeys”—the Sultan faction. With the Salman-Nayif faction equally discredited by the mere threat of terrorism, Prince Abdallah’s National Guard would “save” Saudi Arabia, and Abdallah’s own hold over power would be undisputed.
In Damascus, Prince Abdallah expressed a genuine sense of urgency. By mid-June feuds within the House of al-Saud had reached what Saudi opposition sources called “a boiling point.” In Riyadh military units were placed on alert—a first. The crisis was instigated by a new wild card, Princes Mishaal bin Abdul-Aziz and Talal bin Abdul-Aziz, both about seventy years old, who claimed seniority over the Sudairis because they are the sons of king Abdul-Aziz and demanded the title of crown prince. Prince Sultan, confident that he had already secured the post for himself or his son Bandar, ordered military units in both Riyadh and Jiddah to be put on alert to frighten the newly established Abdul-Aziz faction.
Although this sudden crisis only further fractured the anti-Abdallah forces, it alarmed Abdallah and his Syrian allies. By ordering a military alert, Sultan demonstrated new resolve to struggle for his faction’s power. It became imperative to strike swiftly, to decisively demolish the impression of power and authority the Sultan faction had just established. In early June Prince Abdallah urged Assad to expedite the implementation of their joint designs for a wave of low-level anti-American terrorism in Saudi Arabia.
On June 25, 1996, as if on cue, the tanker bomb exploded in Dhahran, killing nineteen Americans. There is no evidence to suggest Prince Abdallah or any other member of his faction expected such a spectacular and lethal strike. The Abdallah faction was looking for low-level harassment, not a major terrorist strike that only emboldened the Islamist opposition. Apparently Tehran, approached by Damascus to assist in this endeavor, had decided to capitalize on these unique circumstances and deliver a master strike of its own choosing. In so doing, Tehran delivered an unambiguous signal to everybody in Riyadh: Iran is a major regional force in its own right and can cause tremendous problems if its interests are not taken into account.
The launching of the real terrorist campaign was not a hasty undertaking, however. It had been under way since the early 1990s, long before Abdallah asked Syria for help. The main training center for the terrorist elite operating in Arabia remained the Imam Ali department in Saadabad, Iran, and a clandestine IRGC/VEVAK camp some 60 miles south of Tehran. Special emphasis was put on the preparation of clandestine cadres to operate in the Arabian Peninsula in order to destabilize governments and lead Islamic revolutions. To ensure their cover, the Saudi and other Persian Gulf Arabs attending the Imam Ali department traveled to and from Iran through third countries and then Syria. On these trips they used Syrian passports provided by Iranian and Syrian intelligence at their first stop, usually Western Europe, but increasingly also the Far East. Since 1994 these elite terrorist cadres had been organized into what Tehran called “The Gulf Battalion” of al-Quds Forces—Iran’s international force for the spread of the Islamic Revolution.
At the same time the Islamist infrastructure and networks inside Saudi Arabia were being expanded and consolidated. Indicative of the strength of the local Islamist infrastructure was the use of Saudi Arabia in 1995 by cadres of al-Quds Forces and HizbAllah Bahrain as a site for safe meetings between their operatives in Bahrain, the Bahraini senior commanders (then based in Iran and Syria), and Iranian intelligence officers supervising and guiding the preparations and conduct of the Shiite subversion. In late June 1996, after the Bahraini crackdown on the main network of the HizbAllah Bahrain, Tehran decided to demonstrate that Islamist terrorist networks were still operating in Bahrain. VEVAK and HizbAllah Bahrain arranged for a small car bomb to be detonated next to Le Vendome hotel, in the al-Qudaybiyah district of Manama. This operation was actually organized by a Saudi-based Shiite network that constructed the bomb in eastern Saudi Arabia and drove it, in a car with legitimate Saudi Arabian license plates, across the border into Manama.
This was a highly important operation, not because of the magnitude of the bomb, which was small enough to make the operation in essence symbolic, but because it was accomplished at the very same time that the last-minute preparations for the Dhahran bomb were taking place in eastern Saudi Arabia. The concurrent conduct of two operations reflects the redundancy and resilience of the Iranian-controlled terrorist infrastructure in Saudi Arabia and Tehran’s confidence in its ability to run several operations simultaneously without fear of security breaches. Not surprisingly, by early 1996 the Tehran-sponsored terrorist infrastructure in Saudi Arabia was eager and ready to go into action.
Ultimately the Dhahran bomb was the first move in a sustained, escalatory campaign aimed at overthrowing or at least thoroughly destabilizing the House of al-Saud. Although controlled and run by Shiite Iran, this campaign was organized around Saudi Sunni cadres to give “legitimacy” to the claim of a popular uprising.
The Dhahran operation had three main elements: First, the operation demanded advanced reconnaissance, planning, and organization of support infrastructure in the Dhahran area. This element was provided largely by local networks, which were augmented for brief periods by experts. These experts were also responsible for operational security. Most experts arrived from either the Bekáa, via Syria and Jordan, or Pakistan, directly and via third countries. Multiple targets were examined at this stage. One target was initially selected, but other operations were likely also prepared at the time and are probably still ready for implementation. Second, the operation required delivery of supplies, mainly explosives, from the stockpiles of Syrian and Iranian intelligence in the Bekáa and near Damascus. This logistical effort was a buildup of the system already serving the Islamist terrorists in Jordan and Israel. Despite setbacks in March 1996 this venue was still being used for the smuggling of goods and low-level terrorists who completed basic training in HizbAllah camps in the Bekáa. Third, key expert terrorists, mostly Saudi Shiites and Iranians, arrived in Dhahran toward the end of the preparations from bases in Iran, Afghanistan-Pakistan, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, traveling via third countries to Saudi Arabia or to Gulf States from which they were smuggled across the border. These senior experts took over the actual preparations for the bombing, including the construction of the tanker bomb.
Osama bin Laden was involved in key aspects of the Dhahran operation because of his prominence, knowledge, and expertise. His continued involvement in the dynamics of the Saudi Islamist opposition gave him a good understanding of their strong points and weaknesses. He comprehends the inner dynamics of the power struggles in Riyadh that the Islamists were determined to affect. Bin Laden also has a wide following in the ranks of the Saudi “Afghans” and other terrorists operating throughout the world—terrorists who would be recruited to participate in the operation. Bin Laden remained a loyal team player throughout this phase, contributing much to a state-sponsored operation.
For security reasons initial organization of the support system in northeast Saudi Arabia, including the Dhahran area, was based on local Sunni assets, even though the majority of the population in the area is Shiite and largely friendly to Iran. The support system began operating in late summer 1995, after a few leading Saudi Islamists, including devotees of bin Laden, convened in Beirut with Bahraini and Kuwaiti Islamists, HizbAllah commanders, and Iranian and Syrian intelligence officials. Among the issues discussed were the modalities for the forthcoming expansion of the Islamist terrorist networks in northeastern Saudi Arabia.
Abdul Wahab Khairi, a Saudi Islamist originally from the Dhahran area who participated in the Beirut meeting, was selected to begin establishing networks from the ranks of his own extended family and Islamist acquaintances. With Iranian schooling on the organization of terrorist cells and capitalizing on the widespread hostility to the House of al-Saud, Khairi had no problem laying the foundation for a solid, redundant support system. A special effort was made to include Saudi “Afghans” and “Balkans,” primarily those who had served with bin Laden and were thought to be loyal to him, as the militant core of these networks. But these veterans of internationalist jihad were not fit for command or leadership positions in clandestine networks, so the networks were amateurish and somewhat vulnerable to the ruthless dragnets run by the Saudi security services. For clandestine preparations to succeed, it was imperative to introduce professionalism.
Khairi’s apprehension about the security and efficiency of the local networks, aggravated by the leadership’s worries about possible implications from the material the Saudi security authorities were extracting from Hassan al-Saray, prompted a decision that the highest commanders take a closer look at the state of affairs in northeastern Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. A few senior commanders, including bin Laden himself (who by now was traveling at great risk because of the Saudi hunt for him), arrived in Qatar in mid-January 1996 for brief consultations with the on-site commanders. They surveyed the status of the ongoing preparations and discussed several possibilities and potential contingency plans. They decided that although conditions in the theater lent themselves to a spectacular operation, a marked improvement in the professional skills of the local networks was direly needed.
Consequently dozens of Saudi Sunni Islamist youth were recruited in early 1996 in northeastern Saudi Arabia and sent to the Bekáa for four to six weeks of study in terrorism and clandestine activity in HizbAllah camps, mainly Janta, Anjar, and Baalbek. A few Saudi recruits attended crash courses in field intelligence and operational security in safe houses of Syrian intelligence in the greater Damascus area. All the graduates were then smuggled back to Saudi Arabia, mainly via Syria and Jordan, and assigned to provide professional guidance for the expanding networks.
In early 1996 arrival of the first graduates from Syria had directly improved the preparations for an attack. Guards at the al-Khobar compound had recorded incidents of professional surveillance over several months prior to the bombing. Individuals conducted observations of the al-Khobar compound by driving slowly around the perimeter or using binoculars for lengthy observation from afar. At least one truck tried the strength of the fence by ramming it, and two weeks before the bombing a tanker truck similar to the truck that carried the bomb was seen trying to enter the compound and then driving around. These incidents represent only a fraction of the observation and reconnaissance actually carried out in the months leading to the bombing. Similar incidents were recorded throughout Saudi Arabia, suggesting comparable preparation for strikes against other objectives. The United States, convinced that terrorism did not exist in Saudi Arabia, did nothing in response.
The final phase in the preparations for the bombing in Dhahran began in late April 1996. Iranian intelligence officials who had visited Saudi Arabia during the Hajj season returned to Tehran in late April, convinced of the fragility of the regime and encouraged by the commitment, resolve, and skills of the Saudi Islamists. Exploiting the chaos and huge crowds in Mecca, VEVAK operatives had the opportunity to meet with Saudi Islamists and gain a firsthand impression of their capabilities. Back in Tehran, Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati strongly recommended a marked escalation in the Islamist assault on the House of al-Saud. Ayatollah Khamenei and President Hashemi-Rafsanjani agreed.
Two types of expert terrorists arrived in Saudi Arabia in spring 1996 for brief sojourns. The first round of expert terrorists, mostly Saudi HizbAllah (Shiites), Sunni “Afghans,” “Balkans,” and Iranian operatives, began arriving in Dhahran in early May 1996. Originating from bases in Iran, Afghanistan-Pakistan, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, they traveled to Saudi Arabia or to Gulf States. Some of the Iranians were then smuggled across the Saudi border. The terrorist experts arrived in small numbers, two or three operatives at a time. They inspected the site of the intended operation and the sites of a few alternate fallback objectives to ensure that the contingency plans agreed on in Tehran fit the field conditions. Some experts inspected the stored explosives and other materials to ensure their operability. Other experts, mainly Saudis, checked the reliability and commitment of the local Islamist networks.
The second round of expert terrorists began arriving in Dhahran in early June. These terrorists were predominantly Shiites; the Saudis and Gulf Arabs among them had been recruited a few years before while studying in Iran and had since been trained under the supervision of Brigadier Ahmad Sherifi of IRGC intelligence. For obvious security reasons these teams stayed out of touch with the local networks except for a few of Iran’s own agents in place. These senior experts now took over the actual preparations for the bombing, including construction of the tanker bomb.
One of the visiting expert terrorists who was captured and is still imprisoned by the Saudi security authorities testifies to the importance of these initial inspection visits. Mahmud Abdul Aziz, also known as Abu Abdul Aziz, was the organizer and commander of the mujahideen forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992. By then Mahmud Abdul Aziz was a veteran of six years of fighting in Afghanistan under Ahmad Shah Massud, the legendary mujahideen commander from the Panjshir Valley in northeastern Afghanistan, and had fought for “the sacred cause” in the Philippines and Kashmir; he had also conducted clandestine operations in Africa for Sudan’s Hassan al-Turabi. In the mid-1990s Mahmud Abdul Aziz devoted most of his time to the Kashmiri jihad and to organizing Islamist clandestine networks in the United States. He was in Saudi Arabia ostensibly to perform the Umra. But the Saudis had learned from Hassan al-Saray about the role of Mahmud Abdul Aziz in the organization of militant Islamist networks and promptly arrested him, violating the sanctity of the Umra and Mecca. Mahmud Abdul Aziz is still in detention in a Saudi Arabian prison. That a leader as senior as Mahmud Abdul Aziz risked a trip to Saudi Arabia testifies to the importance assigned to the Islamist struggle against Riyadh.
By spring 1996 the logistic push through Jordan was picking up pace. Given the magnitude of the push and the intensity of the concurrent support for the Palestinian Islamists, it was inevitable that both operations would eventually mix as well as share resources, such as high explosives, from the same basic stockpiles. Despite the effectiveness of the Jordanian and Israeli intelligence services, the supply effort of the Saudi Islamist networks proved quite resilient. Additional evidence of the flow of explosives and terrorist systems between the HizbAllah camps in the Bekáa and Saudi Arabia came in spring 1996, when the Jordanian authorities captured equipment used to assemble suicide bombs on its way to Saudi Arabia. Exactly the same kind of equipment had been used to assemble the suicide bomb detonated in Tel Aviv’s Dizengoff Center on March 4, 1996. The periodic loss of shipments of weapons or explosives was of little strategic importance. The Syrians and the Iranians had huge stockpiles and, because they had begun to push supplies well in advance, could easily replace captured shipments without any impact on overall operational schedules.
The capture of people while traveling through Jordan was another matter. As a rule, the Saudis returning from the Bekáa camps traveled clean, with proper documents and without anything such as printed material, weapons, or explosives that might indicate they had just been to a terrorist training base. They had no intelligence knowledge other than the identity of some of their cell comrades. Some were captured carrying Islamist literature, however, while others could not resist stopping on the way to consult with Saudi guides or “assist” their Palestinian brothers. It was during such a meeting that the Jordanians arrested Sheikh Abu Muhammad Isam al-Maqdisi, a leading Palestinian Islamist spiritual guide. Al-Maqdisi is the author of several inflammatory books and leaflets that declare that the leaders of Arab states, in particular the Saudi government and body of senior ulema, are unbelievers. These public writings stop short of inciting violence. Al-Maqdisi’s arrest provided the first authoritative glance into the ideological motivation for the terrorism campaign launched by the Saudi Islamist movement.
By June the bulk of the components of the bomb—high explosives, incendiary materials, and sophisticated fuses—were already in Saudi Arabia. The explosives and incendiaries were smuggled from Syria via Jordan. Various bomb-making tools of the types used during training in the Bekáa were also transported via the same route. The sophisticated electronic equipment and fuses were smuggled from Western Europe disguised as computer parts. Some of the main shipments, including the fuses, were actually addressed to the Saudi National Guard, where Islamist sympathizers hid them.
By mid-June the professional, thorough observation and reconnaissance of the al-Khobar area was completed. A few weeks before the local support network had stolen a Caprice, which was later used as the getaway car and abandoned in Dammam, six miles from Dhahran. The Mercedes-Benz tanker truck to be used for the bomb was stolen from a construction company only a few days before the bombing, which means that the sophisticated bomb was constructed on-site just before the operation—in other words, expert bomb makers were on hand on the eve of the bombing. The bomb was a sophisticated directional charge reinforced by tanks of fuel oil mixed with incendiary materials to create the secondary blast and shock and heat waves. The bomb’s oil and incendiary materials were installed so that they would evaporate and explode only a few fractions of a second after the high explosives. Consequently the duration of the pressure wave increased to the point that human organs could not tolerate the pressure. This specific mixture was aimed to kill people and not just destroy huge buildings. This kind of bomb is characteristic of the Iranians and their proteges.
The fuses and detonators used in the Dhahran bomb were identical to those used in high-quality HizbAllah operations in Lebanon and the ones taught in the terrorist training camps in the Bekáa. The bomb must have been constructed and the fuses placed through the small hole at the top of the tanker. It is impossible to, say, remove a wall of the tanker, build the bomb, and then weld the wall back, as smugglers often do when carrying goods to be sold. The heat generated by the welding would have blown up the bomb.
The expert terrorists left Dhahran safely soon after completing the preparations, most likely just before the operation. They left the Saudi operatives—a small cell of HizbAllah members thoroughly trained in numerous camps in Iran and the Bekáa—to carry out the operation. These experts were so important to Tehran that their travel and presence remained completely clandestine, concealed even from the Syrians.
TWO MAJOR CLAIMS of responsibility were made soon after the explosion. The claims cited the names of previously unknown and in essence bogus organizations. The claims were genuine, however, in that the organizations’ names correctly represented the two major institutions participating in this spectacular operation.
The first claim was made by a caller to the London Arabic newspaper al-Arab. He claimed the attack in the name of a Saudi group calling itself The Legions of the Martyr Abdallah al-Huzayfi. “The [Legions] threatened to undertake further actions against foreign military units without exception unless the Saudi government yields to the group’s demands,” al-Arab reported. The caller added that the Legions of the Martyr Abdallah al-Huzayfi vowed to carry out similar attacks unless Riyadh expelled all U.S. and other foreign troops “occupying the holy Saudi land.” The message was a quintessential Islamist demand.
Abdallah al-Huzayfi had been executed by the Saudis the year before despite having been sentenced earlier to twenty years in prison for murdering a policeman by throwing acid in his face. Huzayfi claimed the policeman had tortured him and members of his family. Riyadh claimed that Huzayfi and several of his followers were arrested for conspiracies against the regime and that arms caches were found in their quarters. At first Huzayfi and his followers received jail terms, but then Huzayfi was beheaded without any forewarning and became a martyr. Huzayfi was made a martyr and a hero by supporters of Sheikh Udah as a symbol of an individual sacrificing life and liberty to fight the evils of Saudi oppression. The use of Huzayfi’s name signaled that the perpetrators were followers of the Islamist line and Sheikh Udah. The language used in the communiqué was identical to that in other Islamist writings, in particular communiqués by supporters of Sheikh Udah. The communiqué emphasized the grassroots background of the perpetrators. By going back to Huzayfi, the perpetrators stressed the element of continued struggle as opposed to simple revenge for the beheading of the four Islamists, which was claimed for the Riyadh bombing.
The second claim was made in Dhubai by a group calling itself HizbAllah al-Khalij, that is, HizbAllah—the Gulf. “In the name of Allah the merciful … HizbAllah—the Gulf declares its total responsibility for the Saudi explosion.… We threaten to carry out more attacks,” the caller said.
The mere use of the term HizbAllah was important. Not only had it previously been associated with Iranian-backed groups but also since early June, Tehran had been stressing HizbAllah’s growing importance as the standard-bearer for the Islamic Revolution throughout the world, especially as the struggle expanded and escalated. Starting in late June, Tehran began reorganizing the HizbAllah International with bin Laden as one of the Committee of Three, responsible for interfacing with various Islamist terrorist forces all over the world, channeling support and expertise and approving, on consultation with Tehran, key spectacular operations. The use of the name HizbAllah in taking responsibility for the Dhahran bombing not only confirmed Iran’s responsibility but also confirmed that the operation was the first in the new jihad, which had been decided on in the Tehran terrorist summit of June 21–23, 1996.
A few days after the bombing, threatening letters were faxed to the private numbers of several senior Saudi officials. Recipients included King Fahd’s private secretary, Prince Turki; the head of Saudi intelligence; and Interior Minister Prince Nayif. The faxes warned that additional civilian targets would be bombed unless a number of Islamist leaders and some 200 of their disciples were released. The importance of these faxed letters lay not in their content but in the mere fact that they existed. The private fax numbers were for exclusive use by the uppermost members of the House of al-Saud—they were not even known to, let alone used by, senior officials and other functionaries. By gaining access to these numbers the perpetrators demonstrated the extent of their reach into the heart of the House of al-Saud, showing that theirs was an inside job.
As the dust was settling in Dhahran the long-term ramifications of the strike were emerging. “This latest terrorist incident marks a new beginning for Saudi Arabia on a road of turmoil and an uncertain future,” warned a Westernized opposition group. “This new era of fundamentalist terrorism in the heartland of Islam can trace part of its roots to … the decay and corruption of al-Saud family.” Ultimately the rise of Islamist violence as the sole expression of despair within the kingdom is the greatest threat not just to Saudi Arabia but to the entire Middle East: “Fundamentalism is the most important threat the Middle East will face for years to come. Keeping a despotic regime like the one concocted by the Sudairi Seven will perpetuate trouble in the region.”
The common denominator expressed by the various Islamist analysts was their expectation of a marked escalation and expansion of Islamist terrorism against both the United States and the House of al-Saud. They considered the Dhahran bomb to be a long overdue first eruption in the radicalization of a major sociopolitical development in Saudi Arabia.
Beyond the anticipated righteous condemnations of terrorism and denials of any Iranian involvement, Tehran’s reaction to the Dhahran bombing was both interesting and sophisticated. Tehran was convinced that the Dhahran bombing had been the first shot in an Islamic Revolution in the Arabian Peninsula, the importance of which would be second only to Khomeini’s revolution. Tehran expected that “in the next few years, a second Middle East explosion [the first was Iran’s Islamic Revolution] will take place in Saudi Arabia.”
While it saw the ultimate establishment of an Islamic republic in Saudi Arabia as inevitable, Tehran warned of the horrendous ramifications of the imminent eruption in an effort to get U.S. troops out of the Arabian Peninsula. Such a violent uprising might spread throughout the region, Tehran argued, and there was no substitute for defusing the regional crisis by having the American forces leave. Tehran warned that “such acts [of terrorism] will continue as long as the American forces are present in this part of the world, particularly in Saudi Arabia.” The crisis had already reached such proportions that half measures would no longer be sufficient: “The only solution to the problem is … unconditional withdrawal of the American forces from Saudi Arabia.”
Tehran stressed, however, that the root cause of the crisis was the corrupt and un-Islamic policies of the House of al-Saud: “Once more a bomb blast in Saudi Arabia has drawn world public attention, and experts have come to the conclusion that apparently there is no full stop to such acts if drastic changes are not brought about in the attitude of the Riyadh kingdom.” The Iranian analysts considered the Dhahran bombing the beginning of a long wave of terrorism intended to rid Arabia of the House of al-Saud.
Tehran argued that opposition to the presence of U.S. forces created a backlash within the host societies: “The presence of American forces in countries with strong traditional and religious social structures has provoked the sensitivities of … people who see this presence as an obstacle to their own cultural identity and national independence.” But in the case of Saudi Arabia the situation was far more complex because the mere presence of the American forces was considered the primary guarantor for the survival of the House of al-Saud. The United States was considered the primary impediment to realizing the genuine aspirations for an Islamic state, and these circumstances were behind the growing hostility to the United States. Tehran stated that “the strong and unabated opposition to a foreign presence in the Arab desert remains the main force for religious and political groups working inside and outside of the country [Saudi Arabia].”
The Iranian analysis of the popular support for the Dhahran bomb and other anti-U.S. terrorism highlighted the possibility of an inside job. Iranian experts concluded that “the powerful explosion targeting U.S. bases in Saudi Arabia has not been possible without the cooperation of some Saudi military and security groups.” These analysts did not rule out “the possibility of the Saudi servicemen’s information cooperation in this and earlier operations.” This possibility, Tehran explained, should serve as an indication of just how thorough and widespread support was for the Islamist movement and how strong anti-U.S. and anti-al-Saud sentiments were.
But if these sentiments had been latent for a long time, Iranian experts stressed, it was the mujahideen factor that served as the catalyst awakening the entire Saudi society: “Of significance is the return of hundreds of Saudi youth who took part in the jihad in Afghanistan and returned home after the mujahideen takeover in Kabul in 1992. These youth, who devoted their life to the new era of Islamization in the Muslim world, refused to accept the Western-oriented foreign relations of the ruling regime. The sense of failure and frustration of the youth, coupled with the already tense situation among religious as well as academic circles in universities and religious centers, posed a formidable and serious challenge to the political establishment.” Short of a mention by name, this was the warmest endorsement official Tehran could openly give Osama bin Laden and his “Afghans.”
It was Riyadh’s refusal to confront the just demands of the young Islamists, Tehran added, that ignited the current crisis: “The failure of the ruling regime to address the main demands of the opposition groups, particularly to widen the scope of their political participation and break the level of close relations between Riyadh and Western capitals, prompted the opposition to take a tough and militant stance against the presence of foreign troops on their land.” The latter action was imperative because the U.S. and foreign forces constituted the key to the House of al-Saud’s ability to survive and stay in power. Given Tehran’s confidence about the buoyancy and bright future of the Islamic Revolution in Saudi Arabia, a marked escalation of the Islamist jihad against the House of al-Saud and their Western guardians was all but certain.
EMBOLDENED BY THEIR early success and the prospects of imminent spectacular strikes, Tehran and its allies were determined to intensify their campaign of international terrorism under the banner of the HizbAllah International. Their primary objective was to better utilize existing assets and to acquire and develop new capabilities. Soon after the conclusion of the June Tehran summit came a clandestine working terrorists’ summit in Pakistan.
This operational summit took place in the central northwest border area between Pakistan and Afghanistan between July 10 and 15. The participants met in a huge tent at the edges of the biggest training camp for Arab “Afghans,” close to the Pakistani border town of Konli. The key leaders of militant Islam, including Osama bin Laden, gathered under heavy guard of both Arab “Afghans” and Pakistani intelligence. The primary objective of this working summit was to improve coordination between the various “Afghan” and “Balkan” groups and their Iranian and Pakistani patrons. The summit clearly established the prominent role of bin Laden and his close military lieutenants as a distinct entity at the uppermost echelons of the Islamist international terrorist movement.
Formal deliberations took place during at least a couple of nightly sessions. Many informal discussions and consultations between groups and individuals occurred in the days between. Key participants included Osama bin Laden; Ayman al-Zawahiri; Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, a senior official of Iranian Intelligence responsible for the intelligence support for al-Quds Forces; and Ahmad Vahidi, the commander of al-Quds Forces. Other participants included senior Iranian and Pakistani intelligence officers; representatives of Egyptian and Persian Gulf Islamists, including leading commanders in exile or training in London, Tehran, and Beirut; senior commanders of Hizb-i Islami (Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar’s group); HAMAS; HizbAllah; Algerian groups; and numerous delegates from Tehran and Khartoum.
The Islamist trend, the gathered leaders and commanders believed, was under fierce attack from the U.S.-led West. This onslaught was expected to intensify in retaliation for the already unfolding Islamist offensive. An Islamist leader from Western Europe explained that “there is a ferocious offensive being readied against Islam under the slogan of an international war against terrorism.” He stressed that “there is a need for an Islamic effort to counter the ferocious attack being mounted against Islam behind the smokescreen of combating terror. For this Islamic effort to get off the ground, the Muslims, wherever they are, will have to join hands and set their minor interpretive differences aside in the interest of the larger cause; namely, facing war with war and force with force so that the arrogant [United States] may get to learn that Islam has teeth and muscle and that there are Muslims who are prepared to sacrifice their lives for their faith.”
Another commander concurred, adding that “there is an imperative need for an integrated plan to deal a fatal blow to the international forces of arrogance.” A United Kingdom—based commander from a Persian Gulf State stressed that given the immense strategic importance of the Persian Gulf to the United States and its allies, the only way to compel the West to withdraw was to inflict so much pain on these countries that their governments would find it impossible to tolerate the public outcry and be compelled to withdraw to stop the Islamist terrorism at home.
Rasul Sayyaf stated that “the time to settle accounts has arrived.” The senior representative of Iranian intelligence declared that “attack is the best means of defense.” He urged a combined offensive, both in the Muslim world, in particular the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula, and in the heart of the West. He repeated Iran’s commitment to the cause and reiterated Tehran’s willingness to provide the Islamists with all possible aid.
The conference resolved “to use force to confront all foreign forces stationed on Islamic land.” One Arab observer with direct knowledge of the conference considered the resolution to be “a virtual declaration of relentless war” on the U.S.-led West. The Islamist leaders agreed to form a planning committee; a financing, supply, and mobilization committee; and a higher military committee to oversee the implementation of their joint operational plan. The military group would operate under the Committee of Three established in Tehran and would be made up of key veterans of the Afghan jihad—Arab “Afghans”—as well as an Iranian and a Pakistani. All resolved to embark jointly on “the road toward confronting the arrogant international offensive against Islam.” Although there was no specific outcome from the discussions in Konli, Zawahiri and Vahidi agreed on additional sessions to be held soon in Tehran on launching joint operations and spectacular strikes in order to evict the United States from Muslim lands.
ALTHOUGH THE OFFICIAL INVESTIGATION of the mid-air explosion of TWA flight 800 in the evening hours of July 17, 1996, has so far failed to determine the actual cause of the aircraft’s explosion, ample evidence points to a terrorist bombing. Because the aircraft exploded and burned over the Atlantic Ocean, off the Long Island coast, it is virtually impossible to recover conclusive forensic evidence. The official investigation concluded only that the explosion of fuel vapors in the central fuel tank doomed the jumbo jet. Still left unresolved, however, is the crucial question: What caused the fuel tank to explode?
The time line of the last minutes of TWA800 provides the key. The time line can be established on the basis of three separate components: (1) the aircraft’s black box, which recorded all voice and electronic activity in the cockpit; (2) the aircraft’s transponder, which broadcast the aircraft’s identification when prompted by ground radar; and (3) the ground radar’s detection of echoes, the returns from any large object. As a rule there is complete correlation to the second between the timing of these three components. Any discrepancy between them is a good indicator that something went wrong.
In the case of TWA800 all the black box recorders “died” suddenly with a brief sound that was virtually identical to the sound heard during the last fraction of a second on PanAm103. Pan American flight 103, also a Boeing 747, exploded in midair on December 21, 1988, over Lockerbie, Scotland, killing all 259 onboard and an additional 11 on the ground. Because the aircraft exploded above land, a massive on-foot search by British security forces yielded microscopic pieces of evidence, which established beyond a shadow of a doubt that a bomb had brought down the plane. Incidentally, as originally planned, PanAm103 should have blown up above water as well. But the plane was delayed for about an hour on the runway in London, so that when the timer activated the bomb, the plane was still over land. The TWA800 aircraft’s transponder also “died” at the very same second. This indicates an instantaneous, complete loss of electrical power throughout the aircraft—the kind of catastrophic event usually attributed to a bomb blast. The radar echoes, however, tell a different story. The radar continued to track a large object—the entire plane or most of it—for about half a minute. TWA8oo’s echo vanished from the screen a few seconds before eyewitnesses on the ground reported seeing twin fireballs. This means that the bulk of the aircraft remained intact for half a minute after the catastrophic failure of its electrical systems. The most logical explanation for this seeming discrepancy is that first a small bomb exploded, cutting the electricity and affecting the central fuel tank, and then, half a minute later, the tank exploded.
This chronology is also supported by the dispersion of the debris on the bottom of the ocean. The remnants of the cockpit were concentrated in a separate “field” closer to the beach than the twin “fields” where the bulk of the aircraft debris was located. This dispersion means that the cockpit and forward area of the plane separated from the rest of the aircraft several seconds before the fatal twin explosion of the fuel tank. The timing of this initial separation corresponds to the “death” of the aircraft’s electrical systems. This sequence of events is virtually identical to that of PanAm103. In TWA800 the twin explosion of the central fuel tank followed the initial explosion that silenced the “echo.”
When these dynamics are compared with bomb techniques known to terrorists and used in schools and training camps, an even more coherent explanation of the downing of TWA800 emerges. A small, twin-charge bomb was placed against the middle of the forward wall of the central fuel tank. The bomb was inserted and attached in place, in either the dry storage area or the wheel well. The twin charges were a blast charge made of powerful plastic explosives (SEMTEX-H class) and an incendiary device. The direction of the explosion was toward the tail of the aircraft.
Once activated, the first charge blew a gaping hole in the fuel tank and then created a shock wave that continued toward the tail of the aircraft. As with the PanAm103 bomb, the bloating and squeezing effect on the aircraft’s rear structure magnified the strength of the countershock wave. As a result a stronger set of shock waves rushed forward, reinforced by the continued reaction of the aircraft’s fuselage. By the time this shock wave reached the forward tip of the aircraft, it was so strong that it tore away the cockpit area. This explains why the cockpit section fell down first.
Meanwhile two things were happening simultaneously inside the central fuel tank: (1) Because of the movement of the shock waves back and forth along the aircraft, the fuel droplets inside the central tank were moving in a way that created a congestion of the fuel droplets with twin foci. (2) The secondary, incendiary, charge was swooped into the fuel tank and then exploded. Because of the distribution of the droplets this explosion instigated two fuel-air explosions, each of them in the general direction of the nearest wing root. These explosions, which destroyed the aircraft, were seen by witnesses on the ground.
The circumstances of the downing of TWA800 make it virtually impossible to acquire conclusive forensic data or any other absolute proof of the reasons for the explosion. The main area around the explosion, forward sections of the fuel tank, evaporated. Most of the missing parts and all the missing bodies are from the area covered by rows 17 to 28—just above the fuel tank—in particular right-side rows 24 and 25. There are still unexplained fist-sized holes in the back of the seats in row 23. These holes may point to the core of the secondary—incendiary—explosion that sent tiny shrapnel pieces upward. Nitrates, a main component of bombs, are damaged by fire and seawater—and in TWA800 both were present. Hence the likelihood of finding microscopic residue is minuscule.
The radical Islamists, some with established track records, quickly claimed responsibility for downing TWA800. The sequence of early warnings and communiqués claiming responsibility, in the context of the overall Islamist dynamics in the Arab world, is critical in understanding the reasons for the downing of TWA800. Through such publications the perpetrators and their sponsoring states explain the logic and context of the terrorist strikes.
Several claims, including an unspecific warning, were made about TWA800. All of them were in the name of Islamist terrorist organizations and groups. To date, however, the sophisticated bomb technology of minute size had been limited to state-sponsored terrorists, and so the validity of any of these claims must be examined in the context of known relationships with terrorism-sponsoring states. Such spectacular terrorist strikes are always launched in the context of long-term strategies and national interests.
Two events on the eve of the downing of TWA800 on July 17, 1996, merit attention. The first was an editorial in the London-based Islamist paper al-Quds al-Arabi that outlined the logic for escalating the armed/terrorist struggle against the United States. The editorial in al-Quds al-Arabi identified the recent fatal stabbing of a U.S. female diplomat in Cairo and the Dhahran bombing as the beginning of a major Islamist campaign against the United States. The authors explained that “there is a wave of hatred toward the Americans on the Arab scene” and that the recent terrorist strikes were the result: “Some people choose to express this hatred in such a bloody manner.” Given U.S. policies, these attacks should be considered the beginning of a larger terrorist campaign: “Thus we would not be surprised if such attacks on the Americans continue on a large scale in the future.”
The al-Quds al-Arabi editorial blamed the United States for the eruption of Islamist violence: “If those who killed the Americans in Saudi Arabia and Cairo belong to the Islamic extremist camp, it was Washington, its policies, and its allies in the region that created this phenomenon and supplied it with the fuel needed for its expansion in the region as a whole.” The editorial concludes with a specific warning that “what has happened in Cairo, Riyadh, and Khobar is only the beginning.” Not only is al-Quds al-Arabi a highly respected Islamist newspaper, but the editor, Abdul-Bari Atwan, is also personally close to Osama bin Laden.
The second event was a fax sent to al-Hayah in London and delivered to al-Safir in Beirut. Al-Hayah, the most important Arabic-language newspaper, is owned by and close to Prince Khalid bin Sultan of Saudi Arabia. Sending a fax to al-Hayah meant issuing a direct challenge to the uppermost echelons of the House of al-Saud, in particular the Sultan faction, perceived to be Washington’s favorite.
The July 17 warning was signed by the Islamic Change Movement—the Jihad Wing in Arabian Peninsula. This warning came only one day after the Movement had suddenly taken credit for the Dhahran bombing in addition to credit for the November 1995 Riyadh bombing. Dated July 16, the communiqué from the Islamic Change Movement was first released in Beirut quietly, without any explanation. The communiqué gained attention in the West only after it reached al-Hayah. This document laid the foundations for the downing of TWA800, introducing the logic of sharp escalations and expansion of terrorist strikes.
The July 16 communiqué began with a restatement of the Movement’s reasons for conducting terrorism in Saudi Arabia. The Movement’s support for Sheikh Udah was clearly stated: “The blasphemous al-Saud regime continues its injustice by detaining preachers and reformers, combating Islam and Muslims, and allowing invading enemy crusaders to control the land of the two Holy Shrines and the Arabian peninsula.” The United States should have understood from the Riyadh bombing the extent of the Islamists’ hostility and resolve to evict the Americans: “Instead, their Defense Secretary has come to threaten the mujahideen that he will fight them if necessary.” The Islamic Change Movement stressed that instead of drawing the right conclusions and withdrawing from the Arabian Peninsula, Washington only aggravated the situation by issuing threats it could not implement. It was imperative for the Islamists to raise the ante: “The [mujahideen’s] reply was harsh and suitable to the challenge of the invaders’ secretary, the insolent William Perry. Once again the Islamic Change Movement has proven that it has long and capable arms by targeting the pilots’ complex in Khobar.”
On July 16 the Islamic Change Movement declared that it was confronting the president of the United States rather than Defense Secretary Perry. In light of the ideological “logic” elucidated on July 16, the warning fax the Movement issued on July 17 was very authoritative. The warning stated that given the United States’ reluctance to withdraw its forces and increased threats from the U.S. government, dramatic escalation was needed in the anti-U.S. struggle: “The mujahideen will give their harshest reply to the threats of the foolish U.S. President. Everybody will be surprised by the magnitude of the reply, the date and time of which will be determined by the mujahideen. The invaders must be prepared to leave, either dead or alive. Their time is at the morning-dawn. Is not the morning-dawn near?” When TWA800 exploded, it was early morning in the United Kingdom.
The next day, July 18, the Islamic Change Movement issued a follow-up communiqué, this time in Beirut via well-established Islamist terrorist channels. The communiqué repeated the diatribes against the continued U.S. presence in Saudi Arabia and its protection of the House of al-Saud. The communiqué stated specifically that although the Islamists’ objective was to evict the United States from the Arabian Peninsula, their jihad would amount to “destroying their [the Americans’] interests anywhere in the world.” The communiqué concluded with a statement of responsibility for the downing of TWA800 and a warning of further escalation: “We carried out our promise with the plane attack of yesterday. You will hear of the fourth event very soon.” A fourth event was indeed planned, but it was eventually thwarted.
The use of the Islamic Change Movement as the vehicle for the warning was significant. Since early April 1995 the Islamic Change Movement had proved a highly reliable organ for joint messages of the Tehran-sponsored Islamist organizations dealing with the Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf and the Saudi militant Islamist movement associated with both Sheikh Udah and Osama bin Laden. Given the recent activation of the HizbAllah International in Tehran and the rise in prominence of Osama bin Laden, the use of an organ with proven authority and associations served to ensure that the importance and legitimacy of both the warning and the communiqué were not lost on the Arab world. Leaders of the Islamic Change Movement participated in the late June terrorist conferences in Tehran. Further developments in Tehran underscored Iran’s preoccupation with the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf as the primary objective of its terrorist surge.
ON JULY 19 the Friday prayer sermon was delivered by Ayatollah Mohammad Emami-Kashani, spokesman for the Guardian Council. Second only to Iran’s spiritual leader, the Guardian Council comprises six of the most senior theologians and six of the most senior Islamic jurists in Iran, whose task is to review and affirm the Islamic correctness of any law and policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The sermon was devoted to security issues and a veiled threat to the Gulf States to either be “friends with Iran” and enjoy regional security and stability or face the inherent dangers of making peace with Israel and relying on the United States. Ayatollah Emami-Kashani warned that “the world of Islam, Islamic countries, and Islamic governments must pay attention to the cry of Iran, of the Islamic Republic, which says: We are friends with all of you. Let all of us safeguard the region, let all of us make the region a safe and secure place; let us make the Islamic world a safe place.”
On July 20 a follow-up conference of the HizbAllah International opened in Tehran. The primary objective of this terrorist summit was to plan a new wave of attacks on U.S. targets around the world. Again leaders of the Islamic Change Movement participated in this terrorist conference as part of the small, distinct group of most trusted organizations. At the Tehran conference the Islamic Change Movement was singled out for recent “achievements.”
In Tehran the Iranians and the three-man leadership committee celebrated their recent achievements as having demonstrated the intensity of the struggle against the United States. But the self-congratulatory messages were general in their phrasing. Nor did any participant take credit for any specific operation. This kind of vagueness was characteristic of all previous Iranian and Iranian-influenced phrasing of responsibility for specific acts of Islamist terrorism. The participants vowed to further escalate their struggle, in particular to evict the United States from the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf, along the same lines of the warning and communiqué issued by the Islamic Change Movement.
The Islamist leadership left no doubt as to the strategy it had adopted. Again an editorial in the London-based al-Quds al-Arabi served to outline the logic in the already unfolding escalation in Islamist terrorism, specifically in and against the United States. Without mentioning TWA800 by name, the editorial stressed that “the terrorism issue … has reached the United States, which has always been immune from terrorist operations” because of its distance from the Middle East and lack of colonial legacy. This situation had already changed drastically. Al-Quds al-Arabi explained that “U.S. domestic and foreign policies have removed this immunity, and we had the bombing of the New York World Trade Center, the Oklahoma bombing, and recently the explosive charge which spoiled the Atlanta Olympics.” Furthermore, Washington should expect Islamist terrorism to strike American objectives all over the world because “U.S. foreign policies … helped provide solid excuses for some groups which believe in using violence to target U.S. bases in Riyadh, Dhahran, and, earlier, Beirut.”
The al-Quds al-Arabi editorial declared that the new antiterrorism measures declared by the United States and its allies would not be able to reverse the surge of Islamist terrorism. “The Paris conference will make security decisions to confront political issues, but it will not succeed in putting an end to terrorism,” the editorial concluded. The theme that Western antiterrorism measures themselves become the motive for additional waves of preventive and retaliatory Islamist terrorism had also been stressed by the participants in the Konli summit as the justification for the forthcoming escalation.
With the Islamists’ track record of authoritatively explaining their strategic decisions about escalation and of issuing credible warnings of and communiqués assuming responsibility for terrorist acts, the emerging trend in state-sponsored Islamist terrorism had to be taken very seriously. As these events were unfolding, Osama bin Laden was also busy consolidating a new support infrastructure for spectacular Islamist terrorism—the new Imarat in Afghanistan. By now bin Laden’s established prominence was apparent in the overall Islamist dynamics. He was a member of the Committee of Three; he played a distinct role in the Konli summit, where important doctrinal issues were decided; and al-Quds al-Arabi, edited by a confidant of bin Laden’s, was emerging as a noteworthy venue for the dissemination of the Islamists’ material.
Again the convergence of seemingly unrelated events brought about yet another milestone in the rise of Islamist international terrorism. This time the events were bin Laden’s relocation of his main base from Sudan to Afghanistan and the establishment by Pakistan of the Taliban’s rule over that country. Those conditions facilitated the emergence of bin Laden’s Imarat and as a consequence a new era in the anti-U.S. Islamist jihad.