I’VE BEEN STUDYING terrorism and subversion, particularly throughout the Hub of Islam, for more than a quarter of a century now. Over such a period, one has not only the opportunity to absorb an extensive amount of material through reading and personal discussions but also the time to reflect.
Osama bin Laden’s name first came to my attention around 1981. An Afghan mujahid mentioned him, and I opened a file. Bin Laden was described as a dedicated and very serious young man. Admittedly, as far as the group that would become the Arab “Afghans” was concerned, at the time I paid more attention to the collection of Egyptians and Palestinians and less to the rich youngsters from the Arabian Peninsula. They were “good guys”—seriously committed to a cause we also supported wholeheartedly. They were not “terrorists.” Still, bin Laden attracted my attention more than did his compatriots. His relationship with Sheikh Azzam, the Palestinian patron of the Arab volunteers in Afghanistan, was intriguing. Among my interlocutors at the time—Pakistanis in and out of government service, Afghan mujahideen, and Arabs—everybody knew of him and had something to say about him, usually good. The file got thicker and thicker.
Sometime in the mid-1980s I was in London, meeting with an Arab Islamist friend. At that time he was still an active “Afghan.” He was in London seeking medical treatment for a combat wound. We talked about his Afghanistan, and Osama bin Laden’s name came up. “He is a unique man,” my friend said. “You can see it in his eyes. He’s doing Allah’s work like nobody else. A true mujahid.” And after a brief pause he added: “Pay close attention to him. If he’s not martyred soon, he’ll get far. He’ll be a great leader of the jihad because he fears nobody but Allah.” My friend was a great mujahid, older than most and grown wise by an illustrious and very special career. In 1980, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, he had to join the jihad. His combat record was even more impressive than his earlier career. So I took notes on what he told me, and I’ve been paying very close attention to Osama bin Laden ever since.
Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War on America is largely based on extensive indigenous source material I obtained from the Islamists, “Afghans,” and terrorist organizations. Additional primary original source material comes from the Arab Middle East, southwest Asia, and other parts of the Muslim world. I have had extensive interviews and communications with numerous officials, mujahideen, terrorists, commanders, émigrés, defectors, and otherwise involved individuals from all sides of these events. These sources supplement the large quantities of open sources—primarily regional media—that by themselves provide a wealth of data and documentation. This open-source material includes wire-service reports by local and international news agencies; articles from local newspapers, periodicals, and newsletters; articles from newspapers, periodicals, and newsletters of the Arab émigré community in Western Europe; articles from newspapers, periodicals, newsletters, and academic journals in the United States, Europe, Russia, and other countries; transcripts of broadcasts by the local electronic media (mostly translated by the U.S. government’s FBIS); and huge quantities of material retrieved through the Internet. For background information I consulted a unique collection of primary sources—plus original publications, documents, and reports—developed over a quarter of a century of intensive research.
This dry definition of sources does not do justice to the human element involved. For over a quarter of a century numerous people have made tremendous contributions to my knowledge and understanding in two major ways.
First, many hundreds, if not thousands, of people from all over the world talked to me, communicated in other ways, and sent stuff from obscure places—sometimes even at a risk to life and liberty. Special thanks to those who patiently told me fascinating things as well as answered what must have been countless dumb and overly detailed questions. Thanks to those who sought, acquired, and delivered piles of documents and other material in “funny” languages and illegible scripts. Many of these individuals live and operate “on the other side.” They have communicated and provided material at great risk to themselves and their families because they really care about their own countries and peoples. Others, usually members of “the other camp,” have communicated because they want to make sure we understand what they stand for and believe in. Theirs was not an easy task either.
Second, it is not enough to have a wide variety of periodicals, newspapers, bulletins, newsletters, communiqués, and other written material pour in from the region. Quality varies from the absurd to the excellent, and so do reliability and pertinence. These sources are all important, for in their wide diversity and variety they constitute an accurate reflection of the colorful and vibrant civilization Osama bin Laden has emerged from. But these nuances are not easy to detect and comprehend. I thank those “native speakers” who patiently translated and explained the multiple layers of meanings and innuendo in the flowery, rich, and fascinating languages of the Muslim East. Thanks to all the translators and readers who worked with me over the years, teaching me how to “read” the material even when I thought I knew the language.
Despite the diversity and multitude of the sources used and the frequent use of published material, precise source noting is inadvisable in this kind of writing because the safety and survival of the human sources is most important. As a rule, the moment a critical work is published, hostile counterintelligence and security organs launch relentless efforts to discover and silence the human sources still in their midst. Whenever such an individual is exposed, that individual—along with his or her family—is usually punished with torture and death to deter others. Using “anonymous sources” or “officials” as specific entries in an otherwise academic-style list of sources is not sufficient to protect most human sources, particularly those providing access to highly sensitive inside information. The distinction via detailed source notes of what material was acquired from human sources expedites the ability of the hostile counterintelligence and security organs to narrow the scope of the search, better identify the institutions from where the leaks came, and ultimately hunt down the human sources. It has been the author’s experience, both as the director of the congressional Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare and as an author, that when confronted with a monolithic text in which the specific sources have been blurred, the hostile counterintelligence and security organs find it virtually impossible to narrow their searches and stifle the human sources.
We owe it to these brave individuals who, at great risk to themselves and their loved ones, provide crucial and distinct information to make every conceivable effort to protect them. The omission of precise source notes is the least one can do.