Ather Zia and Javaid Iqbal Bhat
THE entirety of Kashmir, which includes what are currently the two parts of the Valley under the control of India and Pakistan, has been the abode of tragedy for more than five centuries. When the Western colonial power in South Asia was on the rise, Kashmir was being handed over from one tyrannical dynasty to the next. Finally, in 1846, the British colonizers sold the Kashmir Valley along with its sprawling provinces to the Dogra warlords for a sum of 750,000 Nanak Shahi rupees. Kashmir being a British protectorate, the Dogras were required to present annually the Crown with one horse, twelve shawl goats and three pairs of the finest Kashmiri shawls. This historic treaty included the sale of not only the land but also its people.
During the colonial period Kashmir was depicted in scenes full of holiday idyll, wilderness and romance. Photographs from a bygone era are replete with verdant valleys, majestic peaks capped with snow, white waters rushing down mountains, wild flowers and pashmina goats. An odd native or two may be seen lurking, but they are usually shown in service to royals, or the English sahibs.
The 100 years of Dogra rule were ruthless for the majority of the Muslim population.1 But most colonial administrators and travellers romanticized Kashmir as the ‘emerald amongst the pearls’, a lush vale nestling amidst gorgeous mountains. While they eulogized Kashmir’s rejuvenating natural beauty, some also commented on the cruelty of the ruling kings towards the Muslim population. Yet more often than not, the colonials amply admonished the Kashmiri natives, mostly poor and broken by the tyrannical rule, for their primitive living and general aura of servitude.2 Interestingly, even though Kashmiris had been burdened by centuries of slavery, they had a resilient spirit and a long history of resistance. By the early nineteenth century, while India was fighting to oust the British, Kashmiris were fighting to overthrow the Dogra feudal rule.
One of the most iconic grass-roots agitations against Dogra rule occurred in 1931. At that time the Kashmiris rose against unjust laws, which were used to crack down on the population. The prosecution of one of the leaders named Abdul Qadeer led to mass demonstrations. On 13 July 1931, the maharaja’s police went on a rampage and ended up killing twenty-two Kashmiris in a dramatic manner. As the time for obligatory prayers approached, one Kashmiri protester rose to give the azan (call to prayer). When he stood up, the Dogra governor Raizada Triloki Chand ordered police to fire upon him. As the wounded man fell in a heap, another Kashmiri stood up to complete the azan and was shot down as well. This went on till twenty-two men were executed in public trying to finish the call to prayer as part of their protest. By 1944, much of the social, religious and economic discontent congealed into the famed Quit Kashmir movement, which demanded a sovereign democracy free from the maharaja’s rule.
After the end of British rule in 1947, when the dominions of Pakistan and India came into being, the Kashmir region was forced to choose between joining one of the two dominions. Under the Mountbatten plan, independence was not an option. The Partition had been on religious lines, according to which Kashmir as a Muslim-majority state would go with Pakistan.3 Meanwhile the Dogra ruler signed a ‘standstill agreement’ with Pakistan to ensure that essential services, such as trade, travel and communication remained uninterrupted. Pakistan saw this as a forerunner to the accession and its indisputable claim to the region. The Indian leaders had started their diplomacy to acquire Kashmir long before 1947.4 The majority of Kashmiris at that time preferred to stay independent and not join either of the two countries.5 From 15 August 1947, when India and Pakistan became two dominions, until 27 October 1947, when Indian military landed, Kashmir was an independent state. By then the Partition had descended into communal violence. In the region of Poonch in west Kashmir, an armed revolt was building under the name of Azad (Independent) Kashmir Regular Forces to create an independent state.6 The king suppressed the revolt brutally but the rebels successfully liberated part of the region declaring the Azad (Independent) Kashmir Provisional Government on 24 October 1947. By this time, the communal violence of the Partition reared its head in Kashmir’s Jammu province. Approximately 200,000 Muslims were killed in what evidence has shown was essentially an ethnic cleansing, a pogrom endorsed by the Dogra king.7 Amidst these events, and the fear of losing territory, the maharaja leaned towards acceding to India, the authenticity of which continues to be contested and disputed.8 The monarch fled Kashmir, and a full-scale war between India and Pakistan ensued. In this anthology, Zahir U Din’s essay does delve into some detail around the challenges to the authenticity of the accession.
Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first prime minister, took the issue to the United Nations in January 1948. In its complaint to the United Nations, India reiterated its pledge of conditional commitment to a ‘plebiscite or referendum under international auspices’ to settle the question of Kashmir. The United Nations brokered a ‘ceasefire line’, splitting the region between the two nations. The UN-brokered truce resulted in one-third of the territory becoming a semi-autonomous entity within Pakistan known as Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK). The remaining two-thirds, including the Valley of Kashmir, was placed under Indian control. In the following years, the United Nations formed the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP). In 1949, UNCIP recommended handing over the region to a quasi-sovereign power of the plebiscite administrator. The UN crafted several plebiscite models, all of which failed due to the competing preconditions put forth by both India and Pakistan.
In 1951, India concertedly began a policy of legitimizing its government through holding elections. Pakistan protested, arguing that India was planning to finalize the accession. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) warned India that the assembly might conflict with its recommendations still sub judice and deemed the course of action out of order.9 The UN dispatched several mediators to investigate the election malpractice and continued exploring options for demilitarization and a plebiscite. After 1954, cold war rivalries froze the Kashmir dispute. Subsequently, the United Nations deployed a military observer group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), which continues to monitor the region through its forty-four installations. The plebiscite was never held.
The presence of UNMOGIP is a continuous reminder to Kashmiris that the issue is not solved yet and that the UN has promised to hold an internationally monitored plebiscite to decide the fate of Kashmir according to the wishes of its people. In this anthology we see the icon of UN appear as a reminder of the persistent nature of Kashmir as an international dispute awaiting resolution. The UN office in Srinagar has become the hub for demonstrations and submitting of memoranda demanding the right to self-determination. At one point ‘a 400,000-strong crowd, marched to the UN office in Srinagar to hand over memoranda demanding plebiscite’.10 Kashmiris continue to demand that sovereignty be added as an option to reflect their desire for nationhood, a struggle they insist is older than India or Pakistan. In Kashmir, the fraught era between 1947 and 1989 is characterized by undying political aspirations for azadi (independence), a section seeking alliance with Pakistan, aborted movements for liberation from India, and Indo-Pak wars.
Many Indian analysts and policymakers have often projected these seventy-odd years solely in terms of establishing India’s governing apparatus, with scant regard to the suppressed political desires of the Kashmiri people. For Indians and many foreigners, this era often appears synonymous with Kashmir’s image as the playground of India, an idea that has been majorly peddled by Bollywood movies and reinforced by pro-India politicians active inside Kashmir. However, for Kashmiris, the fortification of the ideological and repressive state apparatuses implemented from New Delhi are a part of India’s strategy for tightening its hold on the territory. Even though many Kashmiris have consistently expressed a desire for an independent state, their demand has been reduced to a mere territorial dispute between India and Pakistan, and often completely ignored. Since 1947, political intrigue, arrests and electoral machinations had become the central motif of India’s relationship with Kashmiris, until 1989 – the year when it came fully undone.
The core attempt of this anthology is to pry open a political wound, to explore the Kashmiri aspiration for azadi as an indigenous and historical demand. This anthology is based on accounts from Indian-administered Kashmir (henceforth referred to as the Kashmir Valley) and will explore the era between 1947 until 1989. Our attempt is to cull an ethnographic memory of what these years were like for the authors, all of whom are Kashmiris; exploring how their political consciousness took root and grew, and what its nature and purpose was.
A range of questions undergirds these essays: what did it mean to grow up as a Kashmiri? What was the meaning of India and Pakistan to Kashmiri life? How was the question of ‘Raai Shumari’ (UN-mandated self-determination) assimilated into the evolving political scenario and connected to contemporary life? How did the question of independence and the disputed integration with India make itself felt as the Indian government made ‘progress and development’ the leitmotif of Kashmir’s integration? How did the first stirrings of political consciousness begin as India began to undermine the United Nations’ political solution for Kashmir? How do the experiences of those years bear upon how most Kashmiris gave popular support to the armed movement in the year 1989 and after? What conclusions can be drawn from those years of growing up amidst the murky local politics and their tenuous relation with whoever held the reins in New Delhi?
How can the years between 1947 and 1989 best be understood, considering the absence of directly visible military violence, as is prevalent now, or militancy, except for a short period in the 1960s? How can we comprehend the era from 1947 till 1989 – which Kashmiris see as ‘the lull before the storm’ – while in the Indian narrative it is reified as ‘peaceful’? By focusing the ethnographic lens on this era, the authors in this collection have tried to provide important insights into understanding the Kashmiri political aspirations for azadi, which run deep, and how the forceful assimilatory politics propagated by India are viewed on the ground.
This anthology does not claim to offer final answers, but presents a range of individual experiences at best, which are the beginnings of what we hope will be a long reflective period. Each of the pieces showcases how the personal is always deeply political, but in Kashmir, given its fraught history, it is even more so. Most Kashmiris have always considered Indian rule as a ‘jabri-qabza’, or ‘maqbooziyat’ (occupation or forced possession) and many scholars openly classify it as a ‘military occupation’.11 Much has been written about how a mix of dubious electoral politics involving rigging, installing pro-India administrators, quashing opposition, incarcerations and increasing militarization has kept Indian governance afloat in Kashmir.
For the global community, Kashmir’s history between 1947 and 1989 is often depicted in varying degrees of order and chaos, depending upon whether the narrator harbours loyalty to India, Pakistan or Kashmir’s independence. A significant body of scholarship exists on various aspects of the provenance and the evolution of the Kashmir dispute. These studies often describe the interregnum between 1947 and 1989 as a dispute between India and Pakistan, largely making pivotal the national positions of the two contesting nations. Contrary to such narratives, this anthology of essays makes central the figure of the Kashmiri, a much-sidelined icon in the dispute. The authors foreground various phases of their life to bring out the nuances which contribute to the complexity of Kashmir as a territory and the unceasing demand of Kashmiris for its sovereignty.12
We invited a number of Kashmiris, gender and religion no bar, to write for the volume, but we did not have control over who finally chose to contribute to the collection. This project, which has been in the making for more than four years, survived some writers losing their manuscripts to the 2014 floods, which was a major setback. While there has been considerable political, media and historical analysis, and literary writing that claims to speak of or speak for Kashmir and Kashmiris, this volume is the first one to focus on culling out the lived experience of native authors during a specific era from 1947 till the start of the armed struggle. We believe that it is important to understand this era to provide context to the continuing political resistance in Kashmir.
The essays are driven by political understandings born of personal experiences rooted in the years between 1947 and 1989, a period which, in the Indian narrative, is erroneously termed as ‘peaceful’. As a collective voice, the anthology serves two purposes. First, it contributes to destabilizing the official and nationalistic histories of both India and Pakistan. These native voices create a much-needed counter-memory, recorded by the people who have lived the years, and are part of the everyday grass-roots resistance as it exists on the ground. This collection foregrounds the indigenous voice of the subalterns whose personal and lived histories have often been displaced, delegitimized, marginalized and criminalized in this dispute.
In the formal Indian history, native Kashmiris are often infantilized and seen as mere pawns on the chessboard of big politics in the subcontinent. Specifically, Pakistan is projected as directing Kashmiri people’s actions and demands. Kashmiris are depicted as not having a sense of the past, nor being committed or united in a political vision of their future. That Kashmiris are demanding not only the UN-mandated self-determination but are also committed to the demand for a sovereign nation, which they were seeking before India and Pakistan emerged, is a perspective that has been well and truly erased from the official Indian narrative. In some measure, the personal narratives in this book counter this naive portrayal of Kashmiris, presenting a direct challenge to the histories that have been structured post-Partition.
The second purpose this anthology serves is to shed light on the notion of ‘peace’ between the years 1947 and 1989 in Kashmir. In the Indian narrative, this period is generally projected as a largely peaceful cohabitation of different faiths and ideologies inside the state of Jammu and Kashmir, wedded to the idea of development and its ‘final integration’ with India. The term ‘Kashmiriyat’ also makes its entry during this era. The philosophical paradigm of Kashmiriyat, an Urdu derivative clearly of political import, emerged on the Kashmiri political firmament only after 1947. In the ensuing years, this term gained traction because ‘pro-India’ Kashmiri and Indian politicians used it as a functional aspect of India’s secular aspirations.
Deployed through the ideal of Kashmiri syncretism, Kashmiriyat has been used to prop up India’s plural existence within the Valley and outside. This is not to say that different religious communities did not exist together in the Valley, but they fundamentally shared a fraught and unequal power dynamic. Against this backdrop, the Indian narrative presents the rupture of 1989 as if it were an anomaly, born of an array of causes – often generalized as misgovernance, rigged elections, or unemployment. Most important of all the causes is the narrative of instigation from across the Line of Control (LoC), which is mostly subsumed under Pakistani interference, thus also negating the existence of Kashmiris in what is known as Azad Kashmir who have been major contributors in the fight against India.
The essays paint a vivid picture of the political phases that the Valley has experienced. Professor Gulam Rasool Malik brings to life his early years around 1953, when Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah, then the prime minister of Jammu and Kashmir, was arrested. Malik’s childhood experiences are not very different from anything a child in Kashmir might witness today; only the names of the political actors have changed. His grandfather’s comment about the Sheikh’s politics is telling of a larger sentiment held by many Kashmiris today. Malik’s grandfather tells the little Malik that had the Sheikh handled the situation well in 1947, Jammu and Kashmir would have been free [from India]. This analysis stands true for most authors in this anthology and those who have previously written about it.13
In the 1940s, Sheikh Abdullah was seen as an unrelenting figure of Kashmiri nationalism. He was the founder of the National Conference party, which in 1931 began as the Muslim Conference. He became the first Muslim prime minister of Jammu and Kashmir. His political missions ranged from spearheading the Quit Kashmir movement against the Dogra warlords to forming the Plebiscite Front to demand the right of self-determination for Kashmiris. His political ambitions and tribulations have been commented upon by most authors in this anthology—pointing to the importance of his stature and its subsequent decline. The Indian government ousted Sheikh Abdullah from his position as prime minister of Kashmir in 1953, after which he was incarcerated multiple times. His increasing acquiescence to Indian policies cost him the carte blanche that the Kashmiri masses had granted him. Since his death in 1982, the public discourse around his legacy has become deeply problematic because of his support to ‘ilhaaq’ (accession to India). Kashmiris opine that the Sheikh betrayed his own legacy of striving for Kashmir’s sovereignty and the accession was largely engineered on the basis of his friendship with and personal loyalty to Pandit Nehru. Such is the level of hostility from people that since 1989 his mausoleum had to be put under security for fear of being vandalized.
In his essay, the reputed poet of the Kashmiri language and avid folklorist Zareef Ahmed Zareef revisits his youth and illustrates in both prose and poetry the dynamics around the plebiscite movement, the arrest of Sheikh Abdullah and the installation of Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed by New Delhi, in what is seen as a de facto coup by India. Other contributors in this anthology including Mohammad Junaid, Mir Khalid and Zahir U Din, have analysed this period extensively in their essays. This period is seen as politically transitive through regime change and incarcerations, through which Kashmir was demoted from an autonomous sovereignty to a de facto state within India.
An event involving my [Ather Zia’s] maternal grandfather Gulam Ahmed Lone also points to how political repression was being institutionalized to smoothen the edgy details of Kashmir’s political history so that it could fit the ‘feel-good’ narrative of assimilation and integration with India. A scriptwriter in the J&K information department, my grandfather and his colleague were commissioned to document the families of the surviving members of the 1931 martyrs and those who had been killed during the roti agitation, which began in May 1932, in Jammu. Their research revealed that the families of the 1931 martyrs were destitute, and there was evidence of hatred of Muslims underlying the roti agitation.14 These reports were unpalatable to the government, which did not want revelations that did not match their official narratives. The authors were ordered to appear before Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, the then prime minister of Jammu and Kashmir, and apologize. Both suspected that they would have been asked to change their analysis. My grandfather did not apologize and never returned to his job. Needless to say, the reports were never published. This is just one small personal example of the intense efforts that the administration in Kashmir was involved in at all levels to make history sterile, and suppress facts that would project Kashmir as anything but compliant to Indian ministrations and in sync with its perceived ideals.
In anthropologist Mona Bhan’s essay, Kashmir emerges as an independent aspiration of not only Muslims but that of Kashmiri Pandit Hindus. She writes about the unexplored nuances of her family dynamics, which reflected the larger differences that undergirded the Pandit and Muslim communities and were exacerbated by Indian policies. In her account, journalist-writer Anuradha Bhasin recalls the tumultuous events of 1984, which made her conscious of the mutual otherness between Hindus, Kashmiris (Pandits and Muslims) and Sikhs. She reflects on the peculiar history that Jammu and Kashmir share as provinces that are geographically and culturally different. Journalist-activist Zahir U Din threads key moments in Kashmir history to illustrate the complexity of Kashmir’s political legacy and deep-rootedness of the aspirations of sovereignty of its people and the deep affective relation with Pakistan which should not be reductively read as being against Kashmir’s independence.
Anthropologist-essayist Mohammad Junaid adopts a fascinating methodology to excavate Kashmir’s deep-rooted resistance to India. He makes Akhtar Mohiuddin, a well-known Kashmiri fiction writer, a symbolic chronicler of the alternative history of Kashmir. Making Akhtar’s writings pivotal, Mohammad illustrates how they are different in tone and tenor from that of the official historiography of Kashmir. While literary historians have tended to dismiss Akhtar for his ‘tendentious plot’, Mohammad uses his writing to trace the precariousness of Kashmiri lives post-1947 within the Indian apparatus. Mohammad hails Akhtar as a native witness who is singularly engaged in the ‘search for an ethical ideal to ground dilemmas of existence in Kashmir’.
Novelist Mirza Wahid travels through the back alleys of his idyllic childhood. His laid-back meanderings and coming of age narrative around 1989 end in crackdowns, identification parades, and killings. These heartaches culminated in Waheed’s epic novel The Collaborator, which is a poignant tribute to the pathos of his homeland. Writer-memoirist Khalid Mir deftly weaves together his family’s conversations, and things heard on the street; both of which were ensconced in increasing militarization by India. A former militant turned human rights activist Abdul Qadeer’s essay, adapted from an interview by Nawaz Gul Qanungo, recounts his past as a combatant, and his arrest and torture by the Indian forces. He gives a first-hand account of the historical motivations that became instrumental in the 1980s in goading Kashmiri men like him towards guerilla warfare.
Novelist Shahnaz Bashir speaks about life both at home and outside, which as a young boy in the 1980s he did not comprehend but now analyses through the events that followed the armed struggle. Journalist Syed Zafar Mehdi revisits his childhood, especially the time he spent being educated as a young boy in Aligarh and how his Kashmiriness took shape and his aspiration for azadi was honed. In human rights activist Khurram Parvez’s narrative (which has been adapted by Haziq Qadri from an interview), we see how the Gaw Kadal massacre, in addition to the general atmosphere of Tehreek (movement), becomes pivotal in rousing his political consciousness. The massacre at Gaw Kadal is invoked at several places in this anthology. Kashmiris see the Gaw Kadal massacre as a singular event, which marked the increasing use of military and paramilitary forces by the Indian government. On 20 January 1990, when the armed struggle was barely a year old, the troopers of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) began a crackdown in an old city locality.15 They combed through houses, not only rounding up men for identification parades and conducting arrests but also molesting women. Anticipating protests, curfew was imposed by Jagmohan, who on 19 January, barely twenty-four hours earlier, had taken the oath as governor. Despite the curfew, people came out in a peaceful procession, protesting the abuses by the government forces. Khurram’s grandfather, who was one of the protestors, was killed along with fifty others when the paramilitary police force opened fire on the procession.
The invocation of Gaw Kadal massacre reflects Kashmiris’ widely held belief about how the events in January 1990 were orchestrated by the Indian government under Governor Jagmohan to intensify its counter-insurgency policies and nip the armed movement in the bud. Jagmohan’s oath-taking ceremony was accompanied by not-so-veiled threats to Kashmiris to behave or ‘he would lose the card of peace’.16 Zahir U Din in his essay talks about this event in detail. The governorship of Jagmohan had been only some hours old when the brutal spectacle of the Gow Kadal massacre began, which was followed by a full and final spurt in the mass migration of around 90,000 Kashmiri Pandit Hindus.17 Soon after, the government stepped up the violence against civilians, combatants and unarmed protestors, and implemented the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA).18 Thus, the figure of the Indian soldier became a persistent and dreaded motif of tyranny for Kashmiris.19
Since 1947, the Indian government has deployed both what the French philosopher Louis Althusser has identified as the ‘ideological state apparatus’ and the ‘repressive state apparatus’ to manufacture an atmosphere of compliance in Kashmir. However, resentment of Indian rule and resistance to the machinations of New Delhi has ensured that the seeds of an armed struggle were sown. The Kashmiri novelist Akhtar Mohiuddin – as Mohammad Junaid reminds us – was prescient in dedicating his 1975 novel Jahnamuk Panun Panun Naar to that one Kashmiri youth, ‘who will fire the first bullet to set things right in Kashmir’. So, a future where Kashmiris would resort to extreme measures against India was not a surprise for Kashmiris who had been witnessing the dismal political scene post-1947. Indeed, these collected essays show that the situation that unfolded in Kashmir was inevitable, and only a matter of time. Thus, seeking liberation from India is not to be understood as the failure of Indian democracy, or alienation of Kashmiris, and it is certainly not a governance issue, or one of election mismanagement. Increasingly since the 1930s, Kashmiris have been single-minded in achieving democratic sovereignty, as these essays point out.
The question of how Kashmiris position themselves vis-à-vis Pakistan is important and crucial in understanding the resistance in Kashmir.20 As the essays in this volume will reveal, there is a deeply affective relation between the two entities, which often manifests itself during cricket matches when most Kashmiris side with Pakistan, a reality that Shahnaz Bashir brings home in his essay. Bashir mentions his aunt who becomes emblematic of the Kashmiri–Pakistan relation when she places the holy Quran on the TV to invoke blessing for the Pakistani cricket team. Such sentiments abound in Kashmir with some people even pledging charity or waging bets on Pakistan’s win. There is also an occasional flag waving by protesting crowds especially in the old Srinagar where a section of Pakistani loyalists remains strong even if majority sentiments have sufficiently travelled towards the goal of azadi.
Mir Khalid has provided a reflection on this in his essay where he talks about the historic politics of ‘Sher’ (‘lion’, the name for the followers of Sheikh Abdullah) and ‘Bakras’ (‘goats’, a derogatory name for the followers of Mirwaiz Moulvi Farooq) in downtown Srinagar and similar allegiances in rural areas. Farooq was from the Mirwaiz (head-preacher) family of Kashmir, known to have strong allegiance to Pakistan as compared to Abdullah who had lent his support to India in 1947. These nuanced readings of lived histories pose challenges to the blanket Indian narrative where the relation of Kashmiris with Pakistan is always portrayed as inherently deviant or ‘traitorous’ and thus an anomaly.
Most analysts in India portray Pakistan as never having had anything to do with the Valley, which is a sweeping erasure of Kashmiris’ political, cultural and geographical history. In Kashmir, there are individuals and extended families that have had ties with this cultural region even before it became Pakistan and who retain their affective ties after it became a country. There were not only family connections but also linkages of trade and education. Before 1947, most Pakistani cities were home to Kashmiri businessmen and students since the region was geographically and culturally closer to Kashmir than what is now India. These connections continue to resurface after the passing of six generations. The blinkers manufactured by India to hide this history are a great disservice not only to Kashmiris but also to the Indian masses. It is important for Indians to acknowledge and understand Kashmir as a region in its accurate historical context, and not ignore the important ties of its past which have a bearing on the future of the entire subcontinent. Today considering the statistics, surveys and popular opinion, most Kashmiris want independence, but Pakistan remains an affective and political ally for many Kashmiris, and a modest percentage favour accession to it.
Since 1989, the Indian administration in Kashmir has faced an outright challenge due to the rise of the armed Kashmiri militancy. A popular uprising, which most Kashmiris had subscribed to, began even as India increased its troops to more than 700,000 in the region. Draconian laws like the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958, were implemented, tightening the Indian military’s grip and repressing any expression of the sentiments of self-determination and independence. There is roughly one Indian soldier for every seventeen Kashmiris, making Kashmir one of the most densely militarized zones in the world. The level of impunity shown by the Indian troops has resulted in gross human rights violations. Human rights organizations claim that to date, more than 70,000 Kashmiris, both combatants and non-combatants, have been killed, and more than 8,000 have disappeared; and rape, as a Human Rights Watch report states, has been used as a weapon of war.21
AFSPA has given Indian troops powers which facilitate and legitimize arbitrary arrest and detention and extrajudicial executions. Under AFSPA, the Indian troops can ‘arrest without warrant, any person who has committed a cognizable offence or against whom a reasonable suspicion exists that he has committed or is about to commit a cognizable offence and may use such force as may be necessary to effect the arrest’.22 Almost everyone in Kashmir is under reasonable suspicion, and hence never far from being shot or ‘disappeared’, or incarcerated, raped, or beaten. These have become common stories, and every Kashmiri household bears them as painful legacies.23 A state of siege exists in Kashmir, where civilians are under as much surveillance as militants, if not more. Bunkers, lookouts, army camps, patrol units and mine-resistant armoured vehicles have become part of the landscape.
Post-2008, armed militancy had receded while the freedom movement took a major turn towards civilian uprisings, including public demonstrations. Also, a new generation of protesters emerged, known as the sangbaaz (‘those who throw stones’). These protestors engage in pitched street battles with Indian troops, armed only with stones. The sangbaaz are just boys with no special combat training. Their qualifications at best include being able-bodied and their utter fury at Indian hegemony. While the stone-throwing has been called the Kashmiri Intifada, alluding to Palestinian protests, this mode of combat is not new in Kashmir. Poet-folklorist Zareef Ahmed Zareef traces the origins of stone-throwing to the sixteenth century when Mughal rulers from Delhi annexed Kashmir. It is said that at that time, bands of Kashmiri men called ‘dilawars’ (brave hearts) would fight the Mughal soldiers by throwing stones at them. As these essays will reveal, stone throwing and street protests have never ceased in Kashmir and have been a constant expression of political resistance.
In the summer of 2016, nearly 556 years later, Kashmiris once again fought a people’s battle to liberate their homeland from yet another form of protracted rule from Delhi.24 While the Indian state and media called the protests ‘unrest’ or a ‘law and order problem’, Kashmiris were unanimously calling it an uprising. It began in the evening of 7 July when, along with the much-needed showers breaking a hot summer, there came the news that Burhan Wani, a popular militant, had been killed by Indian forces. Fifteen-year-old Burhan had taken to militancy in 2010 in the aftermath of another major grass-roots uprising in which more than 112 Kashmiris were killed and more than 2,000 wounded.25 Burhan had been compelled to take up arms after severe harassment from the army and police; his brother was also later killed.
Over six years, Burhan had become the face of the Kashmiri armed movement. Across the valley, the young and old idolized him. Fan pages in his honour had sprouted all over social media. Burhan was from Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM), a militant outfit that supports a merger with Pakistan, but even independence-loving Kashmiris were his admirers. Since the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) gave up arms in 1994, and there has been extreme suppression of other local militant outfits, HM remains the only functional militant group for the Kashmiri youth like Burhan who are forced into combat. Thus, joining the ranks of HM cannot only be read in the reductionist manner of the Kashmiri boys fighting for accession to Pakistan or pan-Islamism. Burhan’s killing unleashed a volcanic surge in anger against India that has refused to recede since.26
In the 2016 uprising, more than 100 people were killed, more than 10,000 wounded, and organs perforated by pellets from shotguns. The Indian government has authorized the use of pellet shotguns, originally made to hunt animals, as a non-lethal method of crowd control. These guns have caused massive injuries to the eyes and faces of protestors, as well as causing fatalities. International human rights organizations have denounced the disproportionate use of force against protestors who at the most might carry stones. Such has been the degree of lethal force used both on protestors and non-protestors that the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) demanded the right to enter Kashmir to investigate the human rights abuses committed by the Indian forces.
The months-long curfew continued off and on. The Valley was an open prison. One might imagine that civilians are diffident around soldiers, but it is not so. The fear of being killed is gone, and so is the fear of being maimed for life. Kashmiris are now demanding the right to self-determination in hand-to-hand street combat. The three decades of intense militarization has made facing danger second nature to Kashmiris. They have buried and lost too many, they say. The government forces quelled the protests with disproportionate force. Hospitals across Kashmir were full of the wounded, both protestors and those who were not even part of the demonstrations. And not only men, but Kashmiri women too have increasingly joined the protests and street battles.27 Such has been the level of women’s participation that a local pro-India politician even used it as an excuse to impose night curfew. He said that women were organizing after they were done with domestic chores, which made it imperative to impose the curfew at night. Such is the constitution of the crowd on the streets of Kashmir. Yet, the Indian government adamantly portrayed the demonstrators as hired hands, criminals, unemployed drugs addicts or unruly kids. No amount of evidence or denouncement of this allegation from Kashmiris allays the Indian narrative, simply because it does not suit their political ends. The Indian state continues to undermine all modes of Kashmiri resistance, either claiming that it is being solely instigated by Pakistan or linking it to the political disenchantment of Kashmiris with India.28
At the time of writing the initial draft of this introduction in the autumn of 2016, following the lifting of the curfew, everyday life in Kashmir, including schools, trade and other economic activities, was shaping around the boycott known locally as the hartal. It is a historical mode of civil disobedience observed by Kashmiris. Often debated as economically and socially unviable, hartal has emerged as the only option through which most Kashmiris can participate in the civil disobedience movement without resorting to street protests. While street battles ebb and flow, Kashmiris have readied themselves for a long resistance to India. The 2016 mass uprising saw the proliferation of young Kashmiris fighting for freedom: chests heaving, daring the Indian troops and demanding liberation for Kashmir, nothing less. There has been a marked increase in young men from upper middle class and educated families joining the armed militancy.29
In September, two months after Burhan’s killing, as the curfew and protests entered their third month, Sayar Shiekh, a fifteen-year-old boy, became another casualty in what has been called India’s ‘war on people’. The events preceding Sayar’s killing are a telling prediction of the everyday tragedy that Kashmir lives. Sayar’s parents say he rose early to take a bath, and then wore new clothes because he had finally decided to join what turned out to be his first and last protest.30 Sayar is not an anomaly. In a similar manner, Khusboo Jan, a young girl, who would lead protests along with her siblings, was killed while chanting ‘Hum Kya Chahte: Azadi’.31 In another incident, a journalist asked two young boys who were wounded in one eye each by a pellet shotgun if they would continue fighting the Indian forces with stones; they replied, ‘Why not, we still have one eye left’. Such is the sentiment of resistance against Indian rule.
These young Kashmiris are symbolic not only of India committing human rights abuses, but more significantly, the country’s deep neglect of the demand for Kashmir’s sovereignty and self-determination.32 The continuing resistance in Kashmir, and the relentless struggle for self-determination and independence from India is not only a political fact but has become part of the cultural legacy of Kashmiris. In 2018, the OHCHR released a report documenting the human rights abuses in Jammu and Kashmir, Azad Kashmir and the Gilgit–Baltistan region, which also reiterated the need to recognize the right to self-determination for the people of these areas.33
Ather Zia is a political anthropologist, poet and short-fiction writer. She teaches at the University of Northern Colorado, Greeley.
Javaid Iqbal Bhat is working as an assistant professor in the Department of English, University of Kashmir.
NOTES
1For detailed historical background see Rai, Mridu, Hindu Rulers, Muslim Subjects: Islam, Rights and the History of Kashmir, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2004.
2On the situation of Muslim Kashmiris see Thorp, Robert, Kashmir Misgovernment, edited by F.M. Hassnain, Srinagar: Gulshan Publishers, 1870/1980; and Tyndale-Biscoe, C.E., Kashmir in Sunlight and Shade, London: Seeley, Service & Co, 1922, Indian reprint, New Delhi: Mittal Publications, 1995.
3For historical background on the ramifications of Indo-Pak partition on Kashmir see Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy 1846-1990, London: Oxford University Press, 1991, written by Alistair Lamb, one of the foremost historians of the region.
4For more background see Indian jurist Abdul Gafoor Noorani’s The Kashmir Dispute 1947-2012, New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.
5Whitehead, Andrew, A Mission in Kashmir, New York: Penguin, 2007, pp. 26–27.
6For more details on this see Bhan, M., H. Duschinski, and A. Zia, ‘Rebels of the Streets: Violence, Protest, and Freedom in Kashmir’, introduction to Duschinski, H., M. Bhan, A. Zia and C. Mahmood (eds), Resisting Occupation in Kashmir, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018. Also see Lamb, Alistair, Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy 1846-1990; Snedden, Christopher, The Untold Story of the People of Azad Kashmir, Columbia: Hurst Publishers, 2012.
7Howley, J.D., ‘Alive and Kicking: The Kashmir Dispute Forty Years Later’, Penn State International Law Review, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1991, p. 89, http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/psilr/vol9/iss1/5 (accessed in December 2017). For more details on the massacre see Snedden, Christopher, ‘What happened to Muslims in Jammu?’, Journal of South Asian Studies, Vol. XXIV, No. 2. 2001; Jaleel, Muzamil, ‘J&K resettlement law: Who it is for, why it has been challenged in Supreme Court’, The Indian Express, 11 December 2018, https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/jk-resettlement-law-who-it-is-for-why-it-has-been-challenged-in-supreme-court-5487273/ Also see Copland, I., State, Community and Neighbourhood in Princely North India, c. 1900–1950, London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005; and Lone, F.N., ‘From “Sale to Accession Deed” – Scanning the Historiography of Kashmir 1846–1947’, History Compass, Vol. 7, No. 6, 2009, pp. 1496–508.
8For more details on contestations and challenges posed to the treaty of accession with India see Schofield, Victoria, Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War, London: I.B. Tauris, 2004. Also see Osuri, G., ‘Imperialism, Colonialism and Sovereignty in the (Post)colony: India and Kashmir’, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 11, pp. 2428–43.
9Lamb, Alistair, Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy 1846-1990, p. 175.
10Schofield, Victoria, Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War, p. 150.
11Roy, Arundhati, Pankaj Mishra, Hilal Bhat, Habba Khatun, Angana P. Chatterji and Tariq Ali, Kashmir: The Case for Freedom, London: Verso Books, 2010, p. 65; Duschinski, H., M. Bhan, A. Zia and C. Mahmood (eds), Resisting Occupation in Kashmir, p. 4.
12Duschinski, H. et al., p. 10.
13For more on earliest analysis and recollections of the political situation in Kashmir see Sofi, Gulam Mohiudin, Kashmir: From 1931 to 1977, Srinagar: Sanobar Publications, 1977; Bhat, Sonaullah, Ahd-Nama-I-Kashmir, Budshah Chowk, Srinagar: Ali Mohamad & Sons Publishers, 1994.
14The Kashmiri Pandit community launched this agitation in 1932 to protest the Glancy Commission recommendations, which were largely seen as ameliorating the lot of Muslim masses under the Dogra rule. For further discussion see Rai, Mridu, Hindu Rulers, Muslim Subjects: Islam, Rights and the History of Kashmir, pp. 171–78.
15Schofield, Victoria, Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War, p. 148; For more details on the state of military repression in this period see Human Rights Watch, ‘“Everyone Lives in Fear”: Patterns of Impunity in Jammu and Kashmir’, 2006, www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/india0906web.pdf (accessed on 7 July 2016).
16For report see Bashir, Abid, ‘How can you forget Gaw Kadal Massacre?’, Greater Kashmir, 17 January 2017, http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/front-page/how-can-you-forget-gaw-kadal-massacre/238949.html (accessed on 11 July 2017).
17The following reports carry details on this period: Human Rights Watch, ‘“Everyone Lives in Fear”: Patterns of Impunity in Jammu and Kashmir’; Human Rights Watch, ‘Investigate Unmarked Graves in Jammu and Kashmir’, 2011, www.hrw.org/news/2011/08/24/india-investigate-unmarked-graves-jammu-and-kashmir (accessed on 7 July 2016).
18For more details see Grossman, Patricia, ‘Kashmir and International Law: How War Crimes Fuel the Conflict’, Crimes of War Project, July 2002, http://www.crimesofwar.org (accessed on 8 November 2011).
19Ray, A., Peace Is Everybody’s Business: A Strategy for Conflict Prevention, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2012, p. 4.
20For a detailed discussion on perceptions of Kashmiris about Pakistan, and armed resistance, see Robinson, Cabeiri, Body of Victim, Body of Warrior: Refugee Families and the Making of Kashmiri Jihadists, Berkeley: California University Press, 2013; Hakeem, Abdul, Paradise on Fire: Syed Ali Geelani and the Struggle for Freedom in Kashmir. UK: Revival Publication, 2014; and Geelani, Syed Ali, Wular Ke Kinaraey, Vols 1, 2 & 3. Srinagar, Kashmir: Millat Publications, 2011, 2013, 2015.
21For detailed discussion on human rights violations and resistance politics, see Duschinski, H., M. Bhan, A. Zia and C. Mahmood (eds), Resisting Occupation in Kashmir, 2018.
22See Amnesty International, ‘A “Lawless Law”: Detentions Under the Jammu & Kashmir Public Safety Act’, Index ASA 20/001/2011, New York, 2011.
23For an exhaustive analysis of human rights violations carried out to repress the resistance movement see Roy, Arundhati, Pankaj Mishra, Hilal Bhat, Habba Khatun, Angana P. Chatterji and Tariq Ali, Kashmir: The Case for Freedom; Kak Sanjay, ‘A Time for Freedom’ in Sanjay Kak (ed.), Until My Freedom Has Come: The New Intifada in Kashmir, New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2010; Duschinski, H., M. Bhan, A. Zia and C. Mahmood (eds), Resisting Occupation in Kashmir; Zia, Ather, Resisting Disappearance: Military Occupation and Women’s Activism in Kashmir, Washington DC: Washington University Press, 2019.
24For more background see Bashir, Khalid, Kashmir: Exposing the Myth Behind the Narrative, Thousand Oaks, California, Sage Publications, 2016.
25For report see Polgreen, Lydia, ‘Indian Forces Face Broader Revolt in Kashmir’, The New York Times, 13 August 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/13/world/asia/13kashmir.html (accessed on 1 May 2017).
26For background see Qanungo, Nawaz Gul, Night Song, Delhi: Juggernaut Books, 2017. Also see Jha, Prem Shankar, ‘The Rise of Kashmir’s Second Intifada’, 2016, The Wire, https://thewire.in/61048/kashmir-uprising (accessed on 12 April 2017); and Waheed, M., ‘India’s crackdown in Kashmir’, The Guardian, 8 November 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/08/india-crackdown-in-kashmir-is-this-worlds-first-mass-blinding (accessed on 7 January 2017).
27For historical analysis on gendered participation in resistance movement see Malik, Inshah, Muslim Women, Resistance and Agency: The Case of Kashmir, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019. Also see Kanth, Fatima, ‘Women in Resistance, Narratives of Kashmiri Women’s Protests’, in N. Kaul and Ather Zia (eds), ‘Women and Kashmir: Knowing in Our Own Ways’, Review of Women’s Studies, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 53, Issue No. 47, 2018, pp. 42–46; and Kanjwal, Hafsa, ‘The New Kashmiri Woman: State-led Feminism in “Naya Kashmir”’, in N. Kaul and Ather Zia (eds), ‘Women and Kashmir: Knowing in Our Own Ways’, Review of Women’s Studies, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 53, Issue No. 47, 1 December 2018, pp. 26–41.
28For more background on Kashmiri resistance to integration with India see Snedden, Christopher, Kashmir: The Unwritten History, Noida, India: HarperCollins Publishers, 2014; Noorani A.G., Article 370: A Constitutional History of Jammu and Kashmir, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011; and Noorani, A.G., The Kashmir Dispute 1947-2012.
29See report by Muzamil Jaleel, ‘Since 2010, 467 local youth from 354 villages across Jammu-Kashmir have become militants’, The Indian Express, 12 June 2018, https://indianexpress.com/article/india/since-2010-a-militant-or-more-in-every-village-in-jammu-and-kashmir-hizbul-mujahideen-burhan-wani-death-5213627/ (accessed on 12 November 2018).
30See report by Umar Mushtaq, ‘For his first (and last) big protest in life, Sayar wore new clothes’, Kashmir Reader, 11 September 2016, http://kashmirreader.com/2016/09/11/for-his-first-and-last-big-protest-in-life-sayar-wore-new-clothes/ (accessed on 7 July 2017).
31See report by Umar Mushtaq, ‘The girl who led from the front, asking, Hum Kya Chahte?’, Kashmir Reader, 21 September 2016, http://kashmirreader.com/2016/09/21/the-girl-who-led-from-the-front-asking-hum-kya-chahte/ (accessed on 7 July 2017).
32Bhan, M., H. Duschinski, and A. Zia, ‘Rebels of the Streets: Violence, Protest, and Freedom in Kashmir’, in H. Duschinski, M. Bhan, A. Zia and C. Mahmood (eds), Resisting Occupation in Kashmir, p. 15.
33See OHCHR (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights), ‘Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Kashmir: Developments in the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir from June 2016 to April 2018’, and ‘General Human Rights Concerns in Azad Jammu and Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan’, United Nations OHCHR, www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IN/DevelopmentsInKashmirJune2016ToApril2018.pdf (accessed on 7 July 2017).