SHAEF Headquarters: Rheims, France, 15 April
The long anticipated order arrived at Eisenhower's headquarters at 1600 hours 15 April 1945. The Supreme Commander spent an hour digesting its contents and anticipating its implications before assembling his staff. In a quiet tone he began reading the order to his staff. “Proceed to Berlin with all deliberate speed!” Eisenhower paused until the muted applause had subsided and then read on, “Your objective is to secure as much of Germany east of the Elbe River as possible and Berlin itself. Take care to inform the Red Army of your objectives and do not engage Soviet forces unless in self defense. Concentrate your forces on the Magdeburg-Berlin axis with secondary attacks toward Stettin and Leipzig-Dresden. Assemble reserves to assure against any Soviet actions against you, and, if necessary, cordon off German forces in the Ruhr region rather than reducing them. The Russians are being informed of our intentions through proper channels. Good Luck, Marshall.”
Although he understood the enthusiasm of his staff for an advance on Berlin and had been urged for days by his subordinates to pursue such a course, Eisenhower faced the task with mixed emotions. As he returned to his quarters after the staff meeting, he mentally catalogued the problems he faced. The political issue was clear to all. For weeks acerbic messages had passed between Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin over the fate of liberated territories and peoples in eastern Europe. Churchill, in particular, concerned over apparent Soviet violations of the Yalta accord, argued that only a fait accompli engineered on the battlefield could have any chance of holding Stalin to his promises concerning the democratization of Eastern Europe. Before his death, days before on 12 April, Roosevelt privately began sharing the same sentiment. His correspondence with Stalin displayed greater impatience, although, to his death, he still adhered to the agreement. The new President, Truman, was an unknown quantity, but it was conceivable he could alter U.S. policy to accord with Churchill's concerns. Apparently he had.
The military ramifications of the new order were even more daunting and fraught with uncertainty. A dash for Berlin was indeed possible, and military commanders well forward described the increasing disorganization in German opposition as they argued for a drive on Berlin. Both Bill Simpson of Ninth Army and George Patton of Third Army for days had pressed Eisenhower to ignore political considerations and exploit German military weakness with a drive directly eastward to Berlin. In fact, since Soviet forces had stood idle along the Oder River for over two months, they argued such a thrust could assist the Soviets as well.
Eisenhower was unsure. Weeks before, he had entertained such thoughts, but he had concluded since that peripheral questions such as securing North Sea ports and dealing with a potential and rumored German national redoubt in southern Germany also warranted his attention. Most important, Eisenhower feared what might occur should U.S., British, and Soviet forces adopt plans whose main thrusts converged on the same objectives, moreover on an objective the Soviets believed they had “blood rights” to secure. “No,” he concluded, “a simultaneous drive on Berlin would be fraught with danger.”
Soon after, Eisenhower had issued plans which ostensibly shifted major forces away from the Berlin axis. Montgomery's 21st Army Group was to swing north and northeast to complete clearing of the Low Countries, the north German ports and southern Denmark. Dever's 6th Army Group was to wheel southeastward and advance into southern Germany on a broad front from Coburg to Baden Baden. The right wing of Bradley's 12th Army Group, Patton's Third Army, was to shift its axis of advance southward as well to support Dever's drive, although the bulk of Patton's strength was still north of the Thuringer Wald within striking distance of the Elbe.
This left only the remainder of Bradley's 12th Army Group available for a strike toward Berlin, and Bradley's group was not ideally postured to undertake the task. Eighteen of Bradley's divisions, including all of Gerow's Fifteenth Army and two corps of Hodge's First Army, were busy reducing German Army Group B, encircled in the Ruhr, while several of Ninth and First Armies' divisions were dealing with a smaller encircled German force in the Harz Mountains. While Eisenhower could change the Ruhr “reduction” mission to simply “contain,” in so doing releasing as many as half of these divisions for the more important Berlin mission, the released divisions would arrive forward piecemeal and only after completing extensive marches.
Thus 12th Army Group had only the forward elements of Ninth, First, and perhaps Third Army to employ in an immediate drive on Berlin, a force of about twenty divisions. They could be reinforced within three to seven days by as many as ten additional divisions. These forces were almost evenly distributed on a front from south of Wittenberge on the Elbe to the Thuringian Forest. To conduct a concentrated drive on Berlin, these forces would have to concentrate along the Elbe-Mulde River line, pierce those water barriers, isolate or reduce the major cities of Magdeburg, Dessau, Halle, Leipzig, and Chemnitz, penetrate the seventy kilometers to Berlin, perhaps reduce that city, and do so in coordination with potential Soviet actions.
As these considerations raced through Eisenhower's mind, his thoughts returned inevitably to the largest question – what will the Russians do? That question haunted Eisenhower's remaining waking hours as he mentally planned the options he would have his staff commit to paper in the morning.
83rd Infantry Division Headquarters: Barby, Germany, 15 April
As the sun settled hazily over the western horizon, frantic activity continued to animate the picturesque little German river village of Barby. Two days before, the U.S. 329th Infantry Regiment of General Mason's 83rd Infantry Division had, in quite leisurely fashion, crossed the Elbe River, where by nightfall it was joined in its bridgehead by full tank and tank destroyer battalions. Mason's good fortune was matched by 2nd Armored Division operating further north, which secured a small bridgehead near Magdeburg. Although 2nd Armored's bridgehead had subsequently been eliminated, by 15 April the 83rd Division's foothold became even more secure since during the evening before Combat Command R (CCR) of 2nd Armored Division had joined the bridgehead defenders and extended the bridgehead eight kilometers to the east. A sign over the bridge entrance captured the troops' mood, “Truman Bridge. Gateway to Berlin over the Elbe. Courtesy 83rd Thunderbolt Division.”
General Simpson, Ninth Army Commander, echoed his troops' enthusiasm. Having entrusted his staff with planning “to enlarge the Elbe River bridgehead to include Potsdam,” early on 15 April Simpson flew to Bradley's headquarters to argue his case for a further advance. After frustrating, day-long discussions, which included a phone call to Eisenhower, Simpson returned to his headquarters and then to Barby with his hopes for a further advance dashed. Despite Bradley's and Eisenhower's arguments that military problems alone precluded such a reckless course, Simpson was convinced they failed to comprehend German weakness. His mission that evening was to buoy the enthusiasm of this troops, in particular the 83rd Infantry Division in their precious bridgehead. Characteristically, Simpson let his staff continue to develop their plans. He mused to himself, “In spring, hope springs eternal.”
At 1900 hours, as Simpson and Mason watched further reinforcements filter across the treadway bridge spanning the Elbe in the twilight, Mason's chief of staff approached and passed Simpson a small folded message. He read it silently, smiled, handed it to Mason, and said, “Your Remagen will be remembered as the launching pad for the final drive in the war. We're going to Berlin from Barby.” Simpson ordered the enthusiastic Mason to enlarge the bridgehead in the morning and prepare for passage of 2nd Armored Division. Wishing him good night, Simpson hastened back to his headquarters to join his planning staff. There he found an order from Bradley summoning him and his chief of staff to Bradley's headquarters first thing the following morning.
12th Army Group Headquarters: 16 April
At 0800 hours 16 April Bradley, Hodges, Simpson, and Patton met to map out plans in accordance with Eisenhower's instructions. There was unanimity among the army commanders that quick work could be made of remaining German opposition, and Berlin could be reached within a week. Patton added the impolitic judgment that Russian military opposition could be easily dealt with as well. He suggested that perhaps the Oder River would be a better objective than just Berlin.
Bradley listened to his commanders but tempered their enthusiasm with hefty doses of reality concerning the problems associated with achieving success in such a plan. German eradication of 2nd Armored Division's bridgehead across the Elbe cast doubt on his field commanders' sanguine view of crumbling German opposition. Clearly some regrouping and concentration of forces would also be required to generate requisite strength for a rapid drive on Berlin. To sustain the drive and meet any unforeseen eventualities, the bulk of divisions tied down in the Ruhr and Harz Mountain regions would have to join Ninth and First Armies' attack force. Some modification would also have to be made in Montgomery's northern thrust to afford protection to Bradley's left flank and provide strength for the ultimate assault on Berlin. Earlier that morning Eisenhower had already informed Bradley that Montgomery's attack axis would shift eastward south of Bremen toward the Elbe River south of Hamburg. Montgomery's right flank, VIII Corps of Dempsey's Second Army, would strike the Elbe near Wittenberge to protect Simpson's left flank and support Ninth Army's drive on Berlin. Patton's XX and VIII Corps would have to reorient their axes of advance northwestward toward Chemnitz and Dresden, leaving XII Corps to cover his ever-lengthening right flank. Some provision would also have to be made regarding major population centers like Magdeburg, Leipzig, and Dresden, whose reduction would take time and sap the strength of the main Berlin thrust.
The full day of deliberations among the army commanders produced a plan agreeable to all (see Map 1). The 12th Army Group would initiate the final thrust across the Elbe and Mulde Rivers along three axes. Ninth and First Armies would attack jointly toward Berlin. The main attack by the joined flanks of the two armies would have XIX Corps advancing from Magdeburg and Barby toward Potsdam and VII Corps from the Dessau area toward Trebbin south of Berlin. Ninth Army's XIII Corps, followed and supported by XII British Corps would advance from the Wittenberge-Stendal region toward Rathenow and the northwest suburbs of Berlin. First Army's right flank V Corps would bypass Leipzig, cross the Mulde River at Wurzen and establish a bridgehead across the Elbe River at Torgau. On Bradley's right flank, Patton's XX and VIII Corps would advance via Chemnitz to establish bridgeheads across the Elbe in the Dresden area, while Patton's XII Corps would cover the long flank along the Erzgebirge (Mountains).
During the first phase of the operation, which was to last three days, 12th Army Group forces were to reach a phase line running from Neuruppin, through Potsdam, Trebbin, Luckenwalde, and Schlieben to east of Dresden. During the ensuing three days the operation would culminate in the seizure of Berlin and Cottbus. Ninth and First Armies would envelop Berlin from north and south, and Third Army would secure the Cottbus-Spremberg region. Bradley's forces would link up with Soviet forces occupying or advancing from the Kustrin bridgehead or across the Oder and Neisse Rivers. British XII Corps would establish security along Ninth Army's left flank from Wittenberge to Neuruppin and assist Simpson's envelopment of Berlin. The attack would begin at dawn on 17 April after only limited regrouping, and it would be spearheaded by forward forces. Other Ninth and First Army elements would deploy forward from the Ruhr and Harz regions as rapidly as possible to constitute a reserve and participate in phase two of the operation. All army commanders were ordered to bypass major cities if necessary to maintain the momentum of the advance.
The day of intense planning was punctuated in mid-morning by stunning news. Eisenhower radioed that the long awaited Soviet offensive had begun. Soviet forces were hammering German defenses along the Oder and Neisse Rivers from Kustrin to Gorlitz. He judged that the Soviet main efforts were from the Kustrin and Forst regions toward Berlin and Cottbus. Since quiet reigned north of Kustrin, it was apparent Soviet objectives coincided with those of the Western Allies. All immediately understood a race was on. Fewer understood the perils of that race (see Map 2).
83rd Infantry Division Headquarters: Barby, Germany, 16 April
At noon on 16 April an anxious General Mason received a cryptic order from Ninth Army headquarters. The news received earlier of the new Soviet offensive underscored the urgency of the order, which read, “Preliminary to launch of a general offensive toward Potsdam on 17 April, dispatch strong task forces to occupy Zerbst and Nedlitz and prepare for advance of division main force.” Similar preparatory orders anticipating the new offensive were received by XIII Corps' 5th Armored Division, VII Corps' 3rd Armored Division, V Corps' 9th Armored Division, and XX Corps' 6th Armored Division. Mason quickly ordered formation and dispatch of a task force consisting of CCR 2nd Armored Division and two battalions from the 83rd Infantry Division. By nightfall this hastily assembled force had taken Zerbst and were preparing to move northwestward the following morning.
Soviet High Command (STAVKA): Moscow, 15 April
Stalin nervously paced his apartment in the Kremlin awaiting reports from Zhukov and Konev regarding the state of their offensive preparations. He had just received a report from Major General Shtemenko of the General Staff detailing Allied progress in central Germany. The news was disquieting, but Stalin congratulated himself that he had at least foreseen the shape and implications of Allied moves and was prepared to counter them.
In fact, since late January Allied strategy had been a subject of major concern. It was clear that once the Allies were over their shock in the Ardennes, the sheer weight of their resources would likely submerge Germany. And when forced to address the realities of the situation, it was clear that the Germans in general, and to an increasing extent their field commanders, preferred to be overwhelmed by Americans and British rather than Soviets. It had therefore been prudent for Stalin to decide to halt his January offensive through Poland at the Oder River, although at that time his most forward forces were but 60 kilometers from Berlin. The excuse of long and vulnerable flanks was an adequate one to justify the halt and provide a smokescreen for his real motivation. Certainly, he reasoned, German forces in Silesia and Pomerania had threatened Soviet forces in their own right. They, however, had posed an even greater threat when considered in the context of another looming problem – that of growing Allied disagreement and the potential consequences should Allied armies move on Berlin.
The pause to regroup and eradicate German forces on the flanks, Stalin reflected, provided time to replenish manpower and equipment stocks for the final drive on Berlin. More importantly, it provided time to gauge Allied strategic intent and to gather sufficient strategic reserves necessary to deal militarily with any Allied attempt to violate provisions agreed to at Yalta.
Stalin mused to himself, “All that has now been done. The flanks have been cleared. German forces have been isolated in Courland, Zemland, and Danzig, forces are massing along the Oder River sufficient to crush the Germans and seize Berlin, and powerful reserves have been assembled to deal with Allied duplicity in this, the culminating period of the war.” A pragmatist by trade, Stalin had proven his ability to define and ruthlessly pursue vital ends. Berlin was such an end.
Stalin recalled that less than two weeks earlier he and his commanders had put the seal on the final plan for termination of the German war. In meetings on 31 March and 1 April in Moscow, the assembled STAVKA and preeminent field commanders planned the Berlin operation, and coincidentally actions to be taken should Allied armies interfere. At the planning sessions he had remained preoccupied with Allied actions, noting at one point, “I think Roosevelt won't violate the Yalta accords, but as to Churchill, he wouldn't flinch at anything .. .”
How significant that comment had been. Now Roosevelt was dead, only to be succeeded by a political hack from the American outback who would be mere grist for Churchill's strong will. Those menacing Allied spearheads along the Elbe River bore ample witness that Truman had weakened and perhaps had already caved in to Churchill's desires.
Fortuitously, the planning session had anticipated such developments. The plan for a rapid two-front thrust on Berlin incorporated operational variants for either Allied involvement or non-involvement. The delayed commitment of a third front to the north permitted freedom to shift forces into the Berlin-Cottbus sector to deal with Allied interference. Finally the large, superbly equipped Soviet strategic reserve assembled over several months would offer prospects for enforcing the Yalta agreement, by force if necessary.
Now on 15 April, Stalin mentally reviewed those measures and the plan for the Berlin operation as he awaited his front commanders' calls. Zhukov's 1st Belorussian and Konev's 1st Ukrainian Fronts would strike tomorrow toward Berlin and Cottbus. Zhukov's three center armies (3rd Shock, 5th Shock, and 8th Guards) would penetrate German defenses around the Kustrin bridgehead and march due west to envelop and reduce Berlin. Three right flank armies (61st, 1st Polish, and 47th) would bypass Berlin to the north and secure objectives along the Elbe River south of Wittenberge by the twelfth to fifteenth day of the operation. Zhukov's left flank 69th and 33rd Armies would plunge south of Berlin to the Beelitz and Juterbog region in the same time frame. Two tank armies (1st Guards and 2nd Guards) would support the main drive on Berlin. Once through German defenses, 2nd Guards Tank Army would shift north and reach the Liebenwalde region north of the city by D+4. Thereafter, depending on Allied actions, it would either swing south to envelop Berlin or continue westward leading the advance of Zhukov's right flank armies to their objectives.
Zhukov's reserve consisted of 3rd Army, 5th Guards Tank Army, and the newly fielded 7th Tank Army, allocated from Stalin's strategic reserve. While Zhukov could employ 3rd Army as he saw fit, the other powerful armies were to be employed only on Stalin's personal orders in the event of an Allied attack on Berlin. Contingency plans called for 5th Guards Tank Army to cooperate with 2nd Guards Tank Army north of Berlin and 7th Tank Army to cooperate with 3rd Army in support of Zhukov's forces operating south of Berlin.
Konev's front was to conduct its main attack across the Neisse River south for Forst toward Cottbus and Spremberg with three armies (3rd Guards, 13th and 5th Guards), while two armies (2nd Polish, 52nd) launched a secondary attack further south toward Bautzen and Dresden. The five combined-arms armies were to secure the line of the Elbe River from Juterbog south to Dresden by the tenth to twelfth day of the operation. Two tank armies would join battle after German defenses along the Neisse River had been penetrated. Thereafter the two armies would lead the drive westward, in one of two variants. If Allied forces halted along the Elbe, 3rd Guards Tank Army could shift its axis of advance northward to join Zhukov's 2nd Guards Tank Army in enveloping and reducing Berlin. The 4th Guards Tank Army, in this case, would sweep northwestward to the Potsdam area to assist in isolating Berlin and to support the combined arms armies' advance to the Elbe. In the event of interference, the two tank armies were to advance westward in tandem toward the Juterbog and Torgau regions, flanked on the right by 3rd Army and 7th Tank Army. Konev's reserve consisted of 28th and 31st Armies and newly formed 8th Tank Army from the strategic reserves. Like Zhukov, Konev could employ the two combined-arms armies as he saw fit, but could use the tank army only in the event of Allied intervention. In that case 28th Army would advance to support 3rd and 4th Guards Tank Armies north of Torgau, while 31st and 8th Armies drove to the Elbe between Torgau and Dresden.
Rokossovsky's 2nd Belorussian Front, with five combined arms armies supported by several separate mobile corps, had orders to delay its attack until 20 April. By that time Allied intentions should have become clear. If the Allies halted at the Elbe, Rokossovsky's front would plunge across northern Germany south of Stettin to secure the line Wittenberge, Waren, Demmin, Anklem by the twelfth to fifteenth day of the operation. If Allied forces moved on Berlin, Rokossovsky could shift his axis of advance southward to support Zhukov's drive to and beyond Berlin.
In the event of Allied interference, Stalin assessed that Zhukov and Konev had sufficient force to isolate Berlin and secure initial front objectives. The three tank armies from the strategic reserve (5th Guards, 7th, and 8th) would be sufficient to drive Allied forces beyond initial objectives lines through Magdeberg, Leipzig, and Chemnitz and perhaps further. In no case would Stalin order an advance beyond the demarcation line agreed to at Yalta. This he intended to declare openly to Churchill, Truman, and Eisenhower should conflict with Allied forces appear imminent.
Stalin's musings were interrupted as Shtemenko arrived with word that both Zhukov and Konev were ready to render their evening reports. Both declared that all was in order for timely commencement of the offensive. Before retiring in the wee hours of the morning, as was his custom, Stalin ordered intensified aerial and long-range ground razvedka (intelligence collection) west of Berlin and Dresden and along the Elbe to determine Allied intentions.
12th Army Group Headquarter: 17 April
All eyes were glued to the wall-size situation map as the 12th Army Group operations officer delivered the 1800 hours briefing to General Bradley and his staff. The officer laconically related the day's action from north to south in the army group's sector.
Ninth Army's XIX Corps had expanded its bridgehead east of Barby, seizing Zerbst and reaching the outskirts of Wiesenburg, where elements of German 349th Infantry Division, supported by a tank battalion, brought the advanced to a halt. XIII Corps consolidated its positions west of the Elbe near Stendal and prepared to cross the river on 18 April. First Army's spearheads (3rd Armored and 9th Armored) likewise secured bridgeheads across the Elbe and Mulde Rivers near Rosslau and Wurzen while Third Army's 6th and 4th Armored Divisions bypassed Chemnitz and reached the outskirts of Freiberg, halfway between Chemnitz and Dresden.
The process of generating reserves accelerated as 1st Infantry Division disengaged from its Harz Mountain battles and moved forward, and six of Ninth and First Army's divisions in the Ruhr assembled and prepared for forward movement with a tentative arrival date of 20 April. German resistance was spotty, with the best organized opposition in the Magdeburg, Wiesenberg, and Dessau sectors, where scattered German Twelfth Army elements were defending. Bradley concluded the session by ordering all of his armored spearheads, in particular those of XIII, XIX, and VII Corps of Ninth and First Armies, to accelerate their advance.
1st Belorussian Front Headquarters: Kustrin, 17 April
Zhukov listened nervously to the evening situation reports. The carnage on his front was appalling as his forces repeatedly assaulted German positions on the Seelow Heights. His decision to commit both of his tank armies to battle in the small bridgehead on this, the first day of battle, only complicated the task of coordinating so large an assault force, and now the nearly 1,000 tanks at his disposal were dispersed in pockets and locked in close tactical combat with enemy strongpoints. With movement restricted, the tanks were being decimated by panzerfausts seemingly in the hands of every German old enough to carry one. At this stage, Zhukov reasoned, there is nothing more I can do than smash the defenses frontally, once and for all.
That, of course, would take time, and Stalin's repeated queries did nothing to assuage Zhukov's growing bad mood. To his chagrin, reports from Konev's sector to the south were more optimistic. Konev's combined-arms armies had forced the Neisse River and were progressing well through the German defenses on the west bank of the river. And Konev had not yet committed his two tank armies. Zhukov could imagine the result when those armies went into a clean penetration. In essence, while his armor slugged it out for days with German defenders – losing strength by the hour – Konev's tank armies, once committed, would have a clear road forward. The implication was clear to Zhukov. Konev may well share in the seizure of Berlin.
But then Zhukov recalled the ominous report passed to his front intelligence elements from the GRU just an hour before. According to aerial razvedka, Allied armored columns had been detected moving east of the Elbe south of Magdeberg. “Is this an isolated incident,” thought Zhukov, “or a portent of things to come?” Only time would tell, but at least, in this instance, it should give Konev cause for concern.
CCA Headquarters, 2nd Armored Division: Belzig, Germany, 18 April
CCA 2nd Armored Division, reinforced by one regiment of the 83rd Infantry Division, finally overcame German defenses at Belzig at 1800 hours. Heavy afternoon showers had restricted movement along the roads. Although organized German resistance was light, the constant harassing fire of groups of Germans armed with the ubiquitous panzerfausts forced the column to repeatedly halt. Infantry, supported by tank and anti-tank gunfire, rooted the Germans from farmsteads, each of which functioned like a fortified strongpoint. VII Corps' 3rd Armored Division, whose gunfire could be heard to the south, was experiencing the same delays, but nevertheless kept pace with 2nd Armored.
By evening, news arrived that 9th Armored Division of V Corps had succeeded in seizing Torgau on the Elbe, and, further south, Patton's 4th and 6th Armored Divisions were within 10 kilometers of Dresden, although increased resistance now also slowed their advance. The 2nd Armored Division G-2 reported heavy fighting in the Soviet bridgeheads west of the Oder and Neisse Rivers, but apparently German defenders had prevented a precipitous Soviet breakout westward. The operations officer did some quick calculations and estimated that Potsdam was only 45 kilometers distant, while Soviet forces were still about 50 kilometers from the eastern suburbs of Berlin. It was clear the race could still be won.
1st Ukrainian Front Headquarters, along the Spree River (5km North of Spremberg): 2100 18 April
Konev, at his forward command post located near the command post of General Pukhov's 13th Army, noted the briefer's words with satisfaction. German defenses along the Spree River between Cottbus and Spremberg had been thoroughly ruptured (while Zhukov further north struggled for operational freedom). Throughout the day he had watched with pride for hours as Rybalko's 3rd Guards Tank Army two lead tank corps crossed the water obstacle, fanned out in multiple columns, and sped to the west. Just kilometers south, Lelyushenko's 4th Guards Tank Army mobile corps were making even better progress. His advanced brigades would penetrate 45 kilometers west of the Spree before calling a halt for a night's rest.
This, of course, made his immediate task even more urgent. Detailed orders would have to be dispatched to re-direct those armies' forward detachments in the proper direction before they were too deep in the German rear. “Good God,” mused Konev, “It is certainly better now than it had been in the early war years, when scarcely any objective could be taken on time.” The message causing Konev concern had been received but twenty minutes before. It read:
To Stepan [Konev's codename]
Allied forces crossing the Elbe River vicinity Magdeburg, Dessau, and Wurzen with apparent intent of moving on Berlin. It is imperative you secure front initial objectives without delay.
I order:
(a) Advance your two tank armies to line Potsdam, Beelitz, Wittenberge, Torgau and support with two combined-arms armies, while containing by-passed German forces and sealing off southern approaches to Berlin.
(b) Secure line of Elbe River from Torgau to Dresden and westward to Pretzsch with remaining combined-arms armies and mobile corps.
(c) Advance your second echelon armies (28th, 31st) to Luckau-Finsterwalde regions, but do not commit until receipt of STAVKA orders.
(d) 8th Tank Army remarns under STAVKA control but will relocate to the Drebcau region to await further orders.
(e) 7th Tank Army will shift to your front sector, east of Neisse River.
(f) To speed your advance employ strong reinforced forward detachments in advance of your main force.
(g) Plan multi-brigade-size airborne assaults in the Beelitz and Torgau regions for evening of 19-20 April.
(h) Front boundary with Zhukov extended from Lubben to Potsdam.Igor [Stalin]
Within two hours Konev's new orders were complete and had been dispatched to his armies. His orders reflected Stalin's desires:
I order:
3rd Guards Tank Army to advance via Calau, Luckau, and Luckenwalde to secure Beelitz-Potsdam region, block advance of Allied forces to Berlin and westward withdrawal of Berlin enemy group. Link up with air assault force vicinity Beelitz on 20 April. 3rd Guards Army – cover right flank of front advance on front Cottbus-Lubben-Gross Koris and support advance of 3rd Guards Tank Army. 13th Army – follow and support 3rd Guards Tank Army. With one corps isolate German forces in Berlin from the south. 4th Guards Tank Army-Advance via Finsterwald and Schlieben to Juterbog and Wittenberg on Elbe River. Secure Elbe River line from Wittenburg to Pretzsch. 5th Guards Army – support advance of 4th Guards Tank Army and secure objective along Elbe River between Pretzsch and Riesa. 2nd Polish Army – advance to secure Elbe River line between Riesa and Dresden. 52nd Army – secure front left flank from Dresden to Corlitz, 4th Guards Tank Corps precede the advance and link up with airborne assault force east of Torgau on 20 April. Begin advance effective 0500 19 April.
By separate orders, Konev arranged for the two airborne drops to occur simultaneously at 2000 on 19 April, hopefully before Allied forces had reached the areas.
One hundred kilometers to the north, Zhukov fumed over his lack of success. Despite constant goading from Stalin, his forces still wallowed deep in the German defenses. He too had received new orders “to push 2nd Guards Tank and 47th Armies westward north of Berlin to the Velten area by evening 20 April.” Zhukov well knew that the order was impossible to fulfill. Moreover, Stalin seemed to realize that fact as he shifted 7th Tank Army southward into Konev's sector. Zhukov realized he was about to become subject to two indignities. First, he would likely share the glories of conquering Berlin with Konev. Second, his forces would play only a secondary role in the larger issue of the race with the Allies for Berlin.
2nd Armored Division Headquarters: Bruck, Germany, 2400 19 April
Rumors of a Soviet airborne drop ran rampant through headquarters, although hard intelligence concerning such an event was difficult to come by. Ninth Army light observation aircraft and ground personnel detected heavy, low-level aircraft traffic in the Beelitz area. Radio intercept units shortly after 2200 hours picked up short radio transmissions in Russian, and what little could be translated indicated some Russian ground activity east of Beelitz.
Even more fascinating were sketchy reports from First Army, which told of Russian paratroopers landing in scattered fashion in the rear of 9th Armored Division's bridgehead east of Torgau. All that could be gleaned from these fragmentary reports was that some Russians surrendered peacefully, while others opened fire and were then shot.
To confirm or dispell these rumors or at least those in his sector, General White, 2nd Armored Division commander, ordered a reconnaissance in force be dispatched at 0300 to determine what action, if any, was going on east of Beelitz. The 2nd Armored Division's main force was to resume its advance at 0500 in tandem with 3rd Armored spearheads operating further south.
12th Army Group Headquarters: Magdeburg, 0200 20 April
The long night for Bradley had become even longer as report after strange report reached his headquarters. The day's news, until evening, had been fine. XIII Corps' 5th Armored Division had secured Rathenow by 1500 hours and then had moved eastward toward Nauen with corps infantry following in its wake. XIX and VII Corps' spearheads were approaching Beelitz, V Corps had secured a sizeable lodgement over the Elbe River east of Torgau, and Patton's spearhead had done likewise northwest of Dresden. Then, at midnight, dis concerting reports arrived from both Ninth and First Armies.
Reports of a potential Russian airborne drop in the Beelitz region, although it could not be confirmed until the next morning, were consistent with reports which soon after arrived from First Army. Hodge's headquarters, shortly after 2230 hours, recounted how numerous Russian paratroopers, identified from the 3rd Airborne Brigade, landed in the center of its bridgehead about 2 kilometers east of the Elbe bridge at Torgau. Scattered groups of paratroopers opened fire on American logistical vehicles and moved along the highway toward the eastern approach to the bridge. Short of the bridge, a reserve armored battalion and a company of infantry engaged the force, killing or wounding thirty and capturing forty before the remainder fled. Other small groups of Russians offered resistance until convinced that the “German enemy” were really Americans. Disarmed Russians (including a major) reported their missions was to seize and hold the bridge against the Germans until the arrival of a Russian mobile ground force, expected to arrive in less than two days time.
Bradley was visibly upset by the reports and immediately contacted Eisenhower's headquarters. “What,” asked Eisenhower, “are Russians doing along the Elbe? Their offensive is still struggling to escape the Oder and Neisse bridgeheads.” Bradley assured Eisenhower these troops were really Russians and not Germans in Russian disguise (à la Kampfgruppe Peiper in the Ardennes). He added his opinion that perhaps Russian progress in the Cottbus sector was better than anticipated, and this airdrop was an attempt to forestall further American movement east. “If so,” Eisenhower interjected, “it is a clumsy attempt. In any case proceed according to plan, Brad, and I will clear things with Washington.”
Bradley at 0300 hours ordered Simpson to report as soon as possible on the situation at Beelitz. To Hodges, he wired, “Proceed according to plan, but with caution. Employ all means of reconnaissance.”
The White House, Washington, D.C.: 2300 19 April (0500 20 April German time)
Marshall phoned President Truman as soon as he had confirmed news of the Russian paradrop along the Elbe. He related the evening's event to Truman and added his views regarding possible Russian motivation. After a pause Truman said, “I agree with your assessment. Stalin knows our intent and is signalling us his. I will find out what is at the bottom of this. In the meantime advance according to plan, but insure our movements are well-coordinated and properly supported.”
Within an hour Truman dispatched a message to Stalin with a copy to Churchill. It read:
I have clearly outlined our plans to you – that is to advance with all speed to assist your operations along the Oder and destroy German forces. We cannot do so if interfered with by Soviet parachute forces dropping in our path.
Our operations will proceed according to the plans outlined to you. To preclude nasty incidents, I request you also share your plans with me and my senior commanders. We intend no harm to your forces and believe you share our concerns as well.
Truman
Churchill's response arrived within one hour. It cryptically noted Russian intentions to take Berlin come-what-may and encouraged Truman to adhere to his plan and brook no further interference from Stalin. Truman took the additional precaution of wiring Eisenhower to alert all strategic air forces for possible employment in the near future on missions other than bombing Berlin.
STAVKA, Moscow: 1000 20 April (0900 German time)
Stalin, forced to interrupt his morning sleep by a message from the General Staff, was in a foul mood. He read Truman's message uttered an oath, and summoned Antonov and Shtemenko. “What is the status of our airborne drop?”
Shtemenko related that the Beelitz drop had been successful, and the 1st Brigade had occupied the village and blocked all roads through it. Unfortunately, he added, there was no communication with 3rd Brigade near Torgau. Light aircraft had attempted to establish communication but were driven off by antiaircraft fire, presumably American.
“Has the situation changed at Kustrin?” asked Stalin.
“Zhukov reports slow progress, but a possible full penetration of German defenses by nightfall,” whispered Antonov, who then volunteered, “but Konev's tank armies are moving at full speed toward their objectives. 7th Tank Army is due by midday in Konev's rear area east of the Neisse.”
“I have provided Truman and Churchill my plan and objectives,” growled Stalin, “but they have ignored them. And they now expect me to respect theirs. We shall see whose plan is most effective.”
“And,” he silently thought, “who has the will to carry it out.”
Turning to Antonov, he directed him to radio Konev – but, thinking better of it, asked for the phone to Konev's headquarters. When Konev had been found, Stalin said to him, “Tell Rybalko [3rd Guards Tank Army] and Lelyushenko [4th Guards Tank Army] to allow no one to hinder their march to my objectives.” As if to purge his soul of the message's bad tidings, he rang up Zhukov to tell him, “You have two days to reach Berlin and no longer. When you do so, launch Sinenko's army [5th Guards Tank Army] to link up with Rybalko near Potsdam.” He menacingly added, “If you fail, there are other Marshals who would gladly do so.
3rd Guards Tank Army Headquarters: 10 kms NW of Calau, Germany, 0800 20 April
Rybalko watched from his command post as the tail end of General Mitrofanov's 6th Guards Tank Corps would its way northwestward. It was a fine corps, led by the superb 53rd Guards Tank Brigade of General Arkhipov. Arkhipov was fulfilling the mission given personally by Konev to Rybalko, “Lead your advance with your best brigade. Reinforce it with all it needs to reach Beelitz within 24 hours. I want the rest of the corps to arrive within 36 hours.” It was not an unreasonable mission. Mitrofanov's corps had performed similar feats on numerous occasions in the Ukraine and southern Poland – and against a more formidable enemy. Yet today there was a special tension in Konev's and Rybalko's orders. For a new enemy might be at hand.
12th Army Group Headquarters: 1600 20 April
“Damn those paratroopers,” mumbled Bradley to his chief of staff. His anger was well founded for Hodge's spearhead 2nd Armored Division had been faced with a day-long dilemma. The Russian airborne force had seized a 2 to 4 kilometer square area around Beelitz and now blocked all the roads through the town. Although they had not fired on the American tank column, their menacing presence prevented the division from using the main road to Potsdam.
Both 2nd Armored Division and XIX Corps headquarters reacted to the dilemma cautiously but with imagination. Leaving two infantry battalions and two tank companies under 83rd Infantry Division control to isolate the Russians in the town, the remainder of 2nd Armored, supported by the 83rd Infantry, bypassed the town to the north and, by nightfall, reached within 8 kilometers of Potsdam. Inexplicably, German resistance lessened as the columns swept around Beelitz as if an open German invitation was being offered the Americans to enter the city. Bradley intended to continue the drive despite the Russians, and, to that end, he ordered Hodges to advance the 35th and 30th Infantry Divisions, whose lead elements were then just south of Brandenburg, to hasten forward and support 2nd Armored Division. The armored division itself was to “secure Potsdam and the western suburbs of Berlin on the axis Potsdam-Zehlendorf-Charlottenburg.”
The more vexing problem for Bradley was VII Corps' situation. Its lead 3rd Armored Division confronted Russian road blocks leading to Beelitz from the southwest, and no one was certain what Russian forces were moving to support the paratroopers. Intense reconnaissance in early afternoon over the Luckenwalde area to the southeast of Beelitz revealed no Russian presence. Radio intercept, however, picked up heavy Russian radio activity further southeast, but local cloud cover precluded aerial detection of any Russian forces.
Bradley's orders were clear, and both he and Hodges resolved to carry them out. In a calculated risk that Russian forces were still far to the southeast, Bradley and Hodges ordered 3rd Armored Division to bypass Beelitz to the south and march on the southwestern outskirts of Berlin via Trebbin toward Teltow. The division reconnoitered routes south of Beelitz during the evening, and the division, led by Combat Command A reinforced with 104th Infantry Division riflemen was to follow at 0500 hours the next day. While 3rd Armored advanced, the 104th Infantry was to contain Russian forces at Beelitz, reconnoiter southeast toward Luckenwalde, and await relief by 1st Infantry Division, then moving northeast from the Dessau area. 7th Armored Division, just returned from the Ruhr and assembled at Kothen under VII Corps control, was to hasten forward to the Beelitz area the next day.
Concerned about XIX and VII Corps' troubled progress toward Berlin, Bradley urged Simpson to add the weight of XIII Corps to the assault on the city. The 5th Armored Division, then approaching Nauen against slackening resistance, was to drive through Nauen toward Spandau and Charlottenburg to link up with 2nd Armored's thrust further south. The 84th and 102nd Infantry Divisions would provide immediate support, and both 75th and 95th Infantry Divisions were now racing forward toward and across the Elbe.
The situation on Simpson's left flank was unsettling and put his flank in jeopardy. Although 29th Infantry Division had seized an Elbe crossing at Werben, British VIII Corps had not yet concentrated in the area to commence its supporting thrust on XIII Corps' left. Although that advance was to materialize on the 21st, clearly Simpson was on his own in his attempt to seize Berlin.
Further south Hodges' V Corps and Patton's reinforced XX Corps were well east of the Elbe at Torgau and north of Dresden. With open country before them, only Russian interference could prevent a successful advance on Cottbus. Late intelligence reports from ground reconnaissance units of both corps indicated little opposition but intense Russian air reconnaissance activity.
1st Belorussian Front Headquarters: Kustrin, Germany 2000 20 April
Bogdanov's [2nd Guards Tank Army] message reached Zhukov as he consulted with General Kuznetsov of 3rd Shock Army. It read, “9th Guards Tank Corps secured Bernau and is approaching Schildow. 1st Mechanized and 12th Guards Tank Corps cooperating with 79th Rifle and 12th Guards Rifle Corps of 3rd Shock. Prepared to advance on northeast suburbs of city this evening.”
Four days and only 40 kilometers of miserable German turf, thought Zhukov. But then Stalin had said twenty-four hours before, “You have two days to enter Berlin,” and now Zhukov would do so. The problem, however, was not just entering Berlin. Intelligence reports indicated American movement on the city from the west was imminent. Only Zhukov's forces could forestall that move.
Zhukov delayed no longer. He phoned Stalin, reported the situation, and asked for release of 5th Guards Tank Army to his control. Stalin hesitated and then asked, “For what purpose?”
Zhukov replied, “To advance via Velten to Falkensee to envelop the city from the north and northwest.”
“Can you reach Falkensee in 24 hours?” questioned Stalin.
A hot flash enveloped Zhukov as he replied, “Yes.”
“Then do so,” replied Stalin, “you have the 5th Guards Tank Army.”
Putting down the receiver, Zhukov noticed a barely perceptible tremor in his hands. Turning to Sokolovsky, his deputy commander, he said, “Order Sinenko to assemble his army east of Bernau by noon tomorrow and then immediately advance north of Berlin via Velten to Falkensee. He must reach Falkensee by 0800 tomorrow.”
As Sokolovsky departed to dispatch the message, Zhukov hoped Sinenko could repeat the feats his predecessor Rotmistrov had so often accomplished. He almost wished Rotmistrov, with his 7th Tank Army, was available to perform the mission. But then, he thought, Rotmistrov has an equally important mission to perform further south – in Konev's sector. Zhukov could barely suppress a sneer.
CCB Headquarters, 9th Armored Division: Kirchheim, Germany, 0915 21 April
Two clusters of tanks awkwardly faced one another on opposite ends of a clearing along the road running east from Kirchheim. Both had prudently withheld fire long enough to discern neither was German. An American captain advanced down the road under a white flag accompanied by a sergeant and a private. There, in the middle of the road midway between the two forces, they met a party of four Russians, one apparently an officer. The captain turned to the private and said, “You're the only one here from Chicago. Do your stuff.” It was fortunate the man could speak Russian, for it would take more than sign language to handle this affair.
The meeting went on under glaring sunlight for almost an hour. Halfway through the discussions an older Russian colonel joined the entourage and introduced himself as Colonel Dushak of 12th Guards Tank Brigade of General Poluboyarov's 4th Guards Tank Corps. He explained his mission, and, after the American explained his, the two agreed to halt operations while seeking instructions from higher headquarters. As the tension abated, the Russian colonel's aide appeared carrying two bottles of vodka. There, in the clearing, the groups passed the bottle as apprehension ebbed, and the small cluster of Americans and Russians toasted the end of the war.
With the 53rd Guards Tank Brigade, 3rd Guards Tank Army: 7 Kilometers south of Trebbin, Germany, 1000 21 April
Whipped on by repeated orders for haste from Mitrofanov and even Rybalko himself, General Arkhipov drove his brigade mercilessly forward. Although he had faced little resistance since his march commenced before dawn, he realized he was but 20 kilometers south of Berlin and the same distance from his objective of Potsdam. Resistance was bound to materialize, and it would likely be fanatic. Arkhipov had survived long enough to realize only bold action could overcome resistance and reduce losses. Bypassing Luckenwalde to the east, his columns raced northward toward Trebbin. At exactly 1000 hours he heard gunfire to the north and soon after received a report from his brigade reconnaissance element. “Enemy forces with two tanks manning a road-block on the highway. I can outflank if the main body can deal with the problem.”
Arkhipov approved the request and ordered his 1st and 2nd Battalions to destroy the enemy and continue the march. The fight was brief. In the morning haze, both enemy tanks were destroyed, the small force was overrun, and two prisoners were taken. At 1020 hours, as he approached the smoking hulks along the road, Arkhipov was greeted by a sweating captain who reported in nervous tones, “The 1st and 2nd Battalions are continuing their advance. The road-block was an American one.”
Arkhipov gasped, and after a moment of silence, said, “Halt the battalions and reconnaissance element and await further instructions. Where is my radioman?”
Headquarters 3rd Armored Division: 6 Kilometers West of Trebbin, 1030 21 April
General Hickey was livid, but spoke in slow measured tones. The report which had arrived just fifteen minutes before read, “Under attack by large force of over 20 tanks. Am outflanked and taking heavy losses. The enemy are ...” The transmission cut off in mid-sentence. Shortly thereafter, aerial reconnaissance reports from First Army reported Russian forces moving in force northward through and around Luckenwalde. Intelligence also noted peaceful contact with Russian forces near Kirchheim.
“Peaceful!” snorted Hickey, “ask my security outposts south of Trebbin.” He immediately ordered CCB, then passing west of Trebbin to detour into the town and establish a defense line around its southern outskirts. CCR, then marching toward Trebbin from the west, was to halt and establish defenses facing south to await relief by the trailing 104th Infantry Division. Then the still angry Hickey reported the situation to VII Corps.
3rd Guards Tank Army Headquarters: Baruth, Germany, 1115 21 April
Rybalko was shocked. It was as if all the adrenaline driving him for days had suddenly run out, leaving him utterly exhausted. The report from Mitrofanov lay limply on the hood of his “Willys.” Certainly, Rybalko reasoned, Mitrofanov had acted properly. He himself had contributed to 53rd Guards Tank Brigade's action by underscoring the urgency of its mission. And wars seldom end cleanly. He approved Mitrofanov's request to halt and issued similar orders to General Novikov's 7th Guards Tank Corps. Novikov's corps had already reached the rail line running north from Juterbog, and his lead brigade and reconnaissance units were nearing Treuenbrietzen. Here they would remain.
Within minutes Rybalko was in contact with Konev's headquarters at Calau. He detailed what had occurred south of Trebbin and his subsequent actions. Konev, having been informed an hour before of the situation in 4th Guards Tank Corps' sector, approved of both Mitrofanov's and Rybalko's actions, but emphasized the continued importance of seizing Berlin:
“STAVKA does not wish confrontation with the Allies, but it does wish to take Berlin. All front forces are to continue their advance until contact is made with the Allies. Coordination measures in that regard are being worked out. However, in sectors where Germans are still in control, operations will continue. Regarding your army, move Sukhov's 9th Mechanized Corps northward to Berlin as rapidly as possible. There it will cooperate with Zhukov's forces in seizing the city. Expect support from 28th Army within 24 hours.”
Konev sighed as he reconciled himself to what would probably be the end of the war. He felt personal affront lest in this, the last operation, he would fail to secure his original objectives. Only the knowledge that he still had a role to play in conquering Berlin assuaged his melancholy. He had an immense force at his disposal – seven combined-arms armies and two fully blooded tank armies. Backing them up were the superbly equipped 7th and 8th Tank Armies under the experienced Rotmistrov and Rodin. What more could a front commander ask for? But now Konev's fame rested in part on the actions of a single corps – Sukhov's 9th Mechanized.
As he walked away from the Willys the thought occurred to him that perhaps it was not yet time to fight Americans.
12th Army Group Headquarters: 1400 21 April
Bradley had immediately passed Hodges' report to Eisenhower, who had, in turn, notified Truman and Churchill. The reaction to the news of Soviet actions south of Trebbin was simultaneous on the part of all three Allied players. Messages dispatched to Stalin lamented the actions, underscored the joint nature of these final operations, and conveyed a thinly veiled threat of the consequences of further such incidents. All three ended their transmission with suggestions for coordinated measures to be worked out between Eisenhower's, Bradley's, Zhukov's, and Konev's headquarters. All three underscored the fact that future political boundaries would result only from further negotiations and expressed a desire they not be settled by force.
STAVKA: Moscow, 1800 21 April (1700 Berlin Time)
Ambassador Harriman delivered Truman's message to Stalin in person. Stalin had anticipated its contents, read it in silence, lit his pipe, looked directly at Harriman, and said,
“I certainly share Truman's concerns and regret the day's unpleasant incident. However, this is war, and when Allies are not forthright in declaring their intent, soldiers often suffer. I have ordered my forces in the affected sector to cease operations and coordinate closely with American forces. This cannot, however, apply to areas where Germans still struggle – specifically Berlin which was, as I clearly stated, and still is our objective. We will pay in blood for its conquest, but we have also earned that right with our blood. Prudence and humanity argue the folly of American and British attempts to seize territory they by right and by previous agreement will have to relinquish once Hitler has been crushed. Zhukov is commencing the conquest of Berlin at this hour. If further incidents are to be avoided, Eisenhower had best coordinate closely with him.”
Alone, Stalin paced the floor of his study after Harriman's departure. There were, he thought, no grounds for an apology over the incident at Trebbin. In fact, American impudence, goaded on by the British, could have produced more serious results. Rybalko could have rolled over the American forces, and had Lelyushenko [4th Guards Tank Army], Rotmistrov [7th Tank Army], and Rodin [8th Tank Army] intervened, the Americans would have had a taste of what the Germans had earlier experienced. I had only to give the order.
But here prudence and patience dictated otherwise. Four years of war at high cost had produced immense gains. With East Europe ripe for incorporation in the Russian camp, why squander the gains with an adventuristic policy? The Americans might risk further war with their reckless drive on Berlin, but he [Stalin] had more to lose. And, after the gains in eastern Europe, there was the Asian factor to consider. Russian intervention in the Japanese War and the conquest of Manchuria, and perhaps Hokkaido as well, could pave the way for an expansion of Russian power in China and Japan. Yes, he thought, instinct alone cautioned prudence in Europe at this critical time.
Stalin scribbled a note, handed it to Shtemenko who had just arrived, and ordered him to pass it to Zhukov and Konev. As he left Stalin's study, Shtemenko glanced at the note, “Take as much of Berlin as possible, but avoid conflict with Allied forces. All STAVKA reserve armies remain under my control. Rokossovsky [2nd Belorussian Front] will expand his attack on 22 April as planned, with his objectives unchanged. Stalin.”
Stalin's parting words to Shtemenko were, “withdraw STAVKA reserve armies to original assembly areas under strict secrecy and await further orders.”
5th Armored Division Headquarters: Falkensee, Germany, 1900 21 April
The day's operations had resembled a triumphal march as resistance decreased to occasional desultory rifle fire. While the noise of heavy gunfire could be heard from the east, the open western approaches to Berlin beckoned the division's armored columns forward. CCA lead elements passed through Spandau and were deploying along the west bank of the Havel River. Patrols already probed along the road south of the Spree River toward Ruleben and Charlottenburg. Word was that XX Corps' 2nd Armored Division had occupied Potsdam and Babelsberg and, itself, had reached the Berlin suburb of Zehlendorf. It would be a matter of hours before the two forces could link up and begin clearing the city itself.
1st Belorussian Front Headquarters: Kustrin, 1900 21 April
Zhukov shouted into the phone, “Take the damn bridge at all costs!” and slammed the receiver into its cradle.
What more could go wrong? thought Zhukov. Sinenko's 5th Guards Tank Army was only 20 kilometers from Falkensee and was blocked by German forces holding a bridge across the Havel River west of Birkenwerder. Old men and boys could not have stopped Rotmistrov, and yet they had stopped Sinenko's army with over 500 tanks. The soldiers in him told him it was a small matter to stop an armored column along a narrow road, particularly across a river, but, on a day like this, emotion got the better of him. He reassured himself thinking that intimidation often spurred subordinates to superhuman efforts. This time only moderate efforts would suffice in putting the necessary force into the right place, at the right time. That place was Falkensee and there were still several hours left, or so Zhukov thought.
Two hours later Zhukov once again experienced nearly simultaneously all the glories and frustrations of a field commander as, in rapid succession, two reports arrived. The first was from Sinenko announcing the capture of the critical bridge. The second was from the front intelligence officer who declared that Falkensee was in American hands, and American patrols were operating as far north of Berlin as Hennigsdorf. Despite the shock of the news, Zhukov acted instinctively. He ordered Sinenko to secure a bridgehead over the Havel, send out patrols to meet the Americans, and turn the bulk of his army southward toward the Spree River and Berlin.
12th Army Group Headquarters: 2400 21 April
Quiet had descended across at least half of the front as an uneasy calm reigned over Russian and U.S. forces from Trebbin to Wittenberg and then southeast almost to Bautzen. Eisenhower had worked out crude coordination measures with both Konev and Zhukov, and Bradley was implementing them. All attention now telescoped into the immediate Berlin area and further north, where a final contest unfolded for the dwindling remnants of the once proud Third Reich.
While Eisenhower's orders echoed his earlier decision to seize as much of Germany as possible, they also incorporated an air of caution reflective of recent developments. Montgomery's 21st Army Group was to expand the operations into northern Germany as quickly as possible and advance as far east as feasible, while isolating German forces in Bremen and Hamburg. Meanwhile Bradley was to press on with the battle for Berlin.
Bradley's last orders of the evening were to Simpson and Hodges to occupy expeditiously as much of Berlin as possible. It was clear to Bradley that this final prize would be a shared one, for he well understood that Zhukov and Konev, whose forces that very hour were likely entering Berlin, shared his and his commanders' enthusiasm for this final battle.
SHAEF Headquarters: Rheims, France 1400 22 April
It was apparently clear to both Churchill and Truman that a fait accompli was in the making in central Europe. The decision to continue the Allied march toward Berlin had, in general, been politically and militarily proper. Allied armies had reached Berlin in advance of the Russians, had seized the key cities of Leipzig and Dresden, and would, it appeared, liberate a sizable portion of northwestern Germany, since the Russian offensive in that region had just begun and was proceeding slowly.
Stalin's reaction to events, despite the unfortunate incident at Trebbin, had been gruff but conciliatory, a good sign for future negotiations over the fate of eastern Europe.
Both leaders, however, were concerned about the consequences of a military race for turf within Berlin. City fighting is complex and confused at best, even when friend and foe are clearly distinguishable. Coalition fighting in a city where members of a coalition are not fully open with each other regarding how the enemy is to be defeated is another matter. In short, both Churchill and Truman feared a repeat of the Trebbin incident, which could occur on a larger scale. With both Allied and Russian forces fully concentrated and in contact with each other along almost half the front, no one could predict the consequences.
Moreover, Churchill was urging Truman to shift Eisenhower's reserves southward, to strip eastern Germany of armored forces so that Patton's Third Army could unleash a thrust into Czechoslovakia. Allied occupation of Prague, reasoned Churchill, could help prevent in Czechoslovakia the kinds of political monkey-business Stalin had undertaken in Poland. Truman seemed to agree.
Eisenhower's task, within the contest of messages sent by both Churchill and Truman to Stalin, was to negotiate with Zhukov and the Russian STAVKA a new demarcation line between Allied and Russian troops in regions where fighting was still underway.
As Eisenhower drafted his proposal, he thought that now was the time for some concessions. It was apparent that actual combat would propel U.S. and British forces to very favorable positions in Berlin and northwestern Germany. German resistance in eastern Berlin and along the Oder River south of Stettin was strong. Elsewhere it was less so. If combat ran its course, Allied armies could probably secure the bulk of Berlin south of the Spree River and probably seize sizeable portions of the city north of the Spree as well. Rapidly advancing British forces in the north would clearly reach the Uecker River line west of Stettin. These gains would deny the Russians any sizeable share of Berlin and give them only Stettin and the Oder River's western bank in the north. Probably most grievous for the Russians would be their inability to participate in seizing what they called “Hitler's Lair,” the Reich Chancellery area of the city.
Eisenhower's message to Zhukov and Stalin accompanied a current Allied situation map as of 1600 22 April and Eisenhower's proposed halt line for U.S. and British forces. The text read:
To preclude repetition of incidents such as occurred at Trebbin, and to insure equitable Russian participation in the reduction of Berlin, I propose to halt my troops on the boundaries indicated on the map. As you can see, this will require me to withdraw my forces in certain sectors to provide for more rational distribution of forces.
Eisenhower.
Eisenhower was sure that Soviet understanding of time and distance problems alone, to say nothing of German resistance to her advance, would underscore that this was a clear concession on Eisenhower's part. In particular, it left most of Berlin north of the Spree River and a small sector south of the river in Russian hands. This would not be the case if the precipitous Allied advance continued.
As Eisenhower worked on the proposal, messages from Bradley indicated that the 5th, 2nd, and 3rd Armored Divisions were moving steadily toward the center of Berlin. Most important, 3rd Armor's seizure of the main road to Templehof blocked Rybalko's 9th Mechanized Corps' advance route northward into the city.
STAVKA, Moscow, 1900 22 April (1800 Berlin Time)
Stalin was once again visibly angered. First, there had been the report from Zhukov that 5th Guards Tank Army had met heavy resistance on the northern outskirts of Berlin. “It appears,” he had said, “that the Germans will contest every inch of ground as they are doing against our troops elsewhere.” Stalin had noted Zhukov's emphasis on “our” troops, confirming his suspicions that the Americans were being treated by the Germans as somewhat less than conquerors. The remainder of Zhukov's report was equally depressing as his two shock armies and two tank armies commenced a tedious process of clearing the northern and eastern suburbs of Berlin, block by block, house by house, and room by room. Konev's report only added to Stalin's discomfiture. Rybalko's 9th Mechanized Corps had made excellent progress in its drive north on Berlin until it reached the Teltow Canal. Crossing the Canal after a brisk two-hour battle Sukhov's tankers then encountered American road-blocks south of Templehof Airfield. Now Sukhov sought passage into Berlin further east, beyond the American lines, like water trying to pass around a barrier.
Stalin reviewed this information in the context of GRU reports from agents in Berlin and from reconnaissance-diversionary forces subordinate to Zhukov. These reports spoke of a rapid American advance and predicted American penetration into the heart of Berlin within forty-eight hours. When Stalin had demanded a timetable for Zhukov's troops to do likewise, Zhukov had said it would take at least seventy-two hours based on his current progress. It was now clear to Stalin that if combat was to determine the future map of Germany, Soviet forces would gain little more than they presently had seized – that is a narrow sector west of the Oder and table scraps in Berlin.
With Antonov and Shtemenko, Stalin drafted a new message to Eisenhower, which proposed that a new demarcation line be established to coordinate the junction of Allied and Russian forces. It ran due south from Stralsund through Neubrandenburg, along the Havel River to the Spree River, and eastward along the Spree to Russian lines east of Berlin. To this proposal was appended the demand, “We have earned the right to reduce the seat of Nazi power – that is the area between the Spree River and Unter der Linden. Request your forces stop short of that region. Stalin.”
SHAEF Headquarters: Rheims, France, 2000 23 April
The message from Truman which read “Seal the deal” echoed that of Churchill. A day of near-frenzied negotiations with Stalin had seen both sides give ground, but, in the end, Eisenhower was satisfied with the fruits of his efforts. Eisenhower's and Stalin's respective proposals, made the day before, provided ample basis for negotiations. Stalin had bridled at the idea of surrendering more of northern Germany, while Eisenhower was unhappy with the Soviet demand to seize the Reich Chancellery area. What tipped the scales was the increased German resistance as U.S. forces approached the seat of Nazidom. It was obvious that the last several hundred yards would exact a huge price in blood on those who conquered it. “This,” reasoned Eisenhower, “was the time to compromise.” Besides, if Stalin's deal was accepted, Soviet forces were to relinquish their temporary control over this several square kilometers of disputed ground.
Affixing his signature to the message, Eisenhower directed his staff to issue copies to all of his force commanders.
Four Power Meetings: Potsdam, Germany, 5 May
Allied negotiators had been meeting for two solid days to implement the temporary demarcation agreement and prepare the ground for future negotiations on a final peace treaty. The deliberations had become ever more rancorous as suppressed Soviet hostility surfaced time and time again.
Soviet forces were still refusing to abandon their prize territory south of the Spree River and had even refused to budge from the small scrap of land they were to pass over to Allied control northwest of Wittenberg, despite the fact that Allied forces had promptly withdrawn to the agreed upon line.
The Soviets failed to moderate their stance vis-à-vis Poland and eastern Europe and issued incessant press releases trumpeting Truman's and Churchill's duplicity in violating earlier accords. Meanwhile, both High Commands had immediately begun simultaneous drives into Czechoslovakia in what became a repeat of the race for Berlin. Tension remained high in headquarters on both sides and across the negotiating table.
At the news conference ending the day's negotiating session, reporters unleashed a barrage of hostile questions at Soviet, U.S., and British negotiators alike, many accusing them of sullying the memories of those who had perished in four years of war and selling out an exhausted world population, which yearned for peace.
During the late evening, Eisenhower walked into the hotel which served as his headquarters. As frustrated as he was over the tense and fruitless negotiations, he reflected that Allied actions had correctly anticipated the likely post-war Soviet stance. At least now, due to Truman's and Churchill's resolute action, the Russians had not been granted undue advantage. “The strong will the Western Allies had demonstrated in recent weeks as they won the war,” Eisenhower thought to himself, “will be essential if we are to have any success in winning the peace.”
He could not, however, avoid grimacing as he glimpsed the banner headline of a newspaper lying on the hotel main desk, “Allied Actions Substitute a Cold War for the Hot War!”
Postscript
The war in Europe endured for less than another month. Although American forces took Prague, they ultimately withdrew to lines approximating those drawn by Eisenhower. The Cold War did endure, its centerpiece a divided Germany and Berlin. Eastern Europe slid into the Soviet camp by coercion, occupation, and political manipulation. Two alliances came to symbolize the Cold War, and the armed stalemate which resulted kept a tense peace for over forty years. In the end, it was the imperative of internal political change that ended the Cold War.
In the 1990s a wave of economic and political reform shook the communist world. Revolution and reaction changed the face of Europe, altered political and military realities, and set world statesmen along a new path in search of a new concert of Europe. This new concert had to recognize a new reality – that of a unified Germany and Berlin.
Historians dissected the corpse of the Cold War and wondered among themselves, “To what extent were Truman, Churchill, and Eisenhower responsible for it.” This question was duly added to the panoply of unresolved twentieth-century questions.