image       DEBATING MILITARY AFFAIRS
(Section 15)
The lord of Linwu and Xunzi were debating military affairs in the presence of King Xiaocheng of Zhao.1 “May I ask what are the most essential points to be observed in taking up arms?” inquired the king.
The lord of Linwu replied, “Above, utilize the most seasonable times of heaven; below, take advantage of the most profitable aspects of the earth. Observe the movements of your enemy, set out after he does, but get there before him. This is the essential point in the art of using arms!”
“Not so!” objected Xunzi. “From what I have heard of the way of the ancients, the basis of all aggressive warfare and military undertaking lies in the unification of the people. If the bow and arrow are not properly adjusted, even the famous archer Yi could not hit the mark. If the six horses of the team are not properly trained, even the famous carriage driver Zaofu could not go far. If the officers and people are not devoted to their leaders, even the sages Tang or Wu could not win victory. The one who is good at winning the support of his people is the one who will be good at using arms. Therefore what is really essential in military undertakings is to be good at winning the support of the people.”
“I disagree,” said the lord of Linwu. “In using arms, one should place the highest value upon advantageous circumstances, and should move by stealth and deception. He who is good at using arms moves suddenly and secretly, and no one knows from whence he comes. Sun Wu and Wu Qi2 employed this method and there was no one in the world who could stand up against them. Why is it necessary to win the support of the people?”
“You do not understand,” said Xunzi. “What I am speaking about are the soldiers of a benevolent man, the intentions of a true king. You speak of the value of plots and advantageous circumstances, of moving by sudden attack and stealth—but these are matters appropriate only to one of the feudal lords. Against the soldiers of a benevolent man, deceptions are of no use; they are effective only against a ruler who is rash and arrogant, whose people are worn out; they are effective only against a state in which the ruler and his subjects, superiors and inferiors, are torn apart and at odds. Therefore a tyrant like Jie may practice deception upon another Jie, and, depending upon how cleverly he proceeds, may happily achieve a certain success. But for a Jie to try to practice deception against a sage like Yao would be like trying to break a rock by throwing eggs at it, or trying to stir boiling water with your bare finger. He will be like a man consumed by fire or drowned in water.
“As for the relations between superior and inferior under the rule of a benevolent man, the various generals will be of one mind, and the three armies of the state will work together. Subjects will serve their lord and inferiors will serve their superiors like sons serving a father or younger brothers serving an elder brother. They will be like hands held up to guard the face and eyes, arms clasped to protect the breast and belly. Try to attack such a ruler by deception and you will see the hands fly up in warning and then dart forward in attack.
“Moreover, if the benevolent man rules a state which is ten li square, the people for a hundred li around will act as listeners for him; if he rules a state of a hundred li, a thousand li will listen for him; and if he rules a state of a thousand li, the whole region within the four seas will listen for him. He will receive clear intelligence and warning, and the whole region will draw about him in unity. Thus the soldiers of a benevolent man, when gathered together, will form themselves into companies; when spread out, they will form in ranks. In striking power they are like the long blade of the famous sword Moye; what comes beneath it will be cut off. In keenness they are like the sharp point of Moye; what falls upon it will be pierced through. Drawn up in square encampment and surrounded by sentries, they will be like a solid rock; what butts against it will be smashed, crushed, broken, defeated, and forced to fall back.3
“When rulers of evil and war-loving states carry out their expeditions, who can they get to accompany them? Obviously they must employ their own people. But if their own people favor the benevolent ruler, look up to him as to a father or mother, and rejoice in him as in the fragrance of iris or orchid, and on the contrary regard their own superiors as so many wielders of branding irons and tattooing knives, as their foes and enemies, then, human nature being what it is, even if the people should be as cruel and violent as the tyrant Jie or Robber Zhi, how could they be willing to fight for the sake of men they hate and do harm to one they love? This would be like trying to force men to do harm to their own fathers or mothers. They will surely come, therefore, and give warning to the benevolent ruler, and in that case how can the evil rulers hope to carry out their deceptions?
“Therefore, when the benevolent man rules the state, he grows day by day more illustrious. Those among the other feudal lords who lead the way in paying allegiance to him will find safety, those who lag behind will be in danger, those who oppose him on too many points will find their territory stripped away, and those who turn against him will perish. This is what the Odes means when it says:
The martial king raised his banners,
Firmly he grasped his battle-ax.
Blazing like a fierce fire,
Who then dared oppose us?”4
“Very good,” replied King Xiaocheng and the lord of Linwu. “And may we ask what ways and what modes of action the true king should follow in employing his soldiers?”
Xunzi said, “Such detailed matters are of minor importance to Your Majesty, and may be left to the generals. What I would like to speak about, however, are the signs which indicate whether the king and the feudal lords are strong or weak, whether they are destined to survive or to perish, and the circumstances which insure safety or invite danger.
“If the ruler is a worthy man, the state will be ordered; if he is incompetent, the state will be disordered. If he honors rites and values righteousness, the state will be ordered; if he disdains rites and despises righteousness, the state will be disordered. The ordered state will be strong, the disordered one weak. This is the basis of strength and weakness.
“If superiors have the qualities that command respect, then inferiors can be employed. If superiors do not command respect, then inferiors cannot be employed. If inferiors can be employed, the state will be strong; if not, the state will be weak. This is a constant rule of strength and weakness.
“To honor rites and seek to achieve merit is the highest manner of action. To work hard for one’s stipend and value integrity is the next highest manner. To consider merit above all other things and despise integrity is the lowest manner. This is the constant principle of strength and weakness.
“He who treats his officers well will be strong; he who does not will be weak. He who loves his people will be strong; he who does not will be weak. He whose government decrees are trusted will be strong; he whose government decrees are not trusted will be weak. He whose people are unified will be strong; he whose people are not unified will be weak. He whose rewards are generous will be strong; he whose rewards are meager will be weak. He whose punishments are held in awe will be strong; he whose punishments are regarded with contempt will be weak. He whose supplies and armaments are complete and efficient will be strong; he whose supplies and armaments are crude and inefficient will be weak. He who uses his soldiers with caution will be strong; he who uses them rashly will be weak. He whose strategies proceed from a single source will be strong; he whose strategies proceed from several sources will be weak. This is the abiding rule of strength and weakness.
“The men of Qi place great emphasis upon skill in personal attack.5 He who by such skill comes back with the head of an enemy is rewarded with eight ounces of gold levied from the men who accomplished no such deed, but outside of this there are no regular battle rewards.6 If one is faced with an enemy who is weak and small in numbers, such methods may achieve a certain temporary success, but if the enemy is numerous and strong, one’s own forces will quickly disintegrate. They will scatter like birds in flight, and it will be only a matter of days before the state will be overthrown. This method of employing soldiers will doom a state to destruction; no way leads to greater weakness. It is in fact hardly different from going to the market place and hiring day laborers to do one’s fighting.
“The rulers of Wei select their foot soldiers on the basis of certain qualifications. They must be able to wear three sets of armor,7 carry a crossbow of twelve-stone weight, bear on their backs a quiver with fifty arrows, and in addition carry a spear. They must also wear helmets on their heads, a sword at their waist, carry three days’ provisions, and still be able to march a hundred li in one day. When men have met these qualifications, their families are exempted from corvée labor and are given special tax benefits on their lands and houses. Thus, although individual soldiers may grow old and their strength wane, their privileges cannot be readily taken away from them, and in addition it is not easy to train a sufficient number of new recruits to replace them. For this reason, though the territory of the state is large, its taxes are meager. This method of employing soldiers puts a state in grave peril.
“As for the rulers of Qin, they have only a narrow, confined area on which to settle their people. They employ them harshly, terrorize them with authority, embitter them with hardship, coax them with rewards, and cow them with punishments. They see to it that if the humbler people8 hope to gain any benefits from their superiors, they can do so only by achieving distinction in battle. They oppress the people before employing them and make them win some distinction before granting them any benefit. Rewards increase to keep pace with achievements; thus a man who returns from battle with five enemy heads is made the master of five families in his neighborhood. In comparison with the other methods I have mentioned, this is the best one to insure a strong and populous state that will last for a long time, a wide expanse of territory that yields taxes. Therefore Qin’s repeated victories during the last four generations9 are no accident, but the result of policy.
“So the skilled attackers of Qi cannot stand up against the armed infantry of Wei, and the armed infantry of Wei cannot stand up against the fierce officers of Qin. But neither could the fierce officers of Qin come face to face with the well-regulated troops of the dictators Duke Huan of Qi or Duke Wen of Jin, nor could the troops of Duke Huan or Duke Wen possibly hold out against the benevolence and righteousness of King Tang or King Wu. Before such a force they would be like something burned and shriveled, something flung against a rock.
“The soldiers of states like Qi, Wei, or Qin are all merely seeking reward or striving for some profit. They are following the ways of hired laborers or tradesmen, and as yet have not understood what it means to honor their superiors, conform to regulations, and fulfill their moral obligations. If one of the other feudal lords were truly able to imbue his people with a sense of honor, then he could rise up and menace them all without difficulty. Therefore, to attract men to military service and recruit soldiers as they do, to rely upon force and deception and teach men to covet military achievements and profit—this is the way to deceive the people. But to rely upon ritual principles and moral education—this is the way to unite them. When deception meets deception, the victory may go either way, depending upon the cleverness of the combatants. But to try to use deception to meet unity is like trying to hack down Mount Tai with an awl—no one in the world would be stupid enough no attempt it! Thus, when the true king leads forth his troops, there is no doubt of the outcome. When King Tang set out to punish Jie, and King Wu to punish Zhou, they had only to give a wave of their hands and a nod, and even the most powerful and unruly nations hastened to their service. Punishing Jie and Zhou then became no more difficult than punishing a lone commoner. This is what the ‘Great Oath’ means when it speaks of ‘Zhou, the lone commoner.’10
“Those whose soldiers achieve a major degree of unity may control the world; those whose soldiers achieve only a minor degree of unity may still be strong enough to menace11 their enemies close by. But those who attract men to military service and recruit soldiers, rely upon deception, and teach men to covet military achievements and profit—their soldiers will sometimes win, sometimes lose, but do neither consistently. At times such men will contract their sphere of influence, at times they will expand it; at times they will survive, at times they will go under, like rivals struggling for supremacy. Military operations of this kind are like the raids of robber bands; the gentleman has nothing to do with such ways.
“Thus, for example, Tian Dan of Qi, Zhuang Qiao of Chu, Wei Yang of Qin, and Miao Ji of Yan12 were all men who were popularly said to have been skilled in the use of soldiers. Yet, though these men achieved varying degrees of cleverness and might, they all followed essentially the same methods, and none of them ever got so far as to bring true harmony and unity to their armies. They all relied upon sudden seizures, deceptions, stratagems, and swift overthrows, and for this reason their armies were no different from robber bands. Duke Huan of Qi, Duke Wen of Jin, King Zhuang of Chu, King Helü of Wu, and King Goujian of Yue13 were all able to attain harmony and unity in their armies, and it may therefore be said that they at least entered the realm of the true way. And yet they never grasped the essentials of the matter. So they were able to become dictators, but not to become true kings. These are the signs of strength and weakness.”
“Excellent!” exclaimed King Xiaocheng and the lord of Linwu. “And now may we ask how to become a good general?”
Xunzi replied, “In knowledge, nothing is more important than discarding what is doubtful; in action, nothing is more important than avoiding mistakes; in undertakings, nothing is more important than to be without regret. Only make sure that you will not regret the undertaking, and then you need not worry about whether it will be successful or not.
“In regulations and commands, strive for strictness and authority. In rewards and punishments, strive for consistency and aptness. In establishing encampments and depots, strive to make them well-guarded and secure. In troop movements, strive for an air of gravity and deliberateness, at the same time striving for alertness and rapidity. In observing the disposition and movements of the enemy, strive to obtain the most complete and penetrating reports, and see that they are checked for reliability. In meeting the enemy in battle, proceed on the basis of what you understand thoroughly, not on the basis of what you are in doubt about. These are called the six arts.
“Do not think only of maintaining your rank as a general and shudder at the thought of losing your command. Do not press too hard for victory and forget about defeat. Do not be too stern with your own men and despise the enemy. Do not fix your eyes on gain alone and take no thought for loss. Seek ripeness in all your plans and liberality in your use of supplies. These are called the five expedients.
“There are three cases in which a general refuses to obey the command of his ruler. Though threatened with death, he cannot be made to take up a position that is untenable. Though threatened with death, he cannot be made to attack where there is no hope of victory. Though threatened with death, he cannot be made to deceive the common people. These are known as the three extremities.
“If the general, having received his commands from the ruler, relays them to the three armies, and sees to it that the three armies are properly regulated, that the officers are assigned to their proper ranks, and that all matters are correctly disposed of, then the ruler will have no particular occasion to rejoice nor the enemy to feel resentment.14 This is called the highest type of service.
“Plan before any undertaking, and carry it out with circumspection; be as careful about the end as you are about the beginning, and end and beginning will be alike. This is the most auspicious policy. The success of all undertakings rests upon circumspection; their failure derives from negligence. Therefore, when circumspection prevails over carelessness, the result will be good fortune; when carelessness prevails over circumspection, the result will be annihilation. When planning prevails over personal desires, the result will be progress; when personal desires prevail over planning, the result will be disaster. Fight as though you were trying only to hold your ground; march as though you were already in battle; regard any success you achieve as merely lucky. Be cautious in strategy and never neglectful; be cautious in your undertakings and never neglectful; be cautious in dealings with your officers and never neglectful; be cautious in using your men and never neglectful; be cautious in regard to the enemy and never neglectful. These are called the five things that must not be neglected.
“He who carefully observes the six arts, the five expedients, and the three extremities, and who disposes of all matters with assiduity and circumspection, never allowing himself to be neglectful, may be called a true general of the world. He partakes of a godlike intelligence!”
“Very good,” said the lord of Linwu. “And now may I ask about the regulations of the king’s army?”
Xunzi replied, “The general dies with his drums; the carriage driver dies with the reins; the officials die at their posts; the leaders of the fighting men die in their ranks. When the army hears the sound of the drums, it advances; when it hears the sound of the bells, it retreats. Obedience to orders is counted first; achievements are counted second. To advance when there has been no order to advance is no different from retreating when there has been no order to retreat; the penalty is the same. The king’s army does not kill the enemy’s old men and boys; it does not destroy crops. It does not seize those who retire without a fight, but it does not forgive those who resist. It does not make prisoners of those who surrender and seek asylum. In carrying out punitive expeditions, it does not punish the common people; it punishes those who lead the common people astray. But if any of the common people fight with the enemy, they become enemies as well. Thus those who flee from the enemy forces and come in surrender shall be left to go free.15 Kai, the prince of Wei, was enfeoffed in Song, but Cao Chulong was executed in the presence of the army.16 The Yin people who submitted to the leaders of the Zhou army, however, were allowed to live and were cared for the same as the people of Zhou. Hence, those close by sang songs and rejoiced, and those far off hastened to the Zhou leaders with the greatest speed. There was no country so remote and out of the way that it did not hurry forward to serve them and find rest and joy in their rule. All within the four seas became as one family, and wherever the report of their virtue penetrated, there was no one who did not submit. This is what is called being a true leader of the people. The Odes refers to this when it says:
From west, from east,
From south, from north,
There were none who thought of not submitting.17
“A true king carries out punitive expeditions, but he does not make war. When a city is firmly guarded, he does not lay siege to it; when the soldiers resist strongly, he does not attack. When the rulers and their people of other states are happy with each other, he considers it a blessing. He does not massacre the defenders of a city; he does not move his army in secret; he does not keep his forces long in the field; he does not allow a campaign to last longer than one season. Therefore the people of badly ruled states delight in the report of his government; they feel uneasy under their own rulers and long for his coming.”
“Excellent,” said the lord of Linwu.
Chen Xiao18 said to Xunzi, “When you talk about the use of arms, you always speak of benevolence and righteousness as being the basis of military action. A benevolent man loves others, and a righteous man acts in accordance with what is right. Why, then, would they have any recourse to arms in the first place? Those who take up arms do so only in order to contend with others and seize some spoil!”
Xunzi replied, “This is not something that you would understand. The benevolent man does indeed love others, and because he loves others, he hates to see men do them harm. The righteous man acts in accordance with what is right, and for that reason he hates to see men do wrong. He takes up arms in order to put an end to violence and to do away with harm, not in order to contend with others for spoil. Therefore, where the soldiers of the benevolent man encamp they command a godlike respect; and where they pass, they transform the people. They are like the seasonable rain in whose falling all men rejoice. Thus Yao attacked Huan Dou, Shun attacked the rulers of the Miao, Yu attacked Gong Gong, Tang attacked the ruler of the Xia, King Wen attacked Chong, and King Wu attacked Zhou. These four emperors and two kings all marched through the world with their soldiers of benevolence and righteousness. Those nearby were won by their goodness, and those far off were filled with longing by their virtue. They did not stain their swords with blood, and yet near and far alike submitted; their virtue flourished in the center and spread to the four quarters. This is what the Odes means when it says:
The good man, the gentleman,
His forms are without fault;
His forms are without fault;
He corrects the countries of the four quarters.19
Li Si20 said to Xunzi, “For four generations now Qin has won victory. Its armies are the strongest in the world and its authority sways the other feudal lords. It did not attain this by means of benevolence and righteousness, but by taking advantage of its opportunities, that is all.”
Xunzi replied, “This is not something that you would understand. When you talk about opportunities, you are speaking of opportunities that are in fact inopportune. When I speak of benevolence and righteousness, I mean opportunities that are in fact great opportunities. This benevolence and righteousness which I speak of are the means whereby government is ordered properly, and when government is properly ordered, then the people will draw close to their superiors, delight in their rulers, and think it a light matter to die for them. Therefore I have said that matters pertaining to the army and the leadership of the generals are of minor importance. Qin has been victorious for four generations, yet it has lived in constant terror and apprehension lest the rest of the world should someday unite and trample it down. These are the soldiers of a degenerate age, not of a nation which has grasped the true principle of leadership. Thus Tang did not have to wait until he had cornered Jie on the field of Mingtiao before he could accomplish his overthrow; King Wu did not have to wait until his victory on the day jiazi before he could punish Zhou for his evil deeds.21 They had already assured victory for themselves by all their earlier deeds and actions. This is what it means to employ the soldiers of benevolence and righteousness. Now you do not try to get at the root of the matter, but look for a model in superficial appearances. This is the way to bring disorder to the world!”
Rites22 are the highest expression of hierarchical order, the basis for strengthening the state, the way by which to create authority, the crux of achievement and fame. By proceeding in accordance with ritual, kings gain possession of the world; by ignoring it, they bring destruction to their altars of the grain and soil. Stout armor and sharp weapons are not enough to assure victory; high walls and deep moats are not enough to assure defense; stern commands and manifold penalties are not enough to assure authority. What proceeds by the way of ritual will advance; what proceeds by any other way will end in failure.
The men of Chu make armor out of sharkskin and rhinoceros hides, and it is so tough it rings like metal or stone. They carry steel spears made in Yuan, sharp as the sting of a wasp, and move as nimbly and swiftly as a whirlwind. And yet Chu’s troops were defeated at Qiusha and their general, Tang Mei, was killed; and from the time when Zhuang Qiao turned against the king of Chu, the state was torn apart.23 Surely this did not come about because Chu lacked stout armor and sharp weapons. Rather it was because its leaders did not follow the proper way. They had the Ru and Ying rivers to protect them, the Yangzi and the Han as their moats; they were bounded by the forests of Deng and shielded by Mount Fangcheng. And yet the Qin forces swept down and seized the Chu capital city of Yan in Ying as easily as one might shake down a dry leaf.24 Surely it was not because Chu lacked natural defenses and barriers to protect it. Rather it was because its leaders failed to follow the proper way. The tyrant Zhou cut out Bi Gan’s heart, imprisoned Jizi, and made the punishment of the burning pillar. He murdered and massacred without season and his ministers and people were filled with terror and gave up all hope of saving their lives. Yet, when the armies of King Wu came sweeping down, none of Zhou’s commands were obeyed and he found he could not rally his people about him. Surely it was not because his commands were not stern enough or his punishments not manifold. Rather it was because in leading the people he failed to follow the proper way.
In ancient times the only weapons were spears, lances, bows, and arrows, and yet enemy states did not even wait until these were used against them, but submitted at once. Men did not build walls and battlements or dig ditches and moats; they did not set up defenses and watch stations or construct war machines, and yet the state was peaceful and safe, free from fear of outside aggression and secure in its position.25 There was only one reason for this. The leaders illumined the Way and apportioned all ranks fairly; they employed the people at the proper season and sincerely loved them, so that the people moved in harmony with their superiors as shadows follow a form or echoes answer a sound. If there were any who did not follow commands, then and only then were punishments applied. Therefore, the rulers had only to punish one man and the whole world submitted. Men who had been punished bore no ill will against their superiors, for they knew that the fault lay in themselves. Therefore, the rulers seldom had to use punishments, and yet their authority was recognized by all. There was only one reason for this: they followed the proper way. In ancient times, when Yao ruled the world, he executed one man, punished two others, and after that the whole world was well ordered. This is what the old text means when it says, “let your authority inspire awe, but do not wield it; set up penalties but do not apply them.”
It is the way with all men that, if they do something only for the sake of winning rewards and benefits, then, the moment they see that the undertaking may end unprofitably or in danger, they will abandon it. Therefore rewards, punishments, force, and deception are in themselves not enough to make men put forth their full efforts or risk their lives for the state. If the rulers and superiors do not treat the common people in accordance with ritual principles, loyalty, and good faith, but rely solely upon rewards, punishments, force, and deception, oppressing them and trying merely to squeeze some kind of service and achievement out of them, then when an invader comes, if entrusted with the defense of a threatened city, they will surely betray their trust; if led into battle against the enemy, they will invariably turn and flee; if assigned to some difficult and demanding task, they will certainly run away. The bonds that should hold them will melt, and inferiors will turn upon and seize control of their superiors. Rewards and punishments, force and deception may be the way to deal with hired laborers or tradesmen, but they are no way to unify the population of a great state or bring glory to the nation. Therefore, the men of ancient times were ashamed to resort to such ways.
Lead the people by magnifying the sound of virtue, guide them by making clear ritual principles, love them with the utmost loyalty and good faith, give them a place in the government by honoring the worthy and employing the able, and elevate them in rank by bestowing titles and rewards. Demand labor of them only at the proper season, lighten their burdens, unify them in harmony, nourish them and care for them as you would little children. Then, when the commands of government have been fixed and the customs of the people unified, if there should be those who depart from the customary ways and refuse to obey their superiors, the common people will as one man turn upon them with hatred, and regard them with loathing, like an evil force that must be exorcised. Then and only then should you think of applying penalties. Such are the kind of men who deserve severe punishment. What greater disgrace could come to them? If they try to profit by evil ways, they find themselves confronted by severe punishment. Who but a madman or a fool, perceiving such an outcome, would fail to reform?
After this the common people will become enlightened and will learn to obey the laws of their superiors, to imitate the ways of their ruler, and will find rest and delight in them. Then, if men should appear who can train themselves to do good, improve and rectify their conduct, practice ritual principles, and honor the Way, the common people will as one man show them deference and respect, will favor and praise them. Then and only then may you think of doling out rewards. Such are the kind of men who deserve lofty titles and generous emoluments. What greater glory could come to them? If they fear to suffer some loss by their virtuous ways, they find themselves supported and sustained by titles and emoluments. What man is there alive who would not wish to receive the same?
With lofty titles and generous emoluments clearly held out before him, and explicit penalties and deep disgrace unmistakably hovering behind him, though a man might have no wish to reform his ways, how could he help himself? Therefore, the people will flock about their ruler like water flowing downward. Where he is present, he commands a godlike respect; when he acts, he transforms the people (and they become obedient).26 The violent and daring are transformed to sincerity; the prejudiced and selfish-minded are transformed to fairness; the quick-tempered and contentious are transformed to harmony. This is called the great transformation and the highest unity. The Odes refers to this when it says:
The king’s plans were truly sincere,
And the country of Xu came in submission.27
There are three methods by which you may annex a neighboring state and bring its people under your rule: you may win them over by virtue, by force, or by wealth.
If the people of a neighboring state respect your reputation, admire your virtuous actions, and desire to become your subjects, they will throw open their gates, clear the roads, and welcome you to their cities. If you allow them to follow their old customs and remain in their old homes, the common people will all rest easy and will willingly obey your laws and commands. In this way you will acquire new territory and your power will increase; you will have added to your population and your armies will be stronger than ever. This is what it means to win over a neighbor by virtue.
If the people of a neighboring state do not respect your reputation or admire your virtuous actions, but are awed by your authority and intimidated by force, then, although they will feel no loyalty to you in their hearts, they will not dare to resist annexation. In such cases, however, you will have to enlarge your garrisons and increase your military supplies, and your government expenditures will increase likewise. In this way you will acquire new territory but your power will decrease; you will have added to your population but your armies will be weaker than before. This is what it means to win over a neighbor by force.
If the people of a neighboring state do not respect your reputation or admire your virtuous actions, but are poor and are looking for some way to get rich, are starving and in search of plenty, then they will come to you with empty bellies and gaping mouths, attracted by your food alone. In such a case, you will have to issue supplies of grain from your storehouses in order to feed them, hand out goods and wealth to enrich them, and appoint conscientious officials to look out for them, and only after three years have passed can you put faith in their loyalty. In this way you will acquire new territory but your power will decrease; you will have added to your population but the state will be poorer than before. This is what it means to win over a neighbor by wealth. Therefore I say, he who annexes a state by virtue is a true king; he who annexes it by force will be weakened; and he who annexes it by wealth will be impoverished. From ancient times to the present it has always been the same.
It is easy enough to annex territory; the difficult thing is to stabilize and maintain control over it. Qi was able to annex Song, but could not hold on to it, and so Wei snatched it away. Yan succeeded in annexing Qi, but could not hold on to it, and so Tian Dan seized control of it. Han’s territory of Shangdang, a region several hundred li square, rich and well inhabited, chose to become part of Zhao, but Zhao could not hold on to it, and hence Qin took it away.28 He who is able to annex territory but not to hold on to it will invariably be stripped of his acquisitions; he who can neither annex territory nor hold on to what he has will surely be destroyed. He who can hold on to territory will invariably be able to acquire more. When one can both acquire and hold on to territory, there is no limit29 to the amount he can annex. In ancient times Tang began with the region of Bo and King Wu began with Hao, both of them areas of only a hundred li square. The reason they were able to unite the world under their rule and win the allegiance of all the other feudal lords was simply this: they knew how to secure their hold upon their territory.
Secure your hold on the aristocracy by means of ritual; secure your hold on the people through government. With ritual well ordered, the aristocracy will submit to your rule; with the government fairly administered, the people will feel safe. With the aristocracy submissive and the people content, you will attain what is called a situation of great stability. If you remain within your borders, you will be unassailable; if you march to battle, you will be strong. What you command will be done, what you forbid will cease, and the undertakings of a true king will be complete in you.
 
1The lord of Linwu is identified by commentators as a general of the state of Chu. Xunzi is referred to throughout the chapter as Sun Qingzi (see Introduction, p. 1). King Xiaocheng of Zhao reigned 265–245 B.C.
2Two famous generals and military experts of the late 4th and 3d centuries respectively. Both are reputed authors of early works on military science, known today as the Sunzi and Wuzi.
3This last clause contains seven characters that are quite unintelligible. Commentators generally agree that they must have the meaning given in the translation, though efforts to interpret or amend the individual characters are scarcely convincing.
4“Hymns of Shang,” Changfa, Mao text no. 304. The martial king is Tang, the founder of the Shang dynasty.
5Writing some 150 years later, the historian Sima Qian noted the same fact: “The people (of Qi) … are timid in group warfare but brave in single combat” (Shiji 129).
6Following the interpretation of Kubo Ai.
7Defined by commentators as breastplates, waist guards, and shin guards.
8Omitting tian, which makes no sense here.
9Probably a reference to the reigns of Duke Xiao and Kings Hui, Wu, and Zhao of Qin, or the period from 361 to 250 B.C., when Qin was steadily growing in size and power.
10From the “Taishi” (Great Oath), a lost section of the Book of Documents. The section by that name in the present text is a later forgery.
11Reading dai instead of zhi.
12Tian Dan was a well-known general of Qi who, in 285–284 B.C., drove the invading troops of Yan and her allies from the state and rescued the royal house of Qi from destruction. His biography is found in Shiji 82. Zhuang Qiao was a general of Chu who, in the time of King Wei of Chu (339–328 B.C.), gained control of a large area west of Chu in present-day Sichuan and Guizhou provinces. He later turned against his sovereign and made himself an independent ruler in the region of Lake Dian in Yunnan. Cf. Shiji 116. Wei Yang, often referred to by his title Lord Shang, was the famous statesman and Legalist adviser to Duke Xiao of Qin (361–338 B.C.), whose biography is the subject of Shiji 68. He is the reputed author of the Legalist work, The Book of Lord Shung. Miao Ji is otherwise unknown.
13This is the usual list of the five ba or dictator leaders of the feudal lords. The dates of their reigns are: Duke Huan of Qi, 685–643 B.C.; Duke Wen of Jin, 636–628 B.C.; King Zhuang of Chu, 613–591 B.C.; King Helü of Wu, 514–496 B.C.; King Goujian of Yue, ?–465 B.C.
14I am not sure I understand what Xunzi means by this. Apparently he is saying that if the army is regulated according to objective principles, both the ruler and the enemy will take its efficiency as a matter of course and feel no particular emotional reaction. But perhaps the text is faulty.
15Following the interpretation of Liu Shipei.
16The prince of Wei was a brother of Zhou, the last ruler of the Yin. Having admonished Zhou in vain, he retired from court and, when King Wu attacked and overthrew Zhou, he greeted the army and acknowledged his submission. In return he was enfeoffed in Song and given the task of carrying on the sacrifices of the Yin royal family. His name is Qi, but it has here been changed by Han editors to Kai in order to avoid the taboo on the personal name of Emperor Jing of the Han. Cao Chulong is usually identified as an evil adviser to the tyrant Jie of the Xia, but Xunzi apparently takes him to be an adviser to the tyrant Zhou of the Yin.
17“Greater Odes,” Wenwang yousheng, Mao text no. 244.
18A disciple of Xunzi, otherwise unknown.
19“Airs of Cao,” Shijiu, Mao text no. 152. The present Xunzi text quotes only the first two lines, but commentators believe that the next two lines should be added in order to make the quotation tie in with Xunzi’s remarks.
20A native of Chu who, after studying for a time under Xunzi, traveled west to the state of Qin and gained the ear of the young king. With Li Si’s advice and aid, the king in time succeeded in conquering the other states and becoming supreme ruler, taking the title of First Emperor of the Qin. Li Si, as prime minister, had much to do with the establishment of the new dynasty, but after the death of the First Emperor he was ousted from power by a court rival and in 208 B.C. was condemned to death.
21The field of Mingtiao was the scene of Tang’s final victory over Jie, the last ruler of the Xia; jiazi was the day of the sixty-day cycle upon which King Wu won final victory over Zhou, the last ruler of the Yin.
22The remainder of the chapter is not in anecdote form. The three paragraphs that follow are duplicated in Sima Qian’s “Treatise on Rites,” Shiji 23.
23In 300 B.C. the army of King Huai of Chu was defeated at Qiusha by the combined forces of Qin, Han, Wei and Qi. For Zhuang Qiao, see above, n. 12.
24Xunzi is referring to the attack against Chu led by the Qin general Bo Qi in 278 B.C., when the Qin forces seized the Chu capital and forced King Qingxiang to flee.
25Following the reading of Shiji 23.
26The words in parentheses, two characters in the original, break the rhythm of the passage; either they are part of a clause the rest of which has dropped out of the text, or they do not belong here at all.
27“Greater Odes,” Changwu, Mao text no. 263.
28Qi annexed Song in 286 B.C. but lost it two years later to Wei. For Tian Dan and the invasion of Qi by Yan, see above, n. 12. The region of Shangdang, originally a part of Han, chose to become part of Zhao in 261 B.C., but three years later it was taken over by Qin.
29Reading qiang (border) instead of jiang.