Experienced negotiators know that few deals result simply from the brilliant insight or dramatic stroke. An intelligent strategy plus the willingness and ability on the part of the negotiator to grind away, pushing the process toward a conclusion, are often essential ingredients for a deal. Kissinger exemplified the kind of sustained negotiating drive needed to transform a strategic conception into a workable agreement. Along with many others, British prime minister Ted Heath noted Kissinger’s “limitless capacity for hard work and an imperviousness to the strains of travel and long hours of negotiation.”1
Persistence
Reaching agreements often took time and persistence: the SALT talks lasted over two years while the secret Paris peace talks went on for almost three—the public talks began earlier and took longer. Yet the intensity of negotiations during shorter periods could be extreme. For example, Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin recalled the 1975 negotiations toward a second disengagement agreement with the Egyptians: “During those ten days, we held daylong—and occasionally nightlong—discussions. . . . Five hours might be spent discussing a stretch of sand one hundred meters long. It was a supreme test of our patience, persistence, and even our physical endurance. . . . [P]atiently, Kissinger inched his way forward between Sadat’s difficulties and mine, between proclamations from each side that ‘this is our final concession!’ . . . The conclusive discussion on the bilateral issues was held on the night of August 31 and lasted until 6:00 a.m. As the hours wore on, participants on both sides dropped out of the discussions, so that by the end it had become a dialogue between Kissinger and me against a chorus of snores all around.”2
In seeking to get an Israeli-Syrian deal, Harold Saunders described the negotiations with Kissinger as lasting thirty-five days with “26 round trips between Ben Gurion airport [Israel] and Damascus International. That meant 26 meetings with Hafez al-Assad. Most of those meetings averaged six hours. The pattern was to have a meeting in Jerusalem in the morning, rush to Ben Gurion airport, fly to Damascus arriving just before lunch.”3
Negotiating Dynamics and “Momentum”
The willingness and ability to grind away can be essential, but to what precise purposes and to power what tactics? Kissinger commented on the dynamics of the negotiation process that could influence tactical choice: “In the course of every negotiation, a point is reached when the parties either conclude that they will eventually come together or that they are hopelessly deadlocked. In the former case, the negotiation gathers steam; individual issues are reconsidered in the light of imminent consensus. In the latter instance, though the process may drag on for some time, the negotiation is doomed because, from then on, the parties concentrate on shifting the blame for failure to each other.”4
These positive or negative dynamics do not operate autonomously; the concerted action of astute negotiators can drive the momentum forward. Kissinger argued that “Speed . . . is often of the essence. Every negotiation reaches a critical point where it will move rapidly to a conclusion or lapse into stagnation. This is when the highest levels of government must engage themselves to overcome bureaucratic inertia.”5 When Kissinger used the term momentum, he meant a shared sense among the negotiators of accelerating movement toward, or away from, an agreement. And this perception can have the quality of a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Shuttle Diplomacy
One of Kissinger’s best-known tactical devices for moving the parties closer together was the “shuttle,” whereby he and his team would fly back and forth between the principals, carrying proposals, responses, and messages—which the shuttle team would often shape to enhance forward movement. The term shuttle was apparently invented by Kissinger’s colleague Joseph Sisco, later undersecretary of state. After a foray to Jerusalem, Cairo, and back, Sisco shouted, “Welcome aboard the Egyptian–Israeli shuttle!”6 (Given Kissinger’s success with this novel tactic, various observers have called for “shuttles” as the proper approach in virtually all subsequent negotiations over Middle East peace.7) Geography permitted this kind of shuttle because the proximity of Cairo, Jerusalem, and Damascus made daily trips easily possible.
As practiced by Kissinger, the shuttle was a highly kinetic version of familiar diplomatic “proximity talks,” in which the principals do not negotiate face-to-face, at least for the most part. Rather, a third party alternates between them, trying to coax an agreement from the process. (The Dayton talks to end the war in Bosnia operated by this method, with Richard Holbrooke as the third party.)
Many factors can lead to the decision to keep the parties separate. For example, representatives of countries at war with each other or those that do not even recognize one another diplomatically may be completely unwilling even to meet. In such cases, indirect negotiations via a third party may be the only possible option. Or the key players might be willing to meet, but the chemistry between them could be toxic. For example, as President Carter mediated Camp David talks between Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin, who had invariably ended up “locked in argument and continually antagonizing each other.” Given this experience, Carter made sure these two men did not meet—though their cabins were scarcely a hundred yards from each other.
Separate meetings with each principal can help the mediator understand the real interests, convey the other side’s priorities and hot buttons, and help shape proposals that have a better chance of acceptance. Since communication takes place through the mediator, shuttles offer the chance to influence, filter, and even buffer the communications between the principals to bring them closer together. If one party argued for making a harsh, one-sided demand, for example, the mediator might be able to moderate it or, at a minimum, warn the other side that a mere “bargaining position” or “opening gambit” was coming.8 These process characteristics can greatly enhance the importance, scope, and role of the mediator, a consideration of which Kissinger was keenly aware.
While there are advantages to the mediator’s keeping the parties apart, there can be disadvantages, too. It creates situations where only the mediator knows what is really going on. The parties lose the opportunity to assess each other’s interests and concerns directly, to suggest options, and to figure out how to do business together. Although flare-ups may be avoided, miscommunication and lost opportunities may result.9
Shuttling, though, could be useful for other reasons. Foremost is building momentum and creating a sense of urgency. As Isaacson argues, the “whirlwind of publicity and the jet-powered pace of Kissinger’s missions swept up the negotiators on each side and created a momentum that made last-minute breakthroughs more likely.”10 Kissinger elaborates that in a “shuttle, the presence of a high-level American mediator supplies the deadline and hence a sense of urgency. The parties have an incentive to consider what cost a stalemate might exact in terms of their relationship with the United States.”11
Bruce van Voorst, a Newsweek correspondent who traveled on many Kissinger shuttles, stated, “My most powerful memories of those days involve the tremendous attention generated by Kissinger, both at home and abroad. The negotiators on both sides couldn’t ignore his public drive for success.”12 Yitzhak Rabin judged that “Only by using shuttle diplomacy could [Kissinger] get both sides to create the atmosphere that in itself made agreement possible.”13 By this time, Kissinger’s global celebrity added a key element to the process.
Beyond momentum and a sense of urgency, the shuttles could induce movement on each side that stimulated reciprocal movement by the other. Kissinger argued that “When the shuttles were effective, they were sustained because each party . . . was prepared to make slight adjustments in its position at each visit of the mediating team. This eased the atmosphere and encouraged the other party to make adjustments of its own. In this manner, the two sides narrowed the gulf between them.”14 When one side dug in its heels for a protracted time, however, Kissinger was clear that the shuttle would not be effective.15 Moreover, if either or both sides suspected bias or a private agenda on the part of the mediator, the process could break down.
In short, Kissinger had a clear view of the characteristic dynamics of negotiation, especially the presence or absence of momentum. To shape these favorably, he often employed shuttle diplomacy. This device was quite successful in negotiations following the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, and Kissinger used variants elsewhere. However innovative or clever shuttle diplomacy might have been, though, it is worth underscoring that its success also depended on the almost Herculean stamina of Kissinger and his team.