‘Little we thought, when laughing and joking with the crew just before she left, that it was the last time that we were going to see them’.
Stoker Petty Officer Henry Kinder
The craggy Sydney cliffs never looked so welcoming, the early morning sun never so radiant and the waters of Sydney Harbour never so luminous. Australia’s first two submarines moved gracefully through the slight chop towards Garden Island Dockyard. The Australians onboard were fit to burst with pride and relief. They had been unable to sleep according to Stoker Petty Officer Henry Kinder: ‘we just watched the South Head light flashing and talked’1. Those entering Sydney Harbour for the first time were equally relieved and entranced. Their welcome had none of the grandeur of the entrance of Australia’s first naval fleet on 4 October 1913. Rough seas had delayed their arrival, it was 6am on 24 May 1914 and only the hardiest of an Australian public had roused themselves from their beds to stand and watch. The welcome flotilla of small boats was insignificant compared with seven months earlier but none of this really mattered to the crews of AE1 and AE2 – they were here and they were safe. One final drama had only just been averted. Just outside Sydney Heads AE2’s engines coughed, spluttered and two cylinders on the port engine ran hot and nearly seized. Henry Kinder scribbled another entry.
Our long journey was finished and the boats’ crews were not sorry. The journey had occupied nearly three months, and with no room to exercise when off watch, time hangs heavy and things get very monotonous.2
The voyage had taken 83 days, 60 days of which were spent at sea;13,000 miles (20,800 kms), 9000 miles (14,400kms) under their own power. This shattered any previous record. The Times (London) declared it: ‘manifestly the most remarkable [voyage] yet performed by a submarine’.3 The Sydney Morning Herald headline described AE1 and AE2 as ‘STRANGE-LOOKING CRAFT’.4
The newspaper had advised its reading public:
As this class of vessel is necessarily small, and lies low in the water, those people who desire to witness their arrival from the shore will do well to take up a position on the more elevated portions of the harbour foreshores. The cliffs at South Head will no doubt prove a popular, point of vantage.5
‘Slowly and silently they came down the harbour’ reported the newspaper.
ACNB informed the Admiralty via ‘The Right Honourable, The Secretary of State for the Colonies’, that the submarines had arrived ‘after a most successful voyage, in which the programme of dates originally mapped out was closely adhered to’.6 Considering that the programme of dates set by the Admiralty had been found impossible to adhere to and went astray with the first broken propeller and delay in the first port of call, Gibraltar – and the submarines had arrived ten days behind schedule – this was a strange comment. The submarines had indeed arrived, which was quite miraculous, but as ACNB was already in possession of the reports made by HMAS Sydney Commanding Officer, Captain John Collings Taswell Glossop, RAN (later Vice Admiral, CB), and the Commanding Officers of both submarines, full of concerned comments, the words ‘most successful’ appeared more diplomatic than candid.
Lieutenant Dacre Stoker, RN, had been particularly forthright in his comments concerning the completion of sea trials and the ‘general tuning up etc.’ period allowed and in his opinion the premature departure date from Britain. He noted that throughout the voyage from day one ‘the Port Thrust Block was a source of constant anxiety and extra work to the N.R. staff throughout the whole passage’ and needed ‘to be carefully nursed whenever running the engine at over 300 revs’. He believed this reflected entirely on the ability of his Chief ERA and staff. They had opened a cylinder which had been ‘Firing Through’ during the voyage, in Singapore, and replaced the rings. ‘The Lubricating oil coolers’ were found to be ‘of no practical use as they barely reduced the oil temperature by 2 when really wanted viz in the tropics’, and the amount of lubricating oil used was much affected through the necessity of ‘sweetening’ up the oil frequently by ‘pumping in 50 gals of fresh so as to reduce the temperature’.7 He commended the Sperry Compass but ‘The Forbes Log was not very satisfactory, constantly altering’ and ‘breaking down altogether after 9000 miles’. Whilst Stoker commended the ‘Engine Clutches’ the propellers had been found lacking and the ‘steering gear’ on both AE1 and AE2 had ‘jammed’. He praised the men who served in both submarines and believed it was more due to their diligence and expertise than the submarine manufacture that they had triumphed.8
His report finished with several suggestions, most of which had a direct bearing on the physical wellbeing of the crews. A coaming or splash plate needed to be fitted to the hull casing on the fore side of the fore hatch to enable it to be kept open in inclement weather to enable greatly needed fresh air. For such a journey more time in ports should be allocated because three days allowed only for maintenance – ‘the ER staff got no rest’ – and the crew needed more shore time relief. Submarines manufactured in Britain for Atlantic and Mediterranean service had revealed shortcomings on a trip around the globe, so far away from their manufacturer. The tropical climate was the greatest factor and the heat and discomfort were oppressive for both officers and sailors. The heat had also had unforseen effects on submarine operation.
The heat generated in after end of engine room by motors when charging at 500 amps is excessive in hot climates, and actually prevents the batteries receiving their proper treatment, as it is often necessary to stop charging from consideration of heat of bearings, bearing oil etc, when from the battery point of view the charge should be continued. It would appear that the only cure of this would be in motor designs.9
Regardless of delays the submarines had arrived on a day of celebration. Empire Day was one of the most celebrated days in the calendar for an Australian people who felt strong bonds with ‘Mother England’ and being part of the spread of pink that so strongly shrouded the world map. It took little time before the submarines and their crews were enveloped in the festivities. The submarines did not carry the magnificent splendour of a fully dressed warship but they were certainly strange curious craft, the likes of which had never ventured into Australian waters before. Australians were proud that their young navy was at the forefront of state-of-the-art naval warfare, and became increasingly fascinated by these unusual boats. Henry Kinder wrote:
Naturally the submarines were objects of curiosity and crowds of people used to sit and watch them from Mrs Macquarie’s chair.10
During Empire Day 1914, as people came out to enjoy the celebrations, more and more gathered in an attempt to view and even visit the submarines. All they could see was a cigar-shaped mass of grey steel, a few feet above the waterline, a bridge and conning tower in the centre and ‘a couple of tall, wooden masts, a couple of shorter brass masts and that was about all’.11 Visits were not permitted. Newspaper men commonly granted access to warships were denied. They decided to exaggerate the mystery and sinisterness. ‘THE HOME OF SECRETS’ read one headline. The journalist continued:
A submarine is a deadly thing. A battleship may ride in majesty on the waves, and in a moment be torn by a torpedo hurled by the stealthy, invisible foe beneath the water. You may see everything else around you, and yet miss the submarine. It is because this type of vessel is so valuable in time of war that such pains are taken to guard its secrets. For it is full of secrets … it spells destruction to the enemy.’12
Lieutenant Commander Besant, after a torrid voyage, was besieged by the press. He handled himself with dignity and impressed with his quiet and serious manner. Reporters described him as a ‘clean-shaven young officer of youthful appearance’, who spoke glowingly of submarines and the pride of being the Captain of AE1. He still wanted it understood that this was a hard life compared to other branches of the navy: ‘It’s not all beer and skittles … yes it’s dangerous … but it’s the life I have chosen’.13
Lieutenant Stoker was struggling with his impressions of Australians and Sydney in particular. The question: ‘What do you think of our harbour?’ became quickly irksome and he had to ‘bite his tongue’.14 He wondered if, of all the people he had met, Australians were not the most ‘patriotic and proud of their country’.15 His views on Sydney were also mixed. By moonlight:
with the deep shadows, bays, and ferry lights picking out the sweeping curves of the shores, Sydney Harbour was ‘as pretty a sight as the eye can desire’.
But by daylight, Stoker queried whether:
the works of men have added to or detracted from what must have been the original picturesque grandeur of this magnificent example of God’s handiwork.16
The Australian submariners had been away for four years and it was a pleasure to smell the eucalypts and squint into the strong sunlight. Sydney did surprise nonetheless; time had not stood still and the city had changed, it seemed so much larger and busier – disorienting. Kinder wrote: ‘Sydney had altered a lot’.17 It would take some time for them to feel comfortable. It always took a period of adjustment when returning home from a sea deployment but four years was an eternity for men who had left as teenagers, and for the families who were surprised by the physical changes and confidence of these seasoned sailors. The Australians had accumulated a great deal of leave and were allowed to leave their boats as quickly as it could be facilitated – the homecomings were wonderful.
Some of the ex-RN sailors were enveloped into the homes of their Australian counterparts and the impression made almost overpowered authorities with paperwork because several quickly decided this land was indeed to their liking. AE2’s Able Seaman Albert Edward Knaggs (RN 191654; RAN 7893) applied for his wife Annie and six-year-old son Albert to be given passage in February. Knaggs had had a very varied naval career starting as a Boy Seaman at HMS Impregnable. After being drafted ashore he joined the Royal Fleet Reserve in 1911 until able to enlist in the RAN as a submarine volunteer. AE1 Chief ERA Frederick Lowe (RN 271421; RAN 8263), on whose shoulders lay the huge responsibility of ensuring that the submarine operated, sent for his wife Mary Priscilla.
Able Seaman Frederick George Dennis (RN 220438; RAN 8281) was born at Newton Abbott in Devon on 11 February 1885, one of seven children.18 He worked as a labourer until he could join the RN as a Boy Seaman 2nd Class at HMS Northampton on 21 April 1902. Dennis advanced to Boy Seaman 1st Class on 21 July 1902 and in September was drafted to HMS Vivid I and then the protected cruiser Prometheus three months later. Rated Ordinary Seaman on 11 February 1903 he drafted to protected cruiser Theseus. Promotion to Able Seaman (Torpedoman) followed quickly and he transferred to the armoured cruiser Cornwall to serve with Atlantic Fleet, 2nd Cruiser Squadron. His career continued with brisk drafts in accordance with the demand for qualified Torpedomen – torpedo gun boats Circe and Skipjack. Frederick Dennis joined submarines in January 1908 and the submarine depot ship Forth. In November 1911 Dennis joined the submarine depot ship Vulcan and in the following years served in the submarine tender Hebe and Vulcan again. He joined the submarine tender Alecto at Portsmouth on the first day of 1913, and Dolphin (5th Submarine Flotilla) at Gosport on 12 July 1913. It was here he was inspired to volunteer for RAN submarines.
Originally designated ‘spare crew’ Dennis soon joined AE1. On his arrival in the sparkling Sydney Harbour Frederick Dennis wrote to his sister: ‘I am glad to tell you we have arrived quite safe and were not sorry for it’s a long way’. He was delighted with all he saw – ‘it’s a splendid place’.19 Dennis had decided this land would not only be his future but also his family’s. In his letter to his sister he wrote, ‘no man could love his wife and children more than I do mine’. He had already convinced wife Florence that she and the children, a baby plus a four and five-year-old, should board a ship at the first opportunity. He realised it would be a huge and brave undertaking for Florence to leave her extended family who had supported her continuously during his long absences: ‘She is sure to feel it when she is leaving’. He asked his sister to please ‘assist in any way possible’.20
Able Seaman Frederick Dennis was not alone in the desire for his family to follow him to this new land and make a permanent home there. Each RN loan member was entitled to free passage back to Britain at the end of his three years. Alternatively he could choose to turn this into passage to Australia for his wife and children. It was not a decision lightly made because should life in this southern land not proceed satisfactorily it would not be possible in 1914 for a junior rank sailor to afford return passage for the family to Britain. Dennis probably would have discussed this with fellow RN loan personnel and sailors who had already signed on to the RAN – like friends Arthur Henry Fisher (RN 208546; RAN O/N 8191) and Able Seaman James Benjamin Thomas (RN 207516; RAN 8111).
Able Seaman (ST) Arthur Fisher was born at Stroud, Gloucestershire, England, on 31 May 1883. He was employed as a warper until like Frederick Dennis he could enlist in the RN as a Boy Seaman 2nd Class and was sent to HMS Caledonia on 19 February 1900. Advancement to Boy 1st Class came on 31 May 1901 and Ordinary Seaman on 31 July 1901. Two weeks later he drafted to Duke of Wellington and then the battleships Revenge and Hannibal. He was promoted to Able Seaman (Torpedoman) on 9 February 1905 and over the next year he served at Firequeen I at Portsmouth, and the torpedo and mining school Vernon, then at sea in Victory I and in Mercury and Thames, both Portsmouth Flotilla submarine depot ships. Arthur Fisher returned to Vernon on 19 April 1906 where he qualified Seaman Torpedoman in August before joining Victory II in September 1906. Fisher and his family must have struggled with so many different drafts in such a short period of time and these were not yet over. He was drafted to the battleship Renown the following month and six months later the battleship Barfleur in which he served only two months before returning to Victory II in June 1907 and then the armoured cruiser Antrim the same month. Seven months later he was drafted to the submarine depot ship Mercury (Portsmouth Submarine Flotilla) and then in June 1909 he was back in Vulcan. Fisher was on a roller coaster because no sooner had he unpacked his kit bag than he was sent to Mercury the next month. He must have felt blessed to remain there for an entire eight months; on 1 April 1911 he was drafted to the submarine depot ship Bonaventure. Arthur Fisher was at this time part of ‘2nd Divisional Crew working part of ship’ and ‘relief bridge lookout’21 just waiting for his opportunity to serve on his own submarine. Four months later this looked feasible; he was drafted to the submarine depot ship Maidstone (8th Submarine Flotilla) at Portsmouth.
When he felt he had done all that had been asked of him, much to the detriment of his family life, he was considered expendable and on 30 May 1912 found himself ‘Drafted Shore, Continuous Service Expired’. Regardless of continuous ‘Superior Ability’ service reports the two-badge Able Seaman was not invited to re-enlist in the RN. The newspaper advertisement calling for volunteers for Australian submarines offered a wonderful opportunity and he enlisted in the RAN for five years on 31 May 1913. By 28 February 1914 Fisher was a member of the crew of AE1. Because the RAN was such a small navy his drafts would be less frequent and allow some semblance of a family life for him and his wife Lily Victoria. His AE1 Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Commander Besant, completed the paperwork and the request was transmitted to Britain to secure early sea passage for Lily, five-year-old Evelyn Nellie Cordelia, Arthur Henry (who would turn four in July), Maud Ruby Victoria (who would be two in June), and baby George Frederick William, who might even be in Australia in time for the family to celebrate his first birthday on 9 September. Able Seaman Arthur Fisher was excited at the prospects that lay ahead. The future looked bright.
Able Seaman James Thomas was equally excited about the future and the arrival of his family. Born on 16 May 1883 at St Helens, Worcestershire, like Dennis and Fisher he enlisted in the RN as a Boy Seaman, and like Knaggs he underwent his Boy Seaman training at HMS Impregnable, having filled in time as a scrap fitter. By his 18th birthday he had signed on for 12 years, served on Black Prince and Agincourt and as an Ordinary Seaman was in Duke of Wellington. His draft lasted less than a fortnight before he was sent to the armoured cruiser Cressey. Mercifully this draft lasted 18 months. After a short sojourn back in Duke of Wellington Thomas joined the protected cruiser Venus commissioned for Mediterranean Station service on 7 February 1903. By October he was Able Seaman James Thomas (Torpedoman).
Thomas returned home to Portsmouth in November 1903 and spent further training time at the torpedo and mining school Vernon, where he qualified as Seaman Torpedoman on 9 July 1904. In September the same year he joined the battleship Hercules. He then drafted to Firequeen, Victory I and the protected cruiser Amethyst, but was allowed to remain on the cruiser for 18 months. Next it was to the Torpedo School, Sheerness, Kent, in July 1907 where he re-qualified as a Seaman Torpedoman on 23 August 1907, joined Victory I two months later and then the battleship Renown. The RN lack of serious concern for the wellbeing of lower deck seamen was again evident when he was returned to Victory I before year’s end. Perhaps as an alternative to such a transitory navy life James Thomas joined submarines on 1 March 1908 and was drafted to the submarine depot ship Mercury (Portsmouth Submarine Flotilla) and then Bonaventure in June. The rapid drafts continued and he went to Mercury in April 1909, Bonaventure in May and back to Mercury by February 1911. That lasted just two months before he was back in Bonaventure. Next it was the submarine depot ship Arrogant, the depot ship for Submarine Section IV at Portsmouth, in January and the submarine depot ship Forth (3rd Submarine Flotilla) at Devonport in May before being returned to Arrogant less than a fortnight later. After joining Dolphin at Gosport on 31 August 1912 this valuable two-badge Able Seaman of ‘Superior Ability’ found himself ‘Discharged, Shore’ – his navy career seemingly ended and employment opportunities dismal. Like Able Seaman Arthur Fisher, he grabbed the opportunity offered by the RAN with both hands and enlisted for five years on 16 May 1913. Wife Emma Elizabeth and their two very small children boarded a ship in England for the long journey around the world.
The AE1 Able Seamen trio continued to encourage Able Seaman Frederick William Woodland (RN 208916; RFR 5589; RAN 7597) and Signalman George Dance (RN 2300063; RAN 8286) to also make the RAN and this new nation their permanent home. Like them Woodland had received the slip of paper from the RN ‘Drafted Shore, Continuous Service Expired’ stating that his services were no longer required. Woodland was born at Aldwich, Sussex, England, on 20 September 1882, the son of Alfred and Ellen Woodland. He worked as a gardener until he too could enlist in the RN as a Boy Seaman 2nd Class at HMS Northampton on 26 March 1900. Promoted to Ordinary Seaman he signed on for 12 years. Rapid drafts to Calliope, Duke of Wellington and battleship Glory followed in 1900. By October 1902 he was an Able Seaman Torpedoman and joined the despatch vessel Alacrity in November the following year. Additional training ashore at Firequeen and Vernon qualified Woodland as a Seaman Torpedoman on 2 September 1905. Like his AE1 compatriots drafts followed in rapid succession: Victory I, the protected cruiser Powerful and the torpedo vessel Vulcan serving as a destroyer depot ship in the Mediterranean Fleet – all in 1905. On his return home he re-qualified as Seaman Torpedoman in July 1907 and remained in Portsmouth for two years before being drafted to the RN barracks at Chatham. Woodland joined the battleship Venerable on 19 October 1909 but this lasted just two weeks. He was then drafted to the submarine depot ship Mercury (Submarine Section IV) at Portsmouth ‘for Submarine Training’ and, later, ‘for Submarines’ before transferring to the submarine depot ship Arrogant on 1 July 1911 and Dolphin the next year.22 Surprisingly he was abruptly returned to general service before being discharged on 21 September 1912. The very next day he joined the Royal Fleet Reserve (5589). He lost no time in joining friends in volunteering for the new submarine service and signed up for five years with the RAN. Now he had to convince wife Emma Helen that she should join the other wives on a ship bound for Australia.
Signalman George Dance was born on 5 November 1887 in Wargrave, Berkshire, England. His father was an Oxfordshire police inspector who may have been disappointed his son did not follow him into the police force. Instead George, like Albert Knaggs and James Thomas, joined the RN as a Boy Seaman 2nd Class at HMS Impregnable (29 February 1904). By October his ability in signals had been noticed and he was rated Boy Seaman 1st Class Signalman. Sea and land drafts began to appear on his service card in rapid succession: Lion, Impregnable Vivid Victory I, battleship Barfleur where he was rated Signalman; the cruisers Diadem and Grafton, and Forte – all before April 1909. By August the following year he was on the battleship Revenge in which he served until February 1911. Victory I followed before an exciting draft, to Hermes – the flagship at the Cape of Good Hope – 8 March 1911. He served with the flagship for two years before volunteering for submarine training and after training was ‘Lent to R.A.N. for service with Submarine AE1 for three years from 17.11.1913’.23 Wife Annie Elizabeth lived in Southsea, England, and the couple had no children – Annie felt it might be best to wait before making such a momentous decision about their future.
In Sydney the Australians, according to Stoker Petty Officer Henry Kinder, had had a ‘good holiday’ before returning to the submarines to ‘prepare the boats for diving and get everything shipshape’.24 The boats needed to be dived deep to test the hulls for leaks in case rivets had worked loose during the long journey out. A dockyard worker remained onboard for a trip outside the Sydney Heads. According to Kinder it was ‘by mistake’ but such a ‘mistake’ seemed difficult on a submarine the size of an ‘E Class’. More likely this shortcoming was deliberate, perhaps for amusement but perhaps also to gain some respect within the dockyard. The service conditions of crews could not be appreciated by anyone who had not gone to sea in a submarine. The dockyard worker was unimpressed, ‘the sea was a bit lively he didn’t seem to enjoy the trip’. The submarine dived for about an hour and the dockyard worker was returned looking rather greener in hue.
By the eager way he jumped ashore on returning to Garden Island, I don’t think he was anxious to repeat the trip.25
Clearly the RAN would not get this man as a recruit.
But the topsy-turvy world of submariners continued and the humour was quickly followed again by drama and tragedy. On 9 June 1914 a steam pinnacle belonging to HMAS Penguin was proceeding down Sydney Harbour from Cockatoo Island to Garden Island, with Leading Seaman Joseph McGregor, and AE1 crew members Able Seaman John Reardon and Leading Stoker John Groves. It was 2.30 in the afternoon and the 303 ton Sydney Ferries steamer Kai Kai had left Milson’s Point for Circular Quay. McGregor was at the helm of the navy boat and altered course to avoid Kai Kai. Unfortunately he had failed to see the 581 ton North Coast Navigation Company steamer Coombar. McGregor attempted to steer the pinnacle out of danger as the Captain of Coombar tried to put his steamer into full astern. It was already too late, and the coastal steamer crashed into the small navy craft, slicing it in two. The Captain of Kai Kai went full astern in an attempt to rescue the men floundering in the cold winter water. A passenger, John Hope of Willoughby, dived overboard, and swam towards Groves, a non-swimmer who was in obvious distress. ‘When I was about five yards from him he suddenly sank … another half a dozen strokes would have brought me to him’.26 Reardon and McGregor continued to struggle in the water, being dragged under by their heavy winter uniforms. The Sydney Harbour Trust launch Helen rescued McGregor. Meanwhile Reardon ‘half frozen, and almost exhausted, was still battling for dear life’.
My clothes seemed heavy, and I was afraid of sharks and I was just on the point of giving up when the Kai Kai came towards me.27
Reardon grasped a lifebuoy thrown from Kai Kai and was hauled to safety. Coombar and Helen continued to search for Groves as did the police the following day. His body was never recovered.
Melbourne-born Acting Leading Stoker William James Groves (7301) had served with fellow AE1 crew members John Moloney, Charles Wright, Percy Wilson, James Fettes and John Reardon in Challenger as members of the ANF. They were joined in England in September 1912 to train for submarines by other former ANF members Ernest Blake, John Bray, Ernest A. Gwynne, Reuben J. E. Mitchell, Charles George Suckling, Gordon Corbould, John Messenger, Robert Smail, William Waddilove, Jack Jarman and Henry Kinder. The AE1 and AE2 crews were a close-knit group and the accident was a shock not only to the Australians but to ex-RN and RN loan men who served with the popular married 27-year-old. It just seemed so incongruous to have survived the arduous 83 day journey from England only to die in a simple accident in an Australian harbour. They inserted an obituary in The Sydney Morning Herald: ‘In loving memory of our dear friend William James Groves, late, Leading Stoker of H.M.A. submarine AE1.28
Lieutenant Commander Besant had lost a well-trained member of the AE1 crew, further compounding the personnel problems of the submarine squadron. Navy Office had continued to move ever so slowly when it came to RAN recruitment and training. At the end of May the submarines were placed into dry dock at Cockatoo Island for a desperately needed refit and it seemed to Besant that organising a refit was less problematic than finding additional submariners.
On 27 May 1914 Besant wrote to the Rear Admiral Commanding the Australian Fleet, explaining how dire the need for submariners was. There appeared to have been no attempt to prepare additional people. He had lost ERA 1st Class George Dickie (RN 268884; RAN 8264), a very experienced ERA and former coppersmith born in Glasgow, Scotland, who had been loaned to the RAN for three years. Dickie’s age of 39 had proven a factor during the trip out and on arrival he was given a medical discharge and returned to England as ‘unserviceable’.
Besant needed his superiors to understand how immediate it was that ‘three ERAs be obtained, if possible from England, to bring spare crews of this rating up to complement’.29 He pointed out that on leaving England the squadron was already one ERA short and now another had returned to England for medical reasons. Furthermore another ERA was confined to light duties, unable to serve within a submarine. Besant also requested that a Torpedo Gunner be appointed to take charge of the gunners stores and the squadron desperately needed more officers and more Stokers. Besant was ordered to visit the 2nd Naval Member in Melbourne ‘at an early date’ because ‘the 2nd Naval Member was unfamiliar with this branch of the service which is novel in these waters’.30
Besant received no satisfaction from his superiors as personnel shortfall within the submarine squadron became more critical. He wrote again on 6 July 1914, informing the Fleet Commander that the RAN Submarine Squadron was desperately in need of another Chief Petty Officer or Petty Officer (Coxswain), two Petty Officers, another Leading Seaman, six Able Seaman, another Signalman, four ERAs, a Chief Stoker or Stoker Petty Officer, two Leading Stokers and six more Stokers. The ‘ERAs should be of some seniority and one preferably a coppersmith by trade’. He also firmly believed ‘all ratings should be VG in conduct’ and ‘should be subjected to a very strict medical examination before being accepted for this service’.31 His letter contained an air of frustration and asked his superiors to consider the immediate necessity for new blood, ‘a training class of 12 Seamen and 12 Stokers’. He was also very concerned that there was only the exact complement of Lieutenants for both submarines and should someone become incapacitated ‘50 percent of the submarines would be unable to go to sea’. Two more Lieutenants were urgently required.32
Besant continued to implore his superiors for more submariners. He had learnt of a Lieutenant Langton Cavaye, RN, who was serving on HMAS Sydney, who had volunteered for submarine service. Cavaye had received instruction in internal combustion engines and had engine room watch-keeping experience. Besant believed that with minimal additional training Cavaye would be an asset and could carry out the duties of a 1st Lieutenant. His request was denied. He requested a permanent wireless operator so that the wireless/telegraphy (w/t) installations on the submarines could be properly utilised. These had been very hurriedly installed prior to departure from Britain but there had been no time for tuning so consequently they could not be used. The submarines had reached Cairns before a Petty Officer from HMAS Sydney temporarily rigged and tuned the installation on AE1 ‘but the results were unsatisfactory owing to the lack of experience of the signalman who performs the duty’. It was agreed that the w/t system should be correctly installed during the refit and it was ‘considered necessary for the successful operation of submarines in these waters’ and that ‘a more or less continuous watch should be kept’.33 But Navy Office admitted there was a ‘shortage of w/t ratings in the RN’ and this did ‘not permit’ adding the necessary qualified telegraphists to submarine complements. In this category also too few Australians had been recruited and trained.34
The weight of family responsibilities concerned two former ANF volunteers and two of the youngest members of the AE1 crew. Stoker Johnny Bray (1604) had been relieved to return home to Victoria to be reunited with his mother Alice and four brothers and sisters. ‘Everybody in Eaglehawk made such a fuss of him … very few people would have known about submarines let alone met a member of the crew of one’.35 And Johnny had such stories to tell. This local lad had even been presented to the King. Johnny could spin a good dit (tell a good story) and he said the King had asked the Australian submariners if they ‘would like a memento of the occasion’. The Australians decided ‘they would each like a piece of wood from a famous English warship [Nelson’s Victory]’.36 But the visit home was marred with sadness for Johnny because his father had died on 13 September 1913 – while Johnny was in England. As the eldest child and son, as much as he loved the navy, Bray knew that his physical presence would help his mother and younger siblings. The RAN was so short of Stokers and even more so of submarine qualified Stokers. He entrusted the wooden relic to his family and returned to Sydney pondering his future.
Fellow Victorian, Able Seaman Jack Jarman (1138), who at just 21 was the youngest on AE1, had already decided his family must come first. Jack had deserted in November 1911 due to concern for his widowed mother Elizabeth and sister Catherine. His mother remarried and moved to Melbourne. Jack gave himself up in October 1912 and after undergoing his punishment was sent to England to train as a submariner. In the middle of 1914 on his first home leave in years he discovered life for his family had taken yet another turn for the worse.
Elizabeth’s second husband, former town clerk Pat McGrath, had been laid off from work for some time. The stress was the likely cause of a paralysing stroke. Elizabeth wrote to the RAN pleading for her son to be allowed to return home to assist the family. Her husband ‘now gets the pension of 10/- weekly, I have also bad health, unable to work for my living’.37 Jack wished to buy himself out of the RAN as he had guaranteed employment which would pay £3/5/- per week. Elizabeth was ‘afraid he may desert’ and would ‘be very grateful if you could obtain his discharge lawfully for him’.38 The Navy Secretary advised Elizabeth McGrath that to purchase a release from the RAN for Jack would cost £10. The family had no money and Able Seaman Jack Jarman remained on AE1.
A letter dated 6 July to the Captain-in-charge, H.M. Naval Establishments, Sydney, from Besant reiterated the personnel issues and his superior supported the recommendations, believing this was particularly important for the operational effectiveness of Australia’s submarines. Lieutenant Stoker and the General Manager of Garden Island Dockyard entered the ongoing personnel discussion. Stoker called for a replenishment of ‘spare crew’, reiterating the vital need for the personnel his Submarine Squadron Commander had requested. Stoker believed this should be done ‘as early as possible’.39 The General Manager of Garden Island Dockyard concurred and suggested that most important were the duties facing submariner ERAs. Their duties were critical and exacting, and their ‘intimate knowledge of ships’ Electrical Fittings’ was indispensable. Furthermore he considered that more were urgently needed for the submarines and he ‘most strongly’ advised that they ‘not be detailed for any extra duties’.40
The reply sent from Navy Office was terse. A copy of the ‘Scheme of Complement’ dated 13 July 1914 was sent to Besant reiterating that ‘29’ was specified for each submarine and for ‘Spare Crew’ and that ‘No deviations to be made without SPECIAL Naval Board sanction’.41 The Board also disagreed with the Garden Island Dockyard General Manager, believing: ‘the electrical work on ships is not likely to be very onerous between now and February next [1915]’.42 It would be one more erroneous judgement. ACNB had delayed too long and their future vision was alarmingly myopic. The Fisher Government agreement with the Admiralty had included the clause:
Vessels of the Australian unit were to be manned as far as possible by Australian officers and seamen, the numbers required to make up the full complement immediately being lent from the Royal Navy.43
ACNB primarily consisted of RN officers; there were no RAN Australian officers holding senior rank. Those in authority had for years not prioritised personnel. It would not be until 5 December 1914 that the Naval Secretary signalled the Commanding Officer of the training school at Cerberus that ‘suitable stokers may be drafted to submarine AE2’ and that ‘4 be made available’ as soon as possible.44 By December 1914 it was too late for additional qualified crew to be sent to AE1.
Nationalism, fear of neighbours and political resolve had seen Australia establish its own navy. Jostling for power and control between successive Australian governments and the British Admiralty, RAN and RN, as well as acrimony with the Australian Commonwealth Naval Board, had destabilised naval administration at a time when a strong united front was needed. An era of unprecedented Australian naval expansion needed urgent reappraisal of personnel policy and accelerated recruitment and training of Australian volunteers. But the reluctance to recruit Australians was maintained and the same lack of foresight which had left the RN undermanned in 1914 had made it impossible to supplement RAN personnel shortfalls with the preferred RN sailors. The RAN was not a cohesive force, being a mixture of permanent and reserve personnel, ex-navy brigade, RN loan and pension personnel, and Australian-born volunteers. A balance had not yet been reached to enable RN traditions to be blended with local needs and standards to achieve the most suitable conditions of service for personnel. Time was needed for more Australians to be trained to assume positions of authority so that the transition from British to Australian command could be completed. Time was needed to fully appreciate regional strategic requirements. It was within this climate of discord over loyalty and roles that the RAN struggled to exist. A period of peace and consolidation was needed but instead the RAN faced a violent initiation in ‘the war to end all wars’.
The rattling of sabres and the clatter of hooves of military horses frequented the grand cities of Europe. Emperors and military leaders eager to test their strength dissolved into a deadly game of dominoes. Men and women around the world scrutinised their newspapers and wondered what this would all mean. On 28 June 1914 Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir presumptive to the Austro-Hungarian throne, and his wife Sophie, Duchess of Hohenberg, were assassinated at Sarajevo by 19-year-old Bosnian Gavrilo Princip. Germany’s Kaiser William II promised his nation would support Austria in a war against Serbia and within four days Austria had declared war on Serbia. On 1 August Germany declared war on Russia. Two days later Germany declared war on France and invaded Belgium as implemented by the Schlieffen Plan. It took just days before the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) was forced to retreat from Mons as Germany invaded France, and only three days for the Russian army to be defeated at Tannenburg and Masurian Lakes. The Battle of the Marne, near Paris, commenced on 5 September – it would be the first time Allied forces halted the German advance. This, the second major clash on the Western Front, caused the first stalemate of the war and the commencement of bloody trench warfare. On 29 October Turkey entered the war as a German ally and the following years marked one the most horrific chapters in world history.
A telegram was received by ACNB via the Senior Naval Officer, New Zealand, at 5pm on 30 July 1914 warning that steam needed to be raised on navy ships at one hour’s notice. Shortly afterwards a telegram from the British Admiralty warned that the outbreak of war would probably mean the distribution of ships between New Guinea, Tonga, Fiji and the New Hebrides, initially to supply intelligence, secure coal supplies and to destroy German communication stations.45 By the end of July German merchant shipping in Australian ports was being carefully watched and then detained.
Australia in 1914 was a naïve nation and its citizens conflicted over being Australians and British. It was a lucky country for white Australians but they were ill-prepared for war and ignorant of what would be its devastating consequences. The mood in Tasmania reflected the sentiment.
In Tasmania, as in the other parts of the Empire, there was enthusiasm – some of it futile, some of it a little foolish. We took up the cry raised in England…We sang patriotic songs on all possible occasions; but in the main the enthusiasm was a serious one, and the obligations which we had assumed, although still imperfectly understood, weighed heavily upon the community.46
The first official intimation in Tasmania that the British Empire was likely to be involved in the European War was received at 9.30pm on 2 August 1914, when orders were issued to the local artillery to be in readiness for action from 9am on 3 August. By 11.45am the following day notices were served on ‘Wireless Experimenters’ in Tasmania directing them to dismantle all radio telegraph aerials and gear at their addresses. At 10pm the same day the Commissioner of Police undertook to watch any movements on the part of the crew of the German ship Oberhaussen at Port Huon. At 2pm on 5 August, His Excellency the State Governor notified the District Commandant that war had broken out with Germany. This was followed at 2.10pm by a telegram from the Defence Department, Melbourne, and arrangements were immediately made to adopt war measures, though no one was entirely sure what these were. The first overt act of war performed in Tasmania was on 5 August when steps were taken to seize Oberhaussen, which was loading timber at Port Huon. At 4.30pm the District Naval Officer requested the assistance of troops to support a naval party that he had despatched an hour earlier to seize the German ship.
Navy wireless operators began to monitor German warship movements. On 1 August SMS Komet was within range of the Port Moresby wireless telegraph station, and Yap wireless telegraph station was in touch with the 12,985 ton armoured cruiser SMS Sharnhorst, the flagship of the German East Asia Squadron’s Admiral Maximilian von Spee. The squadron consisted of Scharnhorst, sister ship Gneisenau, and the light cruisers Emden, Nürnberg and Leipzig.
At 11am on 5 August 1914 ACNB was advised by the Admiralty that Great Britain and Germany were at war and that they assumed control of the RAN fleet through their Commander in Australia, Rear Admiral George Patey, RN (later Vice Admiral Sir George Patey). Patey sent out the secret order on 7 August 1914:
All indication pointing to the probability of German ships ‘Scharnhorst’, ‘Gneisenau’, ‘Nurnberg’ and perhaps ‘Komet’ and ‘Planet’ being in the neighbourhood of Simpsonhafen, New Britain, and to their being found either in that place or in Matupo Harbour, I intend to make an attack on these ports with the object of torpedoing any ships which are there and destroying the Wireless Station.47
The RAN fleet was despatched to capture the German New Guinea colonies which spread from German New Guinea to Samoa in the East, the Marshall Islands and the Western Carolines. The Admiralty relayed that there were as many as five German warships in the surrounding waters and more German cargo ships. The Australian Naval and Military Expeditionary Force (AN&MEF) was formed. A contingent of around 1,000 troops boarded the requisitioned Peninsula and Orient Steam Navigation Company (P&O) liner SS Berrima now commissioned as HMAS Berrima. The transport sailed north from Sydney on 19 August 1914 with an RAN fleet comprising HMA Ships Australia, Sydney, Warrego, Yarra and Parramatta. This was an exciting time for the new nation and its nascent navy, an opportunity to be tested in battle. Bunting and cheering crowds accompanied troops down streets and waved vigorously as the fleet sailed out of Sydney Harbour. Petty Officer H.L.M. Greaves wrote how they were given a ‘most enthusiastic send off lots of boats coming to the harbour entrance with us making all the noise possible’.48
As with any military force untested by war, the spirit and enthusiasm of the members of the RAN was dynamic. In HMAS Sydney:
Everybody onboard went nearly mad with singing and shouting … patriotic songs being sung, accompanied by a violin and melodian [sic].49
War fever gripped men on Parramatta.
We passed the flagship with our silk battle flags flying, the band playing, and the men cheering. It was a most inspiring moment. At 6pm we had our last meal; we were full of gaiety.50
So sure were they of impending action that Parramatta’s ship’s company pooled their money and transferred the money to the flagship for safe keeping. Notices were put up warning ratings ‘great coolness and nerve would be required especially by the younger hands’.51 In HMAS Australia Able Seaman Hellyer paused from his duties long enough to write: ‘There’ll be some fighting and a few of us may fall, but we’ll show them how we do it, for we’re British’.52 Sub Lieutenant Henry Hastings McWilliam (later Captain), RN, also in Australia, observed with mixed emotions ‘numerous discussions onboard about the likelihood of our going to war … Everyone still very incredulous’.53 McWilliam observed:
There are numerous reports of German warships all over the Pacific. Our chief objectives are the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau and possibly the Nurnberg … Everyone is very pleased … Everyone is very excited at the idea, but we cannot yet realize the meaning of war. 54
But the young officer believed ‘everyone’ was more ‘afraid that the Germans may have no wish to engage us and escape Eastwards across the Pacific’. There was great excitement when a ship was observed on the starboard beam and then ‘disappointment’ that instead of Scharnhorst it was only HMAS Encounter. Another ship was sighted and ‘some criticism’ ensued when the destroyers were not dispatched to investigate.55
In Sydney, the time-consuming refit of Australia’s submarines was accelerated but crews still believed it might well all be over before they had a chance to join in the adventure. ‘Our self-pity was extreme’ wrote Stoker Charles Suckling.56 The submariners could never have imagined how extreme their part in this war would be. AE1 sailed north on 28 August and AE2 five days later. They joined the fleet now consisting of Australia, Sydney, Encounter, Warrego, Yarra, Parramatta, Melbourne, the stores ship Aorangi and three colliers near Palm Island in the Great Barrier Reef.57 But still there were delays, caused by the shortage of a submarine depot ship. HMAS Protector was consigned to different duties so on 18 August 1911 the Brisbane Milling Company boat SS Upolo was hastily requisitioned. Built in 1891 with a maximum speed of 10 knots ‘Upolo proved unreliable mechanically and was not entirely suitable for the task’.58 Stoker Petty Officer Henry Kinder referred to Upolo as the ‘slow old tub’. The ‘very slow speed’ at which the fleet travelled, Kinder believed, gave ‘any German cruisers ample time to move out as they had had plenty of warning we were coming.’59 Upolo proved useless as a submarine depot ship and would break down. By the time the fleet proceeded to St George’s Channel and searched the waters surrounding German New Guinea, no German warships were to be found.
There were no additional submariners immediately available so the spare crew were drafted to AE1 and AE2. Hurriedly another officer had to be found for AE1 so that the war complement of 35 was possible. Leopold Florence Scarlett, RN, had left the navy on 14 June 1913, having held the rank of Lieutenant since 30 October 1910. He had been diagnosed with the very serious and infectious lung disease of tuberculosis – commonly called ‘consumption’. Leopold came from an esteemed family. Born on 17 March 1889, he was the son of Mrs Bessie Florence Scarlett of Peneden House, Maidstone, Kent, and the late Lieutenant Colonel (Scots Guards) Leopold James Yorke Campbell Scarlett. Bessie Scarlett (nee Gibson) was the adopted daughter of Sir Percy Florence Shelley, son of the English poet Percy Bysshe Shelley. The two families being long-time residents of Florence, Italy, resulted in Leopold’s second name. Leopold Scarlett joined the Royal Navy as a Cadet Midshipman and was promoted to Midshipman on 30 May 1905. His first appointment was to the battleship Goliath in the channel fleet and then to the armoured cruiser Roxburgh. Promotion to Sub Lieutenant came on 30 July 1908. Scarlett was appointed to Dolphin ‘for Training in Submarine boats’ on 8 August 1910 and he was promoted to Lieutenant in December 1911.60 A flourishing career ended abruptly with his medical discharge 18 months later.
Looking for a warmer, dryer climate, Scarlett travelled to Queensland, Australia, where his brother Captain Hugh (later Major, later 7th Lord Abinger) Scarlett had served as Aide-de-camp (ADC) to the Governor of Queensland in the early 1900s. Captain Hugh Scarlett had married Australian Marjorie McPhillamy, whose family were pastoralists in Bathurst, NSW, and West Queensland. Visiting the properties of his brother’s in-laws enabled Leopold to reclaim his health. ‘Tuberculosis’ could sometimes in fact be the less serious bronchiectasis. By coincidence the sister of Leopold’s sister-in-law, Ethel Alison McPhillamy, was married to Captain James Collings Taswell Glossop RN, Commanding Officer of HMAS Sydney which had escorted AE1 and AE2 on the final leg to Australia. Through Captain Glossop Leopold heard that the RAN was desperately seeking submariners and he lost no time in applying. On 7 August 1914, he wrote:
On arrival in Brisbane this afternoon I reported myself to Fleet Surgeon Brockway DNMO for examination and enclose his certificate. I have the honour to submit that I may be employed in the Naval Service and await your orders. The Hon. Leopold Florence Scarlett, Royal Navy.61
The RAN enveloped him – his experience, his lineage, his being a gentleman – and he officially became a member of the RAN on 10 August 1910. AE2 Captain, Lieutenant Stoker, was delighted; he had served with Scarlett and the two men had thoroughly enjoyed each other’s company. He requested Scarlett be posted to AE2. Besant did not agree, arguing that Scarlett’s seniority made him two months senior to Lieutenant Haggard, the Executive Officer of AE2 and Haggard, having brought the submarine to Australia, deserved to assume command should the situation arise. The Hon. Lieutenant Leopold Scarlett was designated ‘Spare Submarine Officer’ (subject to medical clearance) and appointed to AE1 on 10 August 1914 as Third Officer.
War strategy for Australian ships was devised by British Admirals, of whom it was written: ‘there was a frightful dearth of first class men’.62 Senior RN officers had become complacent and many had failed to modernise their beliefs and stratagems.63 This equipped them poorly for control of modern warships and participation in 20th century warfare.64 An acceptance of British superiority had left naval forces ill-prepared. Intelligence was poor and navigational charts were basic; both would have a direct bearing on the Australian fleet, particularly its submarines. Initial Admiralty war orders were based on the supposition that the German Pacific fleet would be found at its usual peacetime moorings, off the port of Tsingtao, China.65 This was to be one of many flawed interpretations. In the first month of the war no enemy cruisers were found and the Australian fleet met no opposition. Admiralty intelligence had no idea where the German fleet was; von Spee completely out-manoeuvred his opposition and steamed into the central Pacific bound for Chile.66
According to the Admiralty Simpsonhafen, the harbour of the German colonial capital, Rabaul, at the northern end of New Britain, was a likely place to find German warships and ‘a good base for operations against Australia’.67 The harbour was empty. It seemed to the Australian Government and:
Navy Board no one in Whitehall could quite understand the nature of the Pacific or truly grasp the vast distances involved … but the Naval Board was by now firmly under Admiralty control, isolated from the decision-making process, and reluctant to question its judgment.68
False alarms concerning the whereabouts of the German cruisers continued and there were many uneventful reconnoitres. Nevertheless the decision was made for the squadron to proceed to Suva and Noumea in another attempt to catch the German cruisers. As the days and then weeks progressed those in authority within the RAN became increasingly frustrated that the envisaged great sea battle had not eventuated, particularly as there was more and more news of warship-on-warship encounters occurring in Northern Hemisphere waters. On 27 August the fleet weighed anchor and proceeded to night cruising order. Although Suva Harbour was found to be mined, it took little time before German authorities surrendered. Australia and Melbourne proceeded to sea, those onboard again ‘very disappointed that there was nothing … Something to fire at would be a great relief’.69 On 1 September news came that two or three German cruisers and two destroyers had been destroyed in the Heligoland Bight – the sea war was being fought in the Atlantic, not the Pacific. The only excitement within the Australian fleet was a practice attack on 1 September ‘at dusk’ by submarines AE1 and AE2 on Sydney and Encounter. According to Leading Signalman (later Chief Petty Officer) Aubrey Wilfred Donald Hodgson, ‘both boats were observed entering harbour, so attack was considered a failure’.70
As early as 6 August the British Government had prioritised to the Australian and New Zealand Governments the requirement to capture and destroy the wireless stations of Yap, Nauru, Samoa and New Guinea and to eliminate German resistance on land. The Australian Minister for Defence, Senator Millen, was unhappy with the strategy and diversion of the Australian Squadron from the destruction of the German Pacific fleet and made that known, but he had lost control of the RAN and the military forces. There was tension within the fleet between ranks and nationalities. Petty Officer Greaves was impressed with the ‘fine fighting force’ assembled, as ‘with few exceptions they are all ex-imperial service men both from the Navy and Army’ many of whom wore ‘two or three war medals’. He believed that if ‘properly led they would do well’. But this is where his optimism diminished because he believed ‘the officers of the Naval part … are simply awful’. He believed ‘the men have not the slightest respect for the Officers’ because the officers ‘have no idea whatever of handling men’. According to the seasoned Petty Officer they were mostly hastily commissioned ‘Land Agents, Solicitors, & drapery shopkeepers in uniform of Naval Officers’ who ‘endeavour to conceal their ignorance by adopting and bullying & tyrannical manner towards the men’.71
Lieutenant Alec Broughton Doyle (later Rear Admiral) was more concerned with RN officers in authority. On 9 September the force – consisting of the flagship Australia and HMA Ships Sydney, Encounter, Warrego and Yarra, the auxiliary cruiser Berrima, stores ship Aorangi and Australia’s submarines AE1 and AE2 – assembled off the Louisiade Archipelago. The submariners were duly proud because on their arrival off Rabaul they had broken yet another world record, steaming 1,200 miles (1931.2 kms) without an escort. HMAS Parramatta arrived with the oiler Murex and the collier Koolonga. The colliers Waihora and Whangape arrived the following day. The fleet at anchor looked thoroughly impressive, those onboard anxious to see action. Commanding Officers still harboured the hope that German warships would appear and patrols continued but the capture of German shore wireless stations and enemy resistance was to take priority.
Onboard Parramatta Engineering Officer Doyle pondered on the lack of precautionary measures – warships being exposed to surprise attack – and about the delays and tactics. He wrote in no uncertain terms of how frustrated he was by those he referred to as ‘The Great Brains’ onboard the flagship.
It is maddening to think that with a man of action in command we might have had all German islands by this … We have 1000 troops here now and more coming to occupy German possessions … God, Was There Ever Such Bungling! How long are we going to sit wasting time here? … our doings I have found somewhat comic.72
His language became even stronger. ‘Have never been so sick and wild with anything’ he continued ‘as with the most damnable fooling about these scum of the British Navy are giving us’. Doyle believed that not only ‘by sea and land they are chucking away chances with both fists’ but also that the RAN fleet and expeditionary force ‘are a laughing stock’ to the Germans.73
The Papuan Times had cautioned German residents as early as 19 August 1914 of the possibility that the British navy would bombard. The editorial believed this would only occur ‘in the event of their defeating our fleet – a contingency which is not the least likely to happen.’74 The newspaper continued that regardless of wireless stations being attacked it believed ‘every German war boat in these waters’ would ‘hide away and is not likely to make their existence and whereabouts known’.75
Finally on 11 September naval landing parties and troops were put ashore. While the Australian Imperial Force was still being formed, RAN ships and members of the Australian Naval and Military Expeditionary Force (AN&MEF) were in violent action again German forces – the first Australian units to see action in World War I. Rabaul was captured and within three months the remainder of Germany’s Pacific possessions was garrisoned. On 11 September AN&MEF landing parties were hampered by a lack of district maps and they were unaccustomed to the thick jungle. They were quickly under fire. Reinforcements were immediately required because the Bita Paka wireless station was heavily defended – ‘firing heavy, ammunition running short’76 – with strong resistance from enemy soldiers and natives loyal to Germany. Reinforcements were landed from Sydney, Berrima and Australia. Warships opened fire to encourage surrender.
In this encounter Able Seaman William George Vincent Williams (294) was killed. The former Melbourne City Council employee of Northcote, Victoria, had the dubious honour of being the first member of the Australian Defence Forces to die in WWI. 20-year-old Able Seaman Robert David Moffatt (121), a Signaller in the Royal Australian Naval Reserve (RANR) who was born in England but who lived in Sydney before being drafted to HMAS Australia, was wounded by a native sniper.
For Lieutenant Doyle on HMAS Parramatta the day quickly turned dark. His friend, 24-year-old Captain Brian Colden Antill Pockley, Australian Army Medical Corps, from Sydney, was killed.
I saw him last Sunday in Moresby (6th Sept.) and we all came up to take this place … Friday he was in Berrima … Brian landed with first 50 and they went out scouting. Found road mined and concealed pits full of native police with German officers. Natives up trees too shooting down on them. Brian had attended to a couple of wounded and sent them back on stretchers, giving his own Red Cross to the Stoker bearers, saying ‘he’d take his chance and must get up to the firing line again’. He had not gone far when he was shot down through the breast and spine from a tree. He lived some time and was trying to give orders to his stewards to look after the other wounded as he knew he was done. It was a dammed fine finish, I hope the rest of us may only do as well! I wish I could have been with him.77
Pockley was brought back to Berrima but died during the afternoon of 11 September, the first medical officer to be killed in the war.
Able Seaman Moffatt died the following morning and ‘was buried at sea with full honours about 11:30AM’ recorded Sub Lieutenant McWilliam. In the advance from Kabakaul to Bitapaka in New Britain on 11 September Able Seaman Henry William Street (419) and Stoker John Edward Walker RANR (45) from Townsville, Queensland, who served as John Courtney, were also killed.
Lieutenant Commander Charles B. Elwell, RN, who was born in Albrighton, Shropshire, England, but who now lived in Wentworthville, NSW, led a charge on a trench emplacement and was shot through the heart. Able Seamen Timothy Sullivan, James Tonks and Daniel Skillen were wounded.
The deaths and injuries of these men brought a new awareness of the reality of war to their shipmates and a desire for revenge:
When this ship’s company got the news of that cowardly hellish action they all wanted to be loose among the enemy.78
Although the British flag was hoisted over the town of Rabaul at 3pm on 13 September resistance in surrounding country continued and future patrols by Australian warships and submarines were ordered.
On 14 September 1914 Sub Lieutenant McWilliam looked out over the fleet anchored in Rabaul Harbour (now referred to as Simpson Harbour) and considered the cost of the baptism of fire. He preferred to turn his mind to the beauty around him. The ‘excellent harbour’ he wrote was:
a deep and well sheltered harbour and is very pretty with it. The tropical jungle comes right down to the water’s edge. The town of Rabaul is nicely laid out with some very pretty bungalows and gardens.79
And this day had started better than the previous one. There was ‘great excitement as six real nurses’ had arrived onboard the hospital ship Grantala.
On 14 September at 7am submarine AE1 proceeded out of Simpson Harbour with orders to patrol east of Cape Gazelle, New Britain, in company with Parramatta. The warship and submarine separated. AE1 was seen off Duke of York Island in St George’s Channel between Waira Point and Jaquinot Point around 3.30pm. Parramatta returned to its anchorage at Herbertshohe (now Kokopo). AE1 did not return to Simpson Harbour. Australia’s first submarine and crew were never seen again.
FOOTNOTES
1 Kinder, Diary.
2 Ibid.
3 Brenchley, F. & E. Stoker’s Submarine, 2001, p. 19
4 The Sydney Morning Herald, 25 May 1914.
5 The Sydney Morning Herald, 20 May 1914.
6 MP472/1 16/14/4771, ‘HMAS Submarines AE1 and AE2 – voyage to Australia (including log book)’, National Archives, Melbourne.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Kinder, Diary.
11 The Sydney Morning Herald, 25 May 1914.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Brenchley, 2001, p. 19.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Kinder, Diary.
18 Email, Colin Back, 6 September 2010.
19 Emails, Colin Back and Roger Dennis.
20 Ibid.
21 Downer, Barrie. ‘Submarine AE1 Crew List’, 4 November 2011.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Kinder, Diary.
25 Ibid.
26 The Sydney Morning Herald, 10 June 1914.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 MP472/1 5/14/9165, ‘Scheme of Complement of HMAS Submarines AE1 and AE2’, National Archives, Melbourne.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 Email, Bill and Cheryl Duncan.
36 Ibid.
37 AWM 50 18/7, ‘Records of HMA Naval Establishment, Sydney, Submarine AE1’, Australian War Memorial, Canberra.
38 Ibid.
39 MP472/1 5/14/9165, ‘Scheme of Complement of HMAS Submarines AE1 and AE2’, National Archives, Melbourne.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 Jose, p. xxxi.
44 Ibid.
45 AWM 33 18 ‘Participation of Australian seagoing fleet in the operations’, Australian War Memorial Canberra.
46 Broinowski, L. (ed.) Tasmania’s War Record 1914-1918, Govt. of Tasmania, Walch & Sons, 1921, p. 1.
47 Hill, C.J.P. Papers, 1DRL/0350, Australian War Memorial, 7 August 1914.
48 Greaves, H.L.M. ‘The New Guinea Log’, PR00501, Australian War Memorial, Canberra.
49 Seabrook, John William. Papers, AWM 43, A779, Australian War Memorial, Canberra.
50 Journal of HMAS Cerberus, December 1925, p. 30, HMAS Cerberus Museum, Victoria.
51 Seabrook, Papers.
52 Ibid.
53 McWilliam, H. H. Private Record, 1DRL/0467, Australian War Memorial, Canberra.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
56 Suckling, Diary.
57 White, Michael W.D. Australian Submarines: a History, AGPS, 1992, p. 31.
58 Ibid.
59 Kinder, Diary.
60 Downer, ‘Submarine AE1 Crew List’.
61 MP472/1 5/14/9165, ‘Scheme of complement of HMAS Submarines AE1 and AE2’, National Archives, Melbourne.
62 Keegan, p. 107.
63 Ibid., p.106. Keegan offers examples of how this lack of willingness to understand and accept modern technology directly affected the style of warfare employed, pp. 108–109.
64 Grey, J. A Military History of Australia, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 1990,
p. 87.
65 Ferraby, p.124.
66 Von Spee’s fleet was defeated at the battle of the Falkland Islands on 8 December 1911, by the British fleet commanded by Vice Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee.
67 Stevens, D. (ed.), 2001, p. 32.
68 Ibid., p. 35
69 McWilliam, Private Record.
70 Hodgson, Aubrey. Private Record, 3DRL/6032 and Journal of Signals Yeoman, MSS0692, Australian War Memorial, Canberra.
71 Greaves,‘The New Guinea Log’.
72 Doyle, Alec. Private Record, PR85/073, Unofficial record of HMAS Parramatta (1914) and transcripts of correspondence from Doyle to the Pockley Family (1914), Australian War Memorial, Canberrra.
73 Ibid.
74 The Papuan Times, 19 August 1914.
75 Ibid.
76 McWilliam, Private Record.
77 Doyle, Private Record.
78 McWilliam, Private Record.
79 Ibid.