‘Entombed But Not Forgotten.’
Commander John Foster (RAN Rtd)
On 14 September at 7am submarine AE1 left Simpson Harbour with orders ‘to guard against approach of enemy from Southward in St Georges Strait’.1 According to the Captain of AE2, Lieutenant Henry Hugh Gordon D’acre Stoker, RN, ‘AE1 had orders to return to harbour in time to be in daylight. She did not return’.2 It was a simple sentence charged with emotion. Stoker was deeply upset at the loss of Australia’s other submarine and fellow submariners whom he respected and called friends. His report to his Flag Officer Rear Admiral Patey explored the possibilities and complexities of the disappearance of AE1. Stoker had no answer to the mystery and officially considered only four possibilities. The first was that AE1 had broken down and been swept by currents against rocks and reefs. Another was that there had been an internal explosion. The third scenario was that the submarine had ‘sunk while diving’. His final hypothetical was that AE1 was ‘sunk by enemy’.3
HMAS Parramatta was to proceed from its night anchorage off Herbertshoho, rendezvous with the submarine and patrol in the ‘direction of Cape Gazelle to search in St Georges Channel to the South’ard’, according to the destroyer’s Captain, Lieutenant William Henry Farrington Warren, RAN. Both destroyer and submarine captains were under strict orders to return before sunset. Warren reported that at 8am his warship met AE1 and ‘the following signal was made …What speed are you going?’ The reply was ‘10½ knots’. Parramatta increased speed and accompanied the submarine. As they approached Cape Gazelle ‘at 9am’ another ‘signal’ was made from the destroyer. ‘Propose steaming to South’ard ahead of you keeping in touch – Do you concur?’ No reply was received nor to the next, ‘what speed do you wish to go?’ In his report Warren wrote that AE1 signalled ‘What orders have you got?’ Parramatta replied ‘My only orders were to search to the South’ard with submarine – to anchor off Herbertshohe at 5.30pm’. Warren’s hand-written report stated ‘Parramatta then proceeded in a Southerly direction at 6 knots – No further signal was then made by submarine’. He believed AE1 ‘steamed apparently in an N. Easterly direction’. He commented that the weather was hazy and visibility was decreasing and he quickly lost sight of the submarine. Nevertheless Warren decided to take his destroyer in the opposite direction and then ‘North’ard & Westard’ at ‘12.30’. There is another gap in his report and the next citation is that at ‘2.30pm Parramatta was close to submarine, close enough for AE1 to ask ‘What is the distance of visibility?’ to which his reply was ‘About 5 miles’. Parramatta’s Captain reported that the submarine was lost from sight at ‘3.20pm’ so he took his ship in the direction of the last sighting ‘but saw no trace of her’. He believed ‘she must have steamed back to harbour without informing me’. Parramatta again took a north–westerly course up to Duke of York Island, back to Credner Island and anchored off Herbertshohe at 7pm’.4
Admiral Patey’s report to ACNB altered some of the wording of Warren’s report. He stated that Warren and Besant ‘were in communication by wireless at 2.30pm … So that there is no doubt he was all right up to that time’. At no stage did Warren mention wireless communication and this would prove an important issue. The Admiral then reported:
At 3.30pm Parramatta saw the submarine about in the position on the chart to the S.W. of Duke of York Island apparently returning towards harbour.5
Warren did not give the time as 3.30pm. Patey told the Secretary of the Naval Board that he had interviewed Lieutenant Besant on the evening of 12 September as to the ‘state of his submarines’ and been assured ‘both were all right’ but that it would be best for AE1 to remain in harbour until 14 September ‘to make good minor defects’. Patey informed ACNB that he had
personally interviewed officers likely to be able to furnish any information on this matter – including Lieutenant Stoker, who cannot throw any light whatever on the possible cause.6
Based on this information Patey believed that ‘the submarine AE1 made a practice dive and failed to return to the surface’. Interestingly he added ‘she cannot have been in collision as there were no craft in the immediate neighbourhood’.
Warren’s and Stoker’s reports did not mention the word ‘collision’. Admiral Patey did not interview ‘officers’, he interviewed Lieutenant Stoker only; at no time did he interview the Captain of Parramatta. The Flag Officer then reported to ACNB that he despatched ships to search for the lost submarine.
At about 8pm on 14th September … I ordered “Parramatta” and “Yarra” to search for her, and “Encounter” to go at daylight. On the morning of the 15th September … I ordered the “Parramatta” and “Yarra” to make a sweep 30 miles to the N.W. of Duke of York Island. In this they were joined by “Warrego” … Nothing was seen. I then recalled the ships to start a systematic search of Duke of York and Credner Islands, and arranged for Motor Boats to search the coast.7
He hastened to add again that there was ‘no enemy in the neighbourhood’ and that he believed Besant had decided to make ‘a practice dive’ on the return voyage to harbour. The Admiral’s report contained erroneous information. The alarm was raised by Lieutenant Stoker at 8.15 pm and the destroyers did not sail until 11.30pm on 14 September to search for the submarine. Encounter’s involvement in the search on 15 September was brief. Patey signalled Encounter’s Captain demanding to know where he was. Encounter replied: ‘I am searching for submarine in accordance with your orders’. Patey immediately responded ‘return to harbour at once’ and Encounter’s Captain was instructed that ‘Rear Admiral wishes to see captain on anchoring’.8
Admiral Patey interpreted Warren’s report as ‘wireless communication’ whereas Warren used the word ‘signalled’. It is highly unlikely that AE1 had rigged its wireless mast. The wireless telegraphy (W/T) systems were not correctly fitted prior to the submarines departing from Portsmouth and subsequently could not be used during the voyage. Nor during this journey was there a Wireless Telegraphist in either submarine. When the submarines reached Cairns a communicator sailor from HMAS Sydney boarded AE1 and attempted to rig the mast and operate the system – he was unsuccessful. On his arrival in Sydney Besant requested several Telegraphists for the submarine squadron.
ACNB cited a great shortage of trained Telegraphists. Telegraphist Cyril Baker joined HMAS Encounter on 3 August, prior to taking his place in AE1. His time in the submarine was minimal; not only was there no time to adjust to life as a submariner but he had little time to familiarise himself with the submarine’s W/T system, a difficult duty for a very inexperienced young operator. Erecting the mast and securing the aerials and spreaders required a well co-ordinated team of a dozen or so men to undertake the very labour-intensive and time-consuming effort.9 The wireless system only worked on the surface. It is extremely unlikely that during a war patrol, when the submarine’s only offence/defence capacity was to dive, that the W/T would be rigged.
Unlike later British E Class submarines the Australian submarines were not fitted with a 12-pounder deck gun; this was a serious oversight. AE2 Captain, Lieutenant Commander Stoker, was critical: ‘we longed for a gun to enable us to remain on the surface and give them [the Turks] fight’.10 AE1 defence and attack ability rested entirely on 4 x 18-inch (450-mm) torpedo tubes (1 bow, 2 beam, 1 stern) which could only be fired when the submarine was submerged. To enable a quick reaction if the enemy was seen and for self-preservation, it was very unlikely that AE1 steamed with its wireless telegraphy mast raised. Had the submarine dived suddenly with the mast raised, the mast and associated equipment would have been ripped off and some debris would probably remain on the surface.
No W/T capacity also suggests why Warren used the word ‘signalled’ and would explain why communication between ship and submarine was intermittent at best. It is likely that signalling was done by flashing light. The range of the signal depended on the size and quality of the signalling lantern – AE1’s lantern would not be sizeable, certainly not permanent nor as large as that of a destroyer. Maximum distance for visual signals was around 5,000 metres but hazy conditions affected visibility. Had Parramatta and AE1 been in close quarters communication by megaphone (voice trumpet) was likely but it appears the destroyer kept its distance. Following the disappearance of AE1 Petty Officer Stoker Henry Kinder of AE2 wrote in his diary that the last communication between the destroyer and AE1 was by megaphone but he did not state where he came by this information or when that signal was made.11 Another possibility was that Besant needed to undertake a brief trim dive as soon as possible – in which case the submarine could not signal and certainly the W/T mast would be down. No W/T would also explain why no distress signal from AE1 was received.
The currents through St George’s Channel were flowing at around 3 knots.12 Warren reported ‘Very strong currents were experienced during the day’.13 There was a strong northerly wind blowing. This particular part of the coastline witnessed dangerous shoaling and tidal streams churning into deep ocean which pounded against reefs and outcrops. An onshore wind was blowing and the Australian fleet had only poorly marked and basic navigation charts. On 15 September HMAS Yarra, whilst searching for AE1, exited the northern entrance to Mioko Harbour and struck an outcrop. The centre and port propellers were damaged. The destroyer limped back to harbour. The centre propeller was replaced by divers but the port shaft was too bent and could not be used.14 Had AE1 been caught in this vortex of nature? The precarious situation may well have been exacerbated by a steering problem and jammed helm, similar to that witnessed during the journey to Australia. Had this occurred wreckage and debris would have been found, if not by Parramatta, during the search the following day. Stoker certainly believed that had AE1 broken down and ‘got set away by currents’ or been ‘sunk by internal explosion’, ‘wreckage or bodies should have been found’.15 The theory that the submarine had hit a mine was also dismissed for the same reason. Dr Fred Hamilton-Kenny, the medical officer on Upolu, discussed the disappearance with Stoker. ‘Stoker … scoffs at any idea of internal explosion or a floating mine or a rock’.16 The medical officer had befriended the crew of AE1 and struggled with the ‘terrible tragedy’. Hamilton-Kenny ‘saw them go out … Scarlett was forward on the bridge – Besant was aft’.17 The doctor told stewards to keep dinner hot for AE1 officers when the submarine did not return by dinner time and by 8pm ‘anxiety deepened’ for ‘as good men as any in the fleet’. A wireless message was made to Parramatta but no information concerning the whereabouts of AE1 was received. ‘Naturally everyone here is very much upset.’18
Whilst the basic design of the E Class submarine was robust, submarines were still experimental and evolving and their battle effectiveness unproven. The wisdom of a nascent RAN purchasing two new design submersibles was certainly questionable. These submarines were designed for service in the Northern Hemisphere. They were then expected to undertake a marathon journey to the Southern Hemisphere, an enormous distance from their manufacturer and engineering support, a trip described as a ‘journey of endurance both men and engines’.19
Admiral Creswell believed Australian conditions were ‘most unfavourable to the employment of submarines outside the harbours’; even in calm weather, ‘the chances of successfully attacking an enemy’s vessels at distance from port’ were ‘remote’.20 Creswell may have been reluctant to embrace new technology but he was well acquainted with naval warfare and the oceans surrounding the nation he had adopted. With limited budgets Creswell wanted the most effective fleet to protect Australia. The decision to invest in submarines was ultimately made by Australian Prime Minister Alfred Deakin, on the advice of the Admiralty. AE1 and AE2’s lack of wartime operational effectiveness would validate Creswell’s assertions.
Australia’s submarines were ill-prepared for war. Sea trials and trimming exercises had been very hastily undertaken and not completed prior to departure from England. Trimming – commonly referred to as ‘putting on the trim’, were adjustments to weight compensation tanks to offset changes in weight, to maintain neutral buoyancy and aft and fore balance. For AE1 these were unsuccessful in English waters and it was strongly recommended that more trials be completed as soon as possible in Sydney. Besant had pleaded for more personnel, particularly more engineering staff and Stokers. ACNB was unable to assist due to poor manning policy which had culminated in significant delays in the recruiting and training of Australian volunteers. Spare crew submariners were utilised to make up personnel shortfalls. The refit of AE1 at Fitzroy Dock, Cockatoo Island, was curtailed in the haste to go to war. There was no time for sea trials or a workup of the crew. AE1 sailed north on 28 August, rendezvoused with the main fleet off Rossell Island on 9 September and entered Simpson Harbour on 11 September. The Honourable Lieutenant Leopold Scarlett joined AE1 as Third Officer on 10 August 1914. His time as an Australian submariner was just 35 days.
AE1 had a defective starboard main engine clutch – similar to numerous such failings during the voyage to Australia. Again the HMAS Sydney workshop needed to manufacture replacement toggle bolts to refit the clutch, a duty performed during the Singapore to Sydney leg. An ERA and the bolts were transferred to HMAS Upolu during 14 September. If Besant told Rear Admiral Patey he believed his submarine would be operational by 14 September it is likely there was a further delay in the production of the toggle bolts. The lack of submarine depot ship Platypus, still being built, proved an impediment to submarine operations. The requisitioned Upolu proved useless and should never have been requisitioned by the RAN and it was returned to the Brisbane Milling Company as early as 9 December 1914.
Upolu accommodated an engineering support team, Lieutenant Commander Douglas Phillip Herbert, RAN, and Lieutenant Halliday Gunning Paterson, RN. Neither engineering officer had any experience in submarines. Paterson had a chequered record with many indiscretions over his mess bills and poor conduct. Mid-afternoon on 14 September HMAS Sydney contacted Paterson, requesting acknowledgement for the receipt of ‘submarine stores’ prior to Sydney’s departure. The ‘stores’ were not transferred until hours later.22 Paterson was summoned to the flagship, ‘without sword’, meaning he was going to be severely reprimanded.23 It is not known if this had anything to do with lack of mechanical preparedness of AE1 or simply an indiscretion of another type. There is little doubt that due to the very poor state of the Upolu workshop there were further delays in preparing AE1 for patrol. An additional ERA was also transferred to Upolu so that AE1’s mechanical issues could be rectified on the evening of 14 September – but the evening of 14 September was too late.
Besant was under pressure to go on patrol. He had deferred the first patrol to his subordinate Lieutenant Stoker and AE2. There were further delays with engineering support. It was a defect which had occurred on previous occasions so Besant may well have been lulled into a false sense of security. AE1 had some of the very finest Engineering Artificers. Besant valued their expertise and probably believed these skilled ERAs could resolve any contingency. Nonetheless the submarine was severely comprised. Surfaced power was available to both diesel engines but a defective starboard clutch meant the submarine had a 50 per cent power reduction when going astern. If there was a disengaging or delay in the port engine shaft the submarine would have no astern surface power. Prior to diving, the electric propulsion motors were engaged and the diesels shut down. The existing defect on the starboard clutch again meant that a delay in engaging the port engine motor would leave the submarine without propulsion power. It was a serious defect, particularly without a surface ship escort, and one which endangered the lives of those in AE1.
It was, and would continue to be, standard military practice to rest immediate blame on the operator rather than question the wisdom or expertise of those in the highest command levels. In his report Rear Admiral Patey came to the extremely rapid conclusion that ‘the submarine AE1 made a practice dive and failed to return to the surface’. Besant was immediately under scrutiny. His results during training were not glorious; commonly third-class passes except in ‘torpedo’ in which he received a first-class pass in his Sub Lieutenant’s examination. That his only previous command had been of a much smaller C Class submarine was now seen as indicating his lack of experience. Lieutenant Scarlett had secured better passes than Besant as a Midshipman and Sub Lieutenant and was described as ‘intelligent but slow’; ‘zealous, promising, recommended and very strong’. Lieutenant Moore’s results were similar to Scarlett’s with ‘very good indeed’ notated more than once, and ‘good judgement’ and ‘attentive’ pencilled onto his service record. Lieutenants Scarlett and Stoker had taken B Class submarines to Gibraltar. Submarines were new technology and few officers had an abundance of experience. Besant had not only commanded his own E Class submarine on record-breaking voyages but he was entrusted by the Admiralty with the added responsibility of being the Commanding Officer of the RAN Submarine Squadron. Stoker thought Besant ‘a fine officer, a good submariner [who] was very thorough in his following the correct procedure’.24 The Squadron Commander had on occasion been described as a quiet, conscientious, methodical, studious and hard-working naval officer. He on no previous occasion gave the impression of being arrogant or even self-opinionated. In AE1 he also had the counsel of two experienced junior officers.
Upolu’s Dr Hamilton-Kenny wrote that ‘Scarlett was a handsome, curly heady [sic] young devil with a fine face and genial manner’. He would add ‘poor Scarlett’s end is tragic – that beautiful, bright cynical boy’. According to Hamilton-Kenny the Captain of AE1, ‘poor Besant’, had offered much in the way of intellectual conversation and was a ‘quiet good type of English Officer … thoughtful with a sweet smile and kind voice and lovely manner’.25 Lieutenant Besant lacked the charisma of peers like Stoker and Scarlett. He would also have been well aware that as the son of a naval storekeeper he did not have the social standing most commonly expected of a naval officer of the era. He did not mix in the same social echelon as his subordinates. It would be very unusual if Besant had not had a strong desire to prove himself in war and covet glory for himself, his crew and his submarine – but doubtless no more than every other Commanding Officer in the Australian fleet. This nonetheless may well have determined the direction of course he chose for AE1 on the morning of 14 September. The previous day HMAS Yarra had reported to Rear Admiral Patey that a steamer was sighted off the Duke of York Islands and the destroyer would investigate. Patey tersely ordered Yarra to return to anchorage.26 Besant and his crew probably decided the sighting was worthy of reconnaissance. It may well have been a decision made by Warren in Parramatta also. To take a German steamer as a prize was a most enticing prospect in a slow sea war.
Whilst some may have considered Besant less than his peers in a number of ways there was never any previous indication that he was cavalier with the safety of his crew. AE1’s Captain knew his submarine’s defect was to be rectified on return to Rabaul, allowing his boat to be far more operationally effective. He was senior officer and could have determined which submarine would undertake the next patrol and ensuing patrols. Nor as an officer trying to prove himself would he be likely to endanger his future career by disobeying his Admiral’s direct order to return to harbour by sunset – particularly after Stoker’s official rebuke from Rear Admiral Patey the previous evening for failing to have AE2 back in harbour by sunset. If the last sightings of AE1 were correct, Besant would have had to stay on the surface and maintain a speed of 11 knots (top speed on one shaft would be less than this) to return to Simpson Harbour within the approximate two and a half hours before sunset. Dived, his speed was reduced to 9 knots; dived with the starboard clutch defect and with the possibility of a malfunction of the port electric motor, would make this impossible and reckless.
There are serious issues with the report of HMAS Parramatta’s Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Warren. It is almost abstract, with words like ‘estimated’ and ‘approximation’. The report’s brevity alone should have been questioned firstly by Admiral Patey and then ACNB. This was the first time Parramatta patrolled with a submarine and the destroyer was supposed to accompany the submarine and keep AE1 in sight. Warren would have had no knowledge of the submarine’s engineering or operational requirements. He mentioned he was uncertain of the submarine’s speed and had to increase the speed of his own ship. Clearly he was unaware of the difficulty in steering submarines at low speeds on low engine power – AE1 needed to proceed at a comfortable 8 to 10 knots. The destroyer spent so little time in AE1’s company Warren even failed to ensure clear communication between them. Warren was born in Scotland, RAN, 36 years old, a Lieutenant and a destroyer Captain. Besant was RN, English, 30, a Lieutenant Commander and a submariner – they were likely not to agree or have anything in common.
Warren said the weather was extremely hazy and visibility was poor: ‘The submarine was obscured’ as was ‘the land’ – this was by 11am. He took a different course to AE1. Warren’s report says he changed course ‘to the North’ards & Westward at 12.30’. The next entry is somewhat cryptic: ‘at 2.30pm Parramatta was close to submarine’, at which time he reported a signal was exchanged – the sort of signal which would likely have been exchanged much earlier – and given that the boat and ship had not been in contact for hours it seems strange that AE1 asked about visibility, in low visibility, by flashing light. Warren then reported that ‘at 3.20 – submarine was lost sight of’. There are no latitude or longitude co-ordinates offered. The last two entries are that Warren then turned his destroyer towards where he saw the submarine last, steaming close to the coast. He made the decision that AE1 had simply returned to Rabaul and rather than continue on a similar course to ensure this was the case Warren took his destroyer in the opposite direction, sweeping up and around the Duke of York Island group. When questioned the following day by the Commanding Officer of Encounter Warren gave a slightly different AE1 last visual – Waira Point, Duke of York Islands – whereas in his written report he gave a more south–westerly position, between Waira Point and Jaquinot Point. Parramatta returned to its anchorage at 7pm; sunset was around 6pm. The destroyer Captain never verified if the submarine had in fact returned.
There are large gaps in Warren’s report. According to the Parramatta ship’s log the destroyer ‘stopped’ at 3.35pm and ‘proceeded’ at 4.25pm to investigate an impact; no elaboration other than ‘stopped’.27 The impact was put down to a sunken log. Logs were regularly washed down from the mountains in New Ireland into St George’s Channel following heavy rains. This gives rise to the speculation that Parramatta inadvertently ran over a dived submarine. Parramatta was not patrolling with the submarine and lost sight of it. Warren’s suggestion that the submarine and destroyer were not in company and working different parts of oceans and then suddenly close enough to exchange a signal in hazy conditions sounds confused. It is therefore extremely unlikely that the destroyer was in the exact same spot as a submarine, which was very unlikely to have dived. When next in dock Parramatta was found to have only minor scratching on the hull, nothing that would suggest the major damage likely in the advent of a destroyer running over a partly submerged submarine. The chart of the course taken by Warren, officially referenced to as ‘Estimate Track of “Parramatta” 14-9-14 Between 7am & 7pm’ is also strange. The sharp deviation eastwards to incorporate the time he gave – ‘3.20 pm’ (interpreted later by Rear Admiral Patey as ‘3.30 pm’) – as when Parramatta lost sight of the submarine, makes little sense given the smooth and logical course taken by the destroyer. The decision to then circumnavigate the island group is also an enigmatic one.
Warren offered no accurate indication of where the submarine was headed and gave different AE1 positions on ensuing days, as well as vague times. Warren’s report is unprofessional and perplexing. Neither he, nor anyone else in Parramatta, was ever interviewed.
Lieutenant Alec Broughton Doyle, RAN, was Parramatta’s Engineering Officer. He would later be promoted to Rear Admiral (in 1943) and become ACNB 3rd Naval Member. In a letter home on 17 September 1914 he described the 14 September patrol with ‘submarine’. Doyle agrees that signals between warship and submarine were sparse, offering a characteristically acerbic account.
Submarine makes no suggestions so our Captain suggests a course and asks ‘do you concur?’. Submarine, being Senior Officer, sort of puts his thumb to his nose, says nothing, but steers due East to Duke of York Island. We run back & forth to scout & try and keep in touch. See him last at 2.45pm close to D. of Y. Island – where [there] is a number of concealed harbours. On our return at sundown no submarine.28
Doyle mentions seeing AE1‘last at 2.45pm’, not 2.30pm, there is no mention of 3.20 or 3.30pm, no mention of exchange of a signal during the afternoon.
Lieutenant Commander (later Commander) Cyril John Percival Hill, RN, was another whose comments were ignored. Hill was posted to HMAS Parramatta from 1 January 1913. His diary is explicit.
Submarine seen at 2.30 just off Duke of York Island. Parramatta then steamed due East across Channel and returned on same course. Submarine not in sight. Thought she had returned to harbour … Very much afraid she has been sunk. Enemy supposed to have light guns hidden on small islands … we much afraid she’s a goner.29
In letters home Warren never mentioned AE1or spoke further about the loss of Australia’s first submarine. Commander William Farrington Warren DSO, RAN, drowned in Brindisi Harbour, Italy, on 13 April 1918, aged 40, and was buried in Bari War Cemetery, Bari, Apulia, Italy. He was at the time senior officer in command of the RAN destroyer flotilla, the circumstances surrounding his death bizarre. Warren was admitted to the naval hospital at Brindisi with ‘a fever’. He was allowed to go for a walk in the hospital grounds and was found some time later, drowned in a ‘few inches of water’.30
The AN&MEF was anything but a cohesive unit. It is well documented that there was friction within the Australian fleet – between juniors and seniors, between RAN and RN and an ageless tension between those who steamed above the surface and those who went below. Strained personal and professional relationships and rivalries between the RN and RAN were no better illustrated than in the correspondence of Lieutenant Doyle who referred to:
these scum of the British Navy … Both by sea and land they are chucking away chances with both fists and we are a laughing stock to the Shermans [sic] or should be.31
There was a lack of understanding and appreciation of submarines amongst surface captains, expressed from the very top in the words ‘underhand, unfair and damned un-English’ by Admiral Sir Arthur Wilson VC, RN, who was appointed First Sea Lord in 1910.32
When the fleet sailed north full of optimism, a sea battle against German cruisers was greatly anticipated. Instead they chased phantoms. There was confusion, uncertainty and delays, and war meant supervising a rather minor land-based campaign. Doyle complained about the RN officers in charge of the fleet.
They just don’t give a dam [sic] for anything but peace & quiet & snubbing any junior who dares to offer a suggestion … This is WAR … Parramatta hasn’t fired a shot yet; now we have lost a sub, and Yarra is half disabled.33
His frustration typified that of junior and middle-ranking officers unburdened by the whole strategic picture.
Nonetheless it was as frustrating for senior RN officers within the Australian fleet who were desperate for real naval warfare. In the Pacific the RN was disorganised, underprepared and out-manoeuvred. The British Admiralty controlled the RAN. Australia’s own Minister for Defence, Senator George Pearce, had no direct responsibility for strategic policy. He was solely responsible for the welfare, supply and reinforcement of Australia’s military forces. The Admiralty was preoccupied with the battle closer to home in the Atlantic; the Australia and the Pacific campaigns were minor considerations. Captain Stephen H. Radcliffe, Commanding Officer of HMAS Australia, wrote:
We are having a pretty dull time now, at the beginning of the war we had those two convoys and a good sporting chance of meeting the Germans but it all seems to be gone now and I can’t think what they will do with us eventually, but according to our plans if we had been left alone and not humbugged by the Admiralty we could have done that New Britain expedition and then collared them afterwards.34
Lieutenant Stoker of AE2 wrote in his report to Admiral Patey that he considered there was a strong possibility that AE1 was sunk by the enemy. A conversation with Dr Hamilton-Kenny revealed that Stoker believed:
The enemy had got them – two small German boats Comet [sic] and Planet are in these waters – Point Gazelle is where AE1 was last seen & a raid might have taken place from a creek or behind a corner & a 3 pound shell pumped into her.35
Later Hamilton-Kenny noted that even after the search of AE1 had ended, Stoker ‘still believes’ that AE1 and crew were ‘potted by the enemy’.36 It was a synopsis raised by Parramatta’s Lieutenant Commander Hill and Lieutenant Doyle. Doyle considered:
We have strong reason to suppose a small gunboat to have been lying in D of Y Island observing all our frantic dashing to & fro & probably she waited till submarine got quite close & then just biffed off at her & sunk her.37
The rumour gathered pace throughout the fleet. Commander Frederick Campbell Darley, RN, was serving on HMAS Australia. ‘No one knows what happened to the submarine’ but:
Some say she was sunk by a small steamer called the “Colonial” … found a few days later on a reef and burnt to the water’s edge, and on deck was a mounting for a pom-pom and a lot of empty cylinders scattered around.38
He too reiterated Stoker’s belief that there could not have been an internal explosion and that Besant was unlikely to have undertaken an exercise dive.
Sub Lieutenant Henry Hastings McWilliam also served on the flagship and was transferred to HMAS Encounter on 15 September. He was a code/cypher officer through whose hands went most of the incoming signals for the Admiral. His diary is very detailed and offers a well-founded record of day-to-day events. He wrote that AE1 was ‘last seen in St George’s Channel at 2.30pm’. He mentioned that ‘in the course of enquiries about the submarine, a noise like firing of guns in the distance’ was heard.
I distinctly heard it, thinking it was “Sydney’s” 12 pounder at about 8.15 yesterday evening … Several other people in the ship heard it.39
Whilst 8.15pm seems late for an engagement between AE1 and an enemy vessel, McWilliam persisted. ‘There are all sorts of theories as to what happened but a favourite one is that an armed launch attacked her.’40 He wrote of Yarra running aground in ‘1½ fathoms when chart gave 5 fathoms’. On 18 September he was onboard Encounter as the ship searched for AE1 when a signal came from Parramatta reporting that ‘a native’ had been found who may have some knowledge of the whereabouts the SMS Komet. McWilliam wrote:
At about 10am the Captain of Encounter decided to return direct to Rabaul at 14 knots, abandoning the search for the submarine.41
On 18 September Warrego investigated a plume of smoke and found a German launch burnt to the waterline. Its name was Kolonialgesellschaft. McWilliam wrote of the discovery.
She was fitted with a gun mounting but the gun had evidently been thrown overboard. One of two empty cartridges were found, having been fired, calibre 1.45”. This may explain the submarine mystery’.42
Lieutenant Commander Hill elaborated how Kolonialgesellschaft was found on 18 September and that on 23 September Parramatta found the German steamer Meklong at Mioko Harbour. The following day 40 prisoners from the German steamer Kolonialgesellschaft ‘arrived’.43 He wrote that the loss of AE1 ‘cast a gloom over the entire fleet’ and that:
Many rumours … were afloat … chief among which was that she had been sunk by a small enemy steamer mounting a 3 pdr., gun. In support of this theory a craft of this description was found ashore on Elizabeth reef not far distant from Rabaul, while a gun was found on the sea bed just under her bow.44
It was a theory written about by a journalist based in New Guinea and published by The Sydney Morning Herald on 27 September; one repeated by a number of navy personnel on leave in three Australian states and subsequently published in their state daily press. Kolonialgesellschaft was not a glamorous warship, but it was armed with a Maxim Nordenfeldt 5-Barrel Mark II quick-firing gun using 1-inch rounds. The gun and at least one shell were beneath the burn-out keel.
Signalman (later Chief) Aubrey Hodgson recorded in his diary a conversation with ‘an Engineer Officer of Germany’s Warship Planet’ who was brought onboard Hodgson’s ship, the New Zealand passenger liner and supply ship SS Aorangi, as a prisoner of war (POW). His name was Chief Machinist Petty Officer Wilhelm Gustav Edwin Reuschel. The German prisoner, according to Hodgson, ‘claimed to have been in charge of a small yacht named the “colonial”’. Hodgson’s story continued, ‘when our submarine was “hove to” in St George’s Channel on Monday afternoon last, he approached her’. According to Reuschel the incident occurred outside Mioko Harbour, the German vessel approached under ‘a white ensign, fired at, and sunk her, and then ran over her’.
I assured him, our submarine wasn’t lost but he wouldn’t accept my argument. He was most callous, and gloated over the fact, that he caught them napping so very simply.45
Hodgson’s diary has been found to be inaccurate in numerous places. Nonetheless he was unaware of the disappearance of AE1. He said he immediately informed his superiors of this claim and wrote ‘would love to know if this fellow is telling the truth, or only bluffing’. Kolonialgesellschaft ended up on a reef in an inlet about 70 miles to the west of where AE1 was purported to be last seen and discovered by HMAS Warrego on 18 September. The German crew had poured benzene over the craft, set it alight and escaped inland. Kolonialgesellschaft was of dubious value so it seems strange that its crew went to so much trouble to dismantle the gun, throw it overboard and then burn the craft to the waterline – the smoke revealing its previously hidden position. Was this done to destroy any evidence?
Reuschel never repeated the story allegedly told to Hodgson and relayed to authorities. If this was not an accurate account how did Reuschel know an Australian submarine was missing? Reuschel may have echoed a story told by another German sailor and blurted it out in anger culminating from his becoming a prisoner. He may also have indeed been part of the Kolonialgesellschaft crew. Reuschel had nothing to gain by this admission and must have believed there may be possible ramifications for retelling the story. Doubtless RAN naval personnel would be displeased with someone boasting of the death of their companions particularly if some interpreted it as a cowardly act to attack whilst flying a white ensign. Chief Machinist Petty Officer Wilhelm Gustav Edwin Reuschel was sent to Liverpool, NSW, POW camp for the duration of the war. Unfortunately when he returned to Germany he contracted Spanish flu in February 1920 and the story died with him.46
The Admiralty and their Australian fleet commander were fixated on the German cruisers Sharnhorst, the flagship of the German East Asia Squadron’s Admiral Maximilian von Spee and the accompanying same class cruiser Gneisenau. Yet there were a number of armed launches and unarmed auxiliaries hiding in New Guinea inlets – Kolonialgesellschaft was just one. Komet, Planet, Suva, Sumatra, Siar, Meklong and Nusa were some of the vessels hidden in the vicinity when the fleet arrived.
Sumatra (584 tons) was captured on 11 September; Madang (194 tons) two days later. Nusa (60 tons) was found by Warrego on 14 September. Siar, a 450-ton steamer, continued to move supplies to German encampments throughout September ‘often over-daring’.47 The steamer and her two motor-schooners, the Matupi and Senta, were not captured until 18 October. Meklong was a 450-ton German registered (Norddeutscher Lloyd) vessel. She remained undetected in the Duke of York Island group, moored up a creek, so well camouflaged that Parramatta dropped anchor within 50 yards of this not insignificantly sized ship. Yarra also failed to find Meklong despite its frantic searching for AE1 on 15 September. Not until 23 September would a Parramatta shore patrol stumble on the steamer in a shallow north-east passage of Mioko Harbour.
The biggest prize was the German Governor’s yacht, SMS Komet. On 10 October 1914 the armed Komet, with 57 crew, was captured by a detachment of AN&MEF on the north coast of New Britain. The German naval survey vessel Planet was found scuttled soon after. Komet was commissioned HMAS Una on 17 November 1914 and sailed to Sydney.
It took time and patience before the German auxiliaries were discovered. HMAS Sydney did not find Kolonialgesellschaft when Sydney steamed past its position at midday on 15 September. Admiral Patey admitted the Kolonialgesellschaft must have gone ashore on the nights of 15, 16 or 17 September, but he quickly added:
Subsequent investigation shows that Kolonialgesellschaft was from the westward and not the eastward, and therefore it does not appear possible to connect her in any way with the loss of Submarine AE1.48
The grounding was not an accurate indicator of the direction of travel because the craft ‘could also have swung around with the tidal stream’.49
It is common within military history to laud those in the highest level of command. But the priorities and competency of Rear Admiral George Patey needed to be questioned. Patey and others in authority had little war experience and the AN&MEF was an ill-prepared force sent to Rabaul. The Australian Squadron was not the most prestigious of RN flag positions. A pretend sea war in the Pacific, with no grand confrontation with German warships, was frustrating – a fleet with no one to fight. Patey and his senior RN officers would have desperately wished to be part of the real war, closer to England and fighting grand sea battles in the Atlantic. By comparison with what was occurring in the Northern Hemisphere German resistance in New Guinea was a minor affair. Friction existed within the fleet concerning strategy and tactics and delays in the actual landings and capture of wireless stations – Admiral Patey was in command of this campaign.
But it is the loss of AE1 which reveals intimately the confusion and reluctance to assume responsibility. Patey quickly endeavoured to clear himself of any responsibility for the missing submarine. His initial Admiralty report commenced with his interview with Besant on the night of 12 September when the submarine squadron Commander assured him the submarines ‘were both all right’, except that AE1 needed to remain in harbour the following day. The Rear Admiral did not understand the nature or significance of the mechanics of submarines and had no advisor cognisant with submarines on his flagship. Patey either mistakenly or intentionally misinterpreted Warren’s report with regards to signalling and sighting. He claimed to have interviewed ‘officers’ but only interviewed Stoker. He did not interview Warren or anyone onboard Parramatta, which is very difficult to comprehend. Warren at least deserved a rebuke for not following orders and accompanying the submarine on patrol and his senior officer’s course, regardless of the direction AE1 took.
Patey informed his superiors that at 8pm on 14 September he ordered Parramatta and Yarra to search for the submarine. The alarm was actually raised by Stoker at 8.15pm and the destroyers did not leave their anchorage under the Admiral’s instruction until 11.30pm. Patey ordered Encounter into the search and then hours later rescinded this order. Patey claimed the initiative for the search for AE1 on 15 September but he and Australia, accompanied by the cruisers Melbourne and Sydney, steamed away from the area for the Australian mainland, Australia departing by noon.50 He delegated the responsibility for the search and a board of inquiry to Captain C. La P. Lewin, RN, the Commanding Officer of HMAS Encounter. It is hard to envisage a more pressing issue than a missing submarine with 35 RN and RAN officers and men onboard. The search was poorly co-ordinated because Patey left little information and gave no positions due to the dubious value of Warren’s report and lack of co-ordinates. The search party waited a further two hours to receive a wireless signal from the flagship that simply stated ‘St George’s Channel’. Encounter and Warrego joined the search and a 30-mile sweep was conducted around Duke of York Island. Ships’ boats were dropped over the sides to search inlets. Encounter reported a small oil slick and some bubbles but these quickly dissipated and no other ship mentioned them. There is no official record of this. It was the searching ships which initiated the search of inlets by motor boats. At daylight on 18 September Parramatta contacted Encounter with information which might reveal the position of SMS Komet and the search for AE1 came to a hasty end.
Admiral Patey in Australia and HMAS Sydney returned to Rabaul on 19 September as unexpectedly as they had left because of the rumour that Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had returned to the region – another rumour which proved false. No board of inquiry was held into the disappearance of AE1. No further interviews were conducted. Lieutenant Stoker’s final 16 October 1914 report offered:
It is difficult to understand why she [AE1] would be diving at this hour. She was 25 miles off harbour and had to be at anchorage within 2½ hours, and her speed returning would not have exceeded 11 knots. Also if a practice dive was thought necessary it would probably have been carried out in the early morning.51
Admiral Patey dismissed Stoker’s report outright:
This report throws no further light on the subject … I believe that she may have struck a pinnacle or unchartered rock whilst submerged.52
Regardless of Stoker’s educated summary and the thoughts of others within the fleet that AE1 had been lost in enemy action Patey continued to emphasise ‘no enemy in the neighbourhood’ – such would reflect poorly on his command. While there were no warships in the vicinity there were definitely enemy craft in the ‘neighbourhood’. Interestingly Stoker’s typed report included within Admiral Patey’s final ACNB ‘Report of Proceedings’ did not include a 3.30pm position. This is hand-written into the border as ‘1½’ SSE of Berard Pt’. It is not known if Stoker or some other party notated this. Patey’s final synopsis was the same as the one hastily sent immediately after AE1 disappeared. ‘This report confirms my previous opinion that submarine AE1 made a practice dive and failed to return to the surface.’ He concluded ‘I cannot account for her disappearance in any other way’.53 It was others like Dr Hamilton-Kenny who seemed genuinely concerned that some ‘of the bravest men in the fleet’ were missing, ‘Isn’t it awful to think of those fine chaps drowned in a rat trap’.54
Stoker lamented:
The sinking submarine would slip away down into the vast depths existing in those parts, rapidly filling as the increasing pressure of water outside forced its way through the hull, bringing a quick and clean death to the crew, whose end might well have come before their steel tomb had reached the ocean’s bed – there to rest undisturbed by man and his investigation … There seemed to me to lie but a straw in the wind ‘twixt AE2, at anchor in Rabaul Harbour, and her sister ship, the steel tomb, hundreds of fathoms deep.55
Rear Admiral Patey was promoted to Vice Admiral on 21 September 1914 and became Commander-in-Chief, North America and West Indies Station the following year. He was appointed Knight Commander of the Order of St Michael and St George on 1 January 1916.
British strategic priorities were elsewhere, early defeats called for massive on-the-ground reinforcements and the men of the Australian Imperial Force (AIF) were soon thrown into the bloody and terrible campaigns at Gallipoli and on the Western Front. Melbourne and Sydney were ordered to accompany the troop transports. Australia continued to chase but never caught the elusive cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau – which were destroyed by the RN at the Battle of the Falkland Islands on 8 December 1914. Australia returned to English waters and became flagship of the RN’s 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron.
AE2 joined the second convoy of 17 transports of AIF troops which sailed from Western Australia on 31 December. There were no other warships and AE2 was taken in tow by convoy ships on numerous occasions – it was yet another arduous journey for the submariners. Once in the Mediterranean, AE2 was engaged in the Dardanelles campaign. On 25 April, as Australians were coming under withering fire as they landed on the Gallipoli beaches, AE2 attempted to force a passage through the heavily fortified, 35-mile long Dardanelles Strait to enter the Sea of Marmara, to disrupt supplies to Turkish troops defending the Gallipoli peninsula and Turkish warships from bombarding British forces. No submarine had managed to pass through the heavily mined, heavily defended strait – until Australia’s second submarine.
Despite the mines, shore bombardment and feverish attentions of Turkish destroyers, torpedo gun ships and anti-submarine craft, AE2 survived until 30 April and entered the Sea of Marmara. In a last ditch attempt to escape the surface mayhem the crew attempted to dive yet again. On this occasion initially the boat refused, then suddenly inclined down bows first and dived very rapidly. AE2 was fitted with 100-foot depth gauges but the submarine continued to dive steeply and deeper. It then rose as rapidly despite crew efforts to halt the ascent and AE2 broke the surface stern first. Immediately the Australian submarine was hit by gun fire and the crew knew their boat was doomed. All tanks were flooded to scuttle the boat and Australia’s second submarine joined the fate of the first and sank to the bottom of the sea. But this time all hands were picked up by an enemy boat and no lives were lost.
Lieutenant Command Stoker was frustrated by the failures and erratic behaviour of his submarine. The lack of a deck gun, the ‘failure of the wireless receiving instruments’,56 failed firing of torpedoes, the strange diving evolution and steering and manoeuvrability difficulties had plagued his operational effectiveness. It was later suggested that fluctuations in depth, density of water layers and perhaps temperatures with the sudden convergence of fresh and salt water had an unavoidable detrimental effect. These same faults, failures and natural phenomena may well have resulted in the demise of AE1. The Irish born Captain of an Australian submarine, Lieutenant Stoker was awarded the Distinguished Service Order (DSO) in recognition of his submarine achieving the first passage of the Dardanelles. Interestingly the two RN Captains of the Royal Navy submarines which followed his lead were awarded Victoria Crosses.
Unfortunately ensuing years as Turkish POWs took a terrible toll of the physical and mental health of the AE2 crew. In his diary Able Seaman Albert Edward Knaggs (7893) offered a vivid insight into the diseases and deprivations. He himself died of malaria in hospital at the Belemedik Camp on 22 October 1916 and was buried at the Christian Armenian Cemetery.57 Petty Officer Stephen John Gilbert (8053) died at Belemedik on 9 October 1916 of typhoid.58 Chief Stoker Charles Varcoe (8275) died of meningitis in the summer of 1916. Stoker Michael Williams (2305) died on 29 September 1916 possibly of malaria or dysentery but no trace of his body was ever found.59 He is commemorated on the Bozanti Memorial of the Baghdad North Gate War Cemetery where the bodies of his fellow crew were re-interred. Williams had been supporting his widowed mother Margaret in their home in Hamilton,
Victoria. Due to bureaucratic bungling the Department of Defence lost Williams’ paperwork and life for Margaret became dire. She wrote to Prime Minister Billy Hughes pleading for the financial assistance she was entitled to. Eventually she received some of Michael’s back pay and a pension of 2/6d per week. The Prime Minister who prided himself in the nickname ‘The Little Digger’ never answered Margaret Williams’ letter.60
The officers and men of AE1 were quickly forgotten as the nation was overwhelmed by staggering fatalities on the battlefields of Europe. The families were left to struggle with the loss alone – no one interested in their story of a missing submarine and 35 men. It took 60 years before someone became determined to honour the memory of the crew of AE1. Commander John Foster, RAN, working in Papua New Guinea during the 1970s, heard from a local crayfish diver that a submarine lay on the seafloor and for him the AE1 story came to life – indeed the mystery took over the life of John Foster. He was astounded to discover how little official concern had resulted from the disappearance of Australia’s first submarine.
In 1976 Foster convinced the RAN to make a side-scan sonar search from the Australian hydrographic survey ship HMAS Flinders. Something was detected but further investigation was impossible. Famous undersea explorer Jacques Cousteau and his equally famous ship Calypso became involved in 1990. In a search in the vicinity of the Credner Island group there was a promising contact but with Cousteau’s submersible unserviceable nothing was found. Rumours and myths continued as did John Foster but with little fundamental official information the search area was vast.
Peter Richardson was another seduced by the mystery of the lost submarine. He had grown up in the Gazelle Peninsula Area off East New Britain and as a small boy visited the Bitapaka war cemetery with his father for the ANZAC Day dawn service. As a member of the Rabaul Dive Club in 1974 his interest heightened. In 1989 he realised he must return to New Guinea and search and by 1994 sought company sponsorship. His timing was disappointing because of the volcanic eruptions of Vulcan and Tavurvur – making it too dangerous to enter Simpson Harbour. John Foster had on occasion thought that if AE1 had been lost somewhere off Simpson Harbour it might now be buried beneath a thick pyroclastic layer on the bottom of Simpson Harbour.
By 2002, further encouraged by contact with descendants of the crew of AE1, John Foster sought official Australian Government support. None was forthcoming. Foster undertook a privately funded search off Wirian Reef near Mioko Island. Parishioners from Milmila Mission, on Duke of York Island, had told of trochus divers finding a submarine. Foster’s endeavours were circumvented on this occasion not by bureaucracy but by schools of large sharks. Foster was not the sort of man who gave up. The following year he funded another search himself only to again be prevented from further investigation by sharks. Also in 2003 Foster convinced the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) to fund a further investigation. Regardless of the enthusiasm and technical knowledge of those on this expedition of the area off Southern Mioko Island and adjacent islands again no trace of AE1 was found.
Foster consulted the local Wirian people. Accepted to the point of being initiated as an honorary clan member, he was told stories of fishing nets being dragged and catching in deep waters off Mioko Island. The oral history of the indigenous people included the story of tribesmen hiding in caves frightened by shore bombardment – probably Encounter’s bombardment on 14 September 1914. It was said that a ‘monster’ (a submarine), a ‘devil ship’, approached their cave location on the southern side of Mioko Harbour, on the south side of Duke of York Island and that the ‘monster’ stopped near the reef before moving away to the north-east.
In 2007 John Foster started AE1 organisation, later AE1 Incorporated, which soon expanded to include crew descendants, retired RAN personnel, academics and scientific specialists all intent on finding the lost crew.61 Foster secured ministerial support and he was onboard Hydrographic Survey Ship, HMAS Benalla, when sonar identified a man-made object of approximately the size and shape of AE1 close to Wirian Reef, off Mioko Island. But the earlier loss of an inside scan sonar made it impossible to scan the full depths. Further investigation by a remotely operated submersible was now needed – an expedition impossible without well-funded private or government assistance. Later that year HMAS Yarra, a coastal minehunter, searched for four days using mine hunting sonar, divers and the ship’s camera fitted to a remotely operated vehicle (ROV). Unfortunately the object detected by Benalla sonar was confirmed by the ROV camera to be a submarine-shaped rock formation. The oceans continue to guard the mystery. Two more unsuccessful searches occurred in 2009, including one aided by the Seven Television Network. 2009 was the year Commander John Foster, RAN (Rtd), was awarded a Member of the Order of Australia. Foster would happily have returned the award if only it meant the mystery of AE1 could be resolved. John Foster sadly died of cancer in 2011, his enthusiasm undiminished but his quest incomplete.
On 26 October 2011 the RAN investigated an uncharted wreck found during the conduct of ‘Operation Render Safe’ off Rabaul. The operation was the Australian Defence Force’s contribution to the enduring problem of explosive ordnance disposal support for the nations of the South-West Pacific. The wreck discovered in a joint activity with the New Zealand Navy survey ship HMNZS Resolution and the Australian minehunter HMAS Gascoyne was located in Simpson Harbour. Unfortunately again it was not AE1.
The genesis of the Royal Australian Navy was marred by disunity, derision and disorganisation. Much emanated from the refusal of the RN to relinquish control of the fleet in the Southern Hemisphere and Australian governments which wanted their own navy but could not, or would not, take full responsibility for it. The Admiralty, through the senior RN officers sent to command within the RAN, demonstrated a marked reluctance to recruit and train Australian volunteers. By 1913 friction within the Australian Commonwealth Naval Board disrupted naval administration. And there were endemic problems within the larger Department of Defence. The administration of the newly created department was an immense undertaking. Military officers and public servants were quite unprepared for what was to follow. The recruitment, training and equipment of hundreds of thousands of personnel ran into innumerable difficulties. The endeavour was enormous and required time and patient execution, but there was no time before the nation was at war. By 1917 criticism of Department of Defence administration was so widespread that a Royal Commission was instigated. Abundant maladministration was found. Placing Australia’s armed forces under British command in the war to end all wars resulted in a profound diffusion of responsibilities, loyalties and strategic priorities.
The reports of both Rear Admiral Patey and Lieutenant Commander Warren were erroneous and even fabricated. Lieutenant Commander Besant would have undertaken a routine trim dive as he left Simpson Harbour, probably off Cape Gazelle. This could have been where Parramatta lost sight of the submarine and when AE1 lost sight of its escort destroyer. Without wireless further contact was impossible. The priority of Parramatta’s Captain was to find and keep the submarine captained by a senior officer in sight. It has been suggested that AE1 was unable to resurface and was lost off Cape Gazelle but a sighting off Duke of York Island at 2.30 or 2.45pm was mentioned not only by Warren but by two other Parramatta officers. No member of the destroyer crew disagreed with the 2.30–2.45pm time even as the mystery endured. Warren is the only individual, in his hand-written report, to mention an exchange of signals at 2.30pm and the time ‘3.20pm’ – later altered by Patey to read ‘3.30pm’. The last known sighting of AE1 was around 2.30pm, somewhere between Berard and Jacquinot Points – not the position commonly marked further south-east based solely on a time/position in Warren’s report and altered further by Rear Admiral Patey.
It is likely that Besant decided to investigate the sighting by Yarra of a German steamer the previous day in the vicinity of Duke of York Island. Patey’s emphatic summation was that the loss of AE1 was due to Besant undertaking a practice dive on the way back to Simpson Harbour. Patey was the only person to adopt such a single-minded approach, regardless of his very limited knowledge of submarines and Lieutenant Stoker’s opinion. Such a dive was totally unnecessary and dangerous. Besant was very familiar with his submarine’s defect and was a cautious and reliable Captain. He was also unlikely to disregard his Flag Officer’s command to be back by sunset.
The only reason AE1 would have dived would be to avoid or attack enemy craft. Patey advised the Admiralty that there were no enemy ships in the vicinity – this is incorrect. German steamers and launches, armed and unarmed, were hidden in inlets throughout the region. On 16 September ‘two German civilian vessels were found camouflaged in Mioko Harbour, probably in Mangrove Creek’.62 It is very likely that Besant and his crew entered Mioko Harbour to explore the inlets for German craft and it is feasible that one was sighted. The enemy may or may not have opened fire, but attempted to escape and rammed the submarine. With no deck gun AE1’s only defence was to dive. The submarine was at its most vulnerable and unstable as the casing became submerged. If the conning tower was hit as the submarine endeavoured to dive it could sink. If the pressure hull was rammed and cut the submarine could sink very quickly and roll before righting itself – numerous leaks making resurfacing impossible A flooded but largely intact hull would not result in a persistent oil slick. A ‘crash dive’ came with its own dangers given the starboard engine defect. Lack of propulsion would lead to lack of control and this could be exacerbated by jammed steering or steering unresponsiveness. If during the dive the boat damaged ballast tanks on one side of the pressure hull in a beam on grounding, a significant loss of buoyancy and stability would result. The submarine would come to rest on its damaged beam and the situation hopeless for those within.
No German craft may have been involved. AE1 may have run too close to reefs or rocks, unchartered or wrongly chartered, on the south-east or south-west side of Duke of York Island. In an early article John Foster suggested the possibility that AE1 steamed back to harbour and poor visibility and strong currents resulted in their being pushed onto outcrops near Credner Island.63 This same demise may have occurred within Mioko Harbour; or even whilst attempting to exit via the northern passage where HMAS Yarra was badly damaged the following day. The northern passage from Mioko Harbour and a course then hard to port was also a more direct route back to Rabaul, a course not scattered with islands and reefs – a safer, more direct, option. A gash to the stern and damage to the port shaft whilst crossing from shallow to deep water could also cause a rapid sinking. Was it an outcrop or a sunken submarine that Yarra traversed the next day which caused propellers to bend and twist? Whilst desperately ill John Foster continued to consider the fate of Australia’s first submarine and expressed the belief that AE1 is ‘at Mioko Reef having ruptured a saddle tank and flipped turtle. This explains the lack of survivors or flotsam’.64
The Commander of the Australian Fleet and the New Guinea campaign showed a callous disregard for the disappearance of 35 RAN and RN officers and sailors. The legacy of their deaths would blight families for generations. This lack of regard has continued for 100 years. Was AE1 the first military unit lost in action with the enemy? How this would alter the celebrated version of Australian military history. Given the meritorious reverence awarded Australians lost in all wars, particularly those killed in World War I, the question remains: What killed the crew of AE1? Where do they lie? And why has Australia neglected them and their descendants? On 14 September 2014 it will be 100 years! Surely now is the time for the Australian Government, in concert with private enterprise, to solve the Mystery of AE1 Australia’s lost Submarine and Crew and to offer closure to the families who continue to wait.
FOOTNOTES
1 MP472/1 16/14/8314, ‘Loss of Submarine AE1’, National Archives, Melbourne.
2 bid.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 HMAS Sydney, signal log 15 September 1914, courtesy Darren Brown.
9 Briggs, P. and Roach, T. ‘AE1 Search Report 2012 – 2013: Subsunk AE1 inc’, p. 26.
10 Stoker, J, Email.
11 Kinder, Diary.
12 MP472/1 16/14/8314, ‘Loss of Submarine AE1’.
13 Ibid.
14 SP551/1 Bundle 688, ‘HMAS Yarra Log for Period 1 September-31 October 1914, National Archives, Sydney.
15 AWM 33 18, ‘Admiral Patey’s report on the participation by the Australian Seagoing Fleet in the Operations (includes loss of submarine AE1 off Duke of York Islands)’, Australian War Memorial, Canberra.
16 Hamilton-Kenny, F. Letter and Diary 29 August–19 October, MLMSS930/Item1.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Marsland, Journal.
20 Hyslop, R. ‘Creswell, Sir William Rooke (1852-1933)’, Australian Dictionary of Biography, Vol. 8, (MUP), 1981.
21 Stevens, D. (ed.) The Royal Australian Navy, Oxford, opposite p. 32.
22 Briggs, P. and Roach, T. ‘AE1 Search Report 2012–2013, p. 5, p. 22 and p. 49.
23 Ibid.
24 Stoker, J. Email 30 January 2010.
25 Hamilton-Kenny, Letter and Diary.
26 Briggs and Roach, p. 49.
27 AWM35 19/3 HMAS Parramatta log, 1 Sep–31 Oct 1914, Australian War Memorial, Canberra.
28 Doyle, Diary.
29 Hill, C.J.P. Private Record, 1DRL/0350, Australian War Memorial, Canberra. Hill born Kent, England, 14 February, 1884, loaned to the RAN in 1913.
30 Briggs, and Roach, p. 36.
31 Doyle, Private Record.
32 Roskill, S.W. Naval Policy Between the Wars, Walker, 1968, p. 231.
33 Doyle, Private Record, 1 DRL/0350, Australian War Memorial.
34 AWM 33 18, ‘Admiral Patey’s report on the participation by the Australian Seagoing Fleet in the operations in the Pacific (includes loss of AE1 off the Duke of York Islands).
35 Hamilton-Kenny, Letter and Diary.
36 Ibid.
37 Doyle, Diary.
38 Darley, F.D.C. Private Record (Letters), 1 DRL/0232, Australian War Memorial, Canberra. Commander Darley was appointed to HMAS Australia when the flagship was first commissioned until after the war. At this time he returned to RN service and was killed at Wanshien, North China in 1926, whilst leading a naval party against Chinese pirates who had captured a British steamer.
39 McWilliam, Private Record.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 Hill, C.J.P. Diary, 1DRL/0350, Australian War Memorial, Canberra.
44 Ibid.
45 Hodgson, A.W.D. Private Record, 3DRL/6032, Australian War Memorial, Canberra.
46 There is a suggestion that a Lieutenant Emil Joseph Lauer was ordered by the German Governor Haber to lead 12 armed reservists from Madang to Rabaul in Kolonialgessellschaft. No diary or letters have been found verifying this and Lieutenant Lauer was killed in action on 25 September 1915 at the Battle of Ypres. In Briggs and Roach, p. 42.
47 Jose, pp.112–113.
48 Briggs and Roach, p. 61.
49 Ibid.
50 Jose, p. 94 and McWilliam and Hill, Diaries.
51 AWM 33 18.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 Hamilton-Kenny, Letter and Diary.
55 Brenchley, p.25
56 White, p. 66.
57 Downer, B. Submarine AE2 Crew List, 4 November 2011. Brenchley says Knaggs died of typhoid fever.
58 Downer, Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 Some of this information from Brenchley, 2001, p. 242.
61 www.ae1.org.au A very comprehensive search study and report was undertaken and released in September 2014: Briggs, and Roach, ‘AE1 Search Report 2012 – 2013: Subsunk AE1 inc’.
62 Foster, J. AE1 Entombed But Not Forgotten, Australian Military History Publications, 2006, p. 45.
63 Foster, J. ‘Tom Besant where are you?’ the mystery of HMA Submarine AE1, Defence Force Journal, no date, RAN Sea Power Centre, Canberra.
64 Foster, M. Email.