Memorandum on Status of Lighter-Than-Air (1959)
Code 00
SEP 11 1959
CONFIDENTIAL
From: |
CAPT Marion H. Eppes, USN, 74803/1310 |
To: |
Chief of Naval Operations |
Via: |
(1) Commander Fleet Airship Wing ONE |
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(2) Commander Fleet Air Wings, U.S. Atlantic Fleet |
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(3) Commander Naval Air Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet |
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(4) Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet |
Subj: |
ASW effectiveness of the Navy, status and use of lighter-than-air (LTA) aircraft for improvement; personal observations, comments and recommendations (U) |
Ref: |
(a) CNO msg 222123Z Aug 1959 |
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(b) CNO msg 021851Z Sep 1959 |
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(c) CNO spdltr ser 001502P33 of 24 Mar 1959 |
Encl: |
(1) CNO actions relating to LTA units of the Navy |
1. On the occasion of my being relieved as Commander Fleet Airship Wing ONE, I consider it appropriate to submit to the Chief of Naval Operations certain personal observations, comments, and recommendations on the status and use of lighter-than-air (LTA) aircraft in the Navy, with particular emphasis on their relation to ASW effectiveness. There is no flag or other overall command which is primarily concerned with airships. Therefore, as the most senior officer with recent fleet experience in LTA I feel it is my duty to present these views.
2. This letter is prompted by my concern over the cutback ordered by references (a) and (b) and other recent actions which indicate an apparent intention to fold up all LTA activities in the Navy. It is possible that these moves were made in accordance with a considered plan to that effect by the CNO. However, the existence of such a plan, being implemented at the present rate, is not known to me. If such is the case, this letter will serve as a progress report for the phase-out; if not, it will consolidate the record of many separate and apparently unrelated actions which indicate the trend mentioned above.
3. During a period of slightly more than three years, a number of actions relating to the LTA units of the Navy have been taken by the CNO. These are listed in enclosure (1). When completed, they will have eliminated 12 airship squadrons (3 ZP RONS, 8 NAR RONS, and 1 ZX RON) and will have reduced the airship operating strength of the Navy from 43 to 10.
a. Within these figures the fleet ASW forces will have been cut from four squadrons with 23 airships to one reduced squadron (ZP-3) with an allowance of four. The only other operational fleet LTA unit is the AEW squadron (ZW-1), also reduced by reference (b) from a long-planned allowance of six to four airships. The other two numbers will be R&D.
b. Operational flexibility of fleet units will have been severely restricted by successive elimination of Weeksville, Key West, Glynco, and South Weymouth for normal operations, confining all LTA activities to Lakehurst.
c. No provisions now exist for training of pilots or introduction of new blood into the organization.
4. Practically speaking, this has shrunk the Navy to a token participation in LTA activities. The “art” may be kept alive but it will be a precarious existence with no real foundation upon which a substantial wartime capability could be built. The numbers of airships remaining in each category is so small that operations which, with adequate numbers and reasonable access to bases would be routine, become “all-out” events without necessary reserves and alternates for flexibility.
a. The four ASW airships allowed are insufficient to perform the evaluation directed by reference (c) at the full-time rate originally intended. Further, there is no capability for significant participation in joint ASW exercises or for routine integration into the ASW team. Other commands become so used to operating without blimps that the rare occasions when they can be utilized represent unwelcome interruptions in an established training pattern rather than an opportunity for progress. Airship participation in fleet ASW operations under these circumstances could be expected only to raise questions as to the need for their existence on such a limited scale.
b. The contiguous radar coverage operations of ZW-1 are now indefinitely confined to the vicinity of Lakehurst and restricted to the partial coverage now provided. Coincidentally then, this raises the question of further usefulness of this JCS-directed service to CINCNORAD, since the latter, in an effort to relocate ZW-1 to a more advantageous area, has indicated that the present coverage is redundant to an extent.
c. The number of R&D airships is inadequate to effectively prosecute the urgent ASW and AEW projects currently assigned and programmed for accomplishment by these aircraft.
5. Economy has been given as the reason for this drastic reduction. While I am fully aware of the need for such overall measures, I believe that the LTA program, even at its post-Korea height, was of such inconsequential size in relation to the rest of the Navy that the elimination of the whole program would not have made a significant difference in other areas. Indeed, the agonizing step-by-step decrease to the current status has resulted in lower unit efficiency of operations for present airships. This fact, in itself, may well become the argument for final elimination.
6. Beyond the obvious effect of cuts in numbers of operating units and airships, the LTA program has suffered a shattering blow to the morale of its personnel. The officers and men assigned to LTA units are, by and large, as dedicated and sincere in the performance of their duties as those in other and better-known branches of naval aviation. There is an intense desire to deliver the excellent performance of which they believe their units and the airships are capable. The majority have had well-rounded naval aviation experience with backgrounds which include all types of aircraft units. While they are generally strong in their convictions that the airship could (and should) represent a valuable asset to the Navy, particularly in the ASW field, they are by no means monomaniacs on the subject. But they are intensely aware of and disturbed by the present trend.
7. Within the past six to eight months this trend has been marked by a confusing series of policy letters, directives, and changes thereto resulting in net cuts which, at the operating level, have appeared to be arbitrary. This impression has been fostered by the circumstances that (a) each of the actions listed in enclosure (1) has been taken hurriedly, without adherence to a previously published plan, and (b) the operating forces affected have not been given an opportunity for discussion, comment, or reclama prior to the fact, nor, in general, adequate time for orderly implementation after the fact. Not unnaturally, this has caused widespread confusion and insecurity, not to mention personal dislocations amounting to hardship in many cases. It is therefore increasingly difficult to attract and hold personnel of high caliber. Few ambitious officers or enlisted personnel are so dedicated to any “cause” that they can afford to jeopardize an entire career by sticking to one which appears to be so obviously moribund. On the other hand, no program can be on a really solid footing if it must depend, to an unhealthy extent, on drafting of personnel to fill its ranks. Such is now the case in LTA. This problem is further complicated by lack of a training program.
8. The demoralizing factor mentioned above is direct and predictable. However, there is another and more elusive aspect of the morale problem. The unaccountably low esteem held for blimps by many naval officers (reflected in the actions already discussed) has created an atmosphere wherein one who “goes to bat” for airships is often under some suspicion as to his intelligence or his basic loyalty to the Navy. Questions regarding one’s acumen may be shrugged off as perhaps being justified (since presumably no reasonable person would remain voluntarily associated with a dying program). However, doubts as to sincerity of motives are difficult to dismiss with equanimity. Such an atmosphere cannot fail to have its effect on morale at all levels in the organization.
9. This country has the only military airships in the world simply because the U.S. has the only adequate source of helium. The Navy has long had the unique responsibility for development and military use of the airship but this has not received general support nor has it been recognized as an opportunity. No responsible person will seriously contend that airships can (or should) compete with airplanes, helicopters, or surface ships within their own particular capabilities in ASW or AEW. However, there are many unsolved problems within these important fields wherein the unique capabilities of the airship can profitably supplement and enhance those of other types. These capabilities, largely unexploited, presently cannot be duplicated otherwise and if fully utilized can be of significant value to our ASW forces. The limitations, recognized and lived with by LTA personnel, are generally exaggerated or misunderstood by those who decline to use the airship for its positive assets. Moreover, these limitations, if examined objectively, will be found to be in different areas but of no more serious nature than those suffered by other types. Actually, this provides a fortunate overlap in capabilities that could well be exploited by the appropriate use of all types in solving the ASW problem.
10. The operations of ZW-1 during a period of more than two years have given indisputable proof of the value of the AEW airship. Yet the Navy has made no serious effort to use this capability for solving its own AEW problems. Current delivery of the ZPG-3W type, with its greatly improved radar and CIC installation, will enhance the value of the airship in both the contiguous coverage mission and the fleet AEW role.
11. It is a matter of record, but little-known and largely unrecognized, that the airship has played an important role in the R&D phases of many of our operational ASW equipments. These include, among others: airborne radar, MAD, aircraft sonar (both dipping and towed), exhaust trail detector (sniffer), JEZEBEL, and infra-red detector. The same characteristics which made the blimp so attractive a vehicle for prosecution of these projects should insure its continued usefulness in future R&D work. However, R&D projects aimed towards improvement of the vehicle itself have had such low priority and little support that virtually no changes have been made in airship design within the past 10 years.
12. At the moment, however, there is in progress a research project which has promise of providing a breakthrough in airship design which could be of great significance to the Navy. This is an investigation of boundary layer controls, being prosecuted under ONR contract by Dr. August Raspet, Mississippi State University, the results of which have already indicated the practicability of a relatively simple “wake recovery” system that could dramatically increase speed, range, and maneuverability of an airship. This project offers the potential of a marked increase in the Navy’s ASW capability at a very cheap price. My purpose in mentioning it in connection with the current situation is to recommend most urgently and earnestly that this development be given the fullest R&D support, even if other phases of the program should suffer thereby.
13. This letter is not intended to be all-inclusive. It will, however, serve to point up some of the problems now being faced by those who are charged with responsibility for the LTA program. The most pressing of these are:
a. To determine if there is indeed such a program and if it will remain firm enough for timely planning.
b. A very real danger that the currently planned small number of airships operating from a single base is but a short step towards final folding of all LTA activities. Without sufficient reserves and alternates for flexibility, training for new blood, or a vigorous R&D program for improvement of the vehicle, death by atrophy appears almost inevitable.
c. A concern that the Navy is about to voluntarily surrender, in the airship, an undeveloped potential both in ASW and AEW which is uniquely American and solely that of the U.S. Navy.
d. The effective administration of a small portion of the Navy which has been severely demoralized by the actions and uncertainties already discussed.
14. In conclusion, the following recommendations are submitted:
a. That ZP-3 be given full material and personnel support to perform the evaluation as directed by reference (c).
b. That ZW-1 be moved from Lakehurst to a location dictated by the operational requirements of CINCNORAD and that present part-time coverage become full-time, with the addition of previously programmed airships and personnel.
c. That the CNO convene a board which could completely and objectively examine the worth and future of LTA in the Navy, with emphasis on ASW and AEW but with a full examination of other fields. Its recommendations could form the basis for a definitive CNO policy on the subject.
d. That R&D efforts in the LTA field be given full support, with specific attention given to the “wake recovery system” discussed in paragraph 12 above, prior to making any decision which would involve further reduction of the LTA program.
e. That appropriate information concerning these decisions be given timely distribution so that adequate planning may be accomplished.
M. H. EPPES