INTRODUCTION

The Strategic Situation, July 3, 1944

General Dietrich von Choltitz, described the Battle of the Hedgerows as “a monstrous blood-mill, the likes of which I have not seen in my eleven years of battle.” This three-week campaign in July 1944 was a series of relentless small-scale skirmishes in the countryside north east of St Lô. For the US Army, the objective was to push out of the constricted coastal low-lands south of Omaha Beach to reach terrain better suited for a mechanized break-out. Aside from the immediate terrain objectives, the campaign was also intended to decimate the Wehrmacht in Lower Normandy to ensure the success of the eventual break-out. From the German perspective, the mission was to bottle up the US Army in the hedgerow country around the Vire River since the terrain was far more suitable for defense than the countryside further south. By the third week of July, the First US Army had reached far enough south to stage the break-through, and the German 7. Armee had suffered such exceptional losses that it was on the verge of being routed. On July 25, 1944, the First US Army initiated Operation Cobra, starting the break-out that destroyed the German Army in Normandy.

The Battle of the Hedgerows was fought in the bocage country of the western region of Lower Normandy. The hedgerows formed a natural fortification network that facilitated the German defense.

THE STRATEGIC SITUATION

At the beginning of July 1944, the Allied lodgment area was far smaller than anticipated in the original Overlord plans. Three weeks after D-Day, Gen. Omar Bradley’s First US Army had captured the port of Cherbourg, its initial tactical objective (for more information see Steven Zaloga, Cherbourg 1944: The First Allied Victory in Normandy, Osprey Campaign 278 (2015). In the British Second Army sector, the vital road junction of Caen had not yet been secured. This was in no small measure due to the balance of opposing forces in Lower Normandy.

The British Second Army had a tough slog in the open country south of Caen due to the density of German defenses. Repeated tank attacks failed to breakthrough to the Seine River as originally planned. This is a pair of Canadian Sherman Fireflies of the Sherbrooke Fusilier Regiment knocked out in the fighting with the 12. SS-Panzer-Division “Hitlerjugend” on June 7, 1944.

From the German perspective, the British Second Army posed the greatest threat of a break-out from Normandy. The terrain beyond Caen was much more favorable for a mechanized advance to the Seine River and on to Paris. The terrain southeast of Caen was open farmland, well suited to tank operations. This was reflected in the Allied order of battle, with a preponderance of Allied tank strength in the British sector.

The British difficulties in breaking the German cordon was due in large measure to the density of opposing forces. By the middle of June, the British Second Army around Caen was facing four German Panzer divisions, with a combined strength of more than 675 German tanks and AFVs on a front only 20 miles wide. By way of comparison, the Wehrmacht’s Herresgruppe Mitte (Army Group Center) , the target of the Red Army’s Operation Bagration offensive in late June 1944, had about 500 tanks and AFVs on a sector about 250 miles wide. In other words, Montgomery’s forces were facing an opponent with an armored density about 15 times greater than the key summer battle fought by the Red Army. Even Herresgruppe Nordukraine, the most heavily defended sector of the Russian Front in June 1944, had a German armor density that was less than six times as dense as the German Panzer force facing the British in late June 1944.

The British and Canadian attacks near Caen were frustrated by the opposition of concentrated Panzer forces as well as extensive anti-tank defenses. This is a 75mm PaK 40 anti-tank gun of the 12. SS-Panzer-Division “Hitlerjugend” south of Caen in June 1944.

The First US Army sector was further west than the British Second Army, and so more remote from the Seine River and Paris. Furthermore, the terrain was not well suited to mechanized operations. The terrain at the base of the Cotentin peninsula was tightly compartmentalized by bocage, the French term for coastal hedgerows. This situation was exacerbated by the sodden marshlands feeding into the Vire River estuary and numerous other rivers in the area. These marshlands were swollen by late June rain and some of the areas had been dammed and flooded by the German army to repel Allied airborne landings. The conditions in the bocage country were well known to the Heeresgruppe B commander, GFM Erwin Rommel, who had fought in the area during the 1940 Battle of France. The Germans recognized the defensive advantages of the bocage country, and so concentrated their limited forces, especially their premier Panzer divisions, in the British sector. The fighting in the bocage country was conducted primarily by infantry forces on both sides.