THE AFTERMATH

The Battle of the Hedgerows involved no dramatic advances or decisive maneuvers. It was a grinding battle of attrition. A US Army study of the hedgerow fighting concluded that “The real heroes of this fighting were the soldiers, the platoon leaders and the company commanders. They met the enemy, they made the decisions which won and lost the host of little battles which added up to the Battle of the Hedgerows. Superficially resembling position warfare, and at least as bloody, actually this mode of fighting was a war of movement. Seldom has the outcome of battle rested more completely on individual valor and the initative of the small unit commander.”

US casualties in the Battle of the Hedgerows were unexpectedly high, about 40,000 men including about 7,200 killed and 30,000 wounded. A US Army survey of several infantry divisions between June 6 and July 31, 1944 found that rifle companies on average suffered casualties of 60 percent of their enlisted men and 68 percent of their officers. Bradley later remarked that “we had estimated that the infantry would incur 70 percent of the losses of combat forces. By August we had boosted that figure to 83 percent on the basis of our experience in the Normandy hedgerows.” For example, in 15 days of fighting around St Lô, the 30th Division sustained 3,934 battle casualties, a loss rate of 25 percent for the unit as a whole but 90 percent of its rifle platoon strength.

From the perspective of its original plans, the First US Army’s three-week “Battle of the Hedgerows” failed to reach its geographic objectives. Although Bradley had originally anticipated a relatively quick push on the right flank by VIII and VII Corps, the tenacious German defense and the difficulties of operating in the marshes and bocage slowed the pace of the assault. Yet the failure to reach specific geographic objectives was largely irrelevant as the requirements had been met for the impending Operation Cobra break-out. The First US Army had reached adequate starting points out of the worst areas of swamp and hedgerow.

By far the most essential consequence of the Battle of the Hedgerows was the fatal impact it had on 7. Armee as would become evident after the launch of Operation Cobra on Tuesday, July 25. Detailed casualty figures for the 7. Armee in the Battle of the Hedgerows are lacking. Its combat effective strength fell from a peak of about 46,000 to about 26,000 by the third week of July. Total German casualties in France up to the start of Operation Cobra on July 25 were 116,863 men including 10 generals and 158 senior commanders. Since OB West casualties in France up to the end of June 1944 were 35,454, this suggests that casualties in the first three weeks of July in both the American and British sectors were 81,409. OB West had received only 27,125 replacements of which only 10,078 had actually reached the front, leading to impossible shortages of troops in many combat units.

The Battle of the Hedgerows crippled nearly all of the infantry divisions in 84. Korps. With the exception of the newly arrived 275. Infanterie-Division, all were rated by Choltitz’s 84. Korps headquarters as having a combat value of only 3 (suitable for defense), 4 (limited suitability for defense) or less. Even the elite Panzer formations in the corps were exhausted. Operation Cobra was focused against the Panzer-Lehr-Division which was rated at a combat value of “3.” Of its available six Panzergrenadier battalions, three were rated as weak, two as exhausted and one was merely a cadre of the field replacement battalion. The division’s combat strength was only about 2,210 troops plus another 1,000 from attached units such as Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 14. Tank strength was equally meager with only 12 PzKpfw IV and 16 Panther tanks still operational. The neighboring 17. SS-Panzergrenadier-Division was assessed by 84. Korps as having a combat strength of only “4,” with only 1,400 combat effectives. Of its eight Panzergrenadier battalions, two were rated as weak, five as exhausted, and one was a cadre of the field replacement battalion. Heavy losses in its vehicle force left it with barely 30 percent of its mobility and it had only ten of its original 42 StuG IV assault guns operational. The 2. SS-Panzer-Division was the only division in 84. Korps to receive a rating of “1,” but it was too far away from the Operation Cobra penetration zone to affect the course of the ensuing battle.

The Wehrmacht’s failure to reconstitute its forces in lower Normandy had a variety of causes. From the strategic perspective, the Allies’ Operation Fortitude deception plan continued to have crippling tactical consequences. The specter of a second Allied amphibious operation by Patton’s phantom First Army Group continued to haunt German planners. The 7. Armee was unable to move many of its divisions from Brittany to Normandy due to lingering fears that a second Allied amphibious landing might occur there. Likewise, on the eastern flank, anxiety over a possible Allied landing on the Pas-de-Calais kept the 15. Armee largely in place on the North Sea coast. These anxieties did not disappear until August, after the start of Operation Cobra, when Patton’s Third US Army suddenly appeared in the race for Brittany. By then it was too late.

A young assistant squad leader from the 12th Infantry, 4th Division, Sgt. Wyman P. Williams, takes a break near Villedieu following the hedgerow campaign. The 4th Division had landed at Utah Beach on D-Day, and served in both the Cherbourg and hedgerow campaigns, leading to heavy casualties in its rifle companies by the end of July 1944. Williams was killed in action after this photograph was taken.

To make matters worse, the Battle of the Hedgerows forced Hausser into a slap-dash defensive scheme that made 7. Armee ripe for breakthrough. Kluge was unhappy that Hausser was keeping two infantry divisions, the 265. Infanterie-Division and 353. Infanterie-Division, as his reserves instead of the Panzer and Panzergrenadier divisions. In the event of a breakthrough, the infantry divisions would not have the mobility to respond. Hausser had been forced into this deployment since the continual American attacks had prevented withdrawing the Panzer units into the reserves on several occasions. Nevertheless, Hausser failed to rectify the situation during the interlude between the fall of St Lô on July 18 and the start of Operation Cobra on July 24a25. In the event, Kluge was so focused on the British threat that he did not pressure Hausser to make essential changes in the American sector. This fatal disposition became evident during the Operation Cobra breakthrough.

To further distract Kluge from the St Lô problems, the British Second Army launched yet another offensive, Operation Goodwood, on July 18, 1944, the same day as the capture of St Lô. Under such circumstances, Kluge’s headquarters as well as the high command in Berlin remained focused on the Caen sector and not on the St Lô one. The German high command’s focus was further diverted on Thursday, July 20, when a group of German Army officers centered in the Replacement Army (Ersatzheer) attempted to assassinate Hitler at his East Prussia headquarters. Although Kluge was not directly involved in the bomb plot he was aware of the scheme. A witch hunt soon began in Berlin to round up anyone with suspected involvement and both Kluge and Rommel would eventually become caught up.

Kluge tried to convince Hitler of the gravity of the situation in Normandy, but to no avail. On July 23, Hitler received a message from Kluge that concluded “the moment is approaching when despite all efforts, the hard-pressed front will break. In view of the inadequate mobility of our forces, when the enemy has erupted into open terrain, orderly and effective conduct of the battle will become impossible.”

Hitler was still suffering the effects of the July 20 bomb blast, but he would have been unlikely to accept Kluge’s advice any way. Hitler’s tactical response to the Allied advances was inevitably another counter-offensive. As often as not, these served to further undermine the German defenses. Hitler continually gravitated towards a large offensive by Panzergruppe West against the British as the only action likely to push the Allies back into the sea. A basic plan had been outlined by Rommel on July 15 involving seven Panzer divisions, and Hitler issued instructions for a surprise Panzergruppe West night attack to take place on August 1. Although this attack never took place, it undermined the chances for reinforcements of the beleaguered St Lô front.

In order to conduct the August 1 attack, it was necessary to substitute infantry divisions for Panzer divisions in the Panzergruppe West sector, draining the Heeresgruppe B reserve and tying down the few available infantry divisions that might have been used to reinforce the St Lô sector. It also required the diversion of 149 PzKpfw IV Ausf. Hs, 76 Panthers, 19 Tigers, and 15 StuG IIIs to bring these units up to strength prior to the attack, essentially sucking away all the replacements for other sectors of the Normandy front.

Reserving the Panzer Divisions
Division	Relief date	Substitute Division
9. SS-Panzer-Division	July 10	277. Infanterie-Division
1. SS-Panzer-Division	Night, July 13–14	272. Infanterie-Division
12. SS-Panzer-Division	Night, July 13–14	272. Infanterie-Division
10. SS-Panzer-Division	July 17	271. Infanterie-Division
Panzer-Lehr-Division	July 18	5. Fallschirmjäger-Division
2. Panzer-Division	July 22	326. Infanterie-Division

In the event, Operation Cobra pre-empted the August 1 Panzer offensive. Instead, these Panzer forces were used to conduct Operation Lüttich later in August. This was Hitler’s scheme to crush Operation Cobra by a Panzer offensive to the sea at Avranches, thereby cutting off the American spearheads. This attack was crushed in the battle of Mortain between August 7 and 13 by the 30th Division. The Caen sector was so weakened by the diversion of the Panzer force that the British 21st Army Group was finally able to break through and begin its drive on Falaise. It was another critical step in the destruction of the Wehrmacht in Normandy.