Schneider’s HQ group got to the top, as did other rangers to the left and right. What they could see was an open field and a maze of hedgerows. Germans with machine guns were firing from behind the bushes.

Private Weast was furious. He wanted to know, “Where the hell was this Air Force bombardment that was supposed to blow all this stuff out of there. Hell, I didn’t see a bomb crater nowhere! Nowhere did I see a bomb crater.”31

THE ARMY’S OFFICIAL history states, “The penetrations of the beach defenses made between 0800–0900 represented a definite success achieved by determined action in the face of great difficulties.”32

The penetrations had been made by about 600 men, mainly from C Company, 116th, and the rangers. They had penetrated and made it to the top—but they had no radios, no heavy weapons, no tanks, no supporting artillery, no way to communicate with the Navy. All the exits were still blocked; the beach was still jammed with vehicles that could not move, taking heavy artillery fire. The reserve regiments were not coming ashore.

The 116th and the rangers were still on their own. They were mixed together. Moving toward the Germans in the hedgerows, encountering fire, moving to outflank the positions, the ad hoc assault groups tended to split up, resulting in progressive loss of control as movement proceeded inland. When Colonel Canham reached the top, shortly after 0900, and set up his CP, he found rangers and 116th elements scattered all through the field ahead, some headed for the coastal road to Vierville, some engaged in firefights with Germans in the bushes.

The situation was by no means under control. A victory had not yet been won. But there was now a sizable American force on top of the bluff. The battle for Omaha Beach had not gone according to plan, but thanks to men like General Cota, Colonels Schneider and Canham, Captains Raaen and Dawson, and innumerable lieutenants and noncoms, disaster had been averted.


I. Metcalfe commanded the 1st Battalion, 116th Infantry. “I first saw him in Vierville, late on D-Day,” Capt. John Raaen commented. “I was extremely impressed with his manner, his attitude, his knowledge. He was KIA shortly after D-Day.” (Maj. Gen. John Raaen to author, March 12, 1993.)

II. Dawson stayed in the Army. He headed a Special Forces unit in Vietnam, where he made 125 night combat jumps. He retired as a colonel.

III. Most of the men who got to the top that morning tended to move straight inland to their assembly point at Vierville. Had more of them done as Dawson did, the 1st and 29th divisions and supporting units would have gotten off the beach much sooner.