But what looked like catastrophe, wasn’t. Although the situation was far from being well in hand, it was improving, especially at E-1. Thanks to Spaulding and Dawson, the fortification on the east side of the draw had been neutralized; the fortification on the west side was still in action but was being contained by Company M, 116th Regiment. Dozers had made a gap through the dune line just east of the draw and were making it ready for vehicles to pass through.
Best of all, a penetration had been made almost exactly between E-1 and E-3 by companies E, I, and G of the 16th Regiment and Colleville was under attack. To the right, five companies from the 116th had gone up the bluff between D-3 and E-1, while to the left of E-3 patrols from three companies of the 16th had done the same.
At 1309, Gerow was able to make his first favorable report to Bradley: “Troops formerly pinned down on beaches Easy Red, Easy Green, Fox Red advancing up heights behind beaches.”30
“The situation everywhere on the beach was still grave,” Bradley later wrote, “but our troops . . . were inching inland. . . . I gave up any thought of abandoning Omaha Beach.”31
Maj. Gen. Charles Gerhardt, CO of the 29th Division, later wrote a report entitled “Battle Lessons and Conclusions” on D-Day. He summarized the lessons learned in two sentences: “No reports of disaster should be allowed. THEY ARE NEVER TRUE.”32
I. General Smith, in a 1993 letter to the author, recalls, “Today, the site would be very near the Rotunda of our Normandy memorial.” Captain Dawson, also in a 1993 letter, remarks: “I am proud and indeed honored that the esplanade dividing the monument from the reflecting pool and graves is centered at the exact spot where we made the opening from the beach.”
II. Dawson’s route to the top was approximately the same as the paved path that today leads from the beach to the lookout with the bronze panorama of Omaha Beach on the edge of the American cemetery. His oral history and a written memoir are in EC.