Sir Bertrand Russell in a Snapshot

In this chapter we do not intend to look at Russell in the light of his vast works. On the contrary, what is of significance here it is Russell in the light of Allama Jafari’s approach. This is another way of conceptualizing the problem which is different from the primary case, where the researcher should attempt to reconstruct the Russellian project in accordance to the available texts. However, it is evident that each has its own advantages and disadvantages but in this study the objective is to reconstruct the possibilities of dialogue which could have occurred if the clouds of particular mentalité and specific rationalité are realized in a fundamental fashion. In a snapshot we are unable to get all the pictures but this approach shall give us the chance to have a rounded view of Allama Jafari on Sir Bertrand Russell. Of course, it is not claimed that this is the only possible fashion to conceptualize the Russellian project within the parameters of the Jafarian frame of reference but this is the first attempt of this kind on the global stage where specifically Russell has been studied through the vista of Allama Jafari based on my reading during these past decades. How does Allama Jafari evaluate Russell in general? In his view,

To put it otherwise, Allama Jafari thinks the Russellian project is consisted of great many potentials but this does not qualify it to be taken at face value as his approach to metaphysics is extremely naïve and reminiscent of fundamentalist provocateurs’ discourses of the Enlightenment Tradition in 18^th century. Of course, this is not to deny Allama Jafari’s high estimation of Russell as far as his critical approach towards “modern superstitions” is concerned but again this is not tantamount to appreciation of Russell’s view on “primordial doxa” which is often biased and ideological.^[1] To put it differently,

The question of “existential maturity” is a recurring theme in Iranian philosophical traditions which is, except in certain discourses of existentialism and pragmatism, absent in modern philosophical discourses, in general, and analytical philosophy, in particular.^[2] In Allama Jafari’s view, a philosophical system should enable us to encounter life in its totality and provide us with a roadmap towards maturity in the tumultuous context of leben. In his view, Russell deconstructs the false constructions and even destructs the fictitious myths but does not bridge between the realms of “isness” and “ought-to” or “fact” and “value.”^[3]

In other words, the normative dimensions of life are as important as the descriptive aspects which, in Allama Jafari’s view, are absent in the Russellian frame of reference. I think, this critique would be incomprehensible if we do not decode the Jafarian lingual frame of reference. By lingual, I do not merely refer to the grammatical dimensions of his philosophical system which is expressed in Persian. On the contrary, I have in mind the “logical aspect” which is intertwined with the metaphysical elements of “Logos.” In this fashion, then when one mentions the word “language” the ontic frame of reasoning is meant which in the Jafarian frame of reference is connected to an essential reading of existence. This is surely different from the Russellian approach to existence which is pitched upon a phenomenal (not phenomenological) conceptualization of leben. To put it otherwise, when Allama Jafari argues that Russell has not addressed important questions such as “what is being?” or “what is life?” he is, as a matter of fact, asking about the absence of essential dimensions in the Russellian philosophy. Of course, it should be stated that in the Russellian worldview, there is no room for “essences” as they are not analytically accessible to human reason and hence “imaginary,” i.e. unreal. But this view is not shared by Allama Jafari who considers an essential interpretation of reality as realistic. Otherwise, the quest for quiddity of being or essence of life would be inconceivable. In addition, the Jafarian critique leveled against Russell would turn unsubstantiated without recourse to the essential reading of leben.^[4]

Methodic Doubt

Within the historiography of modern philosophy it is argued that the birth of modernity is indebted to the emergence of Cartesian method which is built upon “methodic doubt.” This is a necessarily constructive approach in the realm of epistemology. However when this methodic doubt is taken out of its epistemological context and wrongly incorporated within ontological domains then we are faced with a trouble that has afflicted philosophy as an inquiring approach to the entire gamut of reality. It should be noted that in James’ view, there is an epistemological distinction between “trouble” and “problem.” Lexically speaking, both words mean similar but epistemologically there is an enormous difference between a trouble and a problem. A trouble has not been problematized and therefore there is no chance to find an answer for it. On the contrary, a problem is a dilemma that has turned into a question which compels us to seek an answer for it. A trouble could injure human soul without leading to any meaningful sense while a problem may agonize and at the same time open new horizons before one’s eyes. If this distinction is valid then one can discern a methodical difference between Allama Jafari and Sir Bertrand Russell in regard to centrality of locus methodos. Of course, both of these philosophers agree upon the centrality of doubt in methodically appraising intellectual questions but they differ on how to interpret its position in relation to the totality of life both individually and collectively.

Incommensurability Revisited

Common sense is defined by Merriam-Webster as, sound and prudent judgment based on a simple perception of the situation or facts. Consequently, “common sense” equates to the knowledge and experience which most people already have, or which the person using the term believes that they do or should have. The Cambridge Dictionary defines it as, the basic level of practical knowledge and judgment that we all need to help us live in a reasonable and safe way. Whichever definition is employed, identifying particular items of knowledge as “common sense” is complex. Philosophers may prefer to stay away from using the expression when using exact language. Nevertheless common sense remains a constant theme in epistemology and many philosophers make wide use of the concept or at any rate refer to it. Some related concepts consist of intuitions, pre-theoretic belief, ordinary language, the frame problem, foundational beliefs, good sense, endoxa, axioms, wisdom, folk wisdom, folklore and public opinion. Within the British tradition, the concept of “commonsense” occupies a very pivotal place which has not been debated by Allama Jafari as a separate but interrelated issue in regard to the philosophical system of Russell. This created certainly misunderstanding which needs to be taken into consideration when assessing the accuracy of Allama Jafari’s critique of Sir Bertrand Russell. However, Allama Jafari discerns that within the Russellian paradigm the commonsensical approach is of immense importance. However he tends to believe that Sir Bertrand Russell refuses to follow the logical consequences of his own position. In other words, Allama Jafari states that

Seeing this contradiction one wonders if here we are not faced with an incommensurable situation where Allama Jafari seems to address an issue which may only linguistically be similar to what Sir Bertrand Russell discussed. To put it otherwise, I am not sure if the concepts of commonsense and self-evident as well as primordiality are synonymous. Allama Jafari has translated the concept of “commonsense” into Persian as “Primordial Beliefs.” We know that the concept of “Primordiality” or “Fitra” has a specific connotation in Iranian philosophy which is not similar to the concept of commonsense as employed by philosophers in the British tradition of philosophy.^[5] In addition, to equate “Primordial Beliefs” with the concept of “self-evident beliefs” is a matter of discussion as they are not of similar category. These kinds of problems have not been researched thoroughly either in Iran or in England as the debates between Allama Jafari and Russell have gone terribly unnoticed and disregarded.

Philosophy: What’s in a Name?

What is the objective of philosophical inquiry? Is there any inherent quality within the philosophical quest? It seems on this question Russell and Jafari disagree as the former does not attach any intrinsic value while the latter ascribes a central role for philosophy as an inquiring mode of conceptualizing reality in an intellectual fashion. Within the academic occidental traditions one can discern a “post-philosophical mode” which denies any essential importance for the philosophical analysis as any attachment to essence is dismissed due to the probable political danger which could occur by a converging of “truth” and “authority.” In other words, we are in “in the age of interpretation” where philosophy should stop asking bad questions such as “what really exists?,” “what are the scope and limits of human knowledge?” or “how does language hook up with reality?” and instead philosophers must focus on questions regarding how we can best practice solidarity, charity, and love (Rorty, 2005. 29). The shift from metaphysical reasoning towards sociological interpretation is a move from “knowledge” to “opinion” as in the “Age of Interpretation” neither science, nor philosophy, nor religion enjoys epistemological or ontological authority over the other. The resulting “Gadamerian culture of dialogue,” which understands that “all positions are equally valid because of the lack of confidence in truth constitutes,” says Zabala, “the greatest success obtained by the deconstruction of metaphysics” (Zabala, 2005. 11).

In this fashion of post-metaphysical reflection, “postmodern man, no longer needful of the extreme, magical reassurance supplied by the idea of God, accepts the probability that history is not on his side at all and that there is no power capable of guaranteeing him the happiness he seeks” (2005. 11). Living without metaphysical foundations means affirming our ontological historicity, epistemological insecurity, and existential finitude. Rather than “search for truth,” says Zabala, we now “seek solidarity, charity, and irony” (225. 17-18). These arguments which are based on antifoundationalism and post-metaphysical hermeneutics tend to be tone-deaf to many existential problems which exist outside the walls of academia. In other words, the post-philosophical philosophies may enrich our appreciation for postmodernism’s atonal rhythms and melodies but remain by and large “tone-deaf” when it comes to the essential matters which make up the spirit of human existence.

To put it differently, what Darwin described as the gradual illumination of men’s minds by advance in science came slowly but surely to reach in Russell into maturity which has come to be known today as “post-metaphysical vista” and shared by great many occidental academics as the mainstream narrative. However, this is not the trend within the eastern context where philosophy has gained momentum due to its incessant dialogs with science, religion, mysticism, politics, poetry, and literature.

To put it otherwise, Allama Jafari differs from Russell on the need for philosophy for the future of humanity as it seems they are working through two different concepts of philosophical paradigms which need to be more inquired about rather than taken for granted. Of course, both use the term “philosophy” but this concept has a different connotation in the Iranian context which should not be tantamount to the contemporary British paradigms that are deeply indebted to the tradition of Empiricism. Allama Jafari seems to assign an essential mission (Jafari, 1966. 114-116) for the philosophical inquiry which is in tune with the contemporary state of philosophical sensibility in Iran while the western context seems moving towards the Russellian direction where philosophy has lost its centrality due to the progress of scientific ethos, on the one hand, and the decline of metaphysical engagement, on the other hand. If I would coin a term for the Jafarian philosophical project, I would rather term it as the “Hikmatic Paradigm” where the realms of “leben” and “cogito” are not separated but interwoven into an integral whole. This approach to the question of human condition differs diametrically from the paradigms of “technologies of the self” which are indebted to the Foucaultian readings of la condition humaine (Martin, 1988. 16-49).

Religion and Philosophical Problematiques

Russell argues that there are three pivotal problematiques which are related to the question of religion, i.e. God, Eternity of the Soul and Free Will. Allama Jafari agrees with Russell that talking about religion without taking into consideration these three issues would be impossible. However, Allama Jafari adds that the last problem is not an inalienable aspect of preliminary religious teaching as the other two questions of God and the Eternity of the Soul. Because many of philosophers either in the Christian or Islamic context or even other religious traditions have expressed views and crafted statements which are either an open denial of the free will or it could be interpreted as a refutation of the free will (e.g. Asharites)^[6] (Jafari, 1966. 120).

In a passage along the dialogue which was conducted by Wyatt, Russell refers to his intellectual preoccupations on religion and religious issues by stating that these issues were significant for him while he was a young man but now they have lost their appeals on him. It is at this juncture that Allama Jafari differs from Russell as the former has a foundationalist approach to philosophy which is not shared by antifoundationalist approach of Russell—that is deeply widespread among professional philosophers in the post-metaphysical age of postmodernity. Allama Jafari argues that how could one justify life without these fundamental questions of existential significance? In other words,

To put it otherwise, either we should deny the free will and the sense of responsibility or as a consequence concede that the assumption of each would presuppose the possibility of the afterlife. Although Sir Russell does not believe in the crucial role of free will in the makeup of the human life but it is impossible to ignore the sense of responsibility which is evident in each one of us. If there is no afterlife then how could one explain this profound sense of responsibility which is incongruent with a secular^[7] interpretation of leben? In addition, if there is no room for free will then on what grounds should we be fond of duty? In other words, how could one enjoy the burden of responsibility based on unmechanical factors? Said differently, what does it mean to be an honorable human being in the absence of free will? Because the absence of freedom means that we, as human persons, act not voluntarily but involuntarily (Jafari, 1966. 125).

Allama Jafari was not satisfied by the answers given by Russell on the question of free will that he found in the Russell-Wyatt book so he decided to write directly to Sir Russell on 18^th of August 1963. Interestingly enough Russell answered this letter on 23^rd of August 1963. Allama Jafari argues (1966. 128) that it seems that Russell abandoned the arguments for free will but could not embrace the arguments of those who are for determinism either. In other words, “Russell does not prefer the views of either group on questions of freedom, free will and determinism” (Jafari, 1966. 130).

Allama Jafari argues that Russell has not worked out the question of free will in a systematic philosophical fashion as this question should be treated on three levels. He explains that when we look at the structures of human actions we can distinguish between five different kinds of acts:

Reactive Phenomenon: Blushing of the face when one is embarrassed could be categorized as a reactive movement which is beyond the control of the self. This kind of move follows the mechanical rules.

Necessary Acts: Although the acts here are based on free will but due to the external reasons which condition the very background of one’s voluntary act then these kinds of act could not be considered purely as a voluntary act.

Purely Compulsory Acts: When you are forced to do something without being able to demonstrate your own will then this is an example of purely compulsory act. Imagine someone coerces you to go to a journey against your own will. In this kind of act, in contrast to the necessary act, there is a huge psychological difference as in this case there is not a trace of any internal sense of free will while in the previous case the external conditions were absent.

Ordinary Acts: When a worker carries out his monotonous duty without exercising his free will on every part of his acts, this is an example of ordinary acts. In other words, when he is digging a hole he does not take into consideration if that is based on free will or out of necessity. Each part of this type of act is not borne out of an independent will.

Voluntarily Acts: Conscientiously it is undeniable that among many types of act carried out by human beings there are certain kinds of actions which are done voluntarily and by some means we feel that these kinds of actions differ from other types of acts.

Russell and Religion

Russell states that the impact of religion in most of cases has been destructive for humanity. He believes that the results of actions within the frame of religion in the course of human history have repeatedly been detrimental. In principle, religion has brought great many harms and inflicted deep-rooted pains upon humanity (Jafari, 1966. 152). Why is religion harmful for humanity? One of the main reasons for such harm is the insistence within religions which encourage their respective followers to have faith in certain things without looking for the logic behind or even asking for reasons. Religions are against free- thinking and most of religious establishments proscribe educational systems. Another factor within religions is the question of sacredness which discourages the followers to question received traditions and encourages hatred as well as extremism (Jafari, 1966. 171). These are aspects of Russell’s views on religion as conceptualized by Allama Jafari.

What are the factors behind the inclination of humanity towards religion? Russell provides a very complex theory for the origin and sustenance of religion but in a nutshell one could epitomize Russellian theory as the “theory of dread”^[8] (Jafari, 1966. 189). Allama Jafari refutes the Russellian approach to religion by arguing that

Allama Jafari discerns inconsistencies within Russellian episteme as far as religion is concerned. He states that Russell in A History of Western Philosophy and Its Connection with Political and Social Circumstances from the Earliest Times to the Present Day (1945) holds that humanity cannot be satisfied solely with exact sciences but is in need of thrill, ecstasy, joy, elation, art and religion. Without these wonderful aspects boredom could annihilate humanity altogether (Jafari, 1966. 192). In other words, it is not fear alone that drives humanity towards religion but one could assume other factors which belie the Russellian theory of religion laid bare in the Russell-Wyatt Dialog.

At times it seems that Sir Russell inclines towards an innate interpretation of religion. In other words, in answering the question why human being is in need of religion Russell resorts to inner drive of humanity in looking for an intelligent being that is supreme. When Wyatt asks Russell about the underlying reasons for human search for a “Being” without her/himself Russell’s answer is interestingly telling. Because he does not deny the very fundamental sense within the heart of human person but it disputes its application on “God” by stating that there are other entities which are larger than the individual being such as “Family,” “Nation,” and “Humanity” at large. In his view, these are sufficient to satisfy the sense of benevolence which lies in the heart of human being (Jafari, 1966. 192).

Here Allama Jafari intervenes by arguing that this answer demonstrates clearly that the need (for a Higher Being) which human person senses within her/his heart is not due to fear or powerlessness. On the contrary, the origin of this feeling is a consequence of an “autonomous modality” (Jafari, 1966. 193). In other words, Allama Jafari discerns an inconsistency in Russell’s approach towards the cause of religion . On the one hand, Russell refers the cause to either fear or powerlessness and on the other hand, he concedes that human person is in need of a larger entity which could encompass the individual being (e.g. family, nation and humanity). The question which is asked by Allama Jafari is if the need is there why or on what basis does Russell confine its application to these three entities? Why can’t we think of other larger entities such as God in soothing the pain of this yearning which lies within the heart of human individual?

To put it otherwise, one could argue that Sir Russell may not have intended to conceptualize the cause of religion as “fear” or “powerlessness” on general grounds. On the contrary, it could be that Russell is of the opinion that fear and powerlessness are applicable to “average individuals” as the raison d’être of religion is not ascribable to either of these aforementioned aspects (Allama Jafari, 1966. 193). Here one could see that Allama Jafari is distinguishing between sociological/psychological dimensions and philosophical/metaphysical aspects in conceptualizing the underlying reasons for inclination towards religion in the context of Russellian philosophy of religion. If we assume this then there could arise a problem which makes this interpretation untenable as Russell himself has not made this methodical distinction in regard to the category of religion.

It seems Allama Jafari has been puzzled on these problems too and that is why he decided to write directly to Sir Russell in 16 ^th September of 1963 in clarifying these issues and more importantly to find out the position of Russell on the questions of “autonomous feeling” and “philanthropy.” In other words, Sir Russell seems to suggest that there is an autonomous feeling within the heart of human being which needs to be fulfilled by recourse to a larger idea than the individual and this larger idea could be feelings such as philanthropic tendencies and love of humanity. Although Allama Jafari concedes that these feelings are larger than the individual and could fulfill part of human needs nevertheless it would be a mistake to think that the philanthropic emotion contradicts the affection towards the ultimate reality. On the other hand, how does Sir Russell view this contradiction? In the letter dated 16 ^th September 1963 Russell stated that

Allama Jafari argues that Sir Russell has not explained the reason for the contradiction which he thinks it exists between the “search for perfection” and “philanthropy” except by stating that lofty impulses are not as common as one may think. In Allama Jafari’s view this is not to solve the problem but absolving the very question as when Russell argues that religion is born out of fear and at the same time states that this impulse is not common then here we are faced with a logical contradiction. Because when one argues that this is not a common impulse this implies that people are of two kinds: 1) those who are equipped with this impulse and 2) those who lack this taste (Jafari, 1966. 195). In addition, if fear is an outcome of ignorance then the fear should be removed once the cause of fear is rectified and by extension religion (and its basis which is consciousness of God) should be shaken. However this is not the case as great many of philosophers and thinkers who, at least within the frame of their own philosophies, did not have any unknown quantity in regard to human being and the world of reality nonetheless we see that they have been monotheists (Jafari, 1996. 196). Examples are abundant but Allama Jafari mentions few such as Descartes and Aristotle who are more familiar in Euro-American context rather than Eastern philosophers and dignitaries.

In other words, Sir Russell is inconsistent in his approach towards the cause of religion and the letters which Allama Jafari exchanged with him did not yield to any substantial result in this regard. This is evident in certain passages (on religion) of the critical commentaries which Allama Jafari wrote on the Wyatt-Russell Dialogue three years later. However, it seems Allama Jafari on one account in relation to religion agrees with Sir Russell when he touches upon the question of metaphysic and its relation to modern scientific ethos. This is a truly modern problematique and unprecedented at this level in Iranian context as the growth of knowledge and consciousness of ultimate reality have been concomitant in Iranian (both pre-Islamic and Islamic) context. To put it otherwise, it is undeniable that the rise of atheism and the growth of scientific ethos are somehow interwoven in modern context and this is a question where Russellian discourse and Jafarian episteme tend to converge. We need to explicate the “decline of metaphysic” and the “growth of science” and the difference which may exist between “science” and “knowledge” in the context of Jafarian episteme in contrast to Russellian frame of reference. In Allama Jafari’s view, the rise of materialism

On the other hand, it seems Allama Jafari is struggling with the ghost of Russell when he argues that

Here it seems Allama Jafari is working within the parameters of knowledge as Ilm while Russell is engaged on knowledge as Science . These are two diametrically opposite paradigms and one haste to state that here we are faced with a classical incommensurable case where two philosophers are talking by each other without realizing the fundamental differences which exist between their respective paradigms. Science is based on empirical findings and reconstructed within the parameters of rational calculations while “Ilm” is not confined solely to these two domains (Siahposh, 2010 & 2013). On the contrary, when Allama Jafari is talking of knowledge as Ilm he takes into consideration the empirical level, rational stage, intellectual plane, revelational height and cordial echelon. This is in accordance to transcendental philosophy which Allama Jafari belongs to and within this wisdom-philosophy paradigm those who have excelled in knowledge are indeed more conscious about the wonderful possibilities of ultimate reality in the constitution of self and leben. Nonetheless Allama Jafari refers to the decline of metaphysic by arguing that this is an upshot of cultural changes which are conditioned by cultural patterns. He employs two sociological concepts of “hedonism” and “utilitarianism” in explicating in what sense he agrees with Sir Russell. He does not accept the inverse correspondence Russell promotes between science and metaphysic but confirms minimally the public inattention towards higher reality in the context of modernity (Jafari, 1966. 197).

In other words, it seems Allama Jafari agrees with another British thinker, i.e. Martin Lings who views the modern inattention towards metaphysical ideals as modern superstition rather than any normative progress. Because the decline of metaphysical sensibility is not either an outcome of disciplined approach to the gamut of reality or a corollary of intellectual engagement with profound existential questions of meaning and purpose, suffering and compassion, virtues and values and what is to be a human being.

On Religion and Founders of Religions

There is a debate on religion, founders of religions and the adherents to religious traditions which Russell touched upon in his dialogues with Wyatt in a very interesting fashion as far as Allama Jafari is concerned. Russell is of the opinion that there is a very little connection between the “intentions” of the founders of all religions and the doxa of the followers of a particular religion (Jafari, 1966. 199). Sir Russell gives an example to highlight his point in this regard by stating that

In Jafari’s view Russell is absolutely right in distinguishing between “principles of religion” and “actual deeds of followers of religion.” Because what is expected of a man of knowledge

This is where East and West have met in a very fabulous fashion. In other words, it seems when issues of conscience and integrity of humanity are concerned thinkers, regardless of their ideological positions or geographical locations tend to agree on “significant questions of existence” which touch upon the most essential dimensions of being a human person. Of course, it is not unproblematic to find objective evidences or unambiguous examples for these dimensions but the very existence of such possibilities are worth to cherish as along the dialogue one may be able to find common grounds.

In endorsing the Russellian distinction thesis between principles and actualities of a religion Allama Jafari opens up a discussion on religion and society. When Allama Jafari was discussing in 1966 these issues in Iran the discipline of sociology of religion was not established as an academic profession. In other words, these debates were novel and the Jafarian approach proved to be of a pioneering kind as this required a certain level of a “perspective from without” in regard to religion, history of religion and the community of the faithful. All of these notions occupied sacrosanct positions among scholars within Shiite community in 20 ^th century. For example, when Allama Jafari argues that by the demise of the founder of a religion deviation sets in he comes very close to conceptualizing the question of deviation in relation to religion in a sociological fashion. But in contrast to Sir Russell it seems Allama Jafari does not confine the application of “social deviation” to the category of religion. On the contrary, he argues that

Religion is an essential need for human societies. The question is how to reconcile this essential need with “systematic abuse” which occurs under the banner of religions? To be more accurate, this organized exploitation is not confined to religious sphere but penetrates to other domains such as ideologies, ethical systems, and political orders. In Jafari’s view, it seems Russell has realized very rightly the corrupting effects upon religions along the course of history and he has also correctly distinguished between the fundamentals of religion and the deeds of religious communities but Allama Jafari does not agree with Sir Russell on confining this corruption to the religious realm. On the contrary, the question is how to discern the process of corruption in human society in all its aspects, on the one hand, and release humanity from the falsity which is not part of emancipative aspects of religion, ethics, science, and philosophy. Because here we are faced with the question of responsibility in regard to illuminated thinkers, as Allama Jafari believes in the responsibility of intellectuals in the public sphere. In other words,

Notes

^{1. By “doxa” I don’t mean the current usage of the term in English language which refers
to “opinion.” As it is well-known the term is used in conjunction with another Greek
term, i.e. “Ortho”—which together makeup what today is considered as “orthodoxy” in
relation to contemporary organized forms of religiosities around the globe. In this
organized sense, the term “orthodoxy” means the adherence to accepted norms, more
specifically to creeds, especially in organized forms of religions. This is not what
I mean by “ancient doxa.” In my interpretation, a doxa is “meaning” and ortho is defined
as “true” which, in transcendental philosophy is accessible through “knowledge by
presence” and beyond the realm of “rational discursive reasoning.” In Allama Jafari’s
view, Russell has not understood the logical procedure of metaphysical systems of
non-modern philosophies and therefore he has mistakenly equated Religion, Metaphysics
and Gnosticism with “beliefs” which belong to the category of “opinions.”}

^{2. On “existential maturity” within the occidental discourse it would be constructive
to consult the vision portrayed by Paul Wong who wished to free existential psychology
from the long shadows of existentialist philosophers of the 19th and 20th century.
The Wongian paradigm presents a more compassionate, positive and practical existential
discourse which contrasts with the cold, abstract phenomenology of Heidegger or solipsistic
freedom of Sartre. Wong’s vision includes questions from the many interwoven domains
that constitute human existence (described in James & Prilletensky, 2003; James, Harris
& Clarke, 2003). From the individual domain Wong raises the issue of finding our true
identity and fulfilling our most cherished dreams. On a socio-cultural level Wong
asks what could be done to change the conditions that perpetuate injustice and how
can we facilitate community development? From the realm of the religio-moral, Wong
asks us to consider what it means to treat others with respect and how we are to understand
the meaning of suffering, pain and death. The expansiveness of Wong’s vision parallels
the maturation that has taken place in the work of a number of philosophers who have
emerged from the existential-phenomenological tradition. Much water has passed under
the bridges of the Seine since Sartre, writing from the comfort of his Paris cafés,
told us that “we are condemned to be free” (Sartre, 1966) and that “Hell is other
people” (Garcin in “No Exit”; Sartre, 1955). Modern “continental” philosophers have
continued to emphasize “existence” as opposed to abstract or disengaged views of the
human subject, but this subject is now one who finds her subjectivity through others
(Levinas), recognizes his authentic self only by understanding something of the history
and tradition of their “life-world” (Gadamer) or sees her “self” in terms of a story or narrative constructed dialogically (Ricoeur, Taylor). Emmanuel
Levinas, who studied under both Husserl and Heidegger, rejected the primacy of the
latter’s ontology of the individual, prioritizing instead, the fundamental ethical
relationship that one has to the “Other.” This Other, for Levinas represents, not
only Other people, but also that relationship we have with God, or our debt to those
who came before us and suffered from oppression, violence and injustice (Levinas,
1996). Ethics, a relationship with the Other, is more important than any attempt to
limit the Other through our attempts at comprehending her. Hans-Georg Gadamer, another
student of Heidegger, understands human existence in terms of the cultural and historical
traditions that shape our experience of the world (James & Foster, 2003). What Gadamer
calls a “horizon,” is that set of beliefs, assumptions, or the perspective that we
bring to life enabling us to make some sense of the world, giving it meaning or coherence
(Gadamer, 1999). Realizing our “authentic self” requires that we become aware of these
assumptions or prejudices that constitute our horizon and shape our particular experience
of the world. Paul Ricoeur and Charles Taylor have both contributed greatly to our
understanding of the concept of selfhood. Taylor’s Sources of the Self gives us an historical view of the emergence of the modern subject or self and identifies
the moral sources that gives that “self” substance or helps us find meaning and avoid
despair. Ricoeur’s Oneself as Another, has shown us the dialectical nature of selfhood (James & Foster 2003). The self
is a phenomenon which cannot be fully understood in “descriptive” terms, but also
must be understood as an agent to whom we impute “moral responsibility,” freedom,
and so on. Ricoeur’s notion of “narrative identity” brings together the descriptive
and ethical dimensions of selfhood helping us to view the self in both objective and
subjective terms (Ricoeur, 1992). Wong has pointed the way to a more mature and fruitful
conception of existential psychology.}

^{3. The fact-value distinction is a concept used to distinguish between arguments that
can be claimed through reason alone and those in which rationality is limited to describing
a collective opinion. In another formulation, it is the distinction between what is (can be discovered by science, philosophy or reason) and what ought to be (a judgment which can be agreed upon by consensus). The terms positive and
normative represent another manner of expressing this, as do the terms descriptive and prescriptive, respectively. Positive statements make the implicit claim to facts, whereas normative
statements make a claim to values or to norms (Putnam, 1998).}

^{4. Of course, one may distinguish between the “imaginary” and “imaginal” in accordance
to Corbin’s interpretation. In Corbinian reading, the imaginary refers to “unreal”
while the imaginal refers to the order of reality that Henri Corbin designates as
mundus imaginalis , as equivalent to the “eighth climate” in the context of Iranian
philosophy. Corbin examined thoroughly the faculty that perceives this reality, namely,
the imaginative consciousness, the cognitive imagination; and finally, suggested
the topography of these interworlds, as they have been seen by those who actually
have been there (Corbin, 1972. 1-19).}

^{5. Fitra is an Arabic word meaning “disposition,” “nature,” “constitution,” or “instinct.”
This concept has been reconceptualized within the “Hikmatic Paradigm” by eastern philosophers
such as Allama Tabatabai, Ayatollah Shahabadi, Allama Jafari, Murteza Muttahari and
Seyed Baghir Sadr. This concept needs to be inquired in a comparative fashion with
“Sensus Divinitatis” and its equivalents in other world traditions.}

^{6. Asharite theology is a school of early Muslim speculative theology founded by the
theologian Abu al-Hasan al-Ashari (d. 324 AH / 936 AD). The disciples of the school
are known as Asharites, and the school is also referred to as Asharite School. It
was instrumental in drastically changing the direction of Islamic theology in the
Sunnite context, separating its development radically from that of philosophy in the
Shiite world.The Asharite view holds that:The school holds that human reason in and
by itself was not capable of establishing with absolute certainty any truth-claim
with respect to morality, the physical world, or metaphysical ideas.}

^{7. Here I don’t use the term in the political sense which is current today in eurocentric
discourses on secularism. On the contrary, I have employed this concept in this context
as a synonym for atheism which denies the epistemological importance of revelational
vista on leben within the “Hikmatic Discourses” in Iran. The word “Hikma” has been
translated into western languages as “philosophy,” “theosophy,” and “theology.” However
it seems all of these concepts have been re-conceptualized in modern context in a
fashion which may not correspond to “Hikmatic Paradigm” within the Iranian traditions.
In other words, we should not try to force non-modern concepts and paradigms into
modern discourses as the “Hikmatic Paradigm” may be a possibility in viewing the human
condition from a novel vista in our turbulent time which is under tutelage of corporate
military liberalism rooted in the soil of modernism.}

^{8. The literature on religion based on the theory of fear is a very longstanding tradition
where the proponents attempt to emphasize on the inalienable link between religion
and the power of fear. It is argued that the power of religion lies in the power of
fear; fear of death, fear of the unknown, fear of people who are different, and fear
of God. In this naïve reading of religion, it is argued that “religion” tells us to
fear God, because it is God who will judge us when we die. When we fear God, the religion
that says we must do so also has to be feared, because the religion is the one that
claims to have the rulebook that God has written for us. God is all powerful, and
if you go against his rules you will not be able to quell your fear of death with
the promise of afterlife. God sees and knows you better than you know yourself, so
you’d better fear him because there’s no lying to him. Fear God because he will be
the one to judge you when you die. These petty arguments which reduce the complexity
of religion into infantile conceptualizations miss an important fact which is related
to the question of reasonability. In other words, they attack religion based on the
principle of rationality which is formalized within the parameters of secular paradigm
but we know that rationality is not confined to one single form. On the contrary,
we have forms of rationalities which could not be reduced to a singular modality.
The standard critiques leveled at religion by atheist free-thinkers are conceptualized
within the parameters of an obsolete discourse which needs to be revisited in a fundamental
fashion. In other words, the theory of fear lacks philosophical complexity as far
as “forms of rationality” is concerned. This is a different question which could be
tackled in a separate work in the future by the author.}