Many of the commanders from both sides who fought at El Alamein had been in the theatre for a long time. Some, like Montgomery, had been relatively new arrivals who had brought new ideas to a desert war that had been dragging on for more than two years. Each of them, however, had to acclimatize to an inhospitable battlefield like no other. The wide-open spaces allowed great boldness of action, provided forces were mobile enough and well led, but the empty barren landscape was also quick to punish those commanders who did not pay due regard to their administration arm. More than in any other theatre of war, it was the supply train that dictated the tactics that could be employed on the battlefield. This was especially true during the long retreat of Rommel’s army and the great pursuit undertaken by Montgomery.
Lieutenant-General Sir Bernard Freyberg VC, commander 2nd New Zealand Division. Freyberg was a forceful and energetic leader, but not always easy to deal with. He was also in the unique position of being able to refer any instructions that he was not pleased with to his masters in Wellington. (DA-09107, War History Collection, Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington NZ)
Although Gen. Montgomery was the architect of the victory of El Alamein, he was not the most senior commander in the region. He reported to the Commander-in-Chief Middle East, Gen. Sir Harold Alexander (1891–1969), an aristocratic guardsman of great charm and ability who was responsible for military events, not only in North Africa, but also in the whole of Palestine, Iraq and Persia. He had served as a divisional commander with some distinction during the campaign in France in 1940 and in Burma after the Japanese invasion. A great favourite of Churchill, he had many friends in high places and was for a time ADC to the King. He was also, in October 1937, the youngest general in the British Army.
Alexander’s main attribute was one of diplomacy. He had the ability to organize and persuade, without having to resort to threats and dictates. Although responsible for the strategy of the North African campaign, he was more than happy to leave this matter and general tactical considerations to his subordinate Montgomery. His talents were later put to good use when the USA joined in the conflict in North Africa, for Alexander’s capacity for getting along with people proved to be a great asset when he became the army group commander of 18th Army Group, responsible for both the Anglo-American First Army and Montgomery’s Eighth Army during the Tunisian campaign.
General Bernard Montgomery (1887–1976) made his lasting reputation through the victory at El Alamein. Before that time he was virtually unknown to the British public. He was, however, very well known within army circles. He had built a reputation as an outspoken critic of various military practices and of indifferent and incompetent commanders. His experiences in France in 1940 as a divisional and corps commander led him to think that there was much wrong in the British Army and he never lost an opportunity to explain how things should be put right. He had great conviction in his own ability and always believed that his approach to battle was the only way. In his operations he was often seen as an overcautious commander, only going into the attack when everything was in his favour and he was virtually assured of success.
Major-General George ‘Bobby’ Erskine, commander of 7th Armoured Division. He took over the division when Maj. Gen. John Harding was wounded in January 1943 and fought with it until the middle of the Normandy campaign in August 1944. (IWM, NA2643)
After the Torch landings and the arrival of the Americans in North Africa, Gen. Montgomery had to share command of the theatre. General Eisenhower became the most senior general and he is seen here talking to British major-generals Francis Tuker (4th Indian Division) and John Nichols (50th Division) and Brig. Walsh (BGS XXX Corps). (IWM, E23516)
Montgomery was fortunate that his arrival at Eighth Army in August 1942 coincided with the influx into Egypt of great quantities of new supplies, arms, equipment and reinforcements, things that had been denied to previous commanders. He also was given – or in fact took – sufficient time to retrain his army to his way of thinking before he was prepared to launch his Alamein offensive. There is no doubt that he transformed Eighth Army for the better in every department, not least by being ruthless with those commanders who did not come up to his expectations. On a more personal note, his prickly character and insufferable arrogance often seemed offensive to some, leaving many detractors in his wake, but his fighting men idolized him. They appreciated his raising of Eighth Army’s profile in the world and they loved him for it. After Alamein they knew they were part of a successful army and, as it turned out, one that was never beaten in battle again.
Montgomery always wanted to select his own commanders, those who were already in position wherever he arrived were usually moved on. After Alamein, Montgomery looked closely at the performance of some of his senior commanders and decided few changes had to be made. Two of his corps commanders, Lt. Gen. Leese and Lt. Gen. Horrocks, both individuals that he had brought to the theatre, had proved their worth at Alamein and remained to fight under Montgomery in other campaigns. Lieutenant-General Herbert Lumsden was not so blessed, for he and his divisional commanders were often at odds with Montgomery over armoured tactics.
Lieutenant-General Oliver Leese (1894–1978) and Lt. Gen. Brian Horrocks (1895–1985) had both served in France at the same time as Montgomery in 1940, Leese at Lord Gort’s HQ and Horrocks as a battalion commander in Monty’s division. Their subsequent performance in England led him to think that they were capable of corps command. Lieutenant-General Herbert Lumsden (1897–1945) was a cavalry officer who was already in Egypt when Montgomery arrived. He had a good deal of experience in armoured warfare, first at the head of 1st Armoured Division, then as commander of X Corps which contained the three British armoured divisions. Monty was not happy with Lumsden’s handling of the tanks throughout Alamein and became less convinced that he could lead the corps during the initial pursuit after the battle. Horrocks replaced him at the head of X Corps in December 1942.
General Montgomery with his airmen: Maj. Gen. Karl Spaatz, Commander-in-Chief Allied Air Force North West Africa; Air Vice Marshal Harry Broadhurst, AOC RAF Desert Air Force and Air Chief Marshal Arthur Tedder, Air Commander-in-Chief. (IWM, E23663)
Major-General Wimberley, GOC 51st Highland Division, talks on the radio with one of his brigadiers. (IWM, E21703)
After the Torch invasion of North Africa by an Anglo-American force led by Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower (1890–1969) the whole command structure changed. What was purely a British and Commonwealth battleground then became an Allied one. Eisenhower was eventually to take over the whole of the theatre as Commander-in-Chief Allied Force Headquarters [North Africa]. A new army, First Army, commanded by Lt. Gen. Kenneth Anderson (1891–1959), came into being in Tunisia in late 1942. When Eighth Army finally reached Tunisia early in 1943, First and Eighth Armies were combined into 18th Army Group under the command of Alexander, with Eisenhower being responsible for the whole North African campaign. From this point on, Montgomery was no longer master of the battlefield; he now had to share the making of decisions which affected overall Allied strategy with others.
The long Axis chain of command in North Africa was made particularly complex by the Italian nature of the theatre. Libya was an Italian colony and all the fighting that took place in North Africa up to and beyond Alamein was officially under Italian direction. Mussolini had asked Hitler for German help back in 1941 and had always considered that his commanders were in control of the strategy and the tactics to be used in the campaign. The reality was, however, that once Erwin Rommel arrived he took over the running of the show. In theory, Rommel reported to the Governor of Libya, Maresciallo Ettore Bastico, who in turn reported to the Commando Supremo in Rome, Maresciallo Ugo Cavallero. When Rommel’s army had retreated into Tunisia, command at the top changed. As Panzerarmee Afrika was now out of Libya, Bastico ceased to have a territory to command and was removed from the scene. Also at about this time, Cavallero stepped aside and was replaced by the World War I veteran Maresciallo Vittorio Ambrosio (1979–1958) as Commando Supremo. To complicate matters further for Rommel, his immediate German superior was the Luftwaffe Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring, C.-in-C. German Forces Mediterranean. Thus Rommel had three immediate masters to please, although in practice he seldom took the trouble to please any of them.
Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel, the Desert Fox. As the campaign in North Africa neared its climax, Rommel’s health had deteriorated to such an extent that he was recalled to Germany for rest. By then, Hitler and Mussolini had lost patience with his continual pleading for withdrawals and more withdrawals and believed he had lost the will to stand and fight. (battlefieldhistorian.com)
Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel (1891–1944) had enhanced his already formidable reputation before he arrived in North Africa. One of Hitler’s favourite generals, he had seen impressive service as an armoured commander in the campaign in Poland in 1939 and France in 1940. His numerous victories against the British in Libya and Egypt and his bold use of mobile forces marked him out to be something special. His victory at Gazala in May 1942, together with the capture of Tobruk and the advance into Egypt, threatened the whole of Britain’s Middle East strategy. He appeared to be invincible and was certainly admired by friend and foe alike. In the end the vast nature of the desert battlefields and the problems of keeping his army supplied led to his defeat at Alamein.
At the time of Alamein, Rommel’s command was Panzerarmee Afrika. In Tunisia this formation was renamed German–Italian Panzerarmee (Deutsch-Italienische Panzerarmee) and then finally First Italian Army and given the more familiar abbreviation AOK 1.
Generalleutnant Wilhelm Ritter von Thoma, commander of the Afrika Korps, was captured by the British at the end of the Alamein battle and his place at the head of the German armoured formation was taken by General der Panzertruppen Gustav Fehn (1892–1945), an infantry officer who switched to armour at the beginning of the war. Fehn commanded 5. Panzer-Division and then XXXX Panzer-Korps before moving to Africa in November 1942. The last commander of the Afrika Korps was General der Panzertruppen Hans Cramer (1896–1968) who took over after Fehn was wounded in January 1943. Cramer had arrived in the theatre with 15. Panzer-Division’s Panzer-Regiment 8 in April 1941, but was severely wounded during the British Battleaxe offensive in June.
Most of the troops in Panzerarmee Afrika were Italian. The performance of their commanders varied. Some had Rommel’s support, whilst others left him in a state of despair. Generale di Corpo d’Armata Giuseppe de Stephanis (1885–1965) was one of the better leaders. He had commanded the Divisione Corrazzata ‘Ariete’ before taking over the Italian XX Corpo for the battle at Alamein. Of all the Italian commanders, Rommel regarded Generale di Corpo d’Armata Enea Navarini as his ‘trusted friend’. Navarini commanded the Italian XXI Corpo through the long retreat into the Mareth Line.
To counter the Allied landings in North Africa and their invasion of Tunisia, the Germans raised a new army under the command of Generaloberst Hans-Jürgen von Arnim (1899–1962). This new formation, 5. Panzerarmee Afrika, (later to be shortened to PzAOK 5), controlled most of eastern and central Tunisia. Arnim had previously commanded 17. Panzer-Division and XXXIC Korps on the Eastern Front. When Rommel brought his Panzerarmee Afrika into the defences around Mareth, thought could then be given to combining these two formations into an army group command. Rommel by this time was seen as being overtired and ill and was to be returned to Germany for rest, so Arnim was given command of the new Heeresgruppe Afrika (Army Group Africa), but only after Rommel had left the theatre. Rommel’s position at the head of the German–Italian Army was then taken over by the Italian Maresciallo Giovanni Messe (1883–1968). Messe was a veteran of the Great War and later saw a good deal of service with the Italians in their early campaigns in Ethiopia, Albania and Greece. In Russia he commanded Corpo di Spedizione Italiano. When the Italian Commando Supremo decided that Rommel had to be replaced, Messe seemed to be the obvious candidate with the most battle experience.
A haughty, immaculately turned out, Generaloberst Hans-Jürgen von Arnim, commander Heeresgruppe Afrika, is led away into captivity in Tunisia at the end of the campaign. (IWM, NA2876)
Generale Messe, commander First Italian Army (right) with Gen. Kurt von Liebenstein, commander of the German 164. leichte-Division. (IWM, NA2895)
With Messe in overall command, the famed Afrika Korps now had to report to an Italian master. Oberst Fritz Bayerlein (1899–1970) was Rommel’s Chief of Staff and when he left the theatre Bayerlein acted more or less in the same capacity, as German liaison officer to Messe. As one-time temporary commander of the Afrika Korps, he took great pains to look after that formation’s best interests and often ignored orders from the Italians if they went against his natural instincts. Bayerlein developed hepatitis in Tunisia and was invalided back to Germany and hence escaped capture when the Axis forces there collapsed in May 1943. He later commanded the 3. Panzer-Division in Russia and the Panzer ‘Lehr’ Division in Normandy and the Rhineland. Just before the end of the war he was given a corps command on the western front.