This summary, except where noted, has been extracted from Capt. Geoffrey Bennett’s superb book Nelson the Commander, 86–87.
Britain’s strategy was conditioned by her island structure and her consequent dependence on the sea. Bishop Adam de Moleyns spelled its essence as far back as 1436: “Kepe then the sea that is the walle of England.”
This is a little different than the “wooden walls” of old England, as Anthony Price articulates so well, “for the truth was that, whatever Shakespeare among others might say in misunderstanding history, the ‘moat defensive’ of the sea, which was supposed to serve England ‘in the office of a wall,’ was only as good as its defending navy made it. It had failed to stop innumerable invaders in the past, most recently only a century before in 1688 [when William of Orange landed in Torbay, subsequently forcing James II to flee]. Until the age of railways and better communications on land, a would-be invader could actually transport an invasion force faster by sea than any defender could move defensive forces by land to resist an attack. The sea was not a moat, but a highway” (Price, Eyes of the Fleet, 12).
Nevertheless, Bacon added the rest in 1625: “He that commands the sea is at great liberty, and may take as much and as little of the war as he will.”
The prime objective was the greatest danger, the enemy’s battle fleet. In the time of Queen Elizabeth I Spain’s was opposed only when it came so close to England as the Channel. In the Dutch Wars [First, 1652–54; Second, 1665–67; Third, 1672–73], when the chief threat was to the North Sea and the Channel, the British waited in their own waters until the enemy was reported to have left harbor—usually only in the summer months.
But something more was needed in the eighteenth century, when France’s and Spain’s geographical positions laid the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and seas yet further afield, open to forays by their fleets, something which stronger ship construction made possible. The strategy of close blockade was then evolved by the elder Pitt [Prime Minister William Pitt, first Earl of Chatham, 1708–78, father of Pitt the Younger, who was prime minister at the time of Trafalgar] and Lord Anson [Adm. Lord George Anson, first lord of the Admiralty, 1757–62] for use in the Seven Years War (1756–63); neutralizing the enemy’s fleets, until an opportunity arose to destroy them, by maintaining battle fleets of sufficient size off each of his principal ports, to ensure, so far as possible, that his ships did not put to sea without being brought to action.
And thus [at the end of the century] did Britain’s storm-tossed ships stand—off Brest, Rochefort, Ferrol and Cadiz, as well as Toulon—between Napoleon and his dream of French dominion of the world.
Though close blockade was the keystone of Britain’s defence against invasion, enabling Lord St. Vincent to declare to Parliament in 1803: “My Lords, I do not say the [French] cannot come. I only say they cannot come by sea,” other stones completed the arch of maritime control. Seaborne trade, vital for the conduct of any war, in part for the raw materials which it brought . . . in part for the wealth that it provided . . . had to be protected against attack by enemy cruisers and privateers, which an Act of 1708 made the first charge on Britain’s naval resources. Merchant vessels were sailed in escorted convoys, since, to quote Dryden: “Your convoy makes the dangerous way secure.” Nelson was thus tediously employed during his first months [1781, as captain of] the Albemarle. For a like reason, enemy seaborne trade was curtailed by sending British cruisers to range the trade routes to capture his merchantmen wherever they might be found, as Nelson was employed during his first months [1793, as captain of] the Agamemnon.
British squadrons were needed overseas, to find and destroy those of the enemy, as Rodney did in the West Indies just before the Albemarle joined Hood’s force in those waters, and as Hughes tried so hard to do against Suffren in the Indian Ocean, highway for the rich treasures of the East [Adm. George Brydges, Lord Rodney, 1718–92; Rear Adm. Sir Edward Hughes, 1720–94; and Pierre-André de Suffren de Saint-Tropez, 1729–88, were all effective commanders during the American Revolutionary War].
Britain’s warships were required to support her army and those of her allies, as Nelson did his best to support the Austrians in northern Italy—and, as Trafalgar made it possible, after his death, for Wellington to liberate Spain in a campaign that contributed so much to Napoleon’s eventual downfall.
Britain also used her sea power to land military forces on enemy held territory. As Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher expressed it a century later: “The British Army should be used as a projectile to be fired by the Navy.” . . . Finally, the British Fleet had to prevent the enemy from doing likewise or, if he managed to effect a landing, to ensure that he did not exploit it, as Nelson did when . . . Napoleon tried to extend France’s empire to the Middle-East.
France and her allies could pursue a different naval strategy in the eighteenth century because they were Continental powers, by no means dependent on the sea, except to sustain their colonies. Mahan coined one name for it, the “fleet in being”; the French another, the guerre de course. Except for squadrons sent to East and West Indian waters to dispute Britain’s command of these areas (as when Suffren went to the Indian Ocean and D’Estaing and de Grasse to the Caribbean) [Vice Adm. Jean Baptiste Charles Henri Hector, Comte d’Estaing, 1729–94, and François Joseph Paul, Comte de Grasse, 1722–88, were additional commanders of the American Revolutionary War] France, Spain and the Netherlands kept their battle fleets within such ports as Brest, Cadiz, the Texel and Toulon, where they were safe from attack but were a constant threat to Britain’s interests in Home waters and in the Mediterranean. These were seldom sent to sea except for a specific operation, as when Villaret Joyeuse [Vice Adm. Louis Thomas, Comte Villaret de Joyeuse, 1748–1812] was ordered out of Brest in 1794 to meet and bring in a valuable homebound convoy (and suffered defeat by Howe at the Glorious First of June) [Admiral of the Fleet Richard, Earl Howe, 1726–99, had a remarkable naval career, including a substantial personal contribution to at-sea signaling systems], as when Brueys was ordered to escort Buonaparte’s Armée d’Orient from Toulon to Alexandria in 1798 (which doomed him to destruction at the Nile), and when Villeneuve and Gravina were ordered from Toulon and Cadiz to join with Ganteaume from Brest in 1805 to gain command of the Channel for the twelve hours that Napoleon needed for his invasion of England. [Vice Adm. Pierre Charles Jean Baptiste Sylvestre de Villeneuve, 1763–1806, defeated by Nelson at Trafalgar, later allegedly committed suicide in disgrace; Adm. Don Carlos, Duke of Gravina, commanding the Spanish at Trafalgar, later died of wounds received during that battle; Vice Adm. Honoré Joseph Antoine, Comte Ganteaume, 1755–1818.] Moreover, in all such cases, France’s admirals were strictly enjoined to evade action, so far as possible, with any substantial enemy force, in sharp contrast to Britain’s belief in engaging the enemy whenever opportunity offered.
This “fleet in being” strategy may be termed defensive: not so the guerre de course. Against Britain’s maritime trade French privateers roamed the oceans. Powerful frigate-sized vessels, operating singly or in pairs, were a match for ships of their own size and could use their greater speed to escape if they chanced to meet an enemy ship-of-the-line. Britain’s answer was the convoy system. Even so, many merchantmen sailed independently and were taken in prize. Indeed, such shipping was [very] vulnerable to attack [even] in the Channel, where France could employ numerous privateers smaller than frigates.