Grenze and Schranke: German has two words that can ordinarily be translated into English as “limit”—Grenze and Schranke. In his speculative philosophy, Hegel makes a distinction between these two terms: a Grenze is a limit (or boundary, border, endpoint) that defines a finite entity qualitatively or quantitatively, whereas a Schranke implies a barrier, restriction or limitation that is, or ought, to be overcome (a cognate of Schranke is beschränken, “to restrict”).* In Hegel’s speculative idealism, the movement of spirit is ultimately infinite, insofar as it overgrasps (übergreift) other entities and finds itself at home in them: in this movement, the restrictions or confines of finitude are overcome.
In his mature critique of political economy, Marx adopted this Hegelian distinction, but related it to a different, but in many respects homologous, object: to capital rather than spirit. Thus, in the Grundrisse, Marx argues that value—as money, or the general form of wealth—is “according to its concept the quintessence of all use-values; but since it is always only a definite amount of money (here, capital), its quantitative limit [Schranke] is in contradiction with its quality. It is therefore in its nature constantly to drive beyond its own barrier [Schranke].”† As self-valorizing value, capital is thus characterized by the drive to infinite expansion; accordingly, Marx identifies “the tendency of capital to relate to every limit [Grenze] on its self-valorization as to a barrier [Schranke].”‡ Yet Marx identifies a secular contradiction within capital, the “barriers [Schranken] within its own nature,” such that it “will drive toward its own suspension [Aufhebung].”§ Capital’s intrinsic tendency to develop the productive powers of social labor ultimately restricts the scope for surplus value production, which is its own condicio sine qua non: “By its nature, therefore, [capital] posits a barrier [Schranke] to labor and value-creation, in contradiction to its tendency to expand them boundlessly. And in as much as it both posits a barrier [Schranke] specific to itself, and on the other side equally drives over and beyond every barrier [Schranke], it is the living contradiction.”¶ In the third volume of his Capital, Marx makes a similar argument, this time specifically in relation to the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall: “Capitalist production constantly strives to overcome these immanent barriers [Schranken], but it overcomes them only by means that set up the barriers [Schranken] afresh and on a more powerful scale. The only true barrier [Schranke] to capitalist production is capital itself.”*
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*Cf. Hegel’s discussion of “Limitation and the Ought” and “Transition of the Finite into the Infinite” in G. W. F. Hegel, Hegel’s Science of Logic, translated by A.V. Miller (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 1999), pp. 130–7; see also G. W. F. Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic, translated by T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting and H. S. Harris (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1991), pp. 148–52.
†Karl Marx, Grundrisse, translated by Martin Nicolaus (New York: Penguin, 1973), p. 270.
‡Ibid., p. 422 (translation modified—N. G.).
§Ibid., p. 410.
¶Ibid., p. 421.
Rosa Luxemburg, of course, did not have access to Marx’s Grundrisse (it was first published in 1939–41), and her knowledge of Hegel, especially of the larger Logic, was apparently limited. However, she was thoroughly acquainted with the three volumes of Marx’s Capital, and it is thus no coincidence that she adopts the same conceptual distinction between Grenze and Schranke in relation to the trajectory of capital accumulation (even if her conception of what constitutes the barrier to, or restriction upon, capitalist accumulation diverges from that presented by Marx in the above-cited passages). It thus seemed appropriate to preserve this distinction in translating The Accumulation of Capital. Accordingly, I have rendered Grenze as “limit,” and Schranke variously as “restriction,” “confines,” “constraint,” and “barrier.”
Ursprüngliche Akkumulation; primitive Akkumulation: Marx’s concept of ursprüngliche Akkumulation, which he derives from Adam Smith’s notion of “previous accumulation,” is often translated into English as “primitive accumulation”;† I have opted to follow Martin Nicolaus, translator of Grundrisse, in rendering it as “original accumulation,” which is closer to Marx’s term and best renders its intended sense. In the few instances where Luxemburg herself uses the term “primitive Akkumulation,” I have translated it as “primitive accumulation.”
Tote Produktionsmittel; lebendige Produktionsmittel: Luxemburg introduces a distinction between tote Produktionsmittel (“non-living means of production”) and lebendige Produktionsmittel (“living means of production”). This echoes Marx’s conceptual distinction between tote Arbeit (dead labor) and lebendige Arbeit (living labor);‡ in order to retain this resonance, I have chosen to translate these terms as “dead means of production” and “living means of production” respectively.
Form; Gestalt: Luxemburg uses Form (“form”) and Gestalt (“shape”) interchangeably. I have opted to translate these almost exclusively as “form,” particularly in the compounds Wertgestalt (“value-form”); Geldgestalt (“money-form”); Warengestalt (“commodity-form”); Gebrauchsgestalt (“use-form”); Naturalgestalt (“natural form”); Sachgestalt (“material form”); Kapitalgestalt (“capital-form”).
A NOTE ON ETHNIC DESCRIPTIONS, “RACE” AND GENDER
In the spirit of Luxemburg’s writing and her political engagement, I have attempted to translate the ethnic descriptions used by Luxemburg into English terms that would not generally be considered offensive. In the case of Indianer, all of the terms that might be used are contested (“American Indians”; “Native Americans”; “indigenous peoples”; “first peoples”; etc.). Of these, “American Indians” would seem to meet with the most approval by those the term is intended to designate. However, some reject any such all-embracing term, preferring to identify only as members of individual “tribes” or “nations,” such as Cherokee, Cree, etc. Luxemburg’s references to “race” (die weiße Rasse, “the white race”; andere Rassen, “other races”), which would undoubtedly be regarded as problematic from a contemporary perspective, have been left unmodified. Similarly, I have not attempted to render her language gender-neutral.
Nicholas Gray
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*Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 3, translated by David Fernbach (New York: Penguin, 1981) p. 358.
†Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, translated by Ben Fowkes (New York: Penguin, 1976), p. 873.
‡See for example Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, p. 322.