ETHNICITY AND POLITICS IN AFGHANISTAN: THE ROLE PLAYED BY SETAM-E MELLI
Antonio Giustozzi
(London, September 2001)
The role played by ethnicity in Afghan politics remains a matter of controversy. While Soviet advisers during the war tended to attribute great importance to this issue, and some Russian writers continued to do so after the war, Western commentators have never considered it very relevant. The example of the so-called Setam-e melli (National Oppression) and its role during the war can help clarify the terms of the debate.
Setam-e melli is in reality just a nickname attributed by political rivals to a splinter faction of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) led by Tahir Badakhshi,1 which came into being in the early 1970s in opposition to the ‘Pashtun domination’ of the PDPA and in support of the rights of ethnic minorities. By the time of the Saur Revolution in 1978 the group had split into two different movements, Sazman-e Inqilab-e Zahmatkashan-e Afghanistan, or Revolutionary Organization of the Workers of Afghanistan (SAZA), and Sazman-e Fedayan-e Zahmatkashan-e Afghanistan, or Organization of the Fedayin of the Workers of Afghanistan (SAFZA). Neither organization took part in the Saur Revolution and both remained on the sidelines until Hafizullah Amin obtained full control of the PDPA and unleashed a new and more virulent wave of repression against, among others, the SAZA and SAFZA. SAZA was hit particularly badly, both because of its larger size and its stronger presence in areas within easier reach of the repressive apparatus of Amin, such as Kabul. At the same time, the Islamist component of the anti-PDPA insurrection, which was spreading across the country, also targeted SAZA and SAFZA. SAZA sources claim that before the Soviet arrival, 3,000 of their members succumbed to both Khalq and the Islamists. This figure is probably an overestimate, but the losses were undoubtedely heavy and included T. Badakhshi, leader of SAZA, executed by Amin, and several other leaders.
In the ideological debates of the 1970s, SAZA had taken the Castroist/ Ho Chi Minh line, the essence of which was that party activists had to work in the villages, in direct contact with the people. By the late 1970s, most of its members actually lived, if not in the villages, at least in the small provincial centres of northern and north-eastern Afghanistan. The repression of Amin pushed even those who lived in Kabul and other major cities (and who survived) to seek refuge in remote corners of the countryside. Despite the losses, therefore, SAZA and SAFZA were in 1980 in a much better position to play a role in the ongoing civil war than the PDPA, at least in those regions. PDPA members from across the country had moved towards the capital after the Saur Revolution, seeking a position in the army or in the state administration. With the Mujahedeen insurrection, even the few left in the provinces were forced to flee to Kabul to save their lives. By the time the Soviets were in Kabul, trying to sort out the mess created by Amin, the PDPA had become a completely ineffective machine in the Afghan countryside, where the real war was being fought.
Despite being more or less pro-Soviet organizations, in the early 1980s SAZA and SAFZA were mostly tolerated, with some members still held in prison from the time of Amin and others cooperating with the PDPA. Both asked for arms to fight against the Mujahedeen and at the same time defend themselves in the areas where their membership was concentrated, but in general such requests were not answered very positively, although SAZA and SAFZA members were reported to be already fighting alongside Soviet troops against Pashtun Mujahedeen in Badakhshan Province in this early period. SAZA and SAFZA, in turn, carried out anti-PDPA propaganda. The Soviets were keen to convince SAZA and SAFZA to merge with the PDPA, but while SAFZA formally agreed to this in 1984, SAZA always refused, fearing that it would discredit it among its followers; it also criticized the top–down method adopted by the PDPA in implementing its policies.
It was only from 1986 that General Varennikov, who commanded the corps of Soviet military advisers in Afghanistan, began to equip SAZA and SAFZA members with arms, which led to the formation of militia to fight actively against the Mujahedeen. By 1990 SAZA, the largest of the two organizations, was estimated by Soviet observers to have 9,000 armed men in the field, a sizeable number even if still short of the 20,000 which was the target of the leadership of the party. At about the same time, SAZA controlled an estimated 1,000 villages throughout Afghanistan, mostly concentrated in Badakhshan and Takhar Provinces, but with an important presence as far as Herat.
The impact of SAZA and SAFZA on the conduct of the war was crucial in the provinces where they were strong. Starting from Badakhshan, where they contributed to the strengthening of the government side already in 1983–84, they helped the Soviet army to bring back under its control large parts of the provinces of Takhar, Baghlan and Herat. Why did these small parties succeed, at least to some extent, where the PDPA had failed? To what extent can this success be attributed to their anti-Pashtun ethnic nationalism?
Undoubtedly the ethnic discourse of SAZA and SAFZA appears to have appealed to sections of the Tajik intelligentsia, whose presence in the two parties must have ranked in the low hundreds. It is certainly not a coincidence that Tajiks were the most numerous ethnic group in all the areas where SAZA and SAFZA managed to root themselves. There is little sign, however, that ethnic discourse has represented much of a factor in pushing other town-dwellers and peasants into the parties and the militias, especially in those areas where Pashtun presence was weak, as it was in Takhar and most of Badakhshan.
As always in Afghan politics, patronage rather than ideology appears to have been the key to winning support. Varennikov did not just provide arms but also food and other supplies, which the two parties then redistributed to the villagers. Of course in this context having men of influence in as many villages as possible is crucial to establishing the early connection and trust which makes all the subsequent steps possible. SAZA and SAFZA appear to have been more successful than the PDPA in competing for the allegiance of peasants with the Mujahedeen owing to their stronger roots in the countryside. That, of course, persisted as long as the Soviet Union was able to guarantee a steady flow of supplies. When that ceased in 1991, the structures created by the heirs of the original Setam-e melli collapsed.
NOTES
1.Born in Faizabad, educated in Kabul at the Habibia School and at the faculty of economics of Kabul University; imprisoned in Pul-e Charkhi jail, summer 1978, and executed during the rule of Hafizullah Amin on 17 September 1979.