THE AFGHAN ROOTS OF THE NEO-TALIBAN MOVEMENT
Antonio Giustozzi
(London, October 2007)
It is often contended, both in Kabul and in the capitals of the Western world, that the Taliban do not have deep roots inside Afghanistan and are only penetrating the country from Pakistan, relying on a relatively small core group of Pakistan-educated Afghans and foreigners and recruiting locals as mercenaries to do most of the fighting. However, over the last two years overwhelming evidence to the contrary has been emerging: that the Taliban succeeded in establishing deep roots in southern Afghanistan and increasingly also in parts of the south-east and east.
The first province where the Taliban succeeded in establishing a mass base was Zabul, which by 2003 was already largely under their control. The reasons for this quick success are not clear, but the strength of radical clerical networks in this province seems to have been an important factor. Another factor might have been that in Zabul the Taliban maintained a higher degree of support after 2001 because the province has never been a major poppy-producing area and was therefore not negatively affected by the ban enforced by Mullah Omar in 2000.1 Remote mountainous parts of Uruzgan and of Kandahar Province, particularly along the border with Zabul Province and in the north, followed in 2004. Here the key motivation seems to have been conflicts between provincial authorities (administration and police) and a number of local communities. As in many parts of Afghanistan the local authorities were taken over in 2002 by specific groups and factions, which then proceeded to use their power to harass personal and tribal rivals. But in contrast to other regions, the oppressed communities of the south had somebody to turn to, that is the resurgent Taliban. Emissaries of Mullah Omar were already travelling throughout the south in 2003–04 trying to attract recruits and win over local communities. Military incursions were taking place all along the border with Pakistan. Some of the strongmen supported by President Karzai, however, managed to maintain a firm hold on the situation despite their own abusive or unfair rule and the efforts of the Taliban to mobilize opposition against them. This was the case in Helmand Province, where the Taliban initially found little support. Governor Sher Mohammad Akhundzada, able to maintain a large military following and to distribute patronage thanks to his dubiously accumulated wealth,2 was until his removal at the beginning of 2006 more or less in control of the situation.
The flat districts of central Kandahar and Helmand and the mountainous northern Helmand started giving large-scale support to the Taliban only after the deployment of large contingents of foreign troops there in the spring of 2006. Is this proof that the arrival of the British and Canadians was a direct cause of the intensification of the violence and of increased support for the Taliban? In the case of the British in Helmand, this seems a plausible explanation, given the pre-existing tradition of hostility towards them,3 their reputation as supporters of poppy eradication (in a province which leads the rest of Afghanistan in terms of production) and their insistence on the removal of Sher Mohammad from the governorship. Although the British proclaimed their disinclination to be directly involved in eradication efforts, in the eyes of the locals the despatch of the largest provincial contingent of foreign troops to their area must have sounded really ominous. Although Sher Mohammad was not a popular man beyond his own patronage circle, his removal critically weakened the pro-government forces in Helmand. At the same time, Kabul, unhappy about the imposition by the British of their own choice of governor, sabotaged the effort to improve local administration and undermine the new governor. In Kandahar, more than the deployment of the Canadians per se, the cause of the successful infiltration by the insurgents in districts such as Panjwai, Zhari and Maiwand seems to be related to the intensification of the abuses of the Afghan security forces, particularly the border police, which in turn might have been caused by the strengthened sense of confidence of having strong international support and backup.
Beyond the south, the first areas to offer mass support to the Taliban were the south-eastern districts of Paktika, where opposition to the government seems to have been strong already in 2003–04. Again, bad governance appears to have been the main reason. Gradually the Taliban managed to enlist the support of sparse communities throughout the whole ‘Pashtun belt’. Kunar was deeply infiltrated already in 2003–04, with Pech becoming a major stronghold of the insurgents; the southern and eastern districts of Ghazni fell under Taliban influence in 2005–06; the southern districts of Kapisa and, in particular, Tagab were hosting large concentrations of Taliban by 2006, while the influence of the insurgency was steadily growing in the northern districts of Laghman. By 2007 Zurmat of Paktiya was a major springboard of Taliban operations, while the Pashtun districts of Wardak witnessed a complete loss of government influence. In the west, too, the Taliban were beginning to find an audience in 2007, with strong support growing in pockets like Shindand (Herat Province), Ghormach and Bala-e Murghab (Badghis). The causes seem to have been pretty uniform, including abusive authorities, often captured by factions and communities and used to their exclusive benefit, heavy-handed behaviour by foreign troops and perceptions by local power players that the expanding presence of foreigners was against their interests. To the extent that the Taliban were able to make men and weapons available, they seemed to be able to exploit a whole range of local grievances throughout Afghan Pashtunistan.
As 2007 was drawing to a close, the big question increasingly being asked was whether the Taliban might be able to break through the ethnic barrier and start mobilizing significant support among the ethnic minorities. Small groups of Uzbek and Tajik madrasa trainees were reported to be already infiltrating provinces like Fariyab, Sar-i Pul, Baghlan, Kunduz, Takhar and Badakhshan, while similarly small groups of former collaborators of the Taliban or of socially marginal elements were also said to be organizing throughout the north and even in some Hazara-populated areas. Allies of the Taliban such as Hezb-e islami were also devoting efforts to reactivate groups in northern areas. Although this did still not amount to a serious military threat, the risk of gradual destabilization and of spreading insecurity was obvious.
NOTES
1.One of the proposed explanations of the Taliban collapse in 2001 is in fact that they lost support because of their banning of poppy cultivation.
2.It has repeatedly been alleged that the governor was deeply involved in the trafficking of narcotics.
3.It dates back to the Anglo-Afghan wars of the nineteenth century.