6.4–5 (22–23) comprise a single work on the omnipresence of the intelligible: it preserves its unity in its presence to all sensible things. Any restriction on its presence lies with the sensible, and not the intelligible.
§1. Discussion of how soul is present throughout the cosmos, first with two solutions from the Timaeus, and then with the fundamental puzzle of how something without extension can extend throughout the sensible world.
§§2–6. A first explanation. §2 explains that the sensible world is in the intelligible, and is an imitation of it. §3 argues that the intelligible is everywhere, in that it does not belong to any of the things which receive it imperfectly; in any case it is not in a place. §4 shows that there are a multiplicity of intellects and souls because multiplicity and unity are both present in the intelligible. §5 argues the soul is great, but not in such a way as to have mass and size. Soul belongs to the body that advances towards it. §6 explains how many bodies share in one soul.
§§7–14. A second explanation. §7 offers two images to aid understanding, that of the hand and that of the luminous sphere. §8 argues that since the intelligible is incorporeal it possesses none of the properties of bodies, especially place, divisibility, and passivity. Of itself, the intelligible does not enter the sensible. §§9–10 Sensible powers are images of the intelligible, and hence depend on their model. §11 Each being only participates in the intelligible insofar as it is able to. §12 offers a series of images – ears and eyes, and the presence of sound and sight in the air. While the soul remains in itself, body approaches it, and receives it. §13 The sensible can only participate in the intelligible, that is, in something non-corporeal. §14 Soul itself suffices for all living things in that it is unlimited, in containing all souls and intellects.
§§15–16. When a body approaches the intelligible it receives only what is appropriate to it. In living things, body may dominate intellect. §16 explains the terms used by the decree of Adrastus (Plato, Phaedrus 248C–249B).
1 6.4 and 6.5 in fact form a single work. See Pl., Parm. 131B1–2, 144C8–D1.