§6.8.1. Can one so much as raise the question whether, in the case of the gods, too, there is anything that is up to1 them, or is it really only appropriate to look for such a thing amongst the frailties and ambiguous powers2 of human beings, whereas we should grant omnipotence to gods, so that it is not merely something that is up to them, but everything?5 Or is omnipotence indeed only to be granted to one [god],3 and, as to the other gods, some are actually disposed in one way, and some in another way, and there are some gods of which either is true?
In fact, we should investigate these things, too, and we should dare to investigate these things both in the case of the primary Beings4 and in the case of what is above all [the One], how anything is up to it, even if10 we agree that it is omnipotent.5 Yet what this very power means has to be investigated, so long as we do not take it to mean a potency in relation to an actuality, that is, to a future actuality.
Let us postpone these questions for the moment, and first look at15 ourselves, where one anyway usually looks,6 to see if anything is actually up to us. The first thing to be investigated is how we should define something being up to us, that is, what is the conception of such a thing. In this way, we may come to know if it may be transferred to the gods, too, and even more so to god [the One], or not.20
In fact, it should be transferred, but we have to investigate just how it applies to the other things, and to the primary Beings.
So, what do we think when we say something is up to us? And why do we investigate it? It is my view that because we are subject to motion in the midst of opposing fortunes and necessities, and the assaults of violent passions attacking the soul, and because we consider all these25 to be dominant, and because we are subservient to them, and are led where they drive us, we are puzzled as to whether we are nothing after all, and as to whether in fact nothing is up to us.
The upshot is that something that is up to us is as follows: something we do, without being enslaved to fortunes or necessities or violent passions, because we will it, when nothing opposes our willing. If this30 is so, then the conception of being up to us is that which is subservient to our willing, and, will occur or not, depending on the extent of our willing it. Everything is voluntary that occurs without force7 and with knowledge [of the circumstances]; in contrast, anything is up to us over which we are in charge.
In many cases, the voluntary and what is up to us may coincide,8 even35 if their definitions are distinct, though there are cases where they diverge. For example, if someone has the power to kill someone else, it would not be voluntary for him when he did it, if he did not know that it was his father.9 And that10 would perhaps diverge from what is up to him.11 And, certainly, knowledge relating to what is voluntary must40 include not only particulars, but also universals. For why is it involuntary if you do not know it is a friend, but not involuntary if you do not know that you should not kill generally?12 Because you should have learned that this is so? Not knowing that one should have learned these things is not voluntary, nor is anything voluntary that drives you away from learning them.
§6.8.2. But we have to investigate which factor in us we should actually attribute something to, when we explain it by saying it is up to us. Should we attribute it to impulse or some kind of desire? For example, attributing what is done or not to spiritedness or to appetite or to calculative reasoning about the benefit along with desire?135
In fact, if it were explained through spiritedness or desire we would say that things are up to children and beasts,14 also to mad people, and those beside themselves, and those under the influence of drugs or adventitious imaginative representations,15 over which they have no control.16
If we attribute something’s being up to us to calculative reasoning coupled with desire, then the question arises if we should attribute it to10 calculative reasoning even when it goes wrong.
In fact, it should be attributed to correct calculative reasoning and correct desire.17 But even then one should investigate whether calculative reasoning moves the desire or the desire the calculative reasoning.18 For even if the desires are natural, the soul would follow the necessity of nature, if they belong to the animal, that is, the composite. If the desires15 belong to the soul alone, then many of the things which at present we say are up to us would fall outside this range.
Next, what bare calculative reasoning would precede the [bodily and mental] states? And how, when imagination compels us and desire drags us towards wherever it leads, does that put us in control of these actions?19 How, generally, are we in control of that to which we are driven? For something in need, desirous of a necessary replenishment, is20 not in control of the thing to which it is in every way driven.
How, generally, is something an origin for itself, when it originates from another thing, that is, has its origin in something other, which in turn explains why the thing has come to be such as it is? For it lives due to that other thing, that is, as it has been formed by it.20
In fact, in that case even inanimate things will be able to have something up to them.21 For even fire produces effects in line with the way it25 was produced.
If the animal, that is, the soul, has things up to it because it knows what it does, and if this knowledge is through sense-perception, then what contribution does this make towards its having something up to it? For sense-perception does not give the soul control of the effect merely by its seeing. If it is through knowledge, and if this knowledge is of what has been done, and it merely knows this, well then, something else drives30 it to the action. If reason or knowledge acts, that is, prevails over desire, then we have to investigate by what this is to be explained; and, quite generally, where this occurs. And if reason itself produces another desire, how is this to be understood? If reason halts the desire, and comes to a standstill, and being up to us lies at this point, then being up35 to us will not lie in the action; rather, it will come to a stop in the intellect,22 since everything in action, even if reason prevails, is mixed and is not purely up to us.
§6.8.3. For this reason, these things have to be looked into, too. For we now are once more23 close to the argument about the gods. So, we have now attributed what is up to us to willing, and next posited this as lying in reason, and next in correct reason.24 Perhaps we should now add the correctness of scientific understanding. For it is not the case that, if5 someone has the right belief and acts on it, he would really uncontroversially have autonomy,25 unless he knows why it is right, and is not driven towards his duty by chance or imagination. Since we deny that imagination is up to us, how could we rank those acting in accordance with imagination as having autonomy? Indeed, by ‘imagination properly10 speaking’ I mean that imagination roused from bodily states26 – for states of emptiness with respect to food and drink in a way shape the imagination as does being full of seed – the kind of imaginative representations15 depending on the qualities of the liquids in the body.27 And we do not rank those who are active in ways corresponding to these imaginative representations under the principle of autonomy.
For this reason, we do not designate the actions of bad people, who do many things according to their imaginative representations, as being up to them or voluntary. But we will designate as autonomous those20 who, due to intellect, are free of the affections of the body. In explaining what is up to us by reference to the most beautiful principle, we will grant that the activity of intellect and the premises28 arising from it are truly free, and we shall say that the desires roused from the intellect, which are not involuntary, are present in the gods living in this manner,25 that is, those who live by intellect and strive according to intellect.29
§6.8.4. Still, one should investigate how something occurring in accordance with desire will fall under the autonomy of the agent, because desire drives the agent towards something external, and contains a deficiency. The thing desiring is driven, even if it is driven towards the Good.
Moreover, a problem about Intellect itself arises: since it acts by5 nature based on what it is by nature, should it be said to be free and are things up to it when it is not up to it not to produce some result?
Next, one should investigate if, generally, one can say ‘up to them’ in the proper sense for those beings in which no action is present.30
But even for those things which possess the potency for action, the necessity comes from outside.31 For they will not act for no reason. But,10 then, how will freedom apply also to those enslaved to their own nature?
In fact, if something is not forced to follow another, how then is ‘enslaved’ meant? How can something borne towards the Good be forced, when the desire is voluntary, and if it knows, in moving towards15 it as good, that it is good? For the involuntary is a diversion from the Good and towards something forced, when one is borne towards something not good for one. And that is enslaved which is not free and which does not have the power to move towards the Good; rather, because something else better has a commanding position over it, it is driven away from its own goods, in serving the other thing. Slavery is blamed,20 not because one has32 power to move towards the bad, but where one has no power to move towards one’s own good because one is driven to the good of another.
One can speak of slavery to one’s own nature if you distinguish between the thing enslaved and what it is enslaved to.33 For how could a simple nature, that is, one activity, which is not different potentially25 and actually, not be free? For you could not say that it acts according to its nature, such that its substantiality is one thing and its activity is another, if indeed in the intelligible world existence and acting are identical.34 If, then, the activity is not because of another thing nor up to another thing, how can it not be free? It must be free, even if ‘up to30 itself’ does not fit, but something more than ‘up to itself’ is here, and up to itself in such a way that it is not conditional on another, and nothing else is master of its activity. For neither is anything else master of its substantiality, if indeed the substantiality is a principle.
Even if Intellect has another principle, still, this is not outside Intellect, but in the Good.35 Even if Intellect conforms to that Good, it will be all the more up to itself and something free. For one seeks freedom and what35 is up to it for the sake of the Good. If, then, Intellect is active in conformity to the Good, then its activity is more up to it. For Intellect already has an orientation36 towards that from itself and has in itself what it is better for it to be in itself if indeed it is orientated towards the Good.
§6.8.5. Then, is autonomy or the ‘up to it’37 in Intellect only when it is thinking alone, that is, in pure Intellect, or are they also in the soul when it is intellectually active and acting according to virtue?38 If indeed we grant these attributes to a soul engaged in action, first we should not grant it to the soul in respect of what is accomplished in the action. For5 we do not possess the mastery over bringing actions to completion.39
But if we grant it to acting beautifully and bringing about everything in our power, then that would be said correctly. But how is even that up to us? For example, if we are courageous because there is war. I mean how is the activity then up to us, when, if war had not taken control of10 the situation, we would not have engaged in this activity? Likewise with all other actions in accordance with virtue, when virtue is always forced to bring about this or that. Indeed, if one were to grant choice to virtue itself, we can ask if it would want there to be wars, so that it can act and15 be courageous and want for there to be injustice, so that it can determine and organize what is just, or poverty, so that it can manifest liberality, or, when everything is still and going well, would it choose stillness over action, since no one needs their service, just as a doctor, for example, Hippocrates, wants no one to need his skill.20
If, then, virtue, being active in actions, were to be forced to help, how would it have the ‘up to it’ in a pure fashion? Would we call the actions necessary, but the willing, and the reasoning before the actions not necessary?
In fact, if so, then, in positing these attributes in the bare factor4025 prior to the thing done, we will posit autonomy and being up to virtue itself outside the action.
What is, then, up to virtue itself, as a habit or disposition?41 Should we not say it comes to order the badly disposed soul, by bringing measure to affective states and desires?42 How, then, will we say being30 good and ‘virtue without a master’43 are up to us?
In fact, insofar as it is willed and chosen. Or, because, when it has come about in us, it constitutes freedom and the ‘up to us’, and does not permit us still to be the slaves of what we were slaves to before. If, then, virtue is in a way another intellect44 and a habit which makes the soul35 rational, then again being up to us does not belong to us in action, but to intellect detached from actions.
§6.8.6. How, then, did we explain something being up to us earlier by reference to willing, in saying ‘this would occur in accordance with my willing’, and also adding ‘or would not occur’?45
If, then, this was said correctly, and if the following remarks are to agree with what has been said, we will say that virtue and intellect are5 authoritative, and that one should explain what is up to us and freedom by these.46 And we will say that, since they are without a master,47 intellect wills to be on its own, and virtue wills to be in charge of itself, being in charge of the soul, such that it is good and, to this extent, wills to render themselves and the soul free. But when10 unavoidable feelings and actions befall it, the good soul, rendered such by virtue, does not want them to occur, and nonetheless, even amidst them, preserves what is up to it, by returning to itself even in the sensible world. And we will say that it will not simply obey the demands of the situation, for example, when saving someone in15 danger; rather, should it think right, even in abandoning him, it orders him to abandon life, possessions, children, and his country itself, and, in so doing, it has its own beauty as aim, not the existence of those subordinate to it.
The result is, we will say, that autonomy and what is up to us are20 not to be referred back to acting,48 not to the external situation, but to the internal activity and intellection and the contemplative activity of virtue itself. This virtue must be called a kind of intellect, not reckoning with it those affective states enslaved to or moderated by reason. For those, Plato says,49 when corrected ‘by habits and exercises’ belong ‘close to the body’. And, as a result, we will say that it is25 quite clear that what is immaterial is what is free,50 and it is by this that what is up to us must be explained, and willing itself, which is in control and on its own,51 even if something, of necessity, directs it towards something external. Those things, then, which originate in willing and occur because of it are up to us, both externally and in itself.30 Whatever the will itself wills and accomplishes without hindrance, is indeed the prime case of something being up to us.
Theoretical intellect, that is, primary Intellect52 is in this way up to itself, since its function is never up to something else. On the contrary, it reverted entirely towards itself and its function,53 lying itself in the35 Good with no deficiency and fulfilled, living in a way in conformity to will. Its will is intellection, but it is called ‘will’ because its [activity] accords with Intellect. So-called will54 imitates what is in accord with Intellect, for will wants the Good, while thinking lies truly in the Good. Intellect, then, possesses what will wants, and, when will attains it, will40 becomes intellection. If we, then, posit what is up to us in the will for the Good, how can something which already has what will wants to attain55 not have what is up to it?
In fact, it must be assumed to be something greater, if one does not want to make ‘what is up to itself’ ascend to this level.
§6.8.7. Soul, then, becomes free when it hastens without hindrance towards the Good because of Intellect. And what it does because of Intellect, is up to it, while Intellect does what it does because of itself. The nature of the Good is that which is to be desired for itself, and is that because of which other things have what is up to themselves,5 when they have the power to attain it without hindrance, or when Intellect has it.56
The Good is master of all things lesser in honour, being in the primary abode,57 towards which other things want to ascend, and on which they depend,58 and from which they have their powers, such that some things are up to them. How could one bring the Good under the10 concept ‘up to it’ when that concept is properly used [only] of me and you? Intellect was just barely, albeit violently, dragged under this concept.59
We could do this only if we follow a reckless argument.60 This argument uses a different premise, and claims that, since the nature of the Good is disposed as it is by chance, and is not master of what is, and since it is not what it is on account of itself, it will have neither freedom nor what is up to it, whether or not it produces the effects which it is15 forced to produce or not to produce.
This argument is certainly repellent and without support; it does away with the nature of the voluntary and of autonomy, and the conception of what is up to us, in that, on this assumption, it would be fruitless to say these things, being mere sounds referring to non-existent things. For the argument must not just claim that nothing is up to20 anything; it must also say that this phrase cannot be thought or comprehended. If the argument admits that it can be comprehended, then it would already be refuted with ease, since the conception of what is up to us fits those things which the argument claims it does not fit.61
But this conception neither has anything to do with substantiality nor25 does it include it, since it is impossible for a thing to produce itself or to bring itself into real existence.62 Rather, our thought wants to consider which beings are slaves of others, and which have autonomy, and which are subordinate to other beings, and which are master of their own activity, a feature which belongs purely both to eternal Beings insofar as they are eternal, and to those who pursue or possess the Good without30 hindrance. Indeed, since the Good is above these, it is absurd to look for some other sort of good beside it, since it is also not correct to say that the Good exists according to chance. For chance occurs in things that are posterior and plural.63 We should not say that the first thing conforms35 to chance, nor that it is not the master of its own coming to be, because it never did come to be.
It is absurd to say that it produces effects corresponding to what it is, if one were to think that freedom then exists when something produces effects or is active contrary to its nature.64 Nor may something solitary65 actually be deprived of power, if it is solitary not through being prevented by another thing, but because it is just that thing itself and, in40 a way, is self-sufficient, and has nothing better than itself. Otherwise, one would be removing autonomy from that which attains the Good to the greatest degree.
If this is absurd, it would be even more absurd to deprive the Good of autonomy, because it is good and remains by itself, in not needing to be45 moved towards any of those things moving towards it, and being deficient in nothing. Its sort of existence, is actually its sort of activity, – for these are not two distinct things indeed any more than they are in the case of Intellect, since its activity does not66 conform to Existence, any 50more than vice versa – which means that the Good cannot be active in conformity with its nature, nor can its activity and its sort of life, be explained by reference to its sort of substantiality.67 Rather, its sort of substantiality coexists with its activity and, sort of coming about with it from eternity, produces it itself out of both, for its own sake and belonging to nothing else.
§6.8.8. We see that autonomy is not an accident of the Good; rather, we see that it has this autonomy by stripping away the contraries from things with autonomy in other respects.68 In transferring lesser attributes from lesser beings to the Good, on account of our inability to grasp those5 things which should be said of it, we would like to say the following about it; yet we are in no position to find anything to say about it, let alone anything properly applicable to it.69 Both all beautiful and all holy attributes are posterior to it, for it is their principle.70 Nonetheless, it is not their principle in another respect. Indeed, if you take everything away10 from it, then you take away the ‘up to it’, as posterior, and ‘autonomy’, since this means an activity in relation to another; so, too, ‘unhindered’, and also ‘without impediment towards others’, insofar as there are others. Generally, you should not speak of it in relation to another thing.71 It is just what it is, and is prior to them.
Since we strip away ‘is’ as well,72 so, too, we strip away anything15 relative to beings. Nor may we actually say ‘it has grown to be naturally’.73 For this is posterior also. Even if this phrase were used of intelligibles, it would be said of things coming from something else, and thus primarily of Substantiality, because this grew naturally out of the Good.74 But if nature is in temporal things, then it is not said of Substantiality.75 Nor indeed should ‘not being from itself’ be said of this nature. For we stripped away ‘is’, and ‘not from itself’ might be said20 when something is by the agency of another thing. Is it, then, accidentally thus?
In fact, not even ‘it is accidentally’ is to be applied to the Good, for no attribute is accidental to it, nor is it in relation to another thing.76
‘It is accidentally’ is said, of many things, when some things are, and they are other things accidentally; so how could the first thing of all be accidentally? Nor did it come here, so you cannot investigate how it did25 come, or which chance brought it or gave it real existence. For chance did not yet exist, nor did spontaneity.77 For spontaneity also is both derived from something else and occurs among things that come to be.
§6.8.9. But if someone were to understand ‘it is’ accidentally78 applied to the Good itself, then you shouldn’t stop with the name, you should try to comprehend what the speaker is thinking of. What, then, is he thinking of? This: by having this nature, that is, power, the Good is principle. For if it had a different nature, this other nature would be the5 principle,79 whatever it is; and if it were worse, it would be active in conformity with its substantiality.
What you should actually say in reply to this kind of thought is that it is not possible that any chance thing can be the Good, since it is principle of everything, not because any chance thing is worse, but because it is not good in some respect and not in others, like a deficiency; no, the principle of everything must be better than everything posterior to it so that the Good is something bounded. I mean by10 ‘bounded’, that it is unique, and is not what it is by necessity.80 For there is no necessity in it;81 necessity is in the things following the principle, and even in them it has no force. The solitariness comes from the Good itself. It is, then, this, namely, just what it ought to be, and not something else. It, then, is not accidentally so; it had to be so.15
And this ‘had to be’ is the principle of those things which had to be, and this cannot be accidentally the way it is. For it is not just anything it happens to be, but what it had to be. More correctly, it is not what it ought to be; rather, other things had to wait on whatever way the King may appear to them, and posit him as this, which is him himself, not as20 appearing as chance may have it, but as being the King in truth, in truth the principle and in truth the Good.82 He does not appear as being active in conformity with the Good, since then he might be thought to follow another, but as being one, just what he is; the upshot is that he is not just in conformity with the Good, he is the Good.
So, if ‘it is accidentally’ does not apply even to Being – for something belongs to being accidentally, if it is accidentally, but Being itself is not25 accidentally – then neither does Being come to be what it is accidentally, nor is it happenstance that Being is what it is, nor did it get to be the way it is from another; rather, its nature itself truly is to be Being. How can anyone apply in thought ‘it is accidentally what it is’ to something that transcends Being?83 For it has generated Being,84 which itself is not accidentally what it is; it is as Substance is, being just what Substance is30 and just what Intellect is.
Furthermore, you could then say Intellect is accidentally Intellect, as though Intellect might be something other than what the nature of Intellect actually is. Indeed, something not stepping outside itself, belonging unswervingly to itself, is what should most properly be said to be what it is.
What, then, could you say when you are in the intelligible world35 and have ascended above Intellect, and regard it? What about ‘what it is’, on the grounds that you see it in possession of being what it is accidentally?85 No: neither ‘what it is’, nor ‘it is accidentally in any way’; indeed not ‘it is accidentally’ quite generally; rather, you see it being only in this way, in no other way but this. But, again, not even ‘what it is’, for then you would be defining a something of this kind.8640 It is not possible that the onlooker is able to say either thus or not thus ‘what it is’ or ‘not what it is’. For you would be saying it is one of the Beings to which ‘what it is’ applies.
So, it is something other than all the things to which ‘what it is’ applies. But, when you see that it is indefinite87 you will be in a position to speak about all the things posterior to it, and you will say it is none of these, but if indeed at all, that it is all power, master of itself, being what45 it wants, and even more so distributing what it wants to Beings, being itself greater than any wanting, and itself positing wanting as posterior to itself.88 Neither, then, did it want to be ‘what it is’ such that it would follow on something else, nor has any other god made it what it is.
§6.8.10. But one should also ask the person who says of the Good, ‘it is accidentally thus’: How would he think ‘it is accidentally’ could be false, should it be so? And how would one strip away ‘it is accidentally’? And if it were a nature, would he deny that ‘it is accidentally’ fits? If he attributes to chance that nature which removes ‘it is accidentally what it is’ from other things, where could being not from chance come from? This principle itself removes ‘as it happens to be’ from other things, by5 giving them form or limit or shape;89 it is not possible to attribute these to chance in things that come to be what they are according to reason, but this itself [the imposition of form or limit or shape] attributes the explanation to reason, whereas chance occurs in those things which do10 not come about in orderly progression from earlier to later, but in coincidences.
How can anyone actually attribute to chance the real existence of the principle of all reason, order, and boundary?90 Indeed, chance is master of many things, not however of Intellect and reason and order in generating these things. Where chance is indeed admitted to be the15 contrary of reason, how can it be the progenitor of reason? If, then, chance does not generate Intellect, then neither will it generate what is prior to or better than Intellect. For it would have no resources with which to generate it, nor indeed would it be at all among eternal things. If, then, nothing is prior to the Good, and it is first, then we must come to a stop there, and say nothing more about it. Rather, we must investigate20 how things posterior to it came about, and not how it came to be, since in truth it did not come about.
Why, then, if it did not come to be, and is such as it is, is it not master of its own substantiality? And even if it is not master of its substantiality, but being such as it is, not making itself exist,91 in making use of itself such as it is, then it would be that which it is of necessity, and could not25 be otherwise.
In fact, it is what it is, not because it is not otherwise, but because the best is what it is. Not everything has autonomy to improve, but nothing is prevented by another thing from deteriorating.92 But, that it did not deteriorate, means that it has not deteriorated from itself, not through being prevented, but by being that which did not deteriorate. And the30 inability to deteriorate does not denote an incapacity of the thing which does not deteriorate; rather, not deteriorating lies in the thing itself and is because of it. And not coming to belong to anything else contains the extreme of power within itself, without being constrained by necessity; it is itself necessity and the law93 for other things.35
Did the necessity, then, cause itself to exist?
In fact, it did not come to exist among the other things, posterior to it, which really exist because of it. How, then, can that which is prior to real existence come to exist through another or through itself?94
§6.8.11. And what is the thing which did not come to exist?
In fact, we should retire in silence, and investigate no further, because our judgement is stuck without any resources. What indeed could anyone investigate further, when he has no further way of proceeding, since all investigation proceeds to the principle, and comes to a standstill at it?5
Additionally, all investigation has to be thought of as being either of what something is, or of how it is qualified, or why it exists, or if it exists.95 Existence, then, in the way we say the Good exists, [is known] from things after it.96 Looking for why it exists is to look for a different principle. But there is no principle of the principle of all. Looking for the quality is to look for what it is accidentally, and that in the case of10 something which is not anything accidentally. The question ‘what is it?’ makes clear that we should not seek to discover anything about it; rather, grasping it alone, if possible, in our intellects, having learned that it is not licit for anything to be attributed to it.
Generally, we are accustomed to ponder this puzzle – those of us who ponder this nature at all – by first positing position, that is, place, as15 a kind of chaos.97
Next, once there is position, we introduce this nature into the place that comes to be or is in our imagination. Once we have introduced it to this kind of place, we thus investigate just how and from where, in a way, the Good came to be in the sensible world and, since it is like a stranger,20 to investigate its presence and its sort of substantiality and, moroever, from which depth or height it was flung into this place.
For this reason, we must, in removing the cause of the puzzle, bring it about that the attention directed towards the Good ignores all place, and not to posit the Good in any place, neither as always lying in a place,25 and having its seat there, nor as having come to it. Rather, we must direct attention to the Good as being only as it is, having been said to be as it is by the necessity of our statements, whereas place, like other attributes, too, is posterior, indeed posterior to all things.
If, then, we consider it to be without place,98 as we do, we will not posit anything around it as if it were encircled, nor are we able to grasp30 its quantity, nor will we assert that it is accidentally a quantity. Nor indeed is it qualified in any way. For there is no shape around it, not even an intelligible one. Nor is it said in relation to anything, for it existed by itself before there was anything else.99 What, then, would ‘it is accidentally what it is’ be?
In fact, how shall we be able to say this since everything else said of it is said by stripping away?100 The result is rather that instead of saying35 that ‘it is accidentally what it is’, it is truer to say that ‘it is not accidentally what it is’ since it is not accidentally in any respect at all.
§6.8.12. What, then? Is the Good not what it is? Is it at least master of being what it is or of transcending Existence?101 For the soul, not persuaded102 by anything we have said, finds itself at an impasse. So, this is what is to be said in response to these objections, namely, that each of us, in respect of the body, must be far from Substantiality but, in5 respect of the soul and what we are most of all,103 we participate in Substantiality, and we are a substance, that is, in a way, a composite of differentia and substantiality.104
We are, then, not Substance properly speaking, and not Substantiality itself.105 For this reason, we are not masters of our own substantiality. For the substantiality is, in a way, one thing and we are another, and we are not masters of our substantiality; rather, the substantiality10 is master over us if indeed it adds the ‘differentia’.106 Since, however, we are in a way precisely what is master of us, we may thus be said to be in the sensible world no less masters of ourselves.
But that107 of which the substantiality itself is completely what it is – and it is15 not one thing and its substantiality another – in this case, it is what it is and is master of this, and is no longer to be related [to the substantiality of] another insofar as it exists and insofar as it is substance. For it is again left to be master of itself insofar as it is primarily related to its [own] substantiality.
As for the factor that actually has made the Substance [Intellect] free, and which is naturally such as to make it free,108 and which one might call ‘freedom-maker’, what could that be slave to if indeed it is licit to say20 such a thing at all? A slave to its own substantiality? But Substance is free because of the Good and is posterior to the Good, which has no substantiality. If, then, there is activity in it, and we posit it to consist in the activity, this would not be grounds for it being different from itself, nor for it not being master of itself, from whom the activity derives, because25 the activity is not different from it. But if we generally do not admit actuality to be in it,109 but claim instead that other things have their real existence by their actuality in relation to it, then all the less will we grant that master and mastered are in the intelligible world.
But neither will we grant it to be master of itself, not because something else is master of it, but because we have attributed being master of30 itself to Substance,110 and we posit the Good to be at a greater level of honour than is in conformity with being master of itself. What, then, is there at a greater level of honour than something which is master of itself?
In fact, it is because in the intelligible world, Substance and actuality, although two things in a way, provide the conception of ‘master’ from the actuality, although this was identical to the Substance; because of35 this, being master became separate and Substance was said to be master of itself. But where it is not two taken together as one but just one – for the Good is activity alone, or it is not activity at all – then it is not correct to speak of it being master of itself.
§6.8.13. But even if these names must be applied to the object of the investigation, let it be said once more that these names are not correctly applied because one should not make the Good two even in conception; but now we need to deviate from strict accuracy in our arguments for the5 sake of persuasion. For if we were to attribute activities to it, and attribute its activities to what is in a way its willing – for it is not active unwillingly – and its activities are in a way its substantiality, then its willing and its substantiality will be identical. If this holds, therefore, as it will, so it is. It is, therefore, not the case that it wills and is active according to its nature rather than its substantiality controlling the way10 it wills and is active. It, therefore, is entirely master of itself, in possessing existence in itself.
Actually, consider this. Each being, in desiring the Good,111 wills to be that rather than what it itself is; and it thinks it is most of all that, when it participates in the Good. In such a case, each thing chooses for15 itself existence insofar as it can come to possess it from the Good. The grounds for this are that, for the Good, the nature of the Good is clearly more choice-worthy112 for itself, if indeed any portion of the Good in another thing is most choice-worthy for that thing and, for the Good, substantiality is voluntary, and comes to it by wishing, and since it is one and identical with its wishing, and exists because of wishing.20 And as long as each thing has not come to have the Good, it wants something other than itself, and insofar it has the Good, it at once wants itself already and is; and presence like this is not by chance, nor is its substantiality outside willing. And it is defined by this, and belongs to itself by this.
If, then, each thing produces itself by the Good, clearly it then25 becomes such as the Good would be towards itself primarily, by which other things, too, are being for themselves. And its wishing to be such as the Good is, goes together with its sort of substantiality. It is not possible for anyone to grasp the Good without its wanting for itself to be such as it is. Its wanting to be itself coincides with113 its being itself30 that which it wants, and the wishing and itself are one, and it is not less one because it did not happen to be and that which it willed to be another. For what else would it want to be other than what it is?
Indeed, if we were to suppose it to choose for itself what it wanted to become, and that it is possible for it to alter its nature into another thing,35 neither would it will to become another thing, nor would it blame itself for being that which it is by necessity, since this is ‘being itself’, which it always wanted and wants. For in truth the nature of the Good is wishing for itself, without being bribed by, or slavishly following, its own nature, but in choosing itself, because there was nothing else such that it could40 be dragged towards it.
Further, one could also say that everything other than the Good does not include in the account of its substantiality the principle of self-satisfaction; for it might be dissatisfied with itself. But the choice of and wishing of itself is necessarily included in the real existence of the 45Good; otherwise, it would scarcely be possible for another thing to be satisfied with itself, since things are satisfied with themselves by partaking of the Good or by their imagining themselves doing so.
We must go along with the names, should someone use them of necessity in talking about the Good just by way of indication, although we are not allowed to say them in all strictness. Add ‘in a way’ to each of50 them!
If, then, the Good has been established as really existing, and choice and willing together comprise its existence – it cannot be without them – then choice and willing will not be many, and willing, substantiality, and wanting114 must be drawn together into one. If wanting comes from it, then necessarily its existence comes from it, and the result is that the55 argument has shown that it has produced itself.115 For if willing comes from it, and is in a way a function of it, and willing is identical to its real existence, then in this way it will have brought itself into real existence. The result is that it is not any chance thing, but what it willed itself to be.
§6.8.14. Moreover, we should also regard the matter as follows. Everything that is said to be can be identical with, or different from, its own essence. For example, this human being is one thing, and the essence of a human being something else, given that a human being partakes of the essence of a human being. Soul, in contrast, and the5 essence of soul are identical,116 if soul is something simple and not said of another thing, and human being is identical with the essence of a human being.117 And though a human being can come to be by chance, insofar as he is different from the essence of a human being, the essence of a human being cannot come to be by chance. For Human Being itself comes from itself.
If indeed the essence of a human being comes from itself and not by10 chance or accidentally, how can that which is above Human Being itself, and which is generative of Human Being itself indeed from which all Beings come, be by chance?118 It is after all a simpler nature than the essence of Human Being, and the essence of Being quite generally.
Furthermore, it is not possible, as one moves towards the simple, to take chance with you; the result is that it is impossible for chance to15 ascend to the simplest thing.
Furthermore, we should recall something said elsewhere,119 namely, each of the true Beings comes to have real existence through the agency of the nature of the Good, and if something20 among sensibles is of a certain kind,120 it is of a certain kind by coming from those true Beings. By ‘being of a certain kind’ I mean possessing, along with substantiality, the explanation for the existence of such a substance,121 such that the researcher in retrospect can express the reason why each of the features present in it is there – for example, why there is an eye, and why the feet of such and such an animal are as they are – and that there is an explanation which pertains to each of the parts of each thing, and that the parts25 are there because of one another. Why are the feet elongated? Because this feature is such and such, and because the face is such and such, the feet are such and such. And in general the concord of all parts with each other is their reciprocal explanation; and the explanation why this part is, is that this is what it is to be a human being.
The result is that the existence and the explanation [of the parts] are one, that is, identical. These come from one source in this way,30 a source which did not engage in calculative reasoning but which provided altogether the ‘why’ and the ‘that’.122 It, then, is the source of existence and of the explanation for existence, because it provides both. But just as in the case of things that come to be, the thing they derive from is much more of an archetype, truer and, to a greater extent than in the case of things that come to be, related to the better.35 If, then, none of the things which have their explanations in themselves are random or by chance or accidental, it has everything from the Good, since it is the ‘father of reason and of explanation’, I mean, of explanatory Substantiality.123 It must be the principle, like a paradigm for anything certainly with no share in chance, truly the40 paradigm, the primary paradigm, unmixed with chance events and spontaneity and accidents, itself being the explanation for itself, from itself, and because of itself. For it is primarily itself, and is itself above Being.124
§6.8.15. And it is itself an object of love and love, that is, love of itself,125 inasmuch as it is only beautiful126 by reason of itself and in itself.127 And indeed whatever is present to itself would not be so if that which is present and that to which it is present were not one or identical. If the thing that is present is one with the thing to which it is present, and5 the thing in a way desiring, one with the thing desired, but the thing desired is with respect to its real existence even like a substrate, then once again128 desire will have shown itself to be identical to substantiality. If that is so, then it is the identical being that produces itself, and is master of itself, and did not come to be such as another wanted, but as it10 itself wanted.
Further, if we were to say that the Good takes nothing into itself, nor does anything take it into itself, we would make it such as to be outside the realm of chance, not only by making it isolated, and pure of all else, but also for the following reason. If we ourselves were to see a nature like this in ourselves, with nothing in it of the other things15 attached to us, due to which we undergo whatever happens and whatever is present by chance129 – for all else in us is enslaved and exposed to chance events, dependent on us in a way according to chance – to this alone belongs our mastery of self and autonomy, by means of the activity of a light Good-like130 and good, a light greater20 than that of Intellect, in that this activity is so disposed that its being above Intellect is not an acquired attribute.
On actually ascending to this, and becoming this alone, casting aside all else, what could we say about it, except that we are more than free, and have more than autonomy? Who would connect us with chance events, either random or due to an accidental attribute, once we have become the true Life itself, or having come to be in it, which contains25 nothing else, but is just itself?
Other things, then, which become isolated are not self-sufficient for their existence, whereas the Good is what it is even when it is isolated.131 Primary real existence132 does not depend on anything inanimate or on non-rational life. For non-rational life is weak in existence, since it is a30 scattering of reason and indeterminate. To the extent that it progresses towards reason, it leaves chance behind. For if something accords with reason, then it is not by chance. For us, once we have made the ascent, the Good is not reason but more beautiful than reason. Such is the distance separating it from being a chance accident. For the root of reason originates in itself, and all things come to an end in it, like the principle and foundation of a very large plant living according to an expressed principle, resting in itself, and giving the plant that expressed principle which it itself receives.133
§6.8.16. Since we say, and it is generally admitted, that the Good is everywhere134 and again nowhere,135 we should ponder this, and consider what kind of thing those who look at it from this point of view should posit the objects of our enquiry to be. For if it is nowhere, then it is not accidentally anywhere, and if everywhere, then it is everywhere5 such as it is itself. The upshot is that it itself is being everywhere and being in every way, not because it is in the ‘everywhere’, but because it is the ‘being everywhere’ and gives being to others situated side by side everywhere. By possessing the topmost rank, or rather not possessing it, but being itself topmost, the Good possesses all things as subservient10 without itself being an accidental attribute of other things, but the other way round. It would be better to say that the other things are around it, while it does not regard them, but the other way round.136 It is borne in a way inside itself, as though loving itself, in the pure radiance,137 being itself that which it loved, that is, it has made itself exist,138 if indeed it is15 persisting activity and the most loved thing, like Intellect.139
But Intellect is the result of actuality; hence, the Good is that, too, but not of anything else.140 It is, therefore, the result of its own activity. It is, therefore, not as it is accidentally; rather, it is as it itself acts.
So, furthermore, if it exists most of all, because it fixes itself relative to itself, and in a way regards itself, and this being for itself, in a way, is its20 self-regard, as though it would produce itself, then it is not as chance would have it, but the way it wants to be, nor is its wishing random, nor accidentally as it is. For because its wishing is of the best, it is not random.
But that this sort of inclination towards itself, being in a way an25 activity of itself, and a persistence in itself, produces what it is, is testified to by supposing the opposite. If its inclination were towards that which is outside itself, it would destroy what it is. Being, therefore, just what it is, it is activity relative to itself. This is one thing, namely, itself.
It, therefore, brings itself into existence, because its activity is brought about along with it. If, then, its activity did not come to be,30 but always was, and like a waking141 when the being who is awake is not something else than the waking, always a waking and super intellection,142 then it is in such a way that it is awake. And the waking transcends143 Substantiality and Intellect144 and intelligent life, though35 it is these. It, therefore, is activity beyond Intellect, intelligence, and Life. These come from it and nowhere else. Its existence, therefore, originates in it, and comes from it. There it is not as it is accidentally, but as it wanted itself to be.
§6.8.17. Furthermore, we argue as follows. We say that everything in the universe, and the universe itself, are disposed in such a way as to be just as the choice of the producer145 would want. And they are also disposed such as would be the case if the producer were proceeding and5 foreseeing as a result of acts of calculative reasoning which are in conformity with providence. Since everything is always disposed in this way, and always comes to be in this way, we say that the rational grounds of everything lie in those Beings which are together, established in greater order.146
The result of this is that these things, that is, all Beings, transcend 10providence in the intelligible world and transcend choice, and are always, because they are intellectually fixed. Consequently, should someone call this order ‘providence’, he should understand that, prior to this, the intellect of the universe is established, from which this universe is derived, and which it conforms to.
If, then, Intellect is prior to all things, and this kind of intellect is a principle, it cannot be as it chances to be, since, although it is a multiplicity, it harmonizes with itself, because it is in a way ordered15 into a unity. Nothing that is a plurality and a multiplicity, when ordered together, or all rational grounds, comprised in a unity throughout the universe, is as it chances or is accidentally as it is. That is far from this nature,147 indeed contrary to it, just as much as chance, depending on non-rationality, is distant from reason. If that which is prior to this reason is a principle, it is clearly continuous with what has been made to conform to reason, and what has been made to conform to reason148 in20 this way is in conformity with that principle, and, by partaking of the Good, is such as the Good wants, and is a power of the Good. So, it is one continuous reason149 for all things, one number, and one greater and more powerful than what has come be. Nothing is greater or better than it. It, therefore, does not have either being, or its being such as it is,25 from anything else. It is, then, for itself what it is in relation to itself and towards itself, such that it is not thus in relation to the outside or to something else, but wholly towards itself.150
§6.8.18. In your investigations, do not look for anything outside it; everything posterior to it is within it. And leave it alone, for it is the outside, embracing all things, and the measure of all things.151
In fact, it is inside in the abyss, and on the outside lies all that is reason and intellect, touching it in a sort of circle, and dependent on it. Insofar5 as it touches it and in the way it depends on it, it must be Intellect, inasmuch as its being Intellect derives from it.
Then, it is just as a circle,152 where it would be agreed that it has its power from the centre, inasmuch as it is connected to that centre, and in10 a way has the form of the centre, in that the lines in a circle,153 in meeting at the centre, make their limit such that they are extended to it and in a way grow out from it. Because the centre is more important in relation to these lines and their outer limits,154 the points on the lines15 are like the centre, but merely vaguely, mere traces of the factor which has the power to determine the points, in having the power to determine the lines, which everywhere contain the centre.155 Through the lines, the centre also becomes apparent, as the kind of thing it is, in a way, developed without having been developed.
In this way, one should grasp that Intellect, that is, Being, which comes about from the Good, and is, in a way, poured out, and developed20 from it and depends on it,156 gives evidence by its intelligent nature of a sort of intellect in the One although this [One] is not Intellect, for it is one. Just as in the case of the circle, the centre is neither lines nor circle, but is the father of lines and circle, by giving traces of itself, and produces lines and circle with a persisting power; they come about from a kind of strength without being cut off from it at all. So, too, with the25 Good; it serves as the archetype of the image of itself,157 when the intellectual power is running around it, whereas Intellect comes about by being overcome by the many, and turning into the many Beings. The Good persists all the while its power generates Intellect.15830
What coincidence, or spontaneity, or accidental being, could come close to such a power, producer of Intellect, that is, producer of what really is? For what is in the One is many times greater than what is, in a way, in Intellect. It is just as when light is scattered abroad from a single source, which in itself is luminous. The scattered light is an35 image, its source is the true original. The scattered image, Intellect, does not differ in form;159 it is not chance, but each [element] in it is an expressed principle and a cause160 but the Good is the cause of this cause. It is, therefore, to a greater degree in a way more causal, indeed more truly a cause, since it contains all together the intelligible causes40 which are about to come to be from it.161 It is generative, not just as chance will have it but as it wants. Its wishing is not non-rational, nor is it arbitrary, and not forced on it, but as it ought to be, since nothing there is without purpose.162
Hence, Plato163 speaks of ‘what it ought to be’ and the ‘opportune moment’, when he wanted to show, as far as possible, that it is far from45 chance, and that it is as it ought to be. This ‘as it ought to be’ is not non-rational, and if it is the opportune moment, then it is much the most authoritative thing among those posterior to the Good, and prior to the other Beings by being the Good itself; and it is not just as it chances to be, but just as it willed it, if indeed it wills what ought to be, and what50 ought to be and its activity is one thing. And it ought to be, not as a substrate, but as a primary activity that makes itself apparent as what it ought to be. This is how one ought to speak of it, since one is unable to speak as one wants.
§6.8.19. Let one, then, understand the Good itself from what has been said, by being moved to ascend to it! Then one will even see for oneself, although one is unable to say what one wants. If someone sees the Good in itself,164 although he has put aside any account of it, he will posit it as being derived from itself, such that, if indeed it had substantiality, that5 substantiality would be subservient to it, and in a way derived from the Good. Nor would anyone dare, on seeing it, to say ‘as it is accidentally’; indeed, one cannot speak at all. If one did dare, one would be stupefied, and even rushing towards it, one would not be able to say ‘where’ about it, inasmuch as it appears, in a way, everywhere before the soul’s eyes.16510 Everywhere one looks, one sees the Good, unless one looks elsewhere, letting the god go and thinking no more of it.
One should understand the riddling saying of the ancients ‘transcends Substantiality’166 like this: not only does it mean that it produces15 Substantiality, but also that it is subservient neither to Substantiality nor to itself. Nor is Substantiality a principle for it; rather, it is itself principle of Substantiality; it did not produce Substantiality for itself; rather, having produced it, it left it outside itself inasmuch as it did not need the Existence it produced. So, it does not produce that which exists according to its own existence.
§6.8.20. What, then? Someone might say: Has it not come to be accidentally before coming to be? For if it produces itself,167 as itself it is not yet; however, from the point of view of production it is already before itself, that which is produced.
To this one should indeed say that the Good is not to be ranked with5 the thing produced but with the producer, in that we posit its production to be absolute, not so that something else may be completed from its production, given that its activity does not complete something else; rather, the Good is everything. For it is not two, but one. We should not be afraid to posit the primary activity as without substantiality; this itself10 is to be posited as, in a way, its real existence.168
But if one were to posit real existence without activity, then the principle would be deficient, and the most perfect principle of all, imperfect. But if one adds activity to it, one does not preserve its unity. If, then, activity is more perfect than is substantiality, and the15 first thing of all is most perfect, activity would be primary. In being active, then, it is already the first thing, and it is not possible that it was before coming to be. For it was not the case that it did not exist before coming to be; rather, it was already entire. Since activity certainly does not serve substantiality, it is purely free,169 and in this way it is itself from itself. For if it were preserved in existence by something else, it20 would not be first on his own account. If indeed it is rightly said to maintain itself, then it is itself that produces itself, because from the beginning it has produced the thing that naturally maintains it.
If, then, there was a time when he began to be, ‘having produced’ would be the most proper way of speaking. As it is, if it was just what it25 is even before eternity was, ‘having produced itself’ should be understood to make ‘having produced’ and ‘itself’ go together. For existing is one with the producing and the sort of eternal generation. Hence, ruling itself, if it is two, and if one, then just ruling. For it contains nothing ruled.
How, then, can there be something ruling without there being something30 it is relative to?
In fact, ruling is here relative to what was before it, because there was nothing. If there was nothing prior to it, then it is first. Not in rank, but in authority, and power, purely autonomous. And if it is purely autonomous, then there is nothing not autonomous to be got hold of there. It is, then, entirely in itself, autonomous over itself. What, then, is there which belongs to it that is not it? What, then, is35 not its own activity? And what is not its own function? For if there were a function in it not its own, it would not be purely either autonomous or omnipotent. For it would not be master of that thing which is not its own, nor would it be in that respect omnipotent. For it has no power over something which it is not the master of producing.
§6.8.21. Was it, then, able to produce itself as something other than what it did produce?
In fact, we will not undermine the possibility of its producing good on the grounds that it would not produce evil. For power in the intelligible world is not such that it extends to contraries as well170 but with an unwavering and unalterable power, which is most of all5 power, when it does not breach unity. For having the power to produce contraries belongs to powerlessness, when compared to persisting in the best.
The producing that we are talking about, though, must be a once only thing, for it is beautiful. And who is such that he could divert by willing what a god has produced, that is, willed? By the will, then of10 something that does not yet exist? And what could its will be if its real existence is without willing? Where, then, does its will come from? From inactive substantiality?
In fact, there is will in its substantiality; therefore, there is nothing different from its substantiality.171 Or was there something like willing, which it was not? It, therefore, was entirely willing, and there was15 nothing not willing in it. Therefore, there was nothing prior to willing. Therefore, willing is primarily itself. Therefore, also the way it willed, and the kind of thing it willed, and what followed from its willing, which this kind of willing generated – it generated nothing still in him – it was already.
Its self-maintenance should be grasped as follows, if one may speak20 correctly like that at all, namely, that all those things that there are, are held together due to it. For this is by a kind of participation in it.172 And everything is to be explained by reference to this.173 On its own account, it needs no maintenance or co-presence with them, but rather has all things in itself; better, none of them, and it does not need all things to be25 itself.
But whenever you speak or think of it, cast all else aside, leaving it alone. Once you have cast all else aside, do not try to add anything; be careful lest you have omitted to cast aside something in your understanding. For it is possible for even you to get hold of something of30 which nothing else can be said or grasped.174 Still, this alone, lying above all, is in truth free, because it is not enslaved to itself, but merely is itself, and truly itself, while all else is itself plus something else, too.
1 Up to it, or us or them, that is, to do something or its opposite, indicating, minimally, moral or legal responsibility but also equivalent to what is indicated by the words ‘free will’. These phrases translate τὸ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν which is an important term in Aristotle and then Stoic discussions of action. Alternative translations are ‘dependent on us’, ‘in our power’, ‘authority over ourselves’. However, asking whether anything depends on the god(s) or is in their power would be strange. Cf. 3.1.7.14–16. See Ar., EN 3.1.1110a17–18, 4.1111b30, 5.1112a31, 7.1113b5; SVF 2.298 (= Plutarch, De St. repug. 1047b); Epictetus, Disc. 1.1.
2 Cf. infra 21.1–8. See Alex. Aphr., De fato 204.12–16.
3 I.e., the One.
4 I.e., Intellect, Soul, undescended intellects, and intelligibles, here and infra in l. 21.
5 Cf. 5.3.15.33, etc.
6 I.e., looking to ourselves rather than to the gods. See e.g., Ar., EN 3.5.1113b5; SVF 2.285 (= Cicero, Acad. Pr. 2.143), 295 (= D.L., 7.42).
7 See Ar., Meta. 5.1015a26–28; EN 5.10.1135a33.
8 Cf. 3.1.9.11–13.
9 E.g. Oedipus. See Ar., EN 5.8.1135a28–30; Alex. Aphr., De fato 14.183.27–30, 15.185.13.
10 Reading κακεῖνο with HS1.
11 See Ar., EN 3.1.1110b33–1111a2, 5.1113b30–1114a3; Alex. Aphr., De fato 14.2.2.183.27–30.
12 See Ar., EN 3.2.1110b30–33.
13 See Pl., Rep. 435C–441C; Ar., EN 3.3.1111a25–34.
14 See Ar., EN 3.4.1111b8–9. Plotinus, unlike Aristotle, does not use ‘voluntary’ for children and animals. He wants to restrict the voluntary to the actions of rational animals.
15 Cf. 3.1.7.14, 6.15.18.
16 See Ar., EN 3.4.1111b8–9, 1114a32, 7.1149b35–1150a1; Alex. Aphr., De fato 14.183.30–184.9.
17 See Ar., EN 3.5.1114b29.
18 See Ar., DA 3.10.433a18–20.
19 See SVF 3.177 (= Plutarch, De St. rep. 1057a).
20 Cf. 3.3.4.31–34.
21 See Alex. Aphr., De fato 14.184.15–19.
22 See the Stoic view that what is up to us is assent to a representation, e.g., SVF 2.285 (= Cicero, Acad. Pr. 2.143).
23 Cf. supra 1.18.
24 Cf. supra.2.10.
25 The word is αὐτεξούσιον. Alternative translations are: self-determination, sovereignty. See SVF 2.975 (= Hippolytus, Philos. 21), 2.990 (= Origen, De princ. 3.110 Delarue); Alex. Aphr., De fato 182.24.
26 Cf. 1.1.3.4; 2.3.9.10; 3.6.1.2; 4.2.2.23; 5.3.2.6.
27 Cf. 3.1.7.13–15.
28 I.e., used in arguments about how to act.
29 Following HS1 in preserving the last line which is bracketed by HS2.
30 I.e., Beings in the intelligible world.
31 See Ar., EN 3.1.1110a2.
32 Omitting the οὐκ ἔχει as due to dittography after οὐχ οὗ: blame does not attach to slavery because it is a positive power for the bad, but because slaves perform someone else’s good.
33 See Pl., Rep. 443D4; Tim. 89D3–4; Lg. 645B1–2.
34 Cf. 5.3.7.18; 6.7.40.14.
35 Because the Good is not outside anything. All things are in it.
36 The term is τὸ ὁρώμενον (‘an orientation’) which is a correction by Kirchhoff, followed by HS2, for τὸ ὁρώμενον (‘that which is seen’). Either reading is difficult to construe.
37 The terms τὸ αὐτεξούσιον (‘autonomy’) and τὸ ἐπ’ αὐτῷ (‘up to it’) are being used synonymously.
38 See Ar., EN 4.2.1120a23; 10.8.1178b6; Alcinous, Didask. 152.33–153.4.
39 Plotinus here agrees with the Stoics. Cf. supra 2.35. See Plutarch, De comm. not. 27.1071c–d.
40 I.e., the willing and reasoning preceding the action; these are up to us, not the action itself.
41 See Pl., Phil. 11D4; Ar., EN 2.5.1106a22–24.
42 Cf. 1.2.2.13–16. See Pl., Phil. 45D–E.
43 Cf. 2.3.9.17; 4.4.38.25. See Pl., Rep. 617E3.
44 Cf. 1.2.6.11–15; 6.7.35.5.
45 Cf. supra 1.32–33.
46 See Ar., EN 3.7.1113b6.
47 See Pl., Rep. 617E3.
48 See Pl., Rep. 443C10–D1.
49 See Pl., Rep. 518D10–E2.
50 Cf. 5.1.10.19–21.
51 The words ἐφ’ ἑαυτῆς (‘on its own’) indicate relative causal independence. Cf. supra l. 7; 4.3.3.26; 6.4.2.39; 6.5.1.18.
52 See Ar., DA 3.9. 432b26–27.
53 Cf. 5.1.7.5, 12–13; 5.2.1.10.
54 I.e., the will involved in actions of the body–soul composite.
55 I.e., the Good. Plotinus has now discussed the ‘up to it’ in Intellect and Soul. Now, on this basis, he turns to the Good.
56 Cf. supra 5.29.
57 See Pl., Rep. 519D1; Ar., EN 1.1.1094a3.
58 Cf. infra 9.35; 1.8.2.3; 6.5.10.2; 6.6.18.48; 6.7.42. See Ar., Meta. 12.7.1072b13.
59 These very compressed lines are translated ad sensum.
60 Intellect was ‘dragged’ to the sensible world where things were up to human beings with intellect. Perhaps what follows is a reference to a Gnostic argument (cf. 2.9.15.10), although other targets have been suggested, including Epicurus, certain Christian theologians, and the Peripatetic Alexander of Aphrodisias.
61 I.e., the Idea of the Good as first principle of all.
62 I.e., the conception of autonomy or what is up to something is not about self-creation.
63 See Ar., Phys. 2.6.198a9–10.
64 See Pl., Parm. 153B8–D3.
65 See Ar., Meta. 7.15.1040a29.
66 Reading οὔτι with Kirchhoff rather than the ὅτι of HS2. On the latter reading, either Plotinus would have to be saying what he denies, namely, that activity follows being more than being follows activity or else the questionable claim would have to be put in the mouth of an objector. But this sentence does not otherwise indicate that.
67 The expression οἷον (‘sort of’, ‘in a way’) indicates that the terms ‘being’, ‘activity’, ‘life’, and so on only apply to the Good analogously. Cf. infra 8.4–5, 13.48–51; 5.5.3.23.
68 Cf. 5.3.13.1, 14.1; 5.5.6.12; 6.7.36.7.
69 I.e., non-metaphorical.
70 Cf. 5.2.1.1.
71 Cf. infra l. 22.
72 See Pl., Parm. 141E9–10.
73 Cf. supra 4.5, 4.26, 7.50–52.
74 Playing on the etymological connection between φύσις (‘nature’) and ἔφυ (‘was born’).
75 Cf. supra 7.3.
76 Cf. infra 11.32, 17.27–28; 6.7.23.18.
77 See Ar., Phys. 2.6.197a36ff.
78 Cf. supra 8.22.
79 Retaining ἀρχή deleted by HS2 following Kirchhoff.
80 The Good is not bounded by having an essence. Cf. e.g., 5.5.6.5–6. It is bounded in a way only by its uniqueness and its being uniquely unconstrained by any necessity.
81 Contra Ar., Meta. 12.7.1072b10 who says the Prime Mover exists by necessity.
82 Cf. 1.8.2.8; 2.9.9.34; 5.1.8.2; 5.3.12.42; 6.7.42.10. See Pl. [?], 2nd Ep. 312E.
83 I.e., the Good. Cf. infra 16.34, 19.13 where the phrase is ἐπέκεινα οὐσίας. See Pl., Rep. 509B9.
84 Cf. 3.8.9.41; 5.1.6.7, 25–40; 5.2.1.8; 6.7.32.2.
85 Reading ἆρά γε τὸ οὕτως, ὡς εἶδεν αὐτὸν ἔχοντα τὸ οὕτως συνέβη following Theiler.
86 An individual substance, τόδε τι. See Ar., Cat. 3b10.
87 Cf. supra 1.10, where the term is ὡρισμένον (‘bounded’), meaning set apart by its uniqueness; 6.9.3.39, 43 where the term is ἄμορφος (‘without shape’) and 6.9.6.10–12, where the term is ἄπειρος (‘unlimited’). Here it is ἀόριστος (‘indefinite’).
88 Cf. 3.8.10.1; 5.1.7.9–10; 5.4.1.36; 5.5.12.38–40; 6.7.42.21–24.
89 Cf. 6.7.17.36, 40–41.
90 Cf. infra l. 36, 15.28.
91 This is the inference of the objector.
92 The Greek is τὸ χεῖρον ἐλθεῖν, literally ‘to come to the worse’.
93 See for this role of god in the Stoics, e.g. SVF 1.537, Cleanthes’ Hymn to Zeus (= Stobaeus, Ecl. 1.25.3).
94 I.e., the Good is prior to the real existence of all that exists because of it. Cf. infra 11.33, 13.57, 16.14–15, 20.11.
95 See Ar., AP 2.1.89b24–25.
96 See Pl., Phdr. 245D2–3.
97 See Hesiod, Theog. 116; Ar., Phys. 4. 1.208b31–33.
98 Cf. 6.5.8.32; 6.9.6.30–31.
99 Cf. supra 8.22.
100 Cf. infra 21.26–28; 5.3.17.38. See Alcinous, Didask. 164.31–33.
101 See Pl., Rep. 509B5.
102 Cf. infra 13.4.
103 Cf. 1.1; 1.4.14.1; 4.7.1.24–25. See. Pl., Alc. 1 130C; Ar., EN 9.8.1169a35, 10.1178a2–3.
104 Cf. 6.2.14.21, 19.4. The ‘difference’ is due to embodiment.
105 I.e., the Form of Humanity or perhaps the undescended intellect of each person.
106 I.e., if the embodied soul is necessarily what it is due to the Form of Humanity or the undescended intellect of each person.
107 I.e., Intellect.
108 I.e., the Good.
109 Plotinus denies ἐνέργεια to the Good in several places. Cf. 3.8.11.8–10; 3.9.9.8–12; 5.3.12.16; 6.7.17.10. But he also affirms ἐνέργεια of it. Cf. supra 12.25; infra 16.16–17; 20.9–15; 6.7.18.6. Given l. 22 supra, it seems that it is because the Good has no οὐσία that it has no ἐνέργεια. This allows Plotinus to distinguish the ἐνέργεια that it does not have from the ἐνέργεια that it does have. In the first sense, ἐνέργεια implies a δύναμις (‘potentiality’); in the second sense it does not. Everything other than the Good, including Intellect, is actualizing a potency in relation to the Good as object of desire. The one word ἐνέργεια should be understood as ‘actuality’ in the first case and ‘activity’ in the second.
110 Cf. supra ll. 13–17.
111 Cf. 1.6.7.1; 6.5.1.12; 6.7.26.6.
112 See Pl., Phil. 20D1, 54C10, 60B4–10.
113 Cf. supra 6.8.20.26, infra 54, συνυφίστησιν.
114 Retaining καὶ τὸ θέλειν which is bracketed by HS2.
115 Cf. infra 14.41.
116 See Ar., Meta. 8.3.1043b1–2.
117 See Ar., Meta. 7.6.1031a28–b3.
118 Cf. infra 18.40; 6.9.3.49.
119 Cf. 6.7.2.10, 25–30, 52–55. See Ar., AP 2.2.90a15.
120 Retaining τοιοῦτον with HS1.
121 I.e., why an animal has the characteristics it has given that the substantiality of the animal is to be instantiated.
122 Cf. 6.7.2.19, 19.18–19. Plotinus usually attributes operation without calculation to Intellect. Cf. 3.2.2.8–9; 6.7.1.32–57.
123 See Pl. [?], 6th Ep. 323D4.
124 Cf. infra 16.33; 6.9.6.44–45.
125 Cf. infra 16.13; 6.7.22.8–9.
126 In this and in following chapters, Plotinus invests the Good with a number of ‘personal’ attributes. We retain, however, the impersonal pronouns on the grounds that all of these personal attributes have to be understood οἷον (‘in a way’).
127 See Pl., Phdr. 250E1.
128 Cf. supra 13.19–20.
129 Retaining καὶ bracketed by HS2.
130 See Pl., Rep. 509A3.
131 Cf. 2.9.1.9; 5.3.13.18; 5.6.2.15; 6.6.18.53; 6.7.23.7, 33.18.
132 Cf. supra 10.12.
133 Cf. 3.8.10.10–12.
134 Cf. 3.8.9.24–28; 3.9.4.3; 5.5.8.23; 6.4.3.18.
135 See Pl., Parm. 131A–C, 138A2–3.
136 Cf. 6.9.8.35–45.
137 Pl., Phdr. 250C4.
138 Cf. supra 10.35–38, 11.1–5.
139 Cf. 2.5.3.6; 6.5.3.2; 6.7.27.18. See Ar., Meta. 7.1072b3.
140 The word is ἐνέργημα (‘the result of actuality’), that is, the result of ἐνέργεια, which can be understood either as ‘actuality’ or ‘activity’. Intellect, actualizing its potency, is ἐνέργημα according to the former sense (cf. 3.8.11.1–3); the Good, having no potency, is ἐνέργημα only according to the latter.
141 See Ar., Meta. 12.7.1072b17.
142 The term is ὑπερνόησις, a hapax in Greek literature prior to Plotinus. Cf. the related term κατανόησις, 5.3.1.4, 13; 5.4.2.17.
143 See Pl., Rep. 509B9, 521A4.
144 Ar. On Prayer apud Simplicius, In DC 12.485.19–22 (= fr. 1, p. 57 Ross).
145 I.e., the Demiurge.
146 I.e., the order of intelligible beings.
147 I.e.. the Good.
148 Reading λελογωμένον with Kirchhoff. This refers to Intellect, an expressed principle of the Good.
149 I.e., the Good is the principle of all expressed principles.
150 Cf. supra 8.22, 11.32; 1.7.1.16–17.
151 See Pl., Phil. 25B1; Tim. 30B8; Lg. 716C4.
152 Cf. 5.1.11.10–13, but here a disc is meant.
153 I.e., the radii.
154 Presumably, the points on the circumference.
155 I.e., because they are determined with reference to it and run to it.
156 Cf. 1.7.1.21; 6.7.42.22.
157 Cf. 6.7.15.8–9 where the Living Being is the archetype.
158 Reading νοῦν with HS1 and Ficino.
159 The term ἀλλοειδές (‘other in form’) is a hapax in the Enneads. Since the One has no form at all, Intellect does not differ from it by having a different form.
160 I.e., each Form is a cause or explanation for all of its instances.
161 That the Good is ‘to a greater degree’ and ‘in a way’ more causal is not intended to indicate that it is the same kind of cause as are the Forms since the Good is formless.
162 See Pl., Phil. 28D6–7.
163 See Pl., Sts. 284E6–7.
164 Reading αὑτῷ with Lavaud.
165 See Pl., Rep. 533D2.
166 See Pl., Rep. 509B9.
167 Cf. supra 13.55, 15.8, 16.14, 30.
168 Cf. supra 16.15; 5.4.2.35–38; 6.7.17.10.
169 Cf. 5.5.9.14.
170 Cf. supra 8.1–2. See Alex. Aphr., De fato 180.2, 26–27, 196.24–29. The point is that in the intelligible world, unlike the sensible world, there is no capacity for contrary actions.
171 The Good or One, which has hitherto repeatedly been said to be ‘beyond οὐσία’, is here said to be nothing other than its οὐσία. Plotinus is emphasizing the paradox arising from the fact that the Good exists and so, in some sense, οὐσία, the abstract noun formed from the verb for being, may be used of it. But its οὐσία, as is argued throughout this and previous chapters, is nothing other than its existence, its willing, or its activity.
172 Cf. 5.5.4.1–2.
173 Cf. 3.8.10.20; 5.4.1.2; 5.5.4.1.
174 Cf. 5.1.6.8–10.