2.9 (33) Against the Gnostics

§2.9.1. So, since the simple nature of the Good² appeared to us also to be first – for nothing that is not first can be simple³ – and to contain nothing within itself,⁴ being rather some one thing; and since the nature of what is called the One is identical with the Good⁵ – for the One is not first something else and next one, and neither is this Good something else and next good – [it follows5 that] when we talk about the One and when we talk about the Good, we should consider their nature to be identical and to say that this nature is ‘one’, though in doing so we are not predicating anything of it but only making its nature clear to ourselves to the extent that that is possible.⁶ And it is in this sense that we call it ‘first’ on account of its utter simplicity and ‘self-sufficient’ on account of its not resulting from a plurality of parts – for if it did result from a plurality of parts it would depend on them⁷ – and we10 say it is not in another because everything that is in another derives from another.⁸ If, then, it neither derives from another nor is in another, and if it is also not a composition [of parts], it is necessary that nothing be beyond it. So, we should not go looking for other principles; rather, we should take this as our principle, and next after it Intellect, that is, the primary thinker, and next after Intellect Soul, since this is the natural order. And we ought not15 to posit any more or any fewer principles in the intelligible world. For if anyone posits fewer, they will have to say either that Soul and Intellect are identical,⁹ or that Intellect and that which is first are identical,¹⁰ but it has been shown repeatedly that these are distinct from one another.¹¹

What remains for us to investigate right now is what other natures besides these three there could be, then, [were we to concede that] there are more than these. For no one could discover any principle that is20 simpler or higher than this principle of all things as it was just described. For, certainly, they will not maintain that there is one principle in potentiality and another in actuality, because it would be ridiculous to attempt to establish more natures among those things that are immaterial and in actuality by distinguishing between potentiality and25 actuality.¹²

But neither [could one establish more natures] among the subsequent principles. One cannot pretend that there is one Intellect that is in some state of stillness and another that is, in a way, in motion.¹³ For what would Intellect’s stillness be, and what would its motion and procession be, and what would the idleness of the one Intellect and the work of the other Intellect amount to? For Intellect just is as it is; always the same and established in a steady state of activity.30 By contrast, motion towards and around Intellect is already Soul’s work, and it is an expressed principle proceeding from Intellect into Soul that makes Soul intellectual, and not another nature between Intellect and Soul.

And surely one cannot attempt to produce more than one Intellect by saying that there is one Intellect that thinks and another Intellect that thinks that it thinks.¹⁴ For even if thinking in the sensible world35 is distinct from thinking that one is thinking, there is still a single act of apprehension that is not unaware of the results of its own acts. Indeed, it would be ridiculous to make this assumption of the true Intellect; rather, the Intellect that was supposed to be thinking will certainly be identical with the one thinking that it is thinking. Otherwise, the one will only think, and the other that thinks that it is thinking will belong to something else and not to the one that was40 supposed to be thinking.

And if they should say that this distinction is merely conceptual, they would have, first of all, given up on establishing multiple hypostases, and next, they should consider whether their conceptual distinctions can even accommodate an Intellect that only thinks without being consciously aware of itself as a thinking subject. If this disjunction of self-awareness were to occur in human beings, who, if they are even moderately virtuous people, are always looking after their45 impulses and thinking processes, they would be guilty of a lack of mindfulness.¹⁵ Actually, though, when the true Intellect thinks itself among its intelligible thoughts and its intelligible object does not come from outside itself but rather it is itself its intelligible object, then it necessarily includes itself in its thinking and sees itself. But in seeing itself it does not see itself as unthinking; rather, it sees50 itself thinking. Accordingly, Intellect’s thinking that it is thinking should be included in its primary act of thought as a single being; in the intelligible world, thinking is not even conceptually double. And if it is always thinking what it is, how could the conceptual distinction that attempts to separate its thinking from its thinking that it is thinking be accommodated?

Indeed, if in addition to the supposed doubleness, which said that Intellect thinks that it is thinking, one introduces another conceptual55 distinction that says that Intellect thinks that it is thinking that it is thinking, the absurdity will become clearer still. And why would this not lead to an infinite regress?

And if someone makes an expressed principle from Intellect and next another expressed principle from that one comes to be in Soul, so that the former principle would be intermediate between Intellect and Soul,60 he will be depriving the Soul of thinking, since Soul would not be getting its expressed principle from Intellect but from this other, intermediate principle. And Soul would have an image of an expressed principle instead of the expressed principle itself, and it would not know Intellect at all nor would it think at all.

§2.9.2. So, we ought not to posit any more principles than these nor any superfluous conceptual distinctions among them that they do not admit; rather, we must posit there to be one Intellect, unchangeably self-identical, without any inclination towards what is below it, and imitating its father as much as it can. This is in contrast to our soul, whose one part is always near those intelligible beings, while another part has5 a relation to these sensible things, and another is in between these two.¹⁶ For our soul is a single nature in a plurality of powers, and sometimes the entire soul follows the best part of itself and of being, but sometimes its worse part is dragged down and drags down the middle part along with it.¹⁷ For it is not licit for the worse part to drag10 the entire soul down.

This experience happens to the soul because it did not remain in the finest region, where the soul remained that is not a part,¹⁸ which is to say that it did not remain within the soul of which we are still a part.¹⁹ This soul of the universe granted to the body of the universe the possession of as much of it as it can possess, and it itself remains without care, without using discursive thinking to administer it or to correct its course at all; rather, it is by looking to what is before it that it sets the body of the15 universe in order due to its astonishing power. For the more it is focused on this vision, the finer and more powerful it is. And receiving from this source, it gives to what comes after it, and just as it illuminates, so, too, is always receiving illumination.

§2.9.3. Since it is always in a state of illumination, then, and possesses this light unceasingly, the soul [of the universe] gives to its successors, and they are always maintained and watered by this light and enjoy as much life as they can. It is like a fire positioned somewhere in a central area that warms whoever is able to be warmed. The fire in this example,5 however, is located in a measurable position. By contrast, when powers are at issue that have not been put in a measurable position and have not been removed from Beings, how could they exist without anything partaking of them? Rather, it is necessary that each give of itself to another; neither would the Good be Good, nor would the Intellect be Intellect, nor would Soul be that which Soul is, if it were not the case10 that with the primary act of life there is something living in a secondary manner as long as the primary act of life exists.²⁰

So, it is necessary that all things be always in succession, and those other than that which is first are generated in the sense that they derive from others. So, the intelligibles that are said to be ‘generated’ did not come into being; rather, they were and will be constantly coming into being.²¹ And they will not pass away, except those things that have something to pass into; but what does not have something to pass into15 will not pass away.

Now if someone says that these things pass away into matter, why does not matter pass away, too? And if he should say that even matter passes away, we shall respond by asking whether matter’s coming to be was necessary. If they should say that matter’s generation necessarily followed from what came before it, then it necessarily follows now, too. If, on the other hand, matter alone stands outside this chain, then the20 divinities will not cover the whole range and will be rather set apart in a certain domain and will be, in a way, walled-off from matter.²² But if this is impossible, matter will be illuminated by them.

§2.9.4. If they should say that soul produced the sensible world as if it had ‘lost its wings’,²³ the soul of the universe does not suffer this loss.²⁴ And if they should say that the soul of the universe produced the universe after having fallen, let them tell us the cause of this fall as well as when this fall occurred. For if it was from eternity, then by their5 own argument the soul remains always in a fallen state, and if it began to fall at some point, why did it not fall earlier?

We, for our part, say that it is not an act of declining but rather its not declining that accounts for the producing. If it did decline, the producing is due to its having forgotten the things in the intelligible world, but if it forgot, how does it create? For what source is there for its production other than the Forms which it saw in the intelligible world? But if it is by recollecting these that it produces, it was not declining at10 all, for it did not decline even if it had the Forms murkily. Even if its recollection is murky, would it not rather incline towards the intelligible world in order not to see murkily?²⁵ For if it has any memory whatsoever, why wouldn’t it be wanting to go back? For what could it be thinking to gain for itself by producing the cosmos? For it is absurd to say that it did this in order to gain honour, as this is a false analogy based on sculptors in the sensible world. And then if it produced the universe15 by discursive thinking and this act of production was not part of its nature and its power was not the productive power, then how did it produce this sensible cosmos?

And when will it destroy the cosmos? For if it has come to regret this production, what is it waiting for? And if it has not come to regret it yet, then it is not going to because it has already grown accustomed to the production and with time has become more well-disposed towards it. And if it is waiting for the individual souls, by now they should have20 stopped proceeding into generation since they had already experienced the evils of this world in the previous generation. So, they should have given up on proceeding into generation by now.

And one must not insist on the badness of the sensible cosmos’ generated state on account of its having many disagreeable parts. For this view [that the sensible world should not have any disagreeable parts] belongs to men whose conception of the sensible world is too grand, if they are putting it on a par with the intelligible world rather25 than with an image of it. What other image of the intelligible world could there be that is finer than this one?²⁶ For what other fire could be a better image of the intelligible Fire apart from sensible fire? And what other earth apart from sensible earth could come next after the Earth in the intelligible world? And what sphere could be more precise, more dignified, and more well-ordered in its revolution30 after the one in the intelligible world that contains the intelligible cosmos? And what other sun after the intelligible Sun could be ranked ahead of this visible sun?

§2.9.5. It is outrageous that these men who have bodies such as human beings have, as well as appetites, pains, and anger, insist on their own power and claim that they can be in contact with the intelligible, but then deny that in the sun there is a power more unaffected than our own,5 even though it is more ordered and less subject to change, and deny that the sun’s wisdom is superior to our own, even though we only recently came into being and there are so many deceptive obstacles preventing us from reaching the truth! And outrageous to say that our soul – even the soul of the basest of human beings – is immortal and divine but that the entire universe and the stars up there, though they are composed of10 much better and purer elements, do not have a share in an immortal soul, when they see for themselves the order, grace, and regularity in heaven and especially when they condemn the lack of order here in the sublunary region, as if the immortal soul chose the worse location as15 fitting to itself and wanted²⁷ to concede the better location to the mortal soul!

And their introduction of that other soul that they compose out of elements makes no sense.²⁸ For how could the composition of elements have any kind of life? For the mixture of elements makes something hot or cold or a mixture of the two, and dry or wet or a mixture from these.20 And how can soul be the principle that holds the four elements together if it has subsequently come to be from them? And what is one to say when they attribute apprehension, will, and countless other things to this mixture?²⁹

But they do not honour this creation or this earth, claiming that for them a ‘new earth’³⁰ came to be and that they will actually pass away25 from here to there, and that this ‘new earth’ is an expressed principle of the cosmos. But why do they feel the need to come to be there – in the paradigm of a cosmos that they despise? And where does this paradigm come from? According to them, immediately after the paradigm was produced its creator inclined towards the sensible world. If, then, there was present in the creator himself a great concern to create another30 cosmos after the intelligible cosmos that he possesses – and why should there have been? – and if the paradigm was there before the sensible cosmos, what is the point of creating it? [They will say:] in order to put the souls on their guard. How, then, does that explain anything? The souls were not put on their guard, and so it was created in vain. If, on the other hand, after the sensible cosmos already existed, the creator drew the paradigm from the sensible cosmos by stripping off the form from the matter, for those souls that had already been tested,35 there would have already been an adequate test for putting them on their guard. And if they maintain that the form of the cosmos is received in our souls, then why this novel way of speaking?

§2.9.6. And what do they mean with the other hypostases³¹ that they introduce – ‘sojourns’, ‘impressions’, and ‘repentings’?³² For if, when the soul is in a state of ‘repenting’, they mean these are affections of the soul, and that there are ‘impressions’ whenever, in a way, souls are contemplating images of Beings and not yet the Beings themselves,5 then this is just the jargon of men trying to market their own school. It is as if, having never been exposed to the time-honoured language³³ of the Greeks, they make this vocabulary up, though the Greeks had clear knowledge of these things and spoke of ascents from the cave³⁴ without any pompous language, as the souls proceed little by little to a vision that is truer and truer.10

For, in general, these men have drawn some of their material from Plato, while the rest consists of innovations introduced to establish their own brand of philosophy, but these were discovered by leaving the truth behind. For the judgements,³⁵ the rivers in Hades,³⁶ and reincarnations³⁷ are all drawn from Plato, and putting a multiplicity in the intelligible world – Being, Intellect, a Demiurge distinct [from15 Being and Intellect], and Soul³⁸ – this was extracted from what was said in Timaeus. For Plato says, ‘The creator of this sensible universe, then, rationally planned that it should have all of the Forms that Intellect observes as contained in the real Living Being’,³⁹ and, not comprehending Plato, they assumed that there is one Intellect in stillness and containing all Beings within it, and another Intellect,20 distinct from that one, that contemplates, as well as the [Intellect] that rationally plans – frequently ‘demiurgic Soul’ is found by them in place of the rationally planning Intellect – and they think that this is Plato’s Demiurge, though they are far from knowing who the Demiurge is.⁴⁰

And, in general, they are wrong about the manner of creation and25 about much else of Plato’s thought, and they give feeble distortions of our man’s views, as if they were the ones who had a clear grasp of the intelligible nature while Plato and the other divinely gifted men did not. And by naming a multiplicity of intelligibles, they think they will appear to have discovered the precise truth, but by this very multiplicity they are downgrading the intelligible nature by making it the same as the30 inferior, sensible nature. What they should do is to aim at the smallest possible number in the intelligible world and to remove multiplicity by attributing all these Beings to what comes after that which is first, since all these Beings are what comes after that which is first: the first Intellect or Substance and all the other beautiful things that come after the first nature.

And the form of Soul should come third. And they should look to35 find the differences among souls in their affections or natures, without disparaging these divine men, but rather considerately adopting their views, since they are more time-honoured and since the fine parts of their own doctrine are all drawn from them: the immortality of the soul,⁴¹ the intelligible cosmos,⁴² the first god,⁴³ soul’s need to40 flee its communion with the body,⁴⁴ soul’s separation from the body,⁴⁵ and its fleeing from becoming to Substance. For these things are found in a clear manner in Plato, and they would do well to state them as he does.

There are no hard feelings if they tell us in which respects they intend to disagree with Plato, but they shouldn’t promote their own45 ideas to their audiences by disparaging and insulting the Greeks! Rather, whatever strikes them as their own distinct views in comparison with the Greeks’, these views – as well as the views that contradict them – should be forthrightly set out on their own in a considerate and philosophical manner and with an eye on the truth, they should show that they are right, and they should not be chasing after fame by50 criticizing men who have long been judged – and not by men of modest abilities – to be good [philosophers], and thus claiming themselves to be better than them. For what was said by the ancients about the intelligibles was said in a learned and much better manner,⁴⁶ and those who are not deceived by their fast-talking trickery will easily55 recognize what these men have subsequently taken over from the ancients and appended certain ill-fitting additions to,⁴⁷ since⁴⁸ these are the points on which they intend to oppose the ancients by introducing absolute generations and destructions, making this universe blameworthy, blaming the soul for its association with the body,60 censuring the [Intellect] for taking care of this universe, reducing the Demiurge to being identical to Soul, and granting Soul the identical affections that belong to particular souls.

§2.9.7. It has, then, already been stated⁴⁹ that this sensible cosmos neither started existing nor will stop existing; rather, it always exists as long as those intelligible principles exist. And these men were not the first to say that our soul’s association with the body is not the preferred [mode of existence] for the soul.⁵⁰ And making assumptions about the5 soul of the universe based on our soul is analogous to the case of someone censuring an entire well-administered city on account of assumptions made on the basis of the guild of potters and smiths. Still, one should acknowledge the differences in the manner of the soul of the universe’s administration, since its manner of administration is not identical, nor is it bound to its body.⁵¹

For, again, in addition to the countless other differences that were mentioned elsewhere,⁵² one should also take this one to heart,10 namely, that we are bound by body⁵³ only because this bond already pre-existed. For it is only because the nature of body is already bound within the entirety of soul that it binds whatever it embraces.⁵⁴ But the soul of the universe itself could not be bound by the things that are bound by it. For it is the one in control, and for this reason, it is15 unaffected in the presence of these things, whereas we are not sovereign over them.

And however much of this soul is directed towards the divine heights remains unmixed and unimpeded, and however much of it gives life to body does so without being influenced by body. For, in general, if one thing is in another, it necessarily receives that thing’s affections, without itself passing on its own affections to that thing, since that thing has its20 own life. For example, if some shoot is grafted onto another plant, and this plant suffers some affection, the shoot suffers along with it, but if the shoot itself becomes parched and withered, it does not affect the base-plant and its life. For neither is fire in its entirety extinguished when the fire in you is extinguished since even if all fire should be destroyed, the soul in the case of the universe would not suffer anything; rather, only the25 constitution of the body would be affected. And if it was possible that some cosmos continues to exist because of the remaining elements, this would not concern the soul in the case of the universe.⁵⁵ For the constitution is not the same in the universe and in an individual living being. Rather, in the former case the soul, in a way, runs along the surface as it orders the elements to remain, but in the latter case the elements are bound by a second bond because they are trying to escape to their own30 ranks. But in the former case there is nowhere for them to flee to.⁵⁶

In the case of the universe, then, the soul neither has to contain them from within nor push and squeeze them in from without; rather, its nature keeps them wherever it originally intended them to be. And if in some place one of its parts is subject to a natural motion, those parts for which this motion is not natural will be affected, but qua parts of the35 whole they are nevertheless moved properly. And those parts which are not able to carry out the commands of the whole perish. This is comparable to the case of a great company of dancers moving in order with a tortoise being stranded in the middle of the procession; if it is not able to flee the ordered company of dancers, it will be trampled, but if it itself adopts their order of motion, it, too, will not suffer anything from them.⁵⁷

§2.9.8. To ask why Soul has created the cosmos is identical to [their] asking why there is Soul and why the Demiurge has created,⁵⁸ and this line of questioning belongs to those who, first, assume that what always exists has some beginning and who, next, suppose that the cause of creation was an agent who changes or undergoes an alteration from5 one state to another. We must, then, teach these men, if they will kindly suffer our teaching, what the nature of these things is, so that they might refrain from railing against what ought to be honoured, which they unscrupulously do instead of allotting to these things the high degree of reverence that would be fitting to them.

For it would not be right for one to blame the administration of the universe, since it, first of all, indicates the magnitude of the intelligible10 nature. For if it has come into life in such a way that its life is not broken up – this is the case with the smallest living beings in it that are always being generated night and day by the life within it – but if its life is rather continuous, self-evident, great, ubiquitous, and indicative of15 extraordinary wisdom, how could anyone deny that it is a fine and self-evident ‘statue of the intelligible gods’?⁵⁹

And if, as it imitates the intelligible, it is not the intelligible itself, that is precisely what is natural to it. For otherwise it would no longer be an imitation. And it would be false to say that it is an imitation bereft of sameness. For none of the things of which it can obtain a fine and natural20 image has been left out.⁶⁰ For it was necessary that this imitation not be the result of discursive thinking and contrivance, since it is not possible that the intelligible be the final product. This is so since its activity had to be double – the activity in itself and that proceeding into another.⁶¹ There, then, had to be something after it. For if there is only the intelligible, there is nothing further beneath it [in the order of procession], which is the least possible of all [views]. Also, in the intelligible25 world there runs an astonishing power, from which it follows that it also made a product.

If another cosmos better than this one actually exists, what is it? But if a cosmos is necessary and there is no other cosmos, then our cosmos is the one that preserves the imitation of the intelligible one. For the entire earth is indeed filled with all kinds of living beings including immortal30 ones, and everything up to heaven is full of them. Why are not the heavenly bodies in lower spheres and the stars in the highest region gods, given that they are transported in order and revolve around the cosmos? Why wouldn’t they possess virtue? What could prevent them from acquiring virtue? For things that do indeed make people bad in the35 sublunary region are not present in the heaven, nor is the badness of body, troubled and troubling, present there.

And why, in this untroubled state, are they not always in a state of comprehension, taking god and the other intelligible gods in with their intellects? Why should our wisdom be superior to that of these heavenly things? What man of sound mind would maintain such views? For if our souls arrived here because they were compelled by the soul of the universe,40 how could souls subject to compulsion be superior? For among souls the one that is in control is the greater one. And if they descend willingly, why do you blame the cosmos that you willingly entered and that allows anyone who is not satisfied to escape from it?⁶² But if this universe is actually such that we can be in it and have wisdom and while45 being here live according to those intelligible principles, why wouldn’t this bear witness to its dependence on those intelligible principles?

§2.9.9. And if someone should complain of wealth and poverty,⁶³ that is, of the inequality of their distribution to all people, then this person, first, fails to understand that the virtuous person is not interested in equality in these matters, nor does he think that those who have a lot of possessions are better off than those who do not, nor that those in5 positions of power are better off than private citizens,⁶⁴ and that he rather leaves concerns⁶⁵ of this kind to others. And the virtuous person is fully aware that there are two kinds of life here – that of the virtuous person and that of the human masses – and for the sage life is aimed at the highest peak and pinnacle,⁶⁶ while the life of the all-too-human has again two forms – the one life involves the recollection of virtue and10 participating in some good, while the common mob is there, in a way, to do the manual work necessary to provide for the better kind.

If someone commits a murder or is overcome by pleasures due to an inability to control himself, is it surprising that these moral errors are committed not by an intellect but by souls that are like immature children?⁶⁷ And if in a training ring there are both winners and losers,15 why should this not be true in life as well?⁶⁸ If you are wronged, what danger is there to your immortal part? Even if you are murdered, you got what you wanted.⁶⁹ And if you are now set on complaining about the world, there is no necessity for you to remain a citizen in it. And it is agreed that there are penalties and punishments here, so how can it be right to complain about the world-city that gives to each what he deserves?⁷⁰ Here in this world-city virtue is honoured, and vice20 receives the dishonour that befits it, and there are not merely statues of gods but gods themselves⁷¹ beholding the world from above,⁷² who ‘easily elude’⁷³ the responsibility that human beings attribute to them,⁷⁴ putting all things in order from beginning to end and, in the exchange of lives, giving each the lot that he deserves in accordance with his previous lives.⁷⁵ And the human being who fails to recognize25 this lot is of the more impetuous kind with a crude view of divine matters.

He ought, rather, to try to become the best human being he possibly can, and he shouldn’t think that he alone is able to become excellent – for if he thinks like this he is not yet excellent – but that other human beings can become excellent, too, and further that there are good30 daemons and, what is more, gods – both those that are in the sensible world while looking to the intelligible world and most of all the controlling principle of the sensible universe, a soul most blessed. And from there one ought then to sing the praises of the intelligible gods, and then above all of these, of the great king of that world whose greatness is revealed most especially in the multiplicity of the gods.⁷⁶ For what those35 who understand god’s power do is not to reduce divinity to a single god but to show that divinity is as profuse as god himself shows it to be when he, while remaining who he is, creates all the numerous gods who depend on him and derive their existence from him and through him.⁷⁷

And this sensible cosmos also exists through that god and looks to40 the intelligible world, and this cosmos as a whole and every god preach god’s decrees to us humans and proclaim what pleases them. And if these gods are not what that god is, this is only natural. But if you insist on despising these gods and exalt yourself as being no worse than that god, then, first, we reply that the more excellent you are the more considerately you should behave towards all, and to human45 beings, too.

Next, one must reject the crude view [of divinity] by respecting the hierarchy and ascend by going as far as our nature allows us to go, and one ought to believe that there is a place beside god for the others, too, and not rank himself alone next after god – as if by some flight of fancy! – thereby depriving oneself of becoming a god even to the50 extent that this is possible for a human soul.⁷⁸ And it is possible to the extent that Intellect leads it. But wanting to go beyond Intellect is already to have fallen outside Intellect.

Foolish people are sold on accounts such as these as soon as they hear ‘You will be superior not only to all human beings but even to the gods!’ For there is a great deal of arrogance in human beings. Even the55 man who was previously a humble and moderate private citizen is sold if he hears: ‘You are the son of god, but other men whom you used to admire are not sons of god and neither are the beings that they worship in accordance with the tradition of their fathers; you, however, are even greater than heaven without even having struggled to be so’,⁷⁹ and then others join in the chorus.⁸⁰ This is comparable to a group of60 men who do not know how to count; if one of them in his ignorance hears of a thousand cubits but only has a vague idea that a thousand is a large number, why would not this man think himself to be – what else? – a thousand cubits tall while thinking other men to be five cubits tall?⁸¹

Further, why should god pay this providential favour to all of you while neglecting the entire cosmos in which you yourselves reside? If it65 is because god is too busy to pay attention to the cosmos, then it is not licit for him to be paying attention to anything that is beneath him. And if god is paying attention to them,⁸² why wouldn’t he be directing his attention outwardly and in particular paying attention to the cosmos in which they reside? But if god does not direct his attention outside of himself and so does not watch over the cosmos, then he is not paying attention to them, either.

But they will object that they have no need of god! Yet the cosmos70 does need god and knows its own⁸³ station, and the beings⁸⁴ in the cosmos know both how they are in the cosmos and how they are in the intelligible world. And as far as human beings go, those who are dear to god know this, too, and they bear the cosmos’ influence on their lives lightly, should the revolution of the universe impose any constraining force upon them. For one should not be focused on one’s heart’s desires75 but on the whole universe. Such a man gives other individuals the honour due to them and always strives for that object towards which all things capable of striving are directed – he knows that there are many things striving to be in the intelligible world;⁸⁵ some things succeed and are blessed, while other things get as far as they can and receive the lot that they deserve – and he doesn’t grant this ability to himself alone. For80 one does not have something by its being declared that one has it.⁸⁶ Rather, there are many people who know themselves not to be in possession of what they claim to have, and who think they possess what they do not possess, even believing themselves to be the sole possessors of that which they alone do not possess.

§2.9.10. One could, then, scrutinize many other of their claims, or rather all of them, and have no problem showing how things stand with each argument. But we shall refrain from doing so because we have some sense of compassion⁸⁷ for some of our friends who encountered this doctrine before our friendship began and – don’t ask5 me how – remain attached to it. And they say the very things that the Gnostics say either because they want their views to appear plausible or else because they even believe that their views are true. But we are not addressing the Gnostics themselves – for there is no other means left to persuade them – rather, we have been addressing these things to our own acquaintances so that they might not be troubled by these Gnostics10 who provide no demonstrations – and how could they? – but only audacious claims. For if someone were attempting to defend himself against those who dare to demolish the views beautifully and truthfully advanced by ancient and god-like men, then a rather different style of writing would be required. Let us, then, leave aside that manner of15 examination. For those who have carefully followed the points we made above will also be in a position to understand how things stand with all the other claims.

But our examination should be put aside only after this one point is addressed, a point that actually exceeds all others in its absurdity, if it is fair to call the following an absurdity. They claim that soul fell down as did a certain Wisdom⁸⁸ – regardless of whether soul started20 it, or whether Wisdom was the cause of the soul’s fall, or whether they want both expressions to refer to the identical thing – and they claim that the other souls, as ‘limbs of Wisdom’, went down, too, and put on bodies, for example, human bodies. But then they go back and say that the very thing for whose sake these souls descended did not itself25 descend in the sense of falling down after all but that it merely illuminated the darkness, and that from this an image subsequently came to be in matter. And next, by fashioning an image of the image somewhere in the sensible world, through matter or materiality or whatever they want to call it – they distinguish between matter and materiality, and introduce many other terms to make their meaning30 obscure – they generate what they call the Demiurge, and by making him reject his mother,⁸⁹ they drag⁹⁰ the cosmos which derives from him down to the last of the images. Whoever wrote this did so just to be contemptuous!

§2.9.11. First, then, if it did not go down but merely illuminated the darkness, how can it be right to say that it fell? For if something like light streamed out from it, it is not right to speak of it as, for that reason, having fallen, unless I suppose the darkness was located somewhere in the lower region and soul moved towards it spatially and only illuminated5 it after it had drawn near. But if soul illuminated the darkness while remaining by itself without having to have done anything in preparation, then why did only soul illuminate the darkness and not any of the things that exist that are more powerful than soul? And if it is due to its having in itself the result of an act of calculative reasoning regarding the cosmos that soul was able to illuminate the cosmos on the basis of this calculation, why didn’t it simultaneously illuminate and10 produce the cosmos instead of waiting around for the images to be generated?

Next, even this rational conception of the cosmos, which they call ‘the foreign earth’⁹¹ and which was brought into being by superior beings, as they claim, did not lead its creators to incline downward.

Next, how is it that matter, when illuminated, produces soul-images15 rather than the nature of bodies? For an image of soul would require neither darkness nor matter; rather, once it comes into existence, if it does come to exist, it would be inseparably connected to its creator and will remain joined to it.

Next, is this image a substance or, as they say, a thought?⁹² For if, on the one hand, it is a substance, how does it differ from its source? If it is another form of soul, and if its source is a rational soul, then this image20 would presumably be a growth or generative soul. If so, how could it still be the case that it created in order to be honoured,⁹³ and how could its act of creation be due to ‘pretension’ and ‘audacity’?⁹⁴ And, in general, their claim about creation proceeding through representation and, what is more, through rational planning, will be undone. And why, moreover, was it necessary to produce the creator out of matter and an image? If, on the other hand, it is a thought, then they have first of all to tell us25 where it gets its name from, and next, how this is possible without granting thoughts the power to create. But putting this fictional possibility aside, how does the creation work? They say that this comes first, and something else comes next, but they are just speaking arbitrarily. Why was fire created first?

§2.9.12. And how does this [Demiurge] which has just come to exist set to work? By its memory of what it had seen. But neither it nor the mother⁹⁵ that they granted to it existed at all prior to their generation, [though they would have had to exist] in order to have seen anything.⁹⁶

Next, is it not extraordinary that they themselves came down into this5 cosmos not as images of souls but as genuine souls, and scarcely one or two of them escape from the cosmos and⁹⁷ achieve recollection, barely recalling the things they had once seen, and yet this image which has just come to exist is nevertheless, so they claim, able to form a conception, albeit a dim one, of those things – and its mother, a material image, can,10 too – and not only does it form a conception of those things and acquire an idea of that cosmos⁹⁸ but it also learns what things the cosmos could come to be from?

Why exactly did it make fire first? Did it think that fire had to be first? Why not another element? If it was able to create fire because it had a conception of fire, why, given that it also had a conception of the cosmos – for it had to conceive of the whole first – did it not immediately15 create the cosmos? For those elements were included in its conception of the cosmos.⁹⁹ For the act of its creation was in all ways more natural, and not as in the crafts, since crafts are posterior to nature and to the cosmos. For even concerning the particular things which are presently generated by natures,¹⁰⁰ there is not first fire, and next each of the other20 elements, and next a mixing of these, but rather a sketch or blueprint of the entire living being impressed upon the menses.¹⁰¹ Why, then, in the case [of natural cosmogony] was the matter not impressed with a sketch of the cosmos, which would contain earth, fire, and all the rest? But perhaps they themselves would have created the cosmos this way, since they are in possession of genuine souls, but that Demiurge of theirs did25 not know how to!

And further to foresee the magnitude of the cosmos – that is its exact magnitude – the obliqueness of the zodiac [with respect to the ecliptic], the revolution of the stars beneath it, and the earth – and all in such a way that it is possible to state the causes why they are this way – this is not the work of an image but rather altogether that of the power that30 proceeds from the best beings, which even these men grudgingly admit. For if they examined their ‘act of illumination into the darkness’ closely,¹⁰² they would concede the true causes of the cosmos. For why did this illumination have to take place, if it did not absolutely have to? For this illumination necessarily takes place either naturally or unnaturally, and if this illumination is natural, then it will have always been going on in this manner. But if it is unnatural, then what is unnatural will already be present in the intelligible world, and evil will35 be prior to this sensible cosmos, and it won’t be the cosmos that is responsible for evil; rather, the things in the intelligible world will provide evil to the cosmos, and evil will not come to the soul from the sensible world; rather, evil will come to the sensible world from soul.

And this argument will result in tracing evil¹⁰³ back to the first principles. And if [evil is indeed traced back to the first principles], so is matter, from which [evil] appears. For the soul that fell saw, they40 claim, and illuminated the darkness that was already there. So where did this darkness come from, then? If they should say that the soul that fell created the darkness, clearly there will have been no place for the soul to fall, and neither will the darkness be the cause of the falling; rather, the cause will be the soul’s own nature. But this is identical to attributing the cause to the preceding necessities; consequently, the cause is traced back to the first principles.

§2.9.13. The person, therefore, who complains about the nature of the cosmos does not know what he is doing, nor does he realize where this insolence of his is leading him. This is because they do not know the ordered sequence of what comes first, second, third,¹⁰⁴ and so on, continuously until the final things are reached, and because one5 should not be contemptuous of the things that are worse than the first;¹⁰⁵ rather, one should graciously allow each thing to have its own nature, while oneself pursuing the first things, having left behind the tragic drama of the terrors as [the Gnostics] consider them – in the cosmic spheres, though these spheres actually ‘render all things gentle and kind’ for them.¹⁰⁶ For what is so terrifying about the spheres that they terrify people who are inexperienced in argument and who10 have not been privy to the proper, cultivated ‘gnosis’? For if their bodies are fiery,¹⁰⁷ they should not be feared, since their relationship to the universe and to the earth is a balanced one, and [the Gnostics] should focus their attention on the heavenly bodies’ souls, since it is surely on account of their own souls that they consider themselves to be honourable. And yet even the heavenly bodies differ [from sublunary bodies] in magnitude and in beauty, and they cooperate and15 contribute to the things that are generated in accordance with nature, which could never fail to be generated, as long as the first Beings exist, and they are major parts of the universe and secure the plenitude of the universe.

And if human beings occupy an honourable rank in comparison to other living beings, the heavenly bodies are still more honourable, as they are in the universe – not in order to reign cruelly over everything else – but rather because they provide order and ornament.¹⁰⁸ As for20 what is said to come from the heavens, one should hold that they give signs of what will happen in the future,¹⁰⁹ and yet generated living beings turn out differently on account of chance – since it is impossible that the identical events happen to every individual – as well as on account of the different moments of their generation, the far-removed places [where they were conceived or born], and the states25 of their souls.

And again they must not demand that all human beings be good nor, because this is not possible, should they be so eager to censure the things here in the expectation that they should differ in no way from those higher things; and they should simply think of ‘evil’ as a deficiency in wisdom, that is, an inferior and always diminishing good, just as one might say that nature is ‘evil’, because it is not30 sense-perception, and that the faculty of sense-perception is ‘evil’, because it is not reason. Otherwise, these men will be forced to say that evil exists in the intelligible world, too. For in the intelligible world, Soul is worse than Intellect, and Intellect is also inferior to something else.

§2.9.14. But this is far from being the only way that they contaminate the Beings in the intelligible world. For whenever they compose ‘charms’ in the belief that they are addressing those higher Beings – not only Soul but even the beings that transcend Soul – what else are they doing but making magical spells and enchantments and acts of persuasion, claiming that¹¹⁰ these higher beings are led by and obey our words, provided one of us has the required5 proficiency to speak these charms and, in the same fashion, the vocal tones and sounds, and breathings and hissings, and so on, which, according to their writings, have a magical effect on the intelligible world?¹¹¹ And if this is not what they want to claim, then how do incorporeals obey our speech acts? It follows that those who make words appear more dignified than the incorporeals10 themselves have – by these very words – unwittingly done away with the dignity of the incorporeals.

And when they claim that they purge diseases, if what they mean is that purging is due to self-control and an ordered way of life, then they would be right, since this is just what philosophers say. But in fact they just assumed that diseases are daemons and they claim to be able to exorcize them with words, and by professing this they produce15 the appearance of being holier-than-thou among the masses, who are amazed at the powers at the disposal of these ‘enchanters’. Those, however, who consider the matter carefully will not be fooled into thinking that diseases have any other causes than exhaustion, excess, and deficiency of nourishment, decay, and in general processes that20 have their starting point either inside or outside of the body.

And the treatment of diseases makes this clear. For the disease is passed down and out of the body when the stomach is emptied or a drug is administered, and so, too, when blood is let, and fasting has also cured patients. So if the daemon is famished and the drug turns the contents of25 the stomach into liquid, does it at that point immediately withdraw from the body or does it remain? If it still remains inside, why is one no longer sick even though the daemon is still lurking inside? And if it withdrew, why? What affected it?

In fact, it was presumably because it was feeding on the disease. In that case the disease was something distinct from the daemon.

Next, if the daemon enters the body without any [physiological] cause, why aren’t we always ill? And yet, if there was such a cause,30 what’s the use of positing a daemon to explain disease? For this cause can account for the fever all by itself. And it’s ludicrous to suggest that the [physiological] cause appears simultaneously, as if the daemon was ready to go and then supervened upon the cause. Indeed, both the manner of their claims and the motivation behind them are clear, and it is not least for this reason that we brought up35 these daemons.

I leave it to you to examine their other claims by reading their writings and especially to contemplate this issue thoroughly. The kind of philosophy that we pursue brings out, in addition to all of its other benefits, simplicity of character together with a pure40 manner of practical thought; it promotes not arrogance but dignity, and it gets its prowess from reason and from great carefulness, reverent caution, and immense circumspection. You should compare the other kinds of philosophy to our kind. For the kind of philosophy pursued by others is set up the other way around throughout. So,45 I would not like to say any more, as it would be fitting to leave our discussion of them as it stands.

§2.9.15. Yet this one item should really not escape our notice: what effect these doctrines have on the souls of those who hear them and are persuaded to disdain the cosmos and its contents. There are two schools of thought concerning the achievement of life’s goal. One of them advances pleasure of the body as the goal, and the other chooses beauty5 and virtue, where for the members of this latter school the desire for these goals comes from god and leads back to god, but this needs to be examined elsewhere.¹¹²

Now Epicurus did away with providence and prescribes the pursuit10 of pleasure and enjoying oneself,¹¹³ since this is what is left without providence, but this [Gnostic] doctrine criticized the sovereign lord of providence and providence itself in a still more sophomoric manner; it belittled all of the laws of this world, and ridiculed the virtues uncovered over the course of history and practical wisdom, too, so that there is actually not a glimpse of anything beautiful existing here. It has even¹¹⁴15 done away with the justice intrinsic to human character that is achieved through reason and training and, in general, with all that by which a human being becomes virtuous. As a consequence, they are left with pleasure and self-interest and that which one doesn’t share with one’s fellow human beings but what merely serves one’s own advantage,20 unless, that is, one is by one’s own nature better than these doctrines suggest.

For none of these goals counts as beautiful for them; rather, what they eventually set about pursuing is something else. If, however, they are already in possession of their ‘gnosis’, then they ought to be pursuing this something else here and now, and in doing so they ought first to correct their behaviour here below, seeing as how they originate from a divine nature. For it belongs to this divine25 nature to take notice of beauty and to think little of the pleasure of the body. But those who have no part in virtue would not be moved at all towards these goals.

And there is this evidence against them. They have given no account of virtue, i.e., they have completely neglected addressing the following issues: saying what virtue is, how many parts it has, which of the many30 beautiful aspects of virtue were contemplated in writings of the ancients, from what virtue results and is acquired, how the soul is to be taken care of and how it is to be purified. For simply saying ‘turn your attention to god’ actually achieves nothing of consequence unless one also explains how one turns one’s attention to god. After all, someone might ask, what is to stop one from turning his attention to god without abstaining from35 pleasure or controlling his temper, thus calling to mind the name ‘god’ while also being afflicted by all these passions and not even trying to purge oneself of any of them?

In fact, it is virtue that leads one to the goal and that reveals god, when it is present in the soul together with practical wisdom,¹¹⁵ but when uttered without true virtue, ‘god’ is just a name.40

§2.9.16. But again to have disdain for the cosmos, the cosmic gods, and its other beautiful parts is not to become good. For anyone who is evil would already be disdainful of the gods. And supposing that he was not disdainful [of the gods] before, that is, if there were some respect in which he was not evil, then by becoming disdainful of them he would have become evil in all respects.5

For even their professed respect for the intelligible gods turns out to be lacking affection. For he who bears love towards anything at all also embraces everything that is akin to the object of his love,¹¹⁶ especially the children whose father he loves. And all soul derives from that god as its father, and the souls in these cosmic gods are intellectual and good10 and in much closer contact to the gods in the intelligible world¹¹⁷ than our souls are. For how could this cosmos exist, if it were cut off from that principle? And how could the cosmic gods exist? These problems were dealt with before,¹¹⁸ but now we are saying that if they have disdain for that which is akin to the gods in the intelligible world, then they do not even know the latter, except verbally.

And how reverent is the claim that providence does not extend to this15 region or not to every part of it? Doesn’t this claim lead to contradictions for them? For they say that providential care extends to them and to them alone. Does it extend to them when they were in the intelligible world or even when they are down here? If the former, how was it that they left the intelligible world? If the latter, why are they still here and why is not god himself also here? For how else will20 god know that they are here? And how will god know that when they are here, they haven’t forgotten him and become evil? But if he knows the ones who have not become evil, he also knows the ones who have, in order to be able to distinguish the former from the latter. God will, then, be present to all, and he will be in the sensible cosmos, in whatever25 manner that might be. So, the cosmos will also participate in god. But if god is absent from the cosmos, he will also be absent from all of you [Gnostics], and you would not have anything to say about him or the beings that come after him.

But regardless of whether providence extends from above to you [Gnostics] or to whatever else you want to claim, at the very least the cosmos receives providential care from above, and neither was nor will30 be abandoned. For providence is much more concerned with wholes than with parts, and participation in god belongs much more to the soul of the universe [than to particular souls]. This is revealed both by the fact that the cosmos exists as well as by the intelligent mode of its existence. For who of those mindlessly high-minded men is as well-ordered and intelligent as the universe?

In fact, the comparison is ridiculous and utterly outlandish, and35 whoever is not making the comparison just for the sake of argument would hardly be escaping impiety.

Nor is enquiring into these issues the occupation of the intelligent man but of one who is simply blind and bereft of sense-perception and intelligence and who is far removed from the vision of the intelligible cosmos, as he is not even seeing this sensible cosmos. For what musical40 man, who beholds the harmony present in the intelligible world, would not be moved upon hearing the harmony found in sensible sounds? And what man experienced in geometry and numbers would not be delighted upon seeing symmetry, proportion, and order with his eyes? For even with pictures, those who see these works of art with their eyes do not see45 the identical things in the same way; rather, those who recognize in the sensible [image] an imitation of someone they have stored in their thought are provoked, in a way, and proceed to recall the true original.¹¹⁹ And this is actually the experience by which feelings of love are also kindled.¹²⁰

But if one who beholds a good semblance of beauty in a face is50 conveyed to the intelligible world,¹²¹ who will be so lethargic and unresponsive in his sensitivities that, upon seeing all the beauty in the sensible world, and its symmetry and its great state of order, and the pattern¹²² made visible among the stars, even though they are so far away, he does not thereupon take notice and be seized by reverential awe55 of how marvellous things these are, and how marvellous their source is? Such a person, therefore, neither understood the former, nor was he really seeing the former.

§2.9.17. But if they have come to despise the nature of body because they heard Plato disparaging body for the many ways in which it obstructs the soul¹²³ – and Plato did say that the whole of corporeal nature is worse – they ought to have stripped away the corporeal nature [from the cosmos] in an act of discursive thinking and examined what5 remains, an intelligible sphere¹²⁴ that includes the form imposed upon the cosmos, and the souls arranged in order and supplying magnitude without bodies and¹²⁵ leading the intelligible forth into extension in such a way that what is brought into existence is, by means of its magnitude, made equal to the partless [magnitude] of the paradigm,¹²⁶ as far as this is possible. For greatness there is in terms of power,10 whereas in the sensible world it is in terms of mass. And regardless of whether they preferred to think of this sphere as being in motion, being led in its revolution by god, who possesses the beginning, middle, and end of all of its power,¹²⁷ or as being stationary – on the view that there is not yet another thing for it to manage – they would have done well to direct their attention to thinking about the soul that15 is managing the sensible world.

But as soon as they put body into soul,¹²⁸ they should think about the cosmos in this way, namely, that soul would not be affected but simply gives to another¹²⁹ each and every thing that can be received – for grudging is not licit among the gods¹³⁰ – and they should give as much power¹³¹ to the soul of the cosmos as necessary for it to make the nature20 of body, which is not in itself beautiful, participate in beauty, to the extent that it was possible for it to be made beautiful.

And it is this beauty that moves souls, since they are divine. If, then, the [Gnostics] themselves should claim that they are not moved by beauty, they must not be perceiving beautiful bodies any differently from ugly bodies. But then neither would there be any difference in the way they perceive beautiful and shameful ways of life, nor beautiful objects of study, and so they would not engage in acts of contemplation25 of them, and so [they would not contemplate] god either.¹³² For the primary beauties are what account for these derivative objects of beauty. So, if the derivative objects of beauty do not move these men, neither will the primary beauties. The beauty of the derivative objects, then, is subsequent to that of the primary.

Yet, when they claim to disdain the ‘beauty’ of the sensible world, they would be doing well if they disdained the beauty of boys and women, so as to avoid submitting to licentiousness. But one should bear in mind that they wouldn’t be exalting themselves if they disdained30 an ugly or shameful thing; rather, they exalt themselves because they now despise what they originally called ‘beautiful’. Just what is their attitude [to sensible beauty, then]?

Next, beauty in a part is not identical to beauty in a whole, nor is beauty in all parts [individually] identical to beauty in everything taken together. And then [they ought to recognize] that in sensibles and particulars – in daemons, for example – there is such beauty that one has to marvel at the one who produced them and to believe that they35 derived from the higher world, and hence to conclude that the ‘Beauty’ there is ‘extraordinary’¹³³ – not that this person clings to the beautiful objects here; rather, he, without reproaching them, advances from these to those.

And if something is beautiful on the inside, we say that its interior and exterior are in harmony, and if it is poorly on the inside, we mean that its interior parts are inferior to better ones on the outside. But perhaps it is40 impossible for something that is really beautiful on the outside to be ugly on the inside. For whatever is beautiful in its entirety on the outside, is something whose inside has dominated it. And those men who are ugly on the inside but who are called ‘beautiful’ possess an exterior beauty that is fake. And if someone should claim to have seen human beings who are really beautiful on the outside but ugly on the inside, I suspect that he has not really seen such human beings, and that he45 rather thinks some other people are the beautiful ones. If, however, such people do exist, then it must be that ugliness belongs to them as an acquired attribute, and that they are beautiful in their natures. For there are many obstacles in this world to achieving perfection.

But what obstacle was there preventing the universe, which is beautiful, from being beautiful on the inside, too?

Further, it might perhaps arise that those things which nature did not50 make perfectly complete from the start do not achieve their perfection, and as a result they can turn out poorly, but there was never a time when the universe was incomplete like a child, nor was any kind of addition added to it¹³⁴ and appended to its body. For where could it have come from? The universe, after all, contained all things. Nor should one imagine that anything was appended to its soul. But if, then, someone perhaps were to grant them that there is this addition, it would not be55 anything bad.

§2.9.18. But perhaps they will maintain that those arguments of theirs make us flee the body¹³⁵ and hate it from a distance, whereas our arguments bind the soul to the body. But this would be just like the following scenario: there are two people occupying the identical house,5 a beautiful house, where one of them censures its construction and its builder but nevertheless keeps living in it, and the other does not censure him and says rather that the builder made it most proficiently, and yet he is waiting for the time to come when he will be released from the house and will no longer require it. In this scenario, the former10 considers himself to be wiser and in a better position to leave the house because he knows enough to say that its walls are constructed from lifeless stones and boards and that it is a far cry from a genuine abode, but he doesn’t realize that the only difference between him and his housemate is that he cannot bear the necessity of having to live in the house, if indeed he is not just pretending to despise it while silently adoring the stones’ beauty.

But as long as we have a body, we must remain in the houses15 constructed for us by our sister-soul,¹³⁶ a good soul that has a mighty power to create without toil.¹³⁷ Or do they think it right to address the most common of men as ‘brothers’ while pronouncing with their ‘raving20 mouths’¹³⁸ the sun and the heavenly gods, and the soul of the cosmos, too, to be unworthy of the title ‘sibling’? If the [heavenly beings] are base, it is unlawful, then, to connect them to the family of the soul of the cosmos, but [they should be included] if they are good and are not bodies but souls in bodies and are able to dwell in bodies in a manner that best approximates that of the dwelling of the soul of the cosmos in the body of the cosmos. This manner involves not coming into collision,25 and not allowing themselves to be shaken by pleasures attacking them from outside or by the things they see coming at them, even if it is something hard.¹³⁹ The soul of the cosmos, then, remains unfazed, since there is nothing that could faze it.

But we who live down here can repel the fazing blows through virtue, some of them being rendered smaller thanks to the greatness of our intellectual focus, and others being rendered such as to not even faze us30 thanks to our strength. And once we have gained this proximity to the unfazed, we would be imitating the soul of the universe and that of the stars, and once we have made it to this vicinity of sameness our endeavours would be directed at the identical goal, and within us and within that goddess things would be identical, inasmuch as we ourselves would be fine-tuned both in terms of our natures and in terms of what we care35 about. But the stars and the universe are like this from the beginning.

And if they should actually claim that they alone are capable of contemplation, this doesn’t make them contemplate more, nor would this result from their claim that they are able to leave the universe behind when they die, whereas the stars cannot, since they must always keep heaven in order. For their claim would be due to their lack of understanding of what the term ‘outside’ really means as well as of the manner in which the soul of the universe cares for everything that is40 soulless.¹⁴⁰ It is possible, then, not to be lovers of the body,¹⁴¹ and to become pure, and to disdain death, and to know the higher beings and pursue them, and not to begrudge others who are also capable of pursuing them and do always pursue them by claiming that they do not do so, and not to fall victim to the identical error as those who think45 that the stars do not course through the sky because their sense-perception is telling them that the stars are standing still. This is why [the Gnostics], too, don’t believe that the stars see what is outside the cosmos because they themselves fail to observe that the stars’ souls are outside the cosmos.

¹ In his VP 24.56–57, Porphyry provides an alternative title to this treatise: Against Those Who Say That the Demiurge of the Cosmos is Evil and That the Cosmos is Evil. This is the final of four treatises – the others being 3.8, 5.8, and 5.5 – comprising the so-called Groβschrift, which Porphyry broke up into separate treatises in order to accommodate his vision of six sets of nine treatises. See VP 16 for the identification of some Gnostics as Christians.

² See Pl., Phil. 60B10.

³ Cf. 3.8.9.39–44; 5.4.1.11–15.

⁴ The claim that the Good contains nothing in itself was the conclusion of the preceding treatise 5.5. Cf. 5.5.10.14, 13.33–34.

⁵ Cf. 6.5.1.13–20; 6.9.1.1–2.

⁶ Cf. 3.8.10.28–31, 11.11–13; 5.3.13.1–33; 5.5.6.11–26; 6.9.3.37–54, 5.31–41.

⁷ Cf. 5.3.13.17; 5.4.1.12–15; 6.7.23.7–8; 6.9.6.16–39.

⁸ See Pl., Parm. 138A2–3.

⁹ The Stoics. See [Galen], Phil. hist. 24 (= Doxographi Graeci 615.4–6).

¹⁰ Aristotle. See Meta. 12.7.1072b18–30; Alcinous, Didask. 164.19–28.

¹¹ Arguments for the distinction between the One and the Intellect can be found in 3.8.9–11; 5.1.5–7; 5.4; 5.5.3–5; 5.6.4; 6.9.2–5. For arguments against the identity of Intellect and Soul, cf. 5.1.3 and 5.9.4.

¹² Perhaps a reference to Aristotle’s distinction between active and passive intellects. See DA 3.4.429b27–5.430a25.

¹³ See Numenius, fr. 12 and 15, and Plotinus’ student Amelius apud Proclus, In Tim. 2.103.18ff. It is clear that many Gnostics followed Numenius in making such a distinction.

¹⁴ Cf. 5.3. See Sext. Emp., M. 10.255.

¹⁵ ‘Lack of mindfulness’ translates ἀφροσύνη (‘thoughtlessness’ or ‘folly’). The idea here appears to be that human beings have a moral obligation to be aware of their own mental activities, and so we should expect nothing less from the Intellect.

¹⁶ The threefold division is: (1) the undescended intellect, cf. 3.4.3.24; 3.8.5.10–15; 4.7.13.12–13; 4.8.8.1–3; 5.1.10.22–23; (2) the faculty of discursive thinking, cf. 1.1.11.2–8; 4.8.8.10–11; 5.3.3.35–40; (3) the faculties of sense-perception and growth, cf. 1.1.6. This part is inseparable from the body.

¹⁷ Cf. 1.1.11; 5.3.3.35–40.

¹⁸ This is the soul of the cosmos.

¹⁹ Cf. 4.3.1–3 where it is shown that we are not parts of the soul of the cosmos. Alternatively, Plotinus might be referring to the undescended intellect (cf. 4.8.8.1–3). That part of our soul, like the entire soul of the cosmos, remains in Intellect. Therefore, we would have remained indirectly within the soul of the cosmos if we had not descended.

²⁰ A reference to the distinction between primary and secondary ἐνέργειαι (‘the activity of’ and ‘the activity from’). Cf. 5.1.3.10–12, 6.38–39; 5.4.2.28–29, etc. The secondary life of Soul includes the life of the universe and the lives of living beings.

²¹ Cf. 2.4.5.25–28; 5.1.6.19–22.

²² See Irenaeus, Adv. Haer. 1.4.1–2; Aristophanes, Birds 1576.

²³ Cf. infra 11.21. See Pl., Phdr. 246C2; Clem. Alex., Strom. 5.11.75.3 and 4.13.90.1; Tatian, Orat. ad graec. 20.1.4–5. Plotinus is here interpreting Gnostic doctrine using Platonic images.

²⁴ Cf. supra 2.4–15.

²⁵ Following the punctuation in HS⁴, but retaining the question mark after ἴδῃ.

²⁶ See Pl., Tim. 92C7.

²⁷ Reading ψυχῇ ἐφιεμένης with HS⁴.

²⁸ See Clement of Alexandria, Excerpta ex Theodoto 48.2–50.1.

²⁹ See Pl., Phd. 86B; Ar., DA 1.5.410b11–12.

³⁰ Cf. infra 11.12; Old Testament, Isa. 65.17.2; 66.22.1; New Testament, 2nd Ep. Peter, 3.13.2; Rev. 21.1–2.

³¹ Plotinus uses his own term to refer to the putative principles of the Gnostics.

³² These are terms used by the so-called Sethian Gnostics.

³³ Understanding φωνῆς as the implicit referent of τῆς ἀρχαίας ῾Ελληνικῆς following Igal and HS⁴.

³⁴ Cf. 4.8.1.30–36. See Pl., Rep. 514A1–529D.

³⁵ See Pl., Phd. 81D–82A and 111Dff.; Rep. 615Aff.; Gorg. 523Aff.

³⁶ See Pl., Phd. 111Dff.; Rep. 621A.

³⁷ See Pl., Phd. 81Eff. and 111Dff.; Phdr. 248Dff.; Lg. 903D; Tim. 42B–D and 90Eff.; Rep. 619Bff.

³⁸ See Numenius, fr. 22.

³⁹ Following the punctuation of HS⁴. See Pl., Tim. 39E7–9.

⁴⁰ See Pl., Tim. 28C3–5.

⁴¹ See Pl., Phdr. 246A1.

⁴² See Pl., Rep. 517B5; Tim. 92B5–7.

⁴³ See Alcinous, Didask. ch. 10.

⁴⁴ See Pl., Tht. 176B1.

⁴⁵ See Pl., Phd. 67D9.

⁴⁶ Following the punctuation of HS⁴.

⁴⁷ Reading γνωσθήσεται τάδ᾽ ὕστερον with HS⁴.

⁴⁸ Reading ἔν γε οἷς with HS⁴.

⁴⁹ Cf. supra 3.7–14. Cf. also 2.1.4.29–30; 2.3.18.19–22; 5.8.12.20–26; 6.6.18.46–47; 6.9.9.10–11.

⁵⁰ See Pl., Lg. 828D4–5; 959A–B; Rep. 611B–D; Phd. 67C–D.

⁵¹ Cf. 4.8.2.45–49.

⁵² Cf., e.g., 2.1.4–5; 4.3.1ff.; 4.8.2–3; 4.8.8.13–23.

⁵³ See Pl., Phd. 67D1–2; Tim. 73B3–4, D5–6.

⁵⁴ Cf. 2.1.4.16–17. See Pl., Tim. 36D9–E1; 38E5.

⁵⁵ Cf. 2.1.4.32–33.

⁵⁶ Cf. 2.1.3.10–12.

⁵⁷ Cf. 4.4.32 passim, esp. 43–44.

⁵⁸ Cf. supra 6.21–24, the Gnostic view.

⁵⁹ See Pl., Tim. 37C6–7, 92C7. HS² mark this as a quotation, though Plato uses the term ‘everlasting’ (αἴδιον) instead of ‘intelligible’ (νοητόν).

⁶⁰ Cf. infra 16.48–56; 3.2.13.18–14.6; 4.8.6.23–28. See Pl., Tim. 30C–31A. The Gnostics hold that this cosmos is a bad imitation of the intelligible world.

⁶¹ Plotinus is referring to the doctrine of the two ἐνέργειαι (‘activities’). Cf. supra 3.11; 5.1.3.10–12; 5.4.2.27–36; etc.

⁶² Cf. 1.4.7.31–42 and 1.9 passim.

⁶³ See Pl., Rep. 618B4–5, C8.

⁶⁴ Cf. 1.4.6.7–10, 7.17–22. See Pl., Rep. 618D2, 620C6.

⁶⁵ The Greek term for ‘concern’ (σπουδή ) is related to the term that is here translated as ‘virtuous’ (σπουδαῖος).

⁶⁶ Cf. 1.2.7.12–13.

⁶⁷ See Heraclitus, 22 B 117 DK.

⁶⁸ Cf. 3.2.8.16–38.

⁶⁹ That is to say, your soul has been freed from the sensible world.

⁷⁰ Reading κατ᾽ ἀξίαν with HS⁴.

⁷¹ See Pl. [?], Epin. 983E5–984A1.

⁷² See Pl., Rep. 616B4, 617B5; Phd. 110B6.

⁷³ Here Plotinus cites an unidentified poet.

⁷⁴ See Pl., Rep. 617E3–5.

⁷⁵ Cf. 2.3.16. See Pl., Rep. 617D–E, 619D5–7.

⁷⁶ Cf. 5.5.3.9. See Pl., Phdr. 246E4–6. Reading ἐνδεικνύμενον in l. 35. The ‘great king’ here is the One or Good.

⁷⁷ Perhaps an attack on forms of monotheism that refuse to acknowledge additional, albeit subordinate, gods.

⁷⁸ See Pl., Tht. 176B1.

⁷⁹ See Irenaeus, Adv. Haer. 2.30.28.

⁸⁰ See Pl., Rep. 492B6–C9. Reading a full-stop instead of a question mark in line 60.

⁸¹ See Pl., Rep. 426D8–E1. Reading with HS⁴: Οἷον εἰ ἐν πλείστοις ἀριθμεῖν οὐκ εἰδόσιν ἀριθμεῖν οὐκ εἰδὼς πήχεων χίλιων εἶναι ἀκούοι, <μόνον δὲ φαντάζοιτο ὡς τὰ χίλια ἀριθμὸς μέγας>, τι ἄν, ἢ χιλιόπηχυς εἶναι νομίζοι, τοὺς <δ᾽> ἄλλους πενταπήχεις; [εἶναι ἀκούοι μόνον δὲ φαντάζοιτο ὡς τὰ χίλια ἀριθμὸς μέγας].

⁸² Plotinus switches from second to third person but the referent is still the same.

⁸³ Reading αὑτοῦ with Beutler-Theiler and Dufour.

⁸⁴ Plotinus might be thinking of heavenly bodies and daemons here. Only in the following lines does he introduce human beings.

⁸⁵ Deleting πάντα with HS⁴.

⁸⁶ Reading οὐ γὰρ ᾗ ἐπαγγέλοιτο ἔχει, ὃ λέγει with Kirchhoff and HS⁴.

⁸⁷ See Pl., Rep. 595B9–10.

⁸⁸ See Tatian, Orat. ad Graec. 13 (14.22); Irenaeus, Adv. Haer. 1.2.2, 1.4.1, 1.7.1.

⁸⁹ See Irenaeus, Adv. Haer. 1.5.1.

⁹⁰ Reading αὐτοῦ ἕλκουσιν ἐπ᾽ with Theiler and HS⁴.

⁹¹ Cf. supra 5.24. See Philo, De agric. 65; Hermae Pastor, Simil. 1.1.

⁹² See Irenaeus, Adv. Haer. 1.2.2.

⁹³ Cf. supra 4.13–14.

⁹⁴ See Irenaeus, Adv. Haer. 1.7.1.

⁹⁵ Cf. supra 10.30–31. See Irenaeus, Adv. Haer. 1.5.2.

⁹⁶ See Irenaeus, Adv. Haer. 1.7.1.

⁹⁷ Inserting καὶ before ἐλθόντες with HS³.

⁹⁸ Reading καὶ κοσμοῦ ἐκείνου λαβεῖν ἔννοιαν [κόσμου ἐκείνου] with HS³.

⁹⁹ See Clement of Alexandria, Excerpta ex Theodoto, 7.1–3; Irenaeus, Adv. Haer. 1.2.4, 1.3.4, 1.4.1, 1.5.1, 1.14.7.

¹⁰⁰ Plotinus is referring to natural – we would say ‘biological’ – processes that are executed by individual natures.

¹⁰¹ See Ar., GA 2.4.740a28–29, 2.6.743b20–24, 4.1.764b30.

¹⁰² Cf. supra 10.25–26.

¹⁰³ Reading τὸ κακὸν for τὸν κόσμον with Heigl and Beutler-Theiler.

¹⁰⁴ See Pl. [?], Ep. 2.312E3–4.

¹⁰⁵ Cf. supra 10.32–33.

¹⁰⁶ Pindar, Olympians 1.30; 1.48.

¹⁰⁷ Cf. 2.1.6–7; 2.3.2.2–10, 5.27–41.

¹⁰⁸ See Pl., Tim. 40A6; Gorg. 504A–D.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. 2.3.7–8, 10–15; 4.4.30–45.

¹¹⁰ Reading λέγουσιν ὡς with HS⁵.

¹¹¹ Following the interrogative punctuation of HS⁵.

¹¹² The intended reference is unclear; perhaps, it is to 1.2.

¹¹³ Cf. 1.4.1.26–30; 1.5.8.6–10; 6.7.24.18–30. See Epicurus, Ep. Men. (= D.L., 10.129).

¹¹⁴ Deleting τε τὸ σωφρονεῖν with HS⁴.

¹¹⁵ See Pl., Tht. 176B1–2.

¹¹⁶ See Pl., Rep. 474Cff., 485C6–8.

¹¹⁷ Deleting ὅτι with HS³.

¹¹⁸ Cf. supra 3.19–20.

¹¹⁹ See Pl., Phd. 73Dff.

¹²⁰ Cf. 6.7.33.22ff.

¹²¹ See Pl., Phdr. 251A2–3; Symp. 210Aff.

¹²² See Pl., Tim. 40A6.

¹²³ See Pl., Phd. 65A10.

¹²⁴ See Parmenides, fr. 28 B 8.43 DK.

¹²⁵ Reading καὶ with Kirchhoff.

¹²⁶ Reading τὸ γενόμενον τῷ ἀμερεῖ τῷ with Kirchhoff, Theiler, and Armstrong.

¹²⁷ See Pl., Lg. 715E8–716A1; Ar., Phys. 8.9.265a27–b8. In Plato’s Timaeus an extended soul and motion are created prior to body. See Tim. 34B10ff.

¹²⁸ See Pl., Tim. 36D9–E1.

¹²⁹ Deleting ἔχειν as suggested by HS⁵.

¹³⁰ Cf. 3.2.11.8; 4.8.6.10–14; 5.4.1.34–36; 5.5.12.44–45. See Pl., Phdr. 247A7 and Tim. 29E1–2.

¹³¹ Reading τοσοῦτον with HS⁵.

¹³² See Pl., Symp. 211C4–8.

¹³³ Cf. 1.6.8.2. See Pl., Rep. 509A6.

¹³⁴ Reading προσιόν τι with HS³.

¹³⁵ See Pl., Tht. 176A9; Phd. 65D1, 80C4.

¹³⁶ Cf. 4.3.6.13.

¹³⁷ Cf. 2.1.4.31. See Pl., Lg. 904A; Ar., DC 2.1.284a15; Ar. [?], De mun. 6.400b9–11.

¹³⁸ See Heraclitus, fr. 22 B 92 DK.

¹³⁹ See Pl., Tim. 43B7–C5.

¹⁴⁰ See Pl., Phdr. 246B6.

¹⁴¹ See Pl., Phd. 68C1.