§4.6.1. Since we maintain that acts of sense-perception are not ‘imprints’ or ‘sealings’ that come about in the soul,1 it follows that we are going to refrain altogether from saying that memories are acts of grasping pieces of knowledge or acts of sense-perception, with their impression remaining in the soul, seeing as there never was one in the5 first place. For this reason, both theses would depend on the identical argument; either these impressions come about in the soul, and remain, if there is to be memory; or, if one does not grant the one proposition, then one cannot grant the other. Those of us who actually maintain neither proposition must necessarily raise the question as to what is the manner in which either phenomenon comes about, since we neither say that the impression of the sensible comes to be in the soul and puts10 a stamp on it, nor do we assert that memory is the result of the remaining of the impression.
Now if we were to examine what happens in the case of ‘the clearest of the senses’,2 perhaps, by extrapolating to the other senses, we might come to the discovery of what we seek. It is clear, presumably, in every15 case, that when we have a sense-perception of anything by means of sight, we see and direct our sight straight to where the object of sight is situated. This would indicate, plainly, that this occurs through apprehending the object there and the soul looking at what is outside it, inasmuch as, I presume, no impression has come to be or is coming to be within it, nor taking on a seal,3 as from a seal-ring in wax. For in that20 case, there would have been no necessity to look at what is external, as it would already possess within itself the form of the object of sight, the impression of which it was already looking at when it entered.
And as for the matter of the soul’s actually adding an interval to the thing seen, and being able to say how far away it is seeing it from, how would it be seeing as something far away what is within it and in no way25 separated? And as for its magnitude, such as it really is in the external world, how would it be able to say what it is, or that it is big, as in the case of heaven, when the impression lying within it is not capable of being of such a size?4 And the greatest problem of all: if we were merely taking in impressions of what we see, it will not be possible to view the actual30 objects that we are seeing, but only reflections and shadows of those objects, so that the actual things themselves will be one thing, and the objects of our sight another.
And in general, even though we find it stated5 that one cannot see any object which is placed on the eyeball, but one needs to stand away from it to gain a view of it, this must be even more emphatically so when applied to the soul. For if we were to place the impression of the visual35 object within it, that in which the impression was sealed could not see it as an object of sight; for the seeing agent and the thing seen must be two separate things. The seeing agent, therefore, must be distinct, seeing the impression as situated somewhere else, not in the place where it is. Sight, therefore, is not of something situated within, but rather of40 something not so situated, if it is to be sight.
§4.6.2. If, then, it is not like this, how does it work?
In fact, the soul reports on objects that it does not possess; for this is characteristic of [active] potency, not the experiencing of something, but rather the power to act, and to produce an effect on what it is assigned to. For it is in this way, in my view, that the objects of sight and of hearing5 would be distinguished in the soul; this would not be the case if either of them were impressions, but if it were their nature neither to be impressions nor affections, but rather activities relative to what presents itself to them. But we, in our incredulity that each potency would be able to cognize its own proper object unless it suffers an impact, bring it about that it is affected by, rather than cognizes, what is contiguous to it, though its role is to be in control of this, not to be controlled by it.
The identical manner of proceeding should indeed be assumed in the10 case of hearing, too; the impression is in the air as a sort of articulated blow, like letters inscribed by that which has made the sound, while the power or the substantiality of the soul in a way reads the impressions inscribed on the air on their approach to them, on which approach it is15 their nature to be seen. And in the case of taste and smell, we have on the one hand the basic affections, and on the other what constitute acts of sense-perception of and judgements on these, which are cognitions of the affections, being distinct from them.
In the case of intelligibles, the cognition of them is relatively unaffected and impressionless; for in the reverse manner, the intelligibles, 20in a way, issue forth from within, while the sensibles are viewed as external. And the former are activities in a stronger and more proper sense; for knowledge is of itself, and it itself is the activator of each of its objects. As to whether the soul sees itself as two and as one thing contemplating another, while intellect6 sees itself as one and both of the two aspects as one, is something that we have discussed elsewhere.7
§4.6.3. But having dealt with this topic, we should next discuss memory. First, we should say that it is not remarkable – or rather, it is remarkable, but one should nevertheless not doubt the existence of such a power of the soul – if, while not taking in anything into itself, it nonetheless achieves an apprehension of what it did not possess. For5 soul is the expressed principle of all things, that is, its nature is to be the ultimate expressed principle of intelligibles, or of the contents of the intelligible world, but first of the contents of the whole sensible world.8 For this reason, it is actually oriented towards both worlds, from the former deriving felicity and renewal of life, while from the latter, due to their sameness, it suffers deception and is drawn downwards as if under10 a spell. Occupying this median position, then, it perceives both worlds, and it is said to think intelligibles by coming to a memory of them, if it should encounter them; for it knows them by somehow being them; it knows not by establishing them in itself, but rather by having them in a certain way,9 and seeing them, and being them in a rather dim way, and by coming to be clearer, from this dim state, by in a way rousing itself,15 and proceeding from potentiality to actuality.
It operates in the identical manner in the case of sensibles; when it attaches itself to these in turn, it makes them, in a way, shine out by itself, and contrives that they appear before its eyes, since its power is ready for them and, in a way, strives in labour towards them. So, when the soul moves strongly towards any of the appearances presented to it,20 it is so disposed for a long time as if it were present to it, and the more strongly, the more permanently. And that indeed is why children are said to be better at remembering, because they do not move their attention away, but the object attended to remains in front of their eyes, as they are not yet involved in looking at a multiplicity of things, but only a few. In the case of those, on the other hand, whose discursive thinking and faculty of sight are directed at many things, it is as if they25 are running past these and not staying. But if indeed the impressions were such as to endure, their great number would not have diminished people’s capacity to remember.10
Furthermore, if the impressions were permanent, there would be no need to focus our attention in order to remember, nor would it be the case that we could remember, after forgetting at an earlier stage, if the impressions were lying there all the time.
Exercises to improve memory recovery indicate, too, that what is30 happening is an empowerment of the soul, rather like the training of hands or feet to enable them to perform easily feats that do not come naturally to hands or feet, but to which they can be trained by constant practice. For why is it that, if we hear something once or twice, we do not remember it, while we do so if we hear it many times, and then again in the case of something that we heard previously and did not retain, we35 remember it again much later? For it is certainly not by having previously possessed parts of the impression; one would then have to have remembered these. No, this rather comes about all of a sudden, as a result of hearing something said at a later date, or indulging in some type of mental exercise.
These phenomena give evidence of the arousal of a power due to which we remember, when the soul is invigorated, either in general or in40 respect of this in particular. And when it is not only in respect of subjects about which we have exercised ourselves that memory manifests itself in us, but when those who have taken in a lot of information as a result of being accustomed to making use of reports find it that much easier to have the so-called memory recoveries11 about other things as well, to what might one attribute the cause of this mnemonic facility other than to the strengthening of this power?45
After all, the permanence of impressions is an indication of weakness rather than of power; for that which is most receptive of impressions is so by reason of yielding, and since the impression constitutes an affection, it would be the more impressible entity that is better endowed with memory. The opposite of this, however, appears to be the case; for in no50 instance does practice in any given area render the subject of the exercise more prone to affection. In the case of the sense organs, after all, it is not what is weak – as, for example, an eye – that sees, but rather that which possesses greater power for actualizing itself. For this reason, those who have grown old are weaker both in respect of their senses and likewise with regard to their memories. Both sense-perception and memory,55 therefore, are a kind of strength. Further, if acts of sense-perception do not constitute impressions, how could memories be retentions of these, seeing as they were not put there in the first place?
But if memory is a power and a preparation for readiness, how is it that we do not come to recollection of the identical things all at once, but only at various later points? 60
In fact, it is because in a way one needs to set the power up and make it ready. We see this in the case of the other powers of the soul, when they are made ready to do what they are capable of; they are able to do some things at once, and others when they collect themselves. And, as a general rule, the identical people are not endowed with good memory and sharp-wittedness,12 because it is not the identical power that is65 relevant to each of these, even as the identical person does not tend to be good at boxing and at running; for different forms of competence prevail in different people. And yet there was nothing preventing someone with any number of advantages of a psychical nature from reading off the data available in his soul, nor for someone inclined in this direction acquiring an imperviousness to having the affection or to retaining it. Also, the non-dimensionality of the soul bears witness to70 the fact that the soul is a power.
Generally speaking, there is nothing surprising in the fact that everything to do with the soul is otherwise than is supposed by people who have not gone properly into the question, or who are prone to hasty conclusions on account of sensibles, and which deceive them due to the ways they are the same. For their attitude to the senses and to the75 process of remembering is to regard them just like letters inscribed on boards or writing tablets, and neither those who hold soul to be a body, nor those who regard it as incorporeal, see what impossibilities follow upon their theories.
1 Cf. 4.3.26.31; See Ar., De mem. 1.450a30–32.
2 See Pl., Phdr. 250D2.
3 Reading οὐδὲ τὴν σφραγῖδα with ms R.
4 Cf. 4.3.26.29–33.
5 See Ar., DA 2.7.419a12–13.
6 Reading νοῦς with Theiler and Harder.
7 Cf. 5.1.4.20–22; 5.3.6.1–8; 5.6.1.10–14.
8 Cf. 4.8.7.
9 See Pl., Tht. 197B8–10, on the distinction between ‘possessing’ (κεκτῆσθαι) and ‘having’ (ἔχειν) knowledge.
10 Reading μνήμονας with Creuzer and HS5.
11 See Ar., De mem. 2.451a20.
12 See Ar., De mem. 1.449b7–8.