§4.8.1. Often, after waking up to myself from the body,1 that is, externalizing myself in relation to all other things, while entering into myself, I behold a beauty of wondrous quality, and believe then that I am most to be identified with my better part, that I enjoy the best quality of life, and have become united with the divine and situated within it, actualizing5 myself at that level, and situating myself above all else in the intelligible world.2 Following on this repose within the divine, and descending from Intellect into acts of calculative reasoning, I ask myself in bewilderment, how on earth did I ever come down here, and how ever did my soul come to be enclosed in a body, being such as it has revealed10 itself to be, even while in a body?
Of our predecessors, Heraclitus, who exhorts us to investigate this very thing, postulating the necessity of ‘reciprocal changes’ from opposite states, and talking of ‘the way up and the way down’, and ‘in change there is rest’, and ‘it is laborious always to be toiling at and being15 subjected to the identical tasks’,3 has presented us with these hints, having no concern to clarify his utterance for us, indicating perhaps that we must search the answer out for ourselves, even as he discovered it by searching.4
Empedocles, in turn, having stated that it is the law for souls that have erred to fall down to the sensible world, and that he has descended after becoming ‘a fugitive from the gods, entrusting myself to raving strife’,520 has in my view revealed as much as has Pythagoras too, and his followers who have spoken enigmatically on this matter, as upon many others. In the case of Empedocles, however, there is the excuse for lack of clarity that he is writing in verse.
There remains for us, then, the divine Plato, who, among many other beautiful pronouncements on the soul, has in many places in his works spoken of its arrival in this world in such a way as to arouse in us some25 hope of clarification on the subject. What, then, does this philosopher say?
Well, it will be plain that he does not say the identical thing in every instance, so that one might easily discern his intention, but granting in all cases scant respect for the sensible world, and blaming the soul for its association with the body, he declares that the soul is ‘in bondage’6 and30 has buried itself within it, and that ‘the pronouncement made in secret rites is a great one’, to the effect that the soul is ‘in prison’7 here. And his ‘Cave’,8 like the cavern of Empedocles,9 is to be taken, it seems to me, to be referring to this universe, seeing as the ‘release from the shackles’ and35 the ‘ascent’ from the Cave he declares to be the journey towards that which is intelligible.10 And in Phaedrus he identifies ‘moulting of feathers’ as the cause of its arrival in the sensible world;11 and ‘periodic cycles’12 bring the soul which has ascended back down here, and judgements send others down here, and lots, chances, and necessities.1340
But then again, while in all these passages he has blamed the soul for its arrival in the body, in Timaeus, in speaking of this universe, he commends the cosmos and declares it to be a ‘blessed god,’14 and that the soul was bestowed by the Demiurge in his goodness so as to render this universe intelligent, since it had to be intelligent, and this could not come about without soul.1545
The soul of the universe, then, was sent down into it by the god for this purpose, while the soul of each one of us was sent to ensure its perfection; since it was necessary for the identical genera of living being in the intelligible world also to exist in the sensible world.1650
§4.8.2. So, when we seek to learn from Plato about the situation of our own soul, we find ourselves necessarily involved also in an enquiry into soul in general, how it ever acquired a natural impulse to associate itself with body, and what we should posit as being the nature of the cosmos in5 which soul involves itself, whether under compulsion or voluntarily or in some other way; and also about the creator of the cosmos, whether he has been able to do his work without impairment, or whether perhaps he is affected like our souls, which by reason of having to administer bodies of inferior nature are constrained to descend deep inside them, if indeed they are going to master them, each element of them otherwise being scattered and carried to its proper place17 – whereas in the universe as10 a whole all things are already by nature in their proper places – and requiring a great deal of onerous providential care, inasmuch as there are many external influences falling upon them, and they are constantly in need of support, and the difficult situation that they are in requires every sort of assistance.18
The body [of the cosmos], on the other hand, being perfect and 15sufficient to itself19 and autonomous, and containing nothing in it contrary to nature, needs only a brief prompting; and the soul of the cosmos is always in the state that it wants to be in, and it is subject to no appetites or affections; ‘for nothing goes out from it, nor does anything enter into it’.20 It is just for this reason that Plato says that our soul, too, if it would come to associate with that perfect soul, would come to be20 perfected itself, and would also ‘walk on high and govern the whole world’;21 when it stands apart in such a way as not to be enclosed within any body nor involved with it, then it, too, even as is the case with the soul of the universe, will cooperate readily in the administration of the cosmos, since it is not in any way an evil thing for the soul to provide the body with the power of flourishing and existing, because not every form25 of providential care for what is inferior deprives the carer of remaining in its best state.
For there are two kinds of care of everything, that of the totality being achieved at the bidding of an agent ordering by a ‘royal’ supervision that calls for no exertion, while that of particular things involves a sort of ‘hands on’ activity, in which the contact with what is being acted upon suffuses the agent with the nature of the object of his action. Now, since30 the divine soul is said always to administer the whole heaven in the former way, transcending its subject in respect of its higher aspect, but sending forth its power into its deepest recesses,22 god could not be said to be the cause of placing the soul of the universe in a worse state, while35 the soul is not deprived of its natural state, as it possesses this from all eternity and will continue to possess it, this state not being something that can be rendered unnatural, since it pertains to it eternally and never had a beginning.
And when Plato declares that the souls of the stars relate in the identical manner to their bodies as does that of the universe – for the Demiurge ‘inserts’ their bodies also ‘into the circuits’ of the soul23 – he40 would thereby preserve also for them their proper state of happiness. There being, after all, two aspects of the association of soul with body that are troublesome, first,24 that it constitutes an obstacle to acts of thinking, and secondly,25 that it infects the soul with pleasures and45 appetites and pains;26 none of these would befall a soul which has not entered into the innards of a body, nor belongs to a given body, nor has come to be the soul of that body, but rather that body belongs to its soul,27 and is such as neither to desire anything nor to be deficient in any respect, so that that soul will not be infected with appetites or fears. For50 it does not ever expect anything alarming to derive from such a body as that, nor does any troublesome concern arise, causing declination to what is lower, such as to draw it down from its blessed contemplation of the higher, but it is always in contact with such objects, administering this universe with an effortless power.
§4.8.3. But let us now turn to speak of the human soul, which is said to suffer all sorts of misfortune in the body and to ‘suffer’28 through falling into follies and appetites and fears and all sorts of other evil states, and for which the body is a ‘bond’ and a ‘tomb’,29 and the world its ‘cave’ and5 ‘cavern’30 and enquire what view he has of its descent that will not be discordant with itself because the causes [he indicates] for the descent are not identical.31
So, accepting that universal Intellect dwells in the place of intellection whole and entire, which we indeed posit as the intelligible cosmos, and that there are comprised within it intellectual powers and particular intellects – for it is not one only, but one and many32 – there are10 necessarily also both a multiplicity of souls and one Soul, and the many distinct from the one, like species derived from one genus, some better and some worse, some more intellectually active, while others are such to a lesser extent. For indeed there in the world of Intellect we have on the one hand Intellect itself embracing virtually all others, like a great 15Living Being33 and, on the other, individual intellects, each actualizing one of those which the other embraced virtually.
For example, if a city were to possess a soul embracing all the other ensouled beings within it, the soul of the city would be more perfect and more powerful, but would not preclude the other souls also being of the identical nature as it; or, if from fire as a whole one were to imagine there deriving on the one hand a big fire, and on the other many little fires; but20 the total substance will be that of fire as a whole – or rather that from which the substantiality of fire as a whole also derives.34
It is the role of the more rational soul to think,35 but not solely that; otherwise, how would it differ from Intellect itself? For, by taking on in addition to its intellectual activity something else, it did not remain static in the manner of Intellect; it has its own proper role, after all, if25 indeed this is the case with all members of the intelligible world. When it looks towards what is prior to it, it thinks, but when it looks to itself, it turns to ordering and administering and ruling what is below it; because it was not possible for all things to remain fixed in the intelligible world, when the capacity existed for something else to arise in succession – of lesser status than it, certainly, but necessary nonetheless, if indeed that30 what comes before it is necessary also.
§4.8.4. As for particular souls, they actually employ an intellectual desire in their reversion to that from which they derive, but they also possess a power directed towards this world, like a light which is attached on its upper side to the sun, but which on its lower side does not begrudge what service it can provide; they are free from care as long5 as they remain with universal soul in the intelligible world, while in heaven they share with the universal soul in its administration,36 like those who associate with a king of universal power and assist in his administration without descending themselves from the royal premises; for they are all together then in the identical place.10
But, then, transposing themselves from the universal plane to existing as a part and to being on their own, and becoming in a way weary of existing with another, they retreat each into themselves.37 When the soul actually does this over a period of time, and shunning the totality of things and standing apart in self-distinction, it ceases to look towards the intelligible; having become a part, it falls into isolation and weakness,15 and busies itself with trivialities and takes a partial view, and due to its separation from the whole, it fastens upon some individual body and shuns the rest of the totality, coming and directing itself towards that one individual; battered as it is in every way by the totality of things, it severs itself from the whole and turns to administering the particular with all the trouble that involves, fastening now upon this and putting20 itself in thrall to externals through its presence in it, and plunging itself deep into the interior of it.
It is here that there befalls it the so-called ‘moulting of feathers’38 and its coming to be in the bonds of the body, once it has failed of its blameless cooperation in the administration of the better alternative, which involved remaining with the universal soul; that previous situation25 was altogether better for it, as it was tending upwards. Consequent on its fall, then, it has been caught down here, and is in its prison, and is active at the level of sense-perception, because it is impeded from the outset from activating itself intellectually, and it is said to be ‘buried’ and ‘in a cave’;39 whereas once it has turned itself back towards intellection, it is said to be freed from its bonds and to ‘ascend’, when it has taken its start in ‘contemplating Beings’40 from its30 exercise of recollection; for despite everything it always retains some element of the transcendent.
Souls, then, come to be, in a way, amphibious, as of necessity they live part of their life in the intelligible world and part of their life in the sensible world;41 those who are able to connect more with Intellect spending more time at the former level, while those in the contrary state whether by nature or misfortune are more engaged at this level.35 Plato actually gives a discreet hint of this when he divides in turn42 the contents of the second mixing-bowl and makes them ‘parts’,43 and then declares that it is necessary that they proceed into the world of generation,44 since they have become ‘parts’ of this sort. But if he speaks of the god ‘sowing’ them,45 that is to be understood in the same sense as when he presents him as ‘speaking’ and, in a way, ‘addressing an 40assembly’;46 for his mode of procedure requires him to depict as generated and created what is eternally existent in the nature of the cosmos, for the purposes of exposition presenting in sequence things that are always becoming and things there are eternally Beings.
§4.8.5. So, there is no discordance between the ‘sowing into the world of generation’ and the concept of descent for the perfection of the universe, the judgement and the cave, necessity and the voluntary – seeing as the necessity includes the voluntary – and the entry into body as something evil; nor yet is there a discordance in the ‘flight5 from god’ of Empedocles, nor the moral error, on which follows the judgement, nor the ‘respite in flight’ of Heraclitus,47 nor, in general, that between the voluntariness and the involuntariness of the descent. After all, every process towards the worse is involuntary, but if something goes there by its own motion, in suffering the worse it is said to suffer punishment for its actions.4810
But when the doing and experiencing of these things becomes necessitated eternally by a law of nature, that soul which unites itself to a body in descending from a world superior to the human, accommodating itself to the needs of another – if one says that it is a god who has sent it down, one would not be in contradiction either with the truth, or with oneself. For each class of things, albeit of the lowest status, even if there15 be many intermediate stages, is to be referred back to the principle from which it sprang.
Now, accepting that there are two stages of moral error, the one connected with the cause of the initial descent, the other with whatever vicious deeds one might commit when down here,49 the first is punished precisely by that very thing, what it experiences in the initial descent, while the nature of the second, when less serious, causes it to enter one20 body after another and the more quickly to proceed to judgement according to its due – the fact that it indeed comes about by divine ordinance is indicated by its very name, ‘judgement’ – while the immoderate type of vice merits punishment of a more serious nature, under the supervision of avenging daemons.50
In this way, then, though soul is a divine being and derives from the places above, it comes to be encased in a body, and though being a god,25 albeit of low rank, it comes thus into this world by an autonomous inclination and at the bidding of its own power, with the purpose of bringing order to what is inferior to it. And if it extricates itself promptly,51 it suffers no harm, acquiring a knowledge of evil and learning the nature of vice, while bringing its own powers into the light and30 exhibiting deeds and productions which, if it had remained inactive in the incorporeal world, would have been useless, as never coming to actuality; and the soul itself would never have known what capacities it had, since they would never have been revealed or developed. This is so, if indeed in all cases actualization reveals the potentiality that would otherwise have been entirely hidden and in a way blotted out and non-35existent, since it never would truly exist. As it is, however, everyone is brought to wonder at what is inside it by reason of the variegation of what is outside, reflecting on what sort of a thing it is from the observation of its sophisticated acts.
§4.8.6. If, then, it indeed had to be the case that there should not be just one thing only – for all things would then have remained hidden, since they would not possess form in the One, nor would any one of all things have come to exist, since the One would have stood fast in itself, nor would there have been the multiplicity of these Beings which have been generated from the One, if the things after them had not proceeded such5 that they assumed the position of souls in the order52 – in the identical manner it had to be that there should not only be souls without the appearance of those entities which have come into being through their agency; if indeed it is inherent in each nature to produce what comes after it, and to unfold itself like a seed, developing from a partless principle to a sensible end-product. The higher element remains always10 in its proper seat, while what follows it is, in a way, generated from an inexpressible power53 such as is characteristic of those higher levels of being, for whom it is not an option to remain in a way inactive out of grudging;54 rather, it always proceeds, until all things so far as possible reach their final state, under the impulsion of an immense power that15 extends from itself over all things, and can overlook nothing so as to leave it without a share in itself.
For there is actually nothing that prevents anything from having a part in the nature of the Good, insofar as each thing is capable of participating in it. So, either the nature of matter existed from all eternity, in which case it was not possible for it, as existing, not to participate in that which provides the good to all things insofar as they20 are competent to receive it; or its generation followed of necessity on the causes which preceded it, in which case not even so is it possible for it to stand apart, as if that which granted it its existence by a sort of gift came to a halt through lack of power before it reached it.55
That, then, which is finest in the sensible world is a manifestation of what is best in the intelligible world, both of its power and of its goodness,25 and all things are held together forever, both the intelligible world and in the sensible world, the former existing of themselves, while the latter assume their eternal existence by participation in these, imitating their intelligible nature insofar as they can.56
§4.8.7. Given that soul’s nature is twofold, intelligible and sensible, it is better for the soul to be in the intelligible, but it is necessary nonetheless for it to partake also of the sensible, possessing such a nature as it does; and it must not be discontented with itself if it cannot in all respects5 adhere to the better, seeing as it holds a median position among things that exist.57 Though belonging to the ‘divine portion’,58 it is yet situated at the outer limit of the intelligible, such that, sharing as it does a common border with the sensible nature, it gives something to this from what is proper to it, while apprehending something from that provided that it does not impose this arrangement at the cost of preserving its own security, and plunges in with an excessive degree of enthusiasm,10 without remaining as a whole in contact with the universal soul.59 This is especially so when it is possible for it to rise up again, after acquiring a record of what it saw and experienced in the sensible world and, therefore, having learned what it is like to be in the intelligible world, and by the comparison of what are in a way opposites, in a way learning more clearly of the better.
For the experience of evil results in a clearer knowledge of the15 Good in those whose power is too weak to attain knowledge of evil prior to experiencing it.60 And even as the outgoing procession from Intellect is a descent towards the lowest level of what is inferior for it is not feasible to ascend to what transcends it,61 but it must, because it is activating itself from itself and is not able to remain on its own level, by20 what is indeed a necessary law of nature proceed as far as Soul62 – that being its goal – and it must then hand over to Soul the reality next in line to it before ascending again, such also is the activity of Soul; one part is that which comes after it, namely, the contents of this world, while the other part is the contemplation of the Beings that are prior to it.
For some souls such an experience takes place little by little, and in25 a temporal sequence, and their reversion towards the better takes place in a milieu which is worse, while for that which we call the soul of the universe there has never actually come about an involvement in what is worse, but from a position unaffected by evils it is able to observe by contemplation the things that are below it, while remaining constantly in touch with what precedes it.
In fact, the two things are possible at the same time: that the soul30 should be in receipt of what comes from the intelligible world, while ministering to the needs of the sensible world, because there is no way that, being a soul, it can escape contact with these beings, too.
§4.8.8. And if, against the belief of others, one is to venture to express more clearly one’s own view, the fact is that even our own soul does not descend in its entirety, but there is something of it always in the intelligible world.63 However, if that part which is in the sensible world becomes dominant, or rather if it is dominated and subjected to disturbance, it does not permit there to be self-awareness64 in us of5 that of which the upper part of the soul is in contemplation. For that which is the object of intellection by the upper part only impinges on us when, in its descent, it reaches our self-awareness; it is not the case, after all, that we take cognizance of everything which happens in every part of the soul, before it comes to the whole soul; as, for example, an appetite that remains in the soul’s faculty of appetite is10 not cognized by us, except when we come to grasp it with the internal power of self-awareness, or with that of our discursive thinking, or both.
For every soul possesses an element which inclines downwards towards body, and another which inclines upwards towards Intellect. Now the universal soul or the soul of the universe,65 imposes order upon the whole universe with that part of it which inclines towards body while remaining above it free from any effort, because it does not have to15 employ calculative reasoning as do we, but rather intellect, in order to administer what is below it as a whole – even as they say, ‘craft does not deliberate’.66
Souls, on the other hand, which are particular and preside over a part, while they, too, possess a transcendent element, are yet very much taken up with sense-perception, and with the faculty of apprehension apprehend much that is unnatural and painful and disturbing, inasmuch as the20 part that they are concerned with is both defective and beset on all sides by alien forces, while having at the same time many things that it aspires to; it is steeped in pleasure, and pleasure is its snare. The other soul is exempt from such fleeting pleasures, and its way of life is concordant with its abode.67
1 Cf. 6.9.7.17. See VP 23.15–16 where, however, union with the One, not Intellect, is described.
2 See Pl., Phdr. 248B1; Ar., Meta. 12.7.1072b30.
3 See frs. 22 B 90, B 60, and B 84a–b DK respectively, the last pair only known from this passage of Plotinus.
4 See fr. 22 B 101 DK, ‘I searched into myself’.
5 See Empedocles, fr. 31 B 115.13–14 DK.
6 See Pl., Phd. 67D1.
7 See Pl., Phd. 62B2–5, taking ἐν φρουρᾷ in the sense of ‘in prison’, rather than ‘on guard-duty’, as Plato may well have intended.
8 See Pl., Rep. 514Aff.
9 See Empedocles, fr. 31 B 120 DK.
10 See. Pl., Rep. 532E.
11 See Pl., Phdr. 246C2, 248C9.
12 See Pl., Phdr. 247D5.
13 The ‘judgements, lots, chances, and necessities’ represent a blend of Phdr. 249B2 with Rep. 619D7.
14 See Pl., Tim. 34B8.
15 See Pl., Tim. 30B3.
16 Cf. infra 3.27–30; 6.1ff. See Pl., Tim. 39E7–9.
17 See Pl., Tim. 32B5–6.
18 See Pl., Tim. 43B8–C1.
19 See Pl., Tim. 34B2, 34B8–9.
20 See Pl., Tim. 33C6–7.
21 Cf. 4.7.13.9. See Pl., Phdr. 246E1–2.
22 See Pl., Phdr. 247E3–4.
23 See Pl., Tim. 38C7–8.
24 See Pl., Phd. 65C5–9.
25 See Pl., Phd. 65A10.
26 See Pl., Phd. 66C2–3.
27 Cf. 4.3.9.34–36; 6.4.16.16.
28 See Pl., Phd. 95D3.
29 Cf. supra 1.30–34. A composite reference to Pl., Phd. 62d1 and Crat. 400c2.
30 A conjunction of the ‘Cave’ of Pl., Rep. 7 with the ‘cavern’ of Empedocles, fr. 31 B 120 DK, also mentioned supra 1.34–35.
31 I.e., the cause for the descent of the human soul is not identical to the causes for the descent of the soul of the cosmos and the soul of the stars.
32 Cf. 5.1.8.23–27; 5.4.1.21. See Pl., Parm. 155E5. Intellect is usually said to be a one-many and Soul a one and many.
33 See Pl., Tim. 30C3–8.
34 Presumably, this would be the Form of Fire.
35 Referring to the rational part of the embodied soul or to the soul of the cosmos.
36 Plotinus seems here to be obscuring his own distinction between the hypostasis Soul and the soul of the cosmos, with the term ‘universal soul’ used for both. Cf. infra 7.10–11; 4.3.2.55–56.
37 The words ‘existing as a part’ indicate the individuality or particularity of an embodied soul as distinct from the individuality of an undescended intellect. Cf. 4.7.13.9–14; 6.4.16.32–37.
38 See Pl., Phdr. 246C2, 248C9.
39 See Pl., Rep. 514A5.
40 See Pl., Phdr. 249E5–250A1.
41 Cf. 1.1.10.7–11, 11.2–8; 2.9.2.4–10; 4.3.12.3–8.
42 Reading αὗ τά with HS3, following Igal.
43 See Pl., Tim. 41D5–8. There is, however, in Plato’s account only one mixing-bowl, and two mixings. Plotinus is here adopting an aberrant interpretation of his Middle Platonic predecessor Atticus.
44 See Pl., Tim. 42A3–5.
45 See Pl., Tim. 41E1–4, where the Demiurge is said to ‘sow’ the souls into the organs of time, that is, the planets.
46 See Pl., Tim. 41A7–D4.
47 Cf. supra 11–19.
48 Cf. 4.3.24.15–16.
49 See Pl., Phdr. 248C3–D2, 248E5–7.
50 Cf. 3.4.6.10–17. See Pl., Phd. 113D1–114C6; Rep. 615E4–616A4.
51 This presumably does not imply premature physical death, but rather a spiritual ‘death’ to the physical world and its attractions.
52 Cf. 1.7.1.20–26; 2.9.3.7–12; 3.8.10.1–4; 5.1.6.38–39.
53 Cf. supra 3.19–22.
54 See Pl., Tim. 29E1–3, 42E5–6.
55 Cf. 1.8.14.51–54; 3.4.1.5–12.
56 Cf. 2.9.8.10–20, 16.48–56; 3.2.13.18–14.6.
57 Cf. 4.4.3.11–12.
58 See Pl., Phdr. 230A6.
59 Cf. supra 4.5–6.
60 See Pl., Tht. 149C1–2.
61 See Pl., Rep. 509B9.
62 Cf. 5.2.1.17–18; 6.2.22.23–32.
63 Cf. 2.9.2.5; 3.4.3.24–27; 4.3.12.1–3; 5.1.10.13–19; 6.4.14.16–22; 6.7.5.26. Perhaps ‘others’ refers to other Platonists.
64 The term αἴσθησις here seems to be used synonymously with the term συναίσθησις, ‘awareness’ and is translated accordingly.
65 Here Plotinus again seems intentionally to blur the distinction between the hypostasis Soul and the soul of the universe.
66 See Ar., Phys. 2.8.199b28. The syntax here is obscure, and probably corrupt, but this seems to be the sense.
67 See Ar., Meta. 12.7.1072b14–15.