§4.9.1. Is it the case that, even as we say that the soul of each individual is one because it is present as a whole everywhere in the body, and is really one in this way, not having one part of itself in this area of the body, and another in that, and the soul being present in this way in5 beings with the faculty of sense-perception, and in plants likewise the corresponding soul being present as a whole in each part,1 so my soul and your soul should be one, and indeed all souls should be one?2 And in the universe as a whole, is the soul in all things one, not divided as constituting a mass, but everywhere identical? For why would the soul in me be one, but the soul in the universe not be one? For there is no mass in that case, nor body. Now if my soul and your soul derive from10 [the identical material as]3 that of the universe, and that is one, these, too, ought to be one. And if the soul of the universe and my soul derive from one Soul, then again all souls are one.4 So, what is this one soul?
First, however, we must discuss the question whether it is correct to say that all souls are one, just as the soul of each individual is one. For if15 my soul were one with that of anyone else, absurdities would surely result; for example, if I were to perceive something, then this other person should perceive it, too, and if I were good, he would have to be good also, and if I had an appetite for something, he, too, would have to have the appetite and, in general, we would have the same experience as each other and as the universe, so that if I had an experience of something the whole universe would be aware of it. And further, how, if all20 souls were one, would one be rational, and another non-rational, and one in animals, and another in plants? On the other hand, though, if we do not make that postulate, the universe will not be one, and there will be no possibility of finding one principle of souls.
§4.9.2. First of all, then, it is not the case that if my soul and that of someone else are one, it follows that the two relevant complexes5 are identical. For though it is identical in one subject and in another, it will not undergo the identical affections in each of them, as in the case of ‘human being’6 being present in me while I am moving; for if I am5 moving and you are not moving, in me it will be in motion, whereas in you it will be at rest. It is not absurd or unduly paradoxical, after all, that the identical thing should be in me and in you; there is certainly no necessity that when I perceive something, someone else should in all cases have the identical affection. For not even in the case of one body does the one hand feel what the other hand is experiencing, but it is the10 soul in the whole body that does so. If indeed you had to cognize an affection of mine, there being one thing comprising both of us, then that thing would have to be a conjoined body; for only if linked together in this way would either of us perceive the identical thing.
It is also appropriate to bear in mind the fact that many things that occur in one identical body fall beneath the notice of the whole, and so much the more according as the body is possessed of a greater magnitude,15 as is said to be the case with great monsters of the sea, with whom, when some affection occurs in a part, no perception of that, by reason of the smallness of the motion, impinges upon the whole; so that there is no necessity, when just one part is affected, that the perception should come through clearly as an impression on the body in its entirety. But20 there is nothing absurd, nor is it an idea to be abandoned, that there should be a community of affection, without this necessarily resulting in a sensible impression.7
And that there should be virtue present in me, and vice in someone else, is not absurd either, if it is indeed not impossible for the identical thing to be in motion in the one and at rest in the other. For we do not speak of this as one in the sense of being completely devoid of multiplicity25 – for this must be reserved for the higher nature8 – but we say that it is both one and multiple, and partakes both ‘of the nature which comes to be divided in bodies, and yet again of the undivided nature’,9 so that once again it is one. And even as in my case there is no necessity that an affection occurring in the part should dominate the whole, although what30 occurs in the dominant part has some bearing on the [the other] part,10 even so the influences which come from the universe to each individual have a much clearer impact, since in many cases individuals have the same experiences as the whole, whereas it is unclear whether what affects us personally makes any contribution to the whole.11
§4.9.3. Moreover, on the basis of considerations opposite to this, the argument maintains that we feel sympathy with each other and share in each other’s pain through having sight of it, and we find relaxation and are stimulated to love by the promptings of nature; and, no doubt, this is the reason for the phenomenon of love.
And if spells and magical procedures in general serve to bring people5 together and cause them to connect sympathetically from considerable distances, this must at all events result from a unity of soul.
And an utterance pronounced quietly has an effect on what is far distant from it, and has caused an attentive reaction from something vastly removed in space. From such phenomena, one may conclude the unity of all things, by reason of the unity of soul.
How, then, if soul is one, will one soul be rational and another non-10rational, and another even just a faculty of growth?
In fact, it is because the undivided part of soul is to correspond to the rational element and is not divided in bodies, whereas the part which is divided in bodies, while also itself being one, in being divided in bodies, and in providing every sort of sense-perception, is to be regarded as15 activating different powers of itself, one of which is its power of moulding or producing bodies. It is not because it has many powers that it is not one; after all, in the seed there is a plurality of powers, and it remains one; and from this one seed there derives a multiplicity which is yet one.
But why, then, are not all the powers instantiated everywhere? For in the case of the one soul which is said to be everywhere, the exercise of20 sense-perception is not the same in all the parts, and reason is not present in the whole, while the faculty of growth is present even in the parts which are devoid of sense-perception; and, nonetheless, it all reverts to a unity when it departs from the body. And the faculty of nutrition, if it derives from the universe, possesses something also of that soul.
Why, then, does the faculty of nutrition not derive also from our25 soul? Because what is nourished by this faculty is a part of the universe, which itself possesses a passive faculty of sense-perception, but the sense-perception which makes judgements with the help of intellect is proper to the individual, which had no need to mould that which already received its moulding from the universe – though it would have performed this moulding, if it had not had to be present in this universe already.12
§4.9.4. All this, then, has been said with the aim of diffusing any wonderment that might arise in connection with the proposal that all souls should be drawn back to a unity. But the argument still leaves open the question: in what sense are they all one? Is it in the sense that all derive from one, or that they are all one? And if they derive from one, does this arise through its dividing itself, or by it remaining as it is as a whole, but nonetheless producing a multiplicity from itself? And how,5 on the other hand, if it remains one,13 would it be able to produce a multiplicity from itself?
Let us declare, then, calling upon god to come to our assistance, that there must be one first, if indeed there are to be many, and it is from this that the many [souls] must arise. Now if it were a body, it would be necessary that the many should arise from the division of this, with each10 becoming a completely different substance; and if it were uniform in its parts, all the souls would come to exist as uniform, bearing within them one identical form overall, and distinct only in mass; and if their being souls were conditioned by their underlying masses, then they would be different from one another, but if this was owing to their form, then the15 souls would be one in respect of form.
This, then, involves the existence of one identical soul in a multiplicity of bodies, and prior to this one soul in the multiplicity, the fact that there is another one that is not in the multiplicity, from which derives the one that is in the multiplicity, like an image borne about in many places of the one which is remaining in one place, as, for example, if from one signet-ring a plurality of wax impressions were to20 be made bearing the identical image.14 In the former case, though, the one soul would be all used up in creating the many, but in the second the soul would be something incorporeal. And even if it were a mere affection, there would be nothing remarkable in one quality coming to be in many things from some one thing; and if the soul is to be considered in relation to the complex,15 that would not be remarkable either. But as it25 is, we posit that it is incorporeal and a Substance.16
§4.9.5. How, then, will the Substance be one in many souls? For either the one is present as a whole in all, or the many arise from the one whole, while that remains as it is. That soul, then, is one, and the many relate back to it, as a unit giving itself to a multiplicity, and yet not giving itself; for it has the resources to make itself available to all and yet remain one. 5It is capable, after all, of both extending to all things, while yet not being cut off from each individual; so it is identical in the many.
But in the case of a science, one might say, the part is not the whole.
1 I.e., the faculty of growth.
2 Cf. 4.2.1.68–76.
3 See Pl., Tim. 41D4–7, where our souls are made from the identical ‘mixture’ of ingredients as the soul of the cosmos, but with a lesser degree of purity.
4 Cf. 4.3.2.50–58.
5 I.e., the composites of soul and body. Cf. 4.3.26.1–3; 6.2.13.
6 I.e., the Form ‘Human Being’.
7 Cf. 3.8.19.8–14; 4.4.8.8–13.
8 I.e., the One.
9 See Pl., Tim. 35A1–3.
10 The ‘dominant part’ probably refers here to the faculty of reasoning.
11 Cf. 4.2.1.41–53; 4.4.33.25–41.
12 Cf. 4.3.6, 23.31–32; 4.4.22.30–32.
13 Accepting Harder’s proposal μία (‘one’) for the οὐσία (‘substance’) of mss and HS2, which hardly seems to fit the context. The alternatives that Plotinus has just advanced are ‘deriving from one’, and ‘being one’.
14 See Ar., DA 2.11.424a19.
15 I.e., of soul and body.
16 Cf. 4.7.85.43–46.