§5.5.1. Might, then, one say that Intellect – the true and real Intellect – will ever be in error and have beliefs about non-beings?1 Not at all. For how would Intellect still be what it is if it is unthinking?2 It must, therefore, always know and not ever forget, and its knowledge must 5not be conjecture, or uncertain, or like something heard at second hand. So, its knowledge is not acquired by means of demonstration either.3 For even if someone were to say that some of what it knows it knows by means of demonstration, in that case there would still be something self-evident to it. Actually, our argument maintains that everything is self-evident to it. For how could someone distinguish the things that are self-evident to it from those that are not?
But as for those things they concede are self-evident to it – from 10where will they say their being self-evident comes?4 And from where will Intellect derive the conviction that things are self-evident to it? For even sensibles, which certainly seem to bring with them the most self-evident conviction, do not, in fact, convince us that their seemingly real existence is in substrates rather than in our experiences, and that they are not 15in need of intellect or discursive thinking to make judgements about them. For even if it is agreed that the sensibles are in their substrates, the apprehension of which sense-perception will bring about, what is known by means of sense-perception of the object is a reflection of the thing; it is not the thing itself that sense-perception receives, for that object remains outside it.
Given that when Intellect knows, it knows intelligibles, how, if these 20are different from it, would it connect with them?5 For it is possible that it does not, so that it is possible that it does not know, or knows them only at the time when it connected with them and will not always have the knowledge. But if they are going to say that they are linked to it, what does the term ‘linked’ mean?6 In that case, acts of intellection will be impressions.7 And if this is so, they act externally, that is, they are 25impacts.8 But how will these impressions be made, and what will be the shape of such things? And in that case, an act of intellection will be of what is outside it just like sense-perception. And in what way will it differ from sense-perception other than by apprehending something smaller? And how will it know that it really apprehended them? And how will it know that something is good or beautiful or just? For each of 30these will be other than the object, and the principles of judgement by which it will attain conviction will not be in it, but rather these will be outside it, and the truth will be there.
Next, either intelligibles are themselves without perception and without any portion of life and intellect, or they do have intellect. And if they have intellect, both are simultaneously here – this truth and this primary Intellect – and we shall investigate in addition what the truth 35here is like, and whether the intelligible and Intellect are identical and occur simultaneously, and yet are still two and different – or how are they related?9
But if the intelligibles are without thought or without life, what sort of Beings are they?10 For they are certainly not ‘premises’ or ‘axioms’ or ‘sayables’;11 if they were, straightaway they would be referring to things different from themselves, and they would not then be the Beings 40themselves. For example, if they will say ‘that which is just is beautiful’, that which is just and that which is beautiful are in fact other than what is said.
But if they say that these are ‘simples’, Justice being separate from Beauty, then, first, the intelligible will not be some one thing nor in one thing, but each intelligible will be dispersed.12 And where and in what places will they be dispersed? And how will Intellect hit upon them,45 meandering through these places? How will it remain undisturbed – rather, how will it remain in the identical place? In general, what sort of shape or impression will it have of them? Or are we to assume that they are like constructed golden images or some other matter produced by some sculptor or engraver? But if they are like this, the contemplating of Intellect will in fact be sense-perception. Further, why is one of these things Justice and another something else?50
But the greatest objection is this. If indeed one were to grant that these intelligibles are totally outside Intellect, and then claim that Intellect contemplates them as such, it necessarily follows that it does not itself have the truth of these things and that it is deceived in all that it contemplates; for it is those intelligibles that would be the true reality.13 So, it will contemplate them though it does not have them, instead 55receiving reflections of them in a kind of cognition like this. Not having true reality, then, but rather receiving for itself reflections of the truth, it will have falsities and nothing true. So, if it knows that it has falsities, it will agree that it has no share in truth. But if it is ignorant of this as well, and thinks that it has the truth when it does not, the falsity that is 60generated in it is double, and that will separate it considerably from the truth.
This is the reason, I think, that in acts of sense-perception, too, truth is not found, but only belief, because belief is receptive,14 and for this reason, being belief, it receives something other than that from which it 65receives what it has. If, then, there is no truth in Intellect, an intellect of this sort will not be truth nor will it be truly Intellect, nor will it be Intellect at all. But there is nowhere else for the truth to be.
§5.5.2. So, one should not seek for intelligibles outside Intellect, nor assert that there are impressions of Beings in it, nor, depriving it of truth, make it ignorant of intelligibles and make them non-existent, and even eliminate Intellect itself. But if indeed one must also bring in 5knowledge and truth, that is, preserve Beings and knowledge of what each of them is – but not of their qualities,15 inasmuch as in having these, we would have only a reflection and a trace of real Beings, and we would not have or be present with or mixed with the Beings themselves – all Beings should be given to true Intellect. For in this way it would know, that is, truly know, and not forget, nor would it meander seeking them, 10and the truth will be in it, and it will be the foundation16 for these Beings, and they will be alive and will be thinking.
All of this must belong to the most blessed nature anyway; otherwise, where will its honour and dignity be? Indeed, again, this being the case, it will also have no need of demonstration or of conviction that these things are so – because it is itself the way that it is and it is self-evident to 15itself that it is this way; and if there is something prior to it, that is because it is self-evident to it that it comes from that; and if something comes after what is prior to it, that is because it is self-evident to it that that is itself – and no one can be more convinced of this than it is – and because in the intelligible world it is this and really so.
So, the real truth is also not its being in harmony with something else, but with itself, and it expresses nothing else beside itself, but what it 20expresses, it is, and what it is, this is also what it expresses.17 Who, then, could refute it? And from where would one draw the refutation? For the refutation adduced would rely on the identical thing said before, and even if you were to provide something else, it is brought in line with that which was said originally and it is one with that. For you could not find anything truer than the truth.
§5.5.3. So, there is for us one nature, which is Intellect, all Beings, and the truth.18 And if this is so, it is a great god, though it is not just some god; rather, one might well think that that which is all Beings is the universal god. And this nature is god, a second god, revealing itself before we see the first. That first god is seated or settled above 5Intellect, as if on a sort of beautiful pedestal which is suspended from it.19 For it had to be the case that the One, in proceeding, did not proceed to something soulless, nor indeed even proceed immediately to Soul, but that there had to be an indescribable beauty leading its way,20 just as in the procession of a great king, the lesser come first, and 10the greater and more dignified come after them in turn, and those who are even closer to the king are more regal, and those next even more honoured. After all these, the Great King suddenly reveals himself, with the people praying to him and prostrating themselves, at least those who have not already left, thinking that it was enough to see those who 15preceded the king.
So this king is other than those who precede him, who are other than him. But in the intelligible world, the king is not a foreign ruler; rather, he has the most just rule by nature, and true kingship, inasmuch as he is the king of truth, and by nature sovereign of the massed ranks of his own 20offspring,21 a divine battalion; is king of the king and of kings, and would more justly be called father of gods than Zeus.22 Zeus imitated him in this, not holding himself to the contemplation of his father, but imitating what is in a way the activity of his grandfather which is realized in the real existence of Substantiality.
§5.5.4. It has been said, then, that it is necessary to make the ascent to a one,23 that is, to what is truly one,24 but not in the way that other things are one, which, being many, are one by partaking of a one – we must grasp that which is not one by partaking, not that which is not more one than it is many – and it has also been said that the intelligible universe and Intellect are more one than anything else, and that 5there is nothing that is nearer the One itself, though these are not purely one.25
Now we long to see that which is purely and really one and not one due to something else, if this is in some way possible. So, it is necessary to rush towards the One from the sensible world, and not to add anything else to it, but to stop in absolute fear of separating ourselves 10from it; and not to proceed to duality in the least bit. If you don’t do this, you get two, among which the One is not; rather, both will be posterior to it. For it does not want to be counted with something different from it no matter whether that is one or how many; indeed, it does not want to be numbered at all. For it is a measure and is not measured, and it is not equal to other things, such that it is among them. If this were not the case, there would be something common to 15it and the things numbered, and that would be prior to it. But there cannot be anything prior to it.
Not even the term ‘Substantial Number’ applies to it, let alone what is posterior to this, namely, ‘quantitative number’. For Substantial Number is that which eternally provides Being,26 whereas quantitative number provides quantity along with other things or even without other things, if indeed this is a number.27 Since the nature of quantitative 20numbers is produced as an imitation in relation to the one [Number] which is their principle – that being among the prior Numbers, which are themselves imitations in relation to the true One – it does not have real existence by using up or fragmenting its unity, which is a unit prior to a duality that comes from it. And this unit is not each of the ones in 25the duality nor is it one of them while not being the other. For why would it be one rather than another? If, then, it is neither of them, it is different and, though it remains what it is, it does not remain isolated.28
How, then, are the ones in the duality different from each other? And how is the duality one? Is the one of the duality identical to the one in each part of the duality?
In fact, we have to say that they partake of the primary one, being other than that of which they partake, and the duality, insofar as it is one,30 also partakes, but not in the same way, just as an army and a house are not one in the same way.29 A house is one insofar as it is continuous; it is not essentially one, nor is it a one in quantity.
Are the units, then, in the pentad other than the units in the decad, while the one that unifies the pentad is identical to the one that unifies the decad?35
In fact, if every ship is compared with every other ship, small and large, and every city with every other, and every army with every other, the one in them is identical in each case. But if it is not in these cases, then neither is it for those. If, then, there are certain puzzles remaining regarding these matters, we will take them up later.30
§5.5.5. But we should return to the point where it was said that that which is first remains identical even if other things should come from it. In the case of numbers, then, the one remains while another one produces, and the number is generated according to that one. But in that which precedes Beings, here the One remains by itself much more. And though it remains, 5it is not the case that another does the producing, if Beings are produced by it; rather, it is sufficient itself for generating Beings.
And just as there in the case of quantitative numbers, there was a first – the unit – which was a form primarily and secondarily for all of them, that is, the individual numbers which came after it do not 10participate equally in it, so in the case of Substantial Numbers, each of the Beings that came after that which was first has within itself something of it as a sort of form. And for quantitative numbers, participation brought into existence the quantity of the numbers, whereas for Substantial Numbers participation brought into existence their Substantiality, so that their Being is a trace of the One.
And if someone says that the word ‘to be’ [einai] – the name that is 15indicative of Substance [ousia]31 – comes from ‘one’ [hen], he may have hit on the truth. For that which is said to ‘be’ first proceeded a little from the One, in a way, and did not want to go still further, but turned within itself and stood there [estē], and became Substance, the ‘hearth’ [hestia] of all things.32 It is as if someone who utters the sound [‘einai’],20 starting with the sound hen, reveals that which is from the One, and signifies being [on], insofar as possible. Thus, that which has been generated, the Substance and its existence, have an imitation that flows from the power of the One.33 And Substance,34 looking at and being moved by the sight, and imitating what it saw, let out the sound 25‘being’ [on] and ‘to be’ [einai] and ‘Substance’ [ousia] and ‘hearth’ [hestia].35 Thus, the sounds want to indicate the real existence of the one who, in pain, gave birth to the sounds. They imitate, so far as is possible, the generation of Being.
§5.5.6. But let these remarks be taken in whatever way one wants. Since the Substantiality that is generated is form – for someone could not actually say that what is generated from the One is anything else – and that it is not a form of something, but of everything, the One is necessarily formless.36 And being without 5form, it is not Substance. For Substance must be a ‘this something’, and this is defined. But it is not possible to grasp the One as a ‘this’. For in that case, it would no longer be a principle, but only that thing which you said was a ‘this’.
But if all things are found within that which is generated, which among these will you say that the One is? Since it is no one of these, it can only be said to transcend them. These are Beings, that is, Being. It, 10therefore, transcends Being.37 For ‘that which transcends Being’ does not indicate a ‘this’ – it does not posit it as such – nor does it indicate its name, but implies only that it is not this.38 If this is what the expression does, it does not at all encompass the One. For it would be absurd to try to encompass this unlimited nature. Someone who wanted to do this 15would have immediately prevented himself from in any way advancing towards a trace of the One.
But just as someone who wants to see the intelligible nature will, if he has no image of the sensible nature, be able to contemplate that which transcends the sensible, so someone wanting to contemplate that which 20transcends the intelligible will contemplate it by setting aside all that is intelligible, because while he learns that it exists by means of the intelligible, he learns the way in which it exists by setting the intelligible aside.39 ‘The way it is’ might as well be ‘the way it is not’, for the ‘way it is’ is not in anything or a ‘something’. But we in our birth pains to say something are necessarily at a loss, and we are speaking about that which is inexpressible, and wanting to give it a name, we are trying insofar as 25we are able to make it clear to ourselves.
But perhaps the name ‘One’ just indicates an elimination of plurality. Hence, it is also due to this that the Pythagoreans symbolically meant the One when among themselves they referred to ‘Apollo’ as the negation of plurality [a-pollōn].40 And if the One is affirmed both as the name and as that which the name indicates, this would be less clear than if 30someone did not say that name.41 For perhaps this name was being used so that someone who started their enquiry from that which indicates what is absolutely simple would end up negating this name, too. For though it was asserted as well as could be by the one who asserts it, this has no value for clarifying its nature, because that cannot be heard nor 35can it be understood by one who hears, but by one who sees, if indeed by anyone at all. But if the one who is seeing seeks to look at a form, he will not see the One.
§5.5.7. In fact, the activity of seeing is twofold, as with the eye – one is the thing seen by it, the form of the sensible, the other is that light by means of which it sees the form, and this itself is sensible, and though it is different from the form, and the cause of the seeing of it, it is seen in 5the form, that is, along with it. For this reason, the light does not at that moment provide a clear sense-perception of itself inasmuch as the eye is directed to that which has been illuminated. But when there is nothing else but it, the eye sees it in a concentrated impression, though even then the eye sees it being supported by something else, since if it came into 10being alone, and not in relation to something other, sense-perception would not be able to grasp it. For even the light of the sun, the light which is in it, would perhaps escape sense-perception if it were deprived of the mass that supported it.42 But if someone were to say that the sun is all light, one could take this as a clarification of what has been said. For light will be in none of the forms belonging to the other things which are 15seen, and perhaps it will by itself be visible. For the other visible things are not light alone.
So, the seeing of Intellect is like this. It itself also sees by means of another light the things that are illuminated by that primary nature, and sees since the light is in them.43 But insofar as it inclines towards the nature of that which is illuminated, it sees it less. If it were to set aside 20the things seen and were to look at that by means of which it sees, it would be looking at light and the source of light. But since Intellect must look at this light as not being outside it, we must go back to the eye. This at times will itself see not light that is outside or alien to it, but for a moment, something akin to it, prior to that which is outside, and more 25brilliant. Either it springs from the eye in the darkness of night or, when it does not want to look at other things, it lowers the eyelids and nevertheless emits light, or when the eyelids are shut, one sees the light in the eye. For then it sees without seeing and it is most of all then that it sees.30 For then it sees light. And the other things it saw were light-like in their form, though they were not light.
It is actually in this way that Intellect, covering its eyes so that it does not see other things, and collecting itself into its interior, and not looking at anything, will see a light that is not other than it or in another, but itself by itself alone and pure, and it appears to it all of a sudden so that it is in doubt as to where it appeared from,44 outside or inside, and 35when it goes away it says, ‘so it was inside – but, again, not inside’.
§5.5.8. In fact, one must not try to discover where it comes from. For there is not any ‘where’; it neither comes from nor goes anywhere, it both appears and does not appear. For this reason, it is necessary not to pursue it, but to remain in stillness, until it should appear, preparing oneself to be a contemplator,45 just like the eye awaits the rising sun.5 The sun rising over the horizon – the poets say ‘from Ocean’46 – gives itself to be seen with the eyes.
But from where will that which the sun imitates arise? And rising over what horizon will it appear?
In fact, it arises over the Intellect which contemplates it. For Intellect will be stable in its contemplation, since it is looking at nothing 10else beside that which is beautiful,47 inclining and giving itself over completely to what is in the intelligible world; stable and in a way filled with strength, it sees first itself becoming more beautiful, and shining, as it is near it. It did not, however, come as one expected; rather, it came as if it had not come. For it was seen not as something coming, but as 15something present prior to everything, before Intellect came to it.
It is Intellect that comes and Intellect that goes away, because it does not know where it should wait and where the One is waiting, which is nowhere. And if it were possible for Intellect itself to wait nowhere – not in the sense that it is in place, for it is not in place, but in the sense that it 20is altogether nowhere – it would be always looking at the One. And yet it would not be looking, but would be one with it, and not two. Now, however, because it is Intellect, when it looks, it looks in this way, by that in itself which is not Intellect.48 It is certainly wondrous how it is present not because it has come, and how, not being anywhere, there is nowhere that it is not. It is, then, immediately marvelled at, but for one 25who knows, it would be marvellous if indeed it were the opposite. Or rather: the opposite is not possible such that one could marvel at the opposite. And this is how it is:
§5.5.9. Everything that comes to be by something else is either in that which has produced it or in something else, if indeed there were to be something after that which produced it. For inasmuch as that which comes to be by another was also in need of that other for its generation, it needs that other in every sense, for which reason it is in another.49 Things, then, which are by nature last in order are in the last things prior to them, which are in the things prior 5to them, and so on until one arrives at the principle which is first.
But inasmuch as the principle has nothing prior to itself, there is not any other in which it is. And not being in any other, it encompasses10 all the other things which are in the things prior to themselves. Encompassing them, it is not scattered among them and it holds them and is not held by them. In holding them and in not being held by them, there is actually nowhere it is not. For if there is somewhere it is not, it does not hold what is there. But if something is not held, it is not there. So, it is present and not present by not being encompassed, and by being free of everything that would prevent it from being 15anywhere. For, again, if it is prevented, it is limited by another, and things immediately after would have no share in it, and the god would only go this far, and would no longer be in control, but would be subservient to things after it.
The things which are in something, then, are there where that thing is. But as for things which are not somewhere, there is nowhere they are not. For if a thing is not ‘here’, it is clear that another place20 contains it, and it is ‘here’ somewhere else, making it false that it is nowhere. If, then, it is true that it is not anywhere and false that it is somewhere – without thereby implying that it is somewhere else – it is not separate from anything.50 And if it is not separate from anything, being nowhere, it will be everywhere self-contained.51 For there is not some part of it here, and some part there; nor is it even in one place as a whole. So, it is a whole everywhere, with nothing holding it and 25nothing not holding it. Everything, therefore, is held by it.52
Consider the cosmos, too, which, since there is no cosmos prior to it, is not in a cosmos nor, again, in place. For what place could exist before the cosmos? Its parts are dependent on it and are in it. And soul is not in the cosmos, but rather the cosmos is in Soul.53 For the body 30is not a place in which Soul is, but Soul is in Intellect, body is in Soul, and Intellect in something else.54 And there is nothing else beyond this such that it would be in that. It is, therefore, in nothing at all. In this way, then, it is nowhere. Where, then, are other things? They are in it. Therefore, it is not cut off from other things nor is it in them nor is there something holding it, but rather it holds everything. For 35this reason, and in this way, it is the Good of everything, because everything depends on it, each in a different way.55 For this reason, some things are better than others, because some things have more being than others.
§5.5.10. But please do not, for my sake, look at it through other things. If you do that, you will see a trace of it, not it. But think what it would be to grasp that which is in itself, pure, mixed with nothing, all things partaking in it, but nothing holding it. For there is nothing else of this 5sort, yet there must exist something of this sort. Who, then, could grasp its power as a whole? For if it is everything at once, how could something differ from it?
Does one, then, grasp it in part? But you who are approaching it, approach it comprehensively, even though you are not able to describe it as a whole.56 Otherwise, you will be an intellect thinking, and even if you chance on it, it will escape you, or rather you will escape it. But when 10you try to see it, look at the whole. And when you think it, whatever you might remember of it, think that it is the Good – being the productive power of everything, it is the cause of intelligent life and thought, that from which comes life and intellect57 and whatever there is that has substantiality and existence58 – that it is one – for it is simple and first – that it is a principle – for from it all things come.59 The first 15motion is from it, for it is not in it, and from it is stability, because it did not need it, for ‘it does not move nor come to be stable’,60 for it has neither that in which it can be stable nor that in which it can move.61 For around what or in relation to what or in what would it do these things? For it is first.
But it has not been limited.62 For by what would it be so? And yet it is 20not in magnitude that it is unlimited.63 For where would it have had to proceed to? Or in order to become what, given that it has no need of anything? No, it is insofar as it is power that it possesses unlimitedness, for it will never be otherwise nor will it lack anything, whereas it is because of it that there are things which are not lacking as well.64
§5.5.11. Further, this is unlimited by being not more than one, and it has nothing in relation to which something that comes from it will have a limit. For by being one it could not be measured nor will it amount to a number. It is not limited, then, in relation to something else or in relation to itself for in that case it would be two. So, neither does it have a figure, because it has no parts, nor does it have a shape.5
So, do not try to see this with mortal eyes, as our account says, nor try to see it as would someone who supposed that all things are sensible. By supposing that, one would eliminate what exists most of all. For those things which someone thinks to exist most of all, most of all do not exist.65 And that which someone thinks has great existence has less of it. 10That which is first is the principle of Existence and even more properly first than Substantiality.66
So, you should reverse your belief. If you don’t, you will be left alone, bereft of god, like those at festivals stuffing themselves with food67 – something that it is not licit for those approaching the gods to do – believing that the food is more substantial than the sight of the 15god – whom they should be celebrating – and not partaking of the rites within. For in these rites, the god, who is not seen, produces disbelief in those who only believe in things they can see clearly, which they only see with their flesh. It is as if there were people who slept throughout their lives and believed that their dreams were trustworthy and clear; if someone were to waken them, they would disbelieve what they saw with their own eyes, and they would go back to sleep.
§5.5.12. It is necessary to look at each thing by that by which each should properly be perceived; some things are perceived with the eyes, others with the ears, and others by other means. And one should trust that other things are seen with the intellect, and not believe that thinking is done by hearing or seeing, just as if someone were to command one to see with the ears, and to claim that there were no sounds because 5they were not seen. It is also necessary to consider how people have forgotten what they originally desired, and even now long for and desire. For all things desire and pursue that by a necessity of nature, as if they had divined that without which they are not able to exist.68
And the apprehension of that which is beautiful is there already for those who, in a way, know it and have wakened to it, and so, too, the 10amazement, the awakening of love. But the Good, inasmuch as it was present of old to an innate desire, and is also present to those who are asleep, does not amaze those who sometimes see it, because it is always with them and there is never a recollection of it. People do not see it because it is present when they are asleep. But the love of that which is beautiful, when it is present, gives pain, because one must desire it once 15having seen it. This love is secondary, and the fact that lovers are conscious of it at once reveals the beauty also to be secondary.69 But the desire that is more ancient than this, and non-sensible, declares the Good to be more ancient and prior.
Everyone thinks that, having gotten the Good, that is sufficient for them, for they think that they have thereby arrived at their goal. But not 20all see that which is beautiful, and when it is generated, they think that it is beautiful in itself rather than beautiful for them, just in the way it is with beauty here, for it is the beauty of the one who has it. And for them, it is sufficient if things seem beautiful, even if they are not. This is not how they stand in regard to the Good.70 For they argue and compete and quarrel especially about the primacy of beauty, since they think that 25beauty has come to be in the way they do. It is as if one who was last in the royal line wanted to attain the same position as the one who is first in line, on the grounds that they both have their origin in the king himself, ignoring the fact that, although he does derive his status from the king as well, the other man comes before him.30
The explanation for the error is that both partake of the identical thing, that is, the One, which is prior to both, and that in the intelligible world, the Good is not in need of that which is beautiful, whereas that which is beautiful needs it. The Good is gentle, pleasant, and most delicate, and present to someone just when they want it. But that which is beautiful brings amazement and shock and pain is mixed with the 35pleasure. That which is beautiful even draws away from the Good those who do not know it, as a beloved draws one away from one’s father, for that which is beautiful is younger. The Good is prior not in time, but in truth, which has a prior power. For it has all the power. That which comes after it does not have all the power, but as much as there is that 40comes after it and from it.
So, the Good is also sovereign over this power. It is not in need of that which comes from it, but removing entirely everything that comes from it, and needing nothing of that, it is identical with what it was before it produced that. This is so since it would not have mattered to it if that had not come to be, just as it was not going to begrudge being to 45anything that was able to come to be from it. As it is, there is nothing left that can come to be. For there is nothing which has not come to be, given that everything has come to be. But it itself was not all things in a way such that it would need them, and since it transcends all things, it was able to produce them and leave them to themselves while it50 remained above them.
§5.5.13. But since it is the Good and not good, it must have had nothing in itself, since it did not even have the [property of being] good.71 For what it will have, it will have either as good or not good. But that which is not good will not be in that which is primarily and authoritatively the Good; nor will the Good have the good [as a property].5 If, then, the Good has neither that which is not good nor that which is good, it has nothing. If, then, it has nothing, it is ‘alone and isolated’72 from other things. If, then, the other things are either goods and so not the Good, or are not goods, it will have neither of these properties; in not having them, it is the Good by having nothing. If, therefore, someone adds something to it, either substantiality 10or intellect or the property of being beautiful, by that addition he subtracts from it the Good that it is.
Therefore, removing everything from it, and saying nothing about it, nor making a false claim about there being something in it, one allows the ‘is’, not giving false testimony about things being present in it as do those who produce panegyrics with no scientific understanding in them and who reduce the fame of the things they are praising by attributing to 15them less than their worth, being at a loss to say true things about the underlying subjects behind the words. We, then, too, should try not to add anything of that which comes later and that which is lesser, but treat it as that cause which is above these things, while not being identical to 20them.
For, again, it is the nature of the Good not to be all things nor to be any one of them. For if it were, it would fall under one identical [genus] to which they all belong. But by falling under one identical [genus] with all those, it could differ from them only by a unique differentia, and differentiation is addition. So, it would be two, not one, of which one part is not good, namely, that which is common to other things, and one part good. It will, therefore, be a mixture of 25good and not good. It will, therefore, not be purely nor primarily good; rather, that will be primarily good which, being other than the common part, is that by participating in which it has actually become good. But, then, the Good will be good by partaking. But that in which it partook is not one among all things; therefore, the Good is not one among all things. But if the Good, thus conceived, was in it – for there 30was a differentia due to which the composite was good – it is necessary for this to come from something else. But it was simple and uniquely good. Much more so, therefore, is that from which it came uniquely good.
That, therefore, which is primarily good, that is, that which is the Good, reveals itself to us as being over all beings and uniquely good and having nothing in itself, but unmixed with anything and over everything 35and the cause of everything. For indeed neither that which is beautiful nor beings come from what is evil nor from that which is indifferent.73 For that which produces is better than that which is produced. For it is more perfect.
1 This treatise is continuous with 5.8. The last sentence of that treatise is: ‘So, is what has been said sufficient to lead to a clear understanding of the intelligible world, or should we go back and take another path like this one?’
2 I.e., since Intellect’s activity is eternal cognitive identification with Beings, its having beliefs about that which is not would be equivalent to ‘unthinking’ for it.
3 Cf. 5.8.7.43.
4 The Epicureans. See D.L., 10.32; Sext. Emp., PH 2.169–170; M. 7.203, 364; 8.9.
5 See Pl., Tht. 186C7–10; Ar., DA 3.4.430a4–5, 5.430a19–20, 6.430b25–26, 7.430b17, 8.431a22–23.
6 The term συνεζεῦχθαι (‘linked’) is attributed to the Epicureans by Sext. Emp., M. 7.203.
7 The term τύποι (‘impressions’) is Stoic. See D.L., 7.45.
8 The term is πληγαί. Cf. 3.1.2, 11; 3.6.6.35, 62. See Alex. Aphr., De an. 72.5–11.
9 Cf. infra 2.1–13; 3.8.9.5–11.
10 Cf. 6.7.8.25–27. See Pl., Rep. 477A3; Soph. 248E6–249A2.
11 The premises are the supposedly self-evident propositional truths that form the basis of Aristotelian demonstrations. See Ar., APr. 1.1.24a16–b15. The axioms and ‘sayables’ are Stoic. See e.g., SVF 2.132 (= Sext. Emp., M. 7.38). Plotinus may also be responding to Longinus, who reputedly held that Forms are outside the intellect and identical to ‘sayables’. See Syrianus, In Meta. 105.25–30.
12 See Pl., Soph. 259E4–6.
13 Cf. infra 2.18–20; 5.3.5.22–23.
14 Taking the word for belief, δόξα, from the word for ‘receive’ δέχομαι.
15 Cf. 2.6.1.43–44. See Pl. [?], 7th Ep. 342E2–343A1.
16 The term ἕδρα (‘foundation’) is used by Pl., Tim. 52B1, for the receptacle of becoming. Intellect, as intelligible matter, plays an analogous role for Beings.
17 Cf. 5.3.5.22–23.
18 Cf. 5.9.6.1–3.
19 Cf. 6.6.9.39–40. See Ar., Meta. 12.7.1072b14.
20 Cf. 5.8.3.19, 8.21. See Pl., Rep. 509A6.
21 The ‘offspring’ is Intellect which is all Beings. Cf. 6.5.4.19; 6.7.2.48; 6.7.39–41.
22 See Homer, Il. 1.544.
23 Cf. 3.8.9.4, 10.14–16, 20–23.
24 See Pl., Soph. 245A8.
25 Cf. 4.7.10.35; 6.2.22.37.
26 See Pl., Parm. 144A5–6. Perhaps the ‘other things’ are continuous quantities.
27 Cf. infra 5.11–13; 6.6.9.34–35, 16.26.
28 Reading οὐ with the mss.
29 Cf. 6.2.10.3–4, 11.11–12; 6.6.13.18–25; 6.9.1.4–6.
30 Cf. 6.6.5.
31 ‘To be’ (εἶναι) is indicative of ‘Substance’ (οὐσία) because referring to something as existing always entails that that which exists is something or other; it has Substantiality.
32 See Pl., Crat. 401C.
33 See Pl., Rep. 509B6–7.
34 HS2 take the subject of the sentence to be ψυχή (‘soul’) but HS4 alters this, correctly in our view, to οὐσία.
35 Cf. 6.2.8.7–8. See Pl., Crat. 401C–D.
36 Cf. 6.7.17.36, 32.9; 6.9.3.4.
37 Since Substance includes all Beings, the fact that the One transcends the former means that it transcends the latter. Cf. 1.3.5.7; 2.4.16.25; 3.9.9.1; 4.4.16.27; 5.1.10.2; 6.2.17.22; 6.6.5.37; 6.8.9.27.
38 Cf. 5.3.13.1–6. See Pl., Parm. 142A3.
39 Cf. 3.8.1.31–32.
40 See Plutarch, De Is. 381f.
41 Cf. 6.7.38.4–5. See Pl., Soph. 244D3–9.
42 Reading ὑπέκειτο with HS4.
43 Cf. 6.7.16.20–31. See Pl., Rep. 511B5–6.
44 See Pl., Symp. 210E4, 211B1.
45 Cf. 6.7.34.10; 6.9.4.26.
46 See Homer, Il. 7.422.
47 Here referring to the One itself. Cf. 6.7.33.12–22. But also 1.6.9.37–39; 5.8.8.5, 13.11–12; 6.7.42.15–17.
48 Cf. 3.8.9.19–23, 32.
49 Including Beings in the intelligible world. Cf. 2.4.5.25–28; 2.9.3.11–14.
50 See Pl., Parm. 138B5–6.
51 See Pl., Parm. 144B1–2.
52 Cf. 5.1.10.7–11; 5.4.2.13; 6.9.6.15.
53 The distinction between the soul (of the cosmos) and the hypostasis Soul is here not clearly made. Cf. 4.3.22.8–11. See Pl., Tim. 36D9–E3.
54 I.e., the One.
55 Cf. 6.2.11.26.
56 Cf. 3.8.9.21–22, 10.33; 6.8.11.23; 6.9.4.2.
57 See Pl., Rep. 521A4.
58 See Pl., Rep. 509B6–7.
59 Cf. 2.9.1.1–2. See Pl., Rep. 511B7.
60 See Pl., Parm. 139B3.
61 See Pl., Soph. 254D5; Parm. 138D4–5, 139A3–4.
62 See Pl., Parm. 137D7–8.
63 Cf. 6.5.4.13–15; Ar., Meta. 12.7.1073a8–11.
64 I.e., Intellect and Soul. Cf. 3.7.5.23–24; 6.9.6.10–11.
65 Cf. 3.6.6.65–69; 5.9.1.3–4.
66 Cf. 5.9.5.26, 6.1–2, 8.16–17.
67 See Pl., Phd. 81E5; Tim. 73C6–8; Phdr. 238B1.
68 Cf. 1.7.1.9–13; 5.6.5.18–19; 6.5.1.11–13.
69 Cf. supra 8.10; 1.6.9.37–43. See Alcinous, Didask. 165.27–31.
70 See Pl., Rep. 505D5–E1.
71 Cf. 6.4.16.6–8.
72 Cf. 3.6.9.37; 5.3.10.17. See Pl., Phil. 63B7–8.
73 Cf. 5.1.7.37–40; 5.2.2.1–3.