§5.6.1. There is one type of thinking which is by a subject that is other than its object and another which is by a subject of itself, and the latter, as a result, avoids duality more. The former type also wants to think itself, but it is less able to do so, for though it has within itself that which it sees, it remains something other than it. By contrast, the latter is not separated from its object in substantiality, but being together with itself,5 it sees itself.1 It becomes two while remaining one.
It thinks more truly, then, because it has what it thinks, and thinks in a primary sense because that which is thinking must be one and two. For either it is not one [but two], and the subject of thinking will be other than what is thought – [in this case], it would not be that which is thinking in the primary sense because receiving the thinking from something other than it, it will not be that which is thinking in the primary sense, and this is so because that which thinks does not have 10what it thinks as its own, so that it does not think itself; or else, it has what it thinks as itself, so that it thinks in the proper sense, and that which is two will be one; therefore, subject and object must be one – or it is one and not two, and it will not have something to think of. So, it will not be thinking. Thinking, therefore, must be simple and yet not simple.
One would better grasp the nature of primary thinking if we start our ascent from the soul. For it is easier to distinguish it there, and someone 15could easily see its duality. If, then, one supposes a double light, the soul as the lesser light, and that which thinks as the purer form of it, and next suppose that the light which sees is equal to that which is seen, since one is no longer able to separate the two by their difference, one will suppose 20the two to be one, thinking that they are two, but by the same token seeing them as one. It is in this way that one will grasp Intellect and intelligible.
We have, then, made one out of two in our account, but the contrary is the case: the two actually come from one because it thinks, making itself two, or rather, because it thinks it is two, and because it thinks itself, it is one.
§5.6.2. If there is indeed primary thinking, and next there is thinking in a different way, then that which transcends primary thinking would no longer think.2 For an intellect must be generated in order to think, and being an intellect, and having that which is intelligible, and thinking primarily, it must have the intelligible in itself. But it is not necessary for 5everything that is intelligible to have thinking in itself or to think.3 For it will in that case not be only intelligible but also thinking, and it will not be first since it is two. And intellect which has the intelligible would not be realized unless there is a purely intelligible Substance;4 this will be intelligible for intellect, but in itself it will neither be thinking nor principally intelligible. For the intelligible, which is the purveyor of 10content to the act of intellection, is so for something different from it, namely, intellect, and its thinking is empty unless it grasps and seizes the intelligible which it thinks. For it has no thinking without the intelligible.
Is the One, then, perfect when it has it? But before it was thinking, it had to be perfect in its own substantiality. That, therefore, in which perfection is to exist will be like this prior to thinking. It is, therefore, 15not necessary for it to think. For it is self-sufficient before this occurs. It will, therefore, not think. There is, therefore, that which does not think, and that which primarily thinks, and that which thinks secondarily. Further, if that which is first thinks, something will exist in it, and therefore it will not be first, but second, and not one, but many, and thereby all the things that it thinks. For even if it thinks itself, it will be 20many.5
§5.6.3. But if they6 will say that nothing prevents that which is self-identical from being many, there will be one substrate for these. For it is not able to be many if there does not exist a one from which the many are derived or which is constituted of the many or, generally, a one which is counted first among all the rest, which we must grasp alone in itself. But 5if this one is to exist at the same time as the rest, and we must take it together with them, though it is nevertheless different from them, we must let it go with the others, and seek that which underlies them, no longer being with the others, but itself by itself. For if it were among the others, it would be the same as the One, but it would not be this.10
It should, however, be isolated if it is also going to be seen among the others; that is, unless someone were to say of it that its being consists in having its real existence along with the others. It will not, therefore, be simple; but neither will it be something composed of many parts, for that which is not able to be simple will have no real existence, and that which is composed of many parts will not exist either, since that which is 15simple will not exist. For if no simple individual can have real existence, since there is no one simple that has real existence by itself, then neither can a composite made out of many of them exist, since none of them can have real existence of their own, or make itself available to exist in conjunction with something else, since it does not exist at all. How could that which is composed of many come to be put together from 20things that do not exist – not from that which is not a particular existent but from that which is absolutely non-existent?
If, therefore, there is some many, there must be a one prior to the many.7 If, then, there is a multiplicity in thinking, there must be no thinking in that which is not a multiplicity. But this was what is first.25 Thinking and intellect, therefore, will be in the things that are posterior.
§5.6.4. Further, if the Good is simple and must lack nothing, it would have no need for thinking. But that which it does not need will not be present to it. And since, generally, nothing is present to it, therefore, thinking is not present to it. And it thinks nothing because there is nothing other than it to think.8 Further, Intellect is other than the 5Good, and it is Good-like9 by thinking the Good. Further, as in a duality there is a one and another one, and it is not possible for this one which is with another to be the number one, but rather the number one in itself must be prior to that one which is with another, so it must be in the case of something that has simplicity in it which is with another thing that has simplicity in it. There must be something that is simple in itself, not having in itself anything which is found in things that are 10joined with other things. For how can it be that there is one thing in another if that thing did not come from something that existed separately beforehand? What is simple could not arise from something else – but what is many, or even just two, must itself depend on something else.
And so, one should compare the first principle to light, the second to the sun,10 and the third to the heavenly body of the moon to which light 15is provided by the sun. For Soul has Intellect added to it, which colours it when it is intellectual, whereas Intellect has what belongs to itself, not being only light, but something illuminated in its own substantiality while that which provides the light to Intellect is not something else, but simply light, providing to Intellect the power to be what it is. What, 20then, would it be in need of? For it is not identical with that which is in another thing. For what is in another thing is other than that which is what it is due to itself.
§5.6.5. Further, that which is multiple might seek itself and want to converge on itself and be aware of itself. But as for that which is totally one, where will it be such that from that place it can proceed towards itself? What would be the occasion on which it would need awareness of itself? But it is identical with itself and is better than self-awareness and every act of intellection. For thinking is not first, neither by being first 5nor by being more honourable, but it is second and has come to be when the Good, which already existed, moved that which had come to be to itself, which then was moved and saw it.
And this is intellection: motion11 towards the Good that it desires. For the desire generated the intellection and caused it to exist with itself. 10For desire for seeing is sight. The Good itself, then, needs to think nothing, for the Good is not other than itself. And since whenever that which is other than the Good thinks it, it thinks it by being Good-like, that is, having a likeness in relation to the Good, and thinks it as the Good and as desirable to itself, and in a way having an image of 15the Good. And if it is always like this, it always does this. And again, in the act of intellection, it thinks itself accidentally.12 For looking towards the Good, it thinks itself. For in its activity, it thinks itself; given that the activity of everything is towards the Good.
§5.6.6. If we have indeed stated these matters correctly, the Good would not have any sort of room for thinking, for the Good must be other than that which is thinking. It is, then, without the activity [of thinking].13 And why should activity be additionally active? For generally, no activity has a further activity. But even if some14 are able 5to attribute to actualities other activities directed to something else, that which is primary amongst all, that on which everything else depends, must be allowed to be what it is, with nothing added to it. Such an activity, then, is not thinking. For it does not have something to think. For it is first.15
Next, it is not thinking that thinks, but that which has the thinking. 10Two things, then, again, arise in that which is thinking. But the Good is in no way two.
Further, one could better see what this is if one grasped more clearly how in everything which is thinking this dual nature exists.16 We say that Beings, both collectively and individually, that is, the Beings that are truly Beings, are in the ‘intelligible place’.17 This is not only because 15some things stay as they are due to the substantiality they have, while there are things in the realm of sense-perception that flow and do not stay as they are – though perhaps there are even things among sensibles that do stay as they are – rather, it is because they have the perfection of existence from themselves. For that which is said to be primary Substantiality must not be the shadow of existence, but rather have the fullness of existence. And existence is full when it receives the form of 20thinking and of life. Thinking, therefore, living, and existence are together in the realm of Being. If, therefore, there is Being, then there is Intellect; and if there is Intellect, then the thinking is together with its existing.18
Thinking, therefore, is many and not one. So, it is necessary for anything which is not like this not to be thinking. And we must take as really distinct19 Human Being and the act of intellection of Human 25Being, and the act of intellection of Horse and Horse, and the act of intellection of Justice and Justice.20 So, all things are double, and the one is two, and, again, the two combine into one. But the Good is not among these, nor is it each one, nor is it the totality of these twos, nor is it two at all. As for how the two come from the One, this has been discussed elsewhere.21 But something which ‘transcends 30Substantiality’22 must also transcend thinking. So, it is not strange if it does not know itself. For it does not have within itself something to learn, being one. Nor must other things know it. For it gives to them something greater and better than knowing it since it is the Good of other things; rather, it allows them to get hold of it, insofar as they are 35able, by identifying with it.
1 Cf. 4.6.2.22–24; 5.3.1.12–15, 13.14–16.
2 Cf. 1.7.1.19–20; 3.9.9.1, 12; 5.1.8.7–8; 6.7.40.26–27.
3 Cf. 5.4.3.13–19.
4 This use of οὐσία (‘Substance’) for the One appears to contradict the repeated claims that the One ‘transcends οὐσία’ and also intelligibility. Cf. 3.8.9.10–12. We may suppose that the qualification οἵον (‘in a way’, ‘sort of’) is meant to be understood here, as in 6.8.7.52 and 6.8.13.7. The One is intelligible ‘relative to Intellect’ because the One ‘contains’ within it all that is intelligible.
5 Cf. 5.3.10.9–16, 12.9–10. See Ar., Meta. 12.9.1074b34–35.
6 Presumably, Peripatetics.
7 Cf. 6.9.1.1–2.
8 Cf. 6.9.6.16–50.
9 Cf. 3.8.11.16–17; 5.3.16.18–19; 6.7.15.9–13, 21.2–9. See Pl., Rep. 509A1–4.
10 Inverting the analogy of Rep. 508B.
11 Cf. 3.8.11.23–25; 6.7.35.2–3. See Pl., Soph. 248E6–249A2.
12 See Ar., Meta. 12.9.1074b35–36; Alex. Aphr., De an. 86.22.
13 See Ar., Meta. 12.7.1072b26–27.
14 Reading ταῖς ἄλλαις τίνες with Theiler.
15 Cf. 3.9.9.12–17; 6.8.16.14–18, 31.
16 With Kirchhoff moving σαφέστερον to modify λάβοι.
17 See Pl., Rep. 508C1, 517B5.
18 Cf. 1.4.10.6; 3.8.8.8; 5.1.8.15–21; 5.9.5.29; 6.7.41.18. See Parmenides, fr. 28 B 3 DK.
19 The word καθέκαστα (‘really distinct’) is usually rendered as ‘individuals’ or ‘particulars’. Here, though, Plotinus is making the point that there is a real (internal) distinction in the intelligible world between the act of intellection and its objects.
20 Cf. 5.9.7.11–15; 6.6.6.30–32; 6.7.8.7.
21 Cf. 5.1.6.4–7; 5.9.14.4.
22 See Pl., Rep. 509B9.