§5.9.1. All human beings, when they are born, from the beginning use sense-perception prior to intellect, and, necessarily, encounter sensibles first. Some of them remain at this level and live their lives believing that these are the first things and the last they will encounter, supposing that what is painful in these is evil and what is pleasurable is good, and they 5typically pass their lives believing that it is sufficient that they pursue the one and manage to avoid the other.
Those,1 at least, who pretend that they are just being rational, lay this down as wisdom, like heavy birds who, taking in a lot from the earth, and being weighted down by it, are unable to fly high even though they are 10naturally equipped with wings. Others2 are furnished with the ability to ascend a little from things here below by the better part of their soul moving them from that which is pleasurable to that which is more beautiful. But, having nowhere else to plant themselves, they are unable to see above, and are brought back down to a nominal virtue concerned with actions and ‘choices’ made of those things here below from which 15they at first tried to elevate themselves.3 But there is a third type of divine human being4 who, with superior power and sharp-sightedness, saw, as if by a piercing vision, the glory up above and raised themselves to the intelligible world, in a way, beyond the clouds and the obscurity of the sensible world and remained in the intelligible world looking down on all the things here. They were delighted by being in a true and 20familiar place, as if after much wandering a human being arrived in his well-governed fatherland.5
§5.9.2. What, then, is this place? And how might one reach it? One who is a lover by nature and from the start really has the disposition of a philosopher might reach it;6 assuming that inasmuch as he is a lover, he is having ‘birth pains’ regarding beauty, and since he cannot bear ‘corporeal beauty’ flees from there to ‘the beauties of the soul, virtues 5and types of scientific understanding and practices and laws’.7 Again, he continues his pursuit on to the cause of what is beautiful in the soul, and whatever might be prior to this, until he comes at last to the first, which is beautiful in itself. Arriving there, his birth pains will cease, but not 10before then.8
But how will he ascend? Where does the power to do so come from to him, and what argument will instruct this love?9
In fact, it is this: this beauty which is added to bodies belongs to bodies. For these shapes that bodies have are added to them as to matter. At least, the substrate changes and from being beautiful it becomes ugly.15 The argument, therefore, maintains that it is by participation that this is so. What, then, is that which makes a body beautiful? In one way, it is the presence of beauty; in another, it is the presence of soul, which moulded it and brought this shape to it.
What, then? Is soul beautiful by itself?
In fact, it is not. For if that were the case, one soul would not be wise and beautiful and another stupid and ugly. It is, therefore, by wisdom 20that beauty is in the soul. And what is it, then, which gives wisdom to the soul? Necessarily, it is Intellect; not an intellect that sometimes acts like intellect and sometimes does not, but the true one10 which is, therefore, beautiful by itself. Should one actually stop here, taking this as first, or ought one to transcend Intellect,11 with Intellect standing in front of the25 first principle, from our perspective, as if ‘on the threshold of the Good’,12 proclaiming that all things are in itself just like an impression taken from it, or rather in multiple impressions of it, while it remains in every way one?13
§5.9.3. The nature of this Intellect, which the argument claims to be that which is real and true Substance, should be investigated, after first having taken another approach to assure ourselves that there must be such a thing. It is, then, perhaps foolish to seek to discover if intellect is 5among things that exist even if some would contend that it is not.14 It is better to ask if intellect is such as we say it is, and if it is something separate, and if this is identical with Being and if the nature of Forms is here. Regarding this, it remains for the following to be said.
We certainly see that all things that are said to be are composites not one of which is simple, both whatever craft fashions and whatever 10is constituted by nature. For the products of craft are just bronze or wood or stone, and nothing is made from them until a particular craft fashions a statue or a bed or a house, introducing the form which it has in itself.15
Further, the same goes for the things constituted by nature, some of 15which are multiply composited and are called compounds; these can be analysed into the form and the compounded elements that it governs. For example, a human being can be analysed into soul and body, and the body into the four elements. And when you find that each of these is a composite of matter and something that shapes it – for matter by itself is without shape – you will investigate where the form comes to matter 20from. You will investigate, again, whether the soul is among the simples already or whether there is something in it that is composed of matter and form; and whether the intellect in it has one part which is like the shape in the bronze and another part which is like the one who produces the shape in the bronze.16
And, then, transferring these considerations onto the whole universe,25 one will ascend to posit Intellect, too, as the true producer or creator, and one will say that the substrate, having received shapes, becomes fire, water, air, and earth. These shapes come from another. This is the soul; it is soul, again, that gives to the four elements the30 shape of the cosmos. But it is Intellect that supplies the expressed principles for this to be generated, just as the expressed principles come from the crafts to the souls of the craftsmen to actualize. Intellect is, then, the form of the soul, analogous to the shape, and that which provides the shape is analogous to one who produced the35 statue, in whom everything which he imposed, pre-existed. That which Intellect gives to the soul is near to the truth; what the body receives are already images and imitations.17
§5.9.4. Why, then, must one ascend above Soul, and refrain from positing it as first?
In fact, it is because Intellect is different from Soul and greater than it and that which is by nature greater is first. For it is actually not the case, as they think,18 that Soul, when it has been perfected, generates Intellect. For where will the actualization of that potency come from if 5there is not a cause that brings it to actuality? For if it happens by chance, it is possible for it not to come to actuality. For this reason, we must posit first principles in actuality that are self-sufficient and complete. Those that are incomplete come later from these, being brought to perfection by that which has generated them in the way that fathers bring to perfection offspring that are originally born imperfect.10 And Soul must be matter in relation to that which is first, that which produces it; when it is informed, it is brought to perfection.
Indeed, if Soul has affective states, there must be something that is unaffected – otherwise, in time all things would cease to be – and there must be something that is prior to Soul. And if Soul is in the cosmos,15 there must be something that is outside the cosmos, and in this way, too, there must be something prior to Soul. For if that which is in the cosmos consists of that which is in body and matter, nothing remains that is identical19 so that a human being and all the expressed principles are neither eternal nor do they retain their identities. And one can come to the conclusion that Intellect must be prior to Soul from these and many other arguments.
§5.9.5. One should grasp Intellect if we are indeed going to use this term correctly, as not being in potency nor as that which goes from a nescient state to being Intellect – if we do not do this, we will need to seek again something else prior to it – but as that which is in actuality and is always Intellect. But if it does not have intellectual activity from 5outside, then, if it thinks, it thinks by itself, and if it has something, it has it from itself. But if thinking comes from itself and out of itself, it is itself what it thinks. For if its substantiality is other than its thinking, what it thinks is different from it, and its substantiality will be without thought, and once again, it will be in potency, not in actuality. Neither, therefore, should be separated from the other.20 But it is customary for us to10 separate those things and the conceptions of them in us.
What, then, is in act and what thinks, so that we may posit it as that which it thinks?
In fact, it is clear that Intellect, being real, thinks Beings and causes them to exist.21 It is, therefore, these Beings.22 For either it will think these as Beings in something different from itself, or as Beings in itself. It is, then, impossible that they be in something different from 15it. For where would that be? Therefore, it is the Beings and they are in it.
For they are certainly not in sensibles, as they think.23 For anything which is first is not a sensible. For the form in sensibles that is over and above their matter is an image of the real Form, and all form that is present in something else comes to it from something else, and is an image of that from which it comes. And if there must be ‘a producer of 20this universe’,24 this will not think a universe that does not yet exist in order to produce it. There must be, therefore, prior to the cosmos those Beings that are not impressions of other Beings, but archetypes and primarily Beings and Intellect’s substantiality.25
If they will say that the expressed principles are sufficient, it is clear that these will be eternal. But if they are eternal and unaffected, they must be in an Intellect of this sort, which is prior to disposition and 25nature and soul, for these are in potency.26 Intellect, therefore, is the real Beings, and does not think Beings as if they were elsewhere. For they are neither prior to it nor after it. But it is, in a way, the primary lawgiver, or rather it is itself the law of their existence.27 It is, therefore, correct to say that ‘thinking and Being are identical’,28 and ‘the scientific30 understanding of that which is without matter is identical with the thing itself’,29 and ‘I searched myself’, as being one of the Beings.30
And it is the same with recollections.31 For they are not outside Beings nor are they in place, but rather they remain always in themselves not admitting change or destruction. For this reason, they are really Beings. But if they are generated or destroyed, their being will have to be 35added to them from outside, and they will no longer be Beings, but that which is added will be Being.
Sensibles are indeed what they are said to be by participation, with their underlying nature acquiring a shape from elsewhere; for example, bronze receives it from the sculptor32 and wood from the craftsman by means of an image belonging to the craft entering into it, whereas the craft itself is outside the matter and retains its identity,40 having the true statue or bed.33 This is certainly how it works in the case of bodies.
And this universe, by participating in reflections, reveals Beings to be other than these; they are immutable, while the reflections are mutable; they are ensconced by themselves, not in need of a place for they are not 45magnitudes; and they have a real intellectual existence which is sufficient for them. For the nature of bodies wants to be preserved by something else,34 whereas Intellect, holding up by its marvellous nature the things that would by themselves fall, does not itself seek a place to be ensconced.
§5.9.6. Let us agree that Intellect is indeed Beings, and everything it has in itself it does not have a place for them, but in the way that it has itself; that is, as being one with them.35 And in the intelligible world ‘all things are together’,36 and no less is each thing distinct from the others. Even soul has together in itself many types of scientific understanding, though it does not have these jumbled together, and each soul attends 5as necessary to what it has, not dragging in the others; and each pure thought acts on the basis of what is inside the soul, while the others are standing by. Intellect, then, is, in this way, much more all things together and, again, not all together, because each has its own unique power.37
Intellect as a whole encompasses all things just like a genus encompasses 10its species and just like a whole encompasses its parts.38 The powers that seeds have are a metaphor for what is being said. For all things are undistinguished in the whole, and the expressed principles are as if in the centre. And yet there is one expressed principle of an eye and another one of the hands, whose difference is known from the sensible entity that is generated by the seed.
As for the powers in the seeds, each one of them is a whole expressed 15principle with all its parts enveloped within it, having the corporeal as its matter – for example, that which is moist in the seed – whereas it is itself the form as a whole and an expressed principle, being identical to the form in the soul that generates, which is a reflection of another greater soul. Some designate the soul in the seed as nature,39 which is set in 20motion from the intelligible world, from the things prior to it, and just as light from fire, it twisted and shaped the matter, not pushing it or using those levers that are much spoken of,40 but endowing it with its expressed principles.
§5.9.7. And in the rational soul, there are types of scientific understanding which are of sensibles – assuming one should call these types of ‘scientific understanding’, as opposed to the more appropriate name ‘belief’ – because they are posterior to their objects and are images of them. And there are types of scientific understanding which are of intelligibles, which are indeed truly types of scientific5 understanding,41 which come from Intellect into the rational soul, and think nothing sensible.42 But insofar as they are types of scientific understanding, they are, each of them, identical with what they think, and have internally the intelligible and the intellection, and that is because Intellect remains within itself – it is the primary Beings themselves – being together with itself always and existing in actuality. It is not related to its objects as if it did not possess10 them,43 either seeking to acquire them or passing through them in order as if they were not already available – for these are states that the soul experiences – but stands fast in itself being ‘all things together’,44 and does not bring each one into existence by thinking them.
For it is not the case that it thought god and god came to be, nor, when it thought Motion, that Motion came to be. Hence, to say that Forms are acts of thinking is not right, if what is meant is that when15 someone thought, this or that came to be.45 For that which is thought must be prior to that which is thinking. Or how else would one come to think it? For it is indeed not likely to be by chance nor did it just happen upon them.
§5.9.8. If, then, intellection is of that which is internal to Intellect, then the Form is that which is internal.46 It is the Idea itself. What, then, is this? Intellect and the intellectual Substance, with each Idea not being different from Intellect, but each being Intellect. And Intellect is wholly all the Forms, and each Form is Intellect,47 just as 5the entirety of scientific understanding includes all theorems, each part of the whole not discriminated by place, but each having its own power in the whole.
This Intellect is, then, in itself and holding itself in stillness, always full. If, then, one supposed that Intellect were prior to Being, one should have said that Intellect, in being actual and in thinking, perfected and10 generated the Beings. But since Being must be supposed to be prior to Intellect, it is necessary to posit that the Beings reside in that which is thinking, whereas the actuality, that is, the intellection is an addition to the Beings – as in the case of fire, the actuality of fire is an addition to it – in order that they would have Intellect as the unity that is their own 15actuality. But Being is also actuality. There is, then, one actuality for both, or rather both are one.48
Being and Intellect are, then, one nature. For this reason, so are the Beings and the actuality of Being and an Intellect of this sort. And so acts of intellection are the Form or shape of Being, and its actuality. They are considered by us as one before the other, since they are divided by us.20 For the dividing intellect is one thing, but the undivided Intellect does not divide and is Being and all things.
§5.9.9. What, then, are the things in the unity of Intellect which we divide when we are thinking? For we should, although these are stable, bring them forth, in the way that we consider the contents of a science that is unified. Since this cosmos is actually a living being encompassing all living beings49 which has its existence, that is, its existence as the sort 5of thing it is, from something else,50 which leads back to Intellect, it is necessary, too, that its entire archetype be in Intellect, and that this Intellect be an intelligible cosmos, which, Plato says, is ‘in that which is the Living Being’.51
For just as, when there is an expressed principle for a living being, and there is matter which is receptive of the seminal principle, then it is 10necessary for that living being to come to be, so when there is an intelligent nature which is all powerful and prevented from doing nothing, and there is nothing standing in the way of this and of that which is able to receive it, it is necessary that the one be ordered and the other do the ordering.52 And that which has been ordered is divided and this is how it receives the Form, with a human being in one place and the15 sun in another. But that which orders has all things in a unity.
§5.9.10. Such forms as there are in the sensible world come from the intelligible world; such forms as are not there, do not. For this reason, things that are contrary to nature are not in the intelligible world, just as there is nothing contrary to craft in the crafts, and there is no lameness in seeds. Lameness of the feet is actually either congenital and due to the 5expressed principle not dominating, or by chance and due to damage to the form. In the intelligible world, there are indeed harmonious qualities and quantities, numbers and magnitudes and relations, actions and experiences which are in accord with nature, kinds of motion and stability generally and their parts. Instead of time, there is eternity. Place in the intelligible world is of an intellectual kind, where one 10Being is in another.
In the intelligible world, then, all Beings are together, and whichever of them you happen to grasp is Substance and intellectual, each partaking of Life – Identity, Difference, Motion, and Stability53 – being in motion and stable – Substance and quality – since all are Substance. For each Being is in actuality and not in potency such that the quality of each15 Substance has not been separated from it.54
Is it, then, the case that only the forms in the sensible world are in the intelligible world or are there more of other things there? In order to answer this question, we have to first examine things that are produced according to craft. For there is no evil in the intelligible world; evil here comes from a lack or privation or deficiency, and it is the state of matter’s misadventures or of that which is made to be like matter.
§5.9.11. In the intelligible world, then, are there products of the crafts and the crafts themselves?55 Actually, among the crafts, such as the mimetic ones – painting and sculpture, dance and mime – the construction of which, I suppose, is done here by the use of a sensible paradigm, that is, by imitating forms and motions, and transferring the symmetries5 that they see, one would not reasonably refer to the intelligible world, unless it were to the expressed principle of human being. But if human beings had some disposition for examining the symmetries of beings generally apart from those of individuals, it would also be a part of that ability to examine and to theorize the symmetry of everything in the intelligible world.
Further, we could say the identical thing for the study of harmony 10and rhythm in the case of music generally, too, insofar as matters concerning rhythm and harmony have a conceptual basis,56 just as intelligible Number has as well.57 And so, too, those of the crafts that produce sensible objects, such as architecture and carpentry, to the extent that they make use of symmetries, would have their principles 15in the intelligible world and their thought processes there, too.
But insofar as they are mixed with something sensible, they are not as a whole in the intelligible world, except within the human being. Indeed, there would not be farming, which contributes to the growth of the sensible plant, nor medicine, which considers health in the sensible world, nor the craft which is concerned with strength and good conditioning. For there is another power in the intelligible world and 20another health, according to which all living beings are undisturbed and have sufficient means.
But as for rhetoric and strategy, economics, and the craft of kingship, if some of these share in that which is beautiful in their actions, and if they contemplate that, they have, by having this scientific understanding, a share of the scientific understanding that is in the intelligible world. Geometry, being concerned with intelligibles,25 should be classified as being in the intelligible world, as should theoretical wisdom, which at the highest is concerned with Being. And this is what needs to be said about the crafts and about things produced by them.
§5.9.12. But if there exists in the intelligible world a Form of Human Being, that is, of Human Being qua rational or craftsman, and of the crafts which are generated from Intellect, it is necessary to say that Forms of universals exist:58 not of Socrates, but of Human Being. We should examine whether in regard to Human Being there is also a Form of an individual human being.59 There is individuality because 5the identical characteristic varies from individual to individual. For example, given that one nose is snub and another is aquiline, the snub and the aquiline should be posited as differentiae in the Form of Human Being, just as there are differentiae in the Living Being. But it is the result of matter that one has one sort of aquiline nose and another has another. And some colour differentiae belong in the 10expressed principle, whereas for others matter and location make them to be as they are.
§5.9.13. It remains to speak about whether only things in the sensible world are in the intelligible world, or also, just as Human Being itself is different from human being, Soul itself in the intelligible world is different from soul, and Intellect itself different from intellect.60 The first thing to say is that one should not believe that all things that are in the sensible world are images of archetypes, nor should one 5believe that soul is an image of Soul itself, but the one differs from the others in value, and Soul itself is in the sensible world as well, though perhaps [its nature is] not as it is in the sensible world.
And for each individual soul that is truly a soul, there should be some sort of justice and self-control, and for the souls in us there should be some genuine scientific understanding, and these are not 10reflections or images of Forms as are things in the sensible world, but are the identical things here in another manner. For they are not set apart in a different place; whenever the soul is released from the body, those virtues and scientific understanding are in the intelligible world. For the sensible world is localized, but the intelligible world is everywhere. And such things as this kind of soul has here are in the 15intelligible world.
So, if one takes the things in the sensible world to be just those things which are seen, then not only are things in the sensible world in the intelligible world, but so are other things, too. But if one takes things in the cosmos to include soul and what is in soul, everything is in the intelligible world that is here.
§5.9.14. This nature, then, encompassing all things in the intelligible world, should be posited as this principle. And how is this so, when the real principle is one and simple in every way, whereas there is a multiplicity among the Beings? We need to say how besides the One there is multiplicity, that is, how there are all these Beings, and why 5Intellect is all these and where it comes from, beginning from another beginning.61
Regarding the question of things that arise from putrefaction and wild animals, and whether there is a Form of them in the intelligible world, and one of dirt and mud,62 it should be said that everything provided by Intellect from the outset is best. These things are not among these types. Nor can one infer from these things to Intellect;10 rather, to Soul, which comes from Intellect, and receives additional things from matter, these things among them. Regarding these, matters will be spoken of more clearly when we come back to the puzzle of how a plurality comes from a one.
We must say that composites occurring by chance and not by Intellect are sensible by coming together by themselves, and are not 15among Forms. The things that come to be by putrefaction are perhaps from a soul impotent to produce anything else; if it were, it would have produced one of the things that exists by nature. Nevertheless, it produces what it can.
Regarding the crafts, it should be said that such crafts as are attributable to things that are natural for a human being are included in the Human Being itself. But is there another universal human nature, and 20Soul itself, or Life, that goes with it, prior to human nature?
In fact, there is Soul itself in Intellect prior to the generation of Soul, which makes it possible for Soul itself to be generated.
1 The Epicureans. See Ep. ad Men. 128–130.
2 The Stoics. See SVF 3.23 (= Plutarch, De St. repug. 1040c).
3 See SVF 3.64 (= Alex. Aphr., De an. mant. 160.3), 118 (= Stob., Ecl. 2.79.1); Sext. Emp., M. 11.133.
4 The Platonists. See Pl., Phd. 82B10.
5 Cf. 1.6.8.16–17. See Homer, Od. 5.37, 204.
6 See Pl., Phdr. 248D3–4.
7 Cf. 1.3.1.5–18; 1.6.9.1–6. See Pl., Symp. 210B3–C6.
8 See Pl., Phdr. 251E3–252A1.
9 See Pl., Symp. 210E3.
10 Cf. 2.9.1.50; 5.5.1.3; 5.8.3.9–10. See Ar., DA 3.5.430a22.
11 See Pl., Rep. 509B9; Ar., fr. On Prayer, apud Simplicius, In DC 485.22 (= fr 1, p. 57 Ross).
12 See Pl., Phil. 64C1.
13 See Pl., Tim. 37D6.
14 Perhaps an allusion to Epicureans. Alternatively, Plotinus is referring to Intellect, the existence of which Epicureans would deny even if they believe that intellect exists in some sense.
15 Cf. 5.8.1.15–30.
16 See Ar., DA 3.5.430a14–15.
17 See Pl., Tim. 50C5.
18 The Stoics. Cf. 4.7.83.8–9. See SVF 2.835 (= Iamblichus, De an. apud Stobaeus, Ecl. 1.317.21), 836 (= Aëtius, Plac. 4.21), 837, 839 (= D.L., 7.159).
19 Since bodies are always changing. See Pl., Crat. 440A7; Tht. 152E1.
20 Cf. 2.9.2.46–51; 3.8.8.8–11; 5.3.5.23–48, 8.15–41; 5.4.2.44–48; 5.5.1.19–33, 50–61; 5.6.1.4–13; 6.6.15.19–24. See Ar., DA 3.4.430a2–5, 5.430a17–18, 7.431a1–2; Meta. 12.7.1072b18–21, 12.9.1074b18–1075a5.
21 Cf. 5.1.4.26–28.
22 Adding the omitted τὰ in the words ἔστιν ἄρα ὄντα.
23 The Stoics. Cf. 3.6.17.12–14. See SVF 2.88 (= Sext. Emp., M. 8.56).
24 See Pl., Tim. 28C3–4.
25 Cf. 5.1.4.5–7; 5.3.7.30–34; 5.8.12.15–20; 6.5.8.12–13.
26 The Stoics. See SVF 2.1013 (= Sext. Emp., M. 9.78). These are the three manifestations of πνεῦμα for the Stoics.
27 See Numenius, fr. 13.
28 Cf. 1.4.10.6; 3.8.8.8; 5.1.8.17–18; 5.6.6.22–23; 6.7.41.18. See Parmenides, fr. B 3 DK.
29 See Ar., DA 3.4.430a3; 7.431a1–2.
30 See Heraclitus, fr. B 101 DK.
31 See Pl., Phd. 72E5.
32 See Ar., Meta. 5.2.1013b6–9.
33 See Pl., Rep. 597C3.
34 See Pl., Crat. 400C7.
35 Cf. 5.5.3.1–2.
36 Cf. 5.3.15.21; 5.8.9.3. See Anaxagoras, fr. 59 B 1 DK.
37 Cf. 6.2.21.54–56.
38 Cf. 6.2.20.1–23.
39 The Stoics. Cf. 4.9.5.9–12. See SVF 2.743 (= Galen, De foet. form. 6.4.699).
40 See Ar., Phys. 8.6.259b20.
41 See Pl., Phdr. 247E2.
42 See Pl., Rep. 533E8–534A2.
43 Cf. 5.5.1.62–65. See Ar., Meta. 12.7.1072b21–23.
44 See Anaxagoras, fr. 59 B 1 DK.
45 Cf. 5.6.6.26; 6.6.6.30–32; 6.7.8.7. See Pl., Parm. 132B3–4.
46 Cf. 5.5.
47 Literally, ‘each Form is each intellect’ (ἕκαστον εἶδος νοῦς ἕκαστος). Cf. 4.9.5.17–20; 5.1.4.26–27; 6.2.20.10–23.
48 Cf. 5.3.5.32–35; 5.4.2.43–44.
49 See Pl., Tim. 33B2–3.
50 Presumably, Soul.
51 Cf. 5.3.5.31–35; 6.7.12.1–14. See Pl., Tim. 39E8.
52 See SVF 1.102 (= D.L., 7.135–136).
53 See Pl., Soph. 254D5, 254E5–255A1. See 252A1–2 and 260D3 where Plato uses οὐσία for what he later terms τὸ ὄν.
54 Cf. 2.6.1.1–8; 5.1.4.33–41; 6.2.8.25–41.
55 Cf. 6.3.16.13–27.
56 See Pl., Rep. 398D2; Symp. 187E5; Lg. 655A5.
57 See Pl., Rep. 525C–526A.
58 See Ar., Meta. 8.1.1042a15.
59 Cf. 5.7.
60 The words – αὐτοψυχή and αὐτονοῦς – are being used on the analogy of αὐτοάνθρωπος, which would normally refer to the Form of Human Being. But here Plotinus seems to be asking about soul and intellect on the analogy with the nature of a Form as distinct from the Form itself that has this nature. He is asking if this nature, due to its being in the intelligible world, is different from its (non-sensible) being in the sensible world. See Ar., Meta. 1.9.991a29, b19; 7.16.1040b33; 13.5.1079b33, 7.1081a11, 8.1084a14–18.
61 Cf. 5.4.
62 See Pl., Parm. 136C6; Alcinous, Didask. 163.28–29.