“If Washington will not hobble me,” boasted Gen. Douglas MacArthur after North Korea invaded the South in June 1950, “I can handle it with one arm tied behind my back.” At seventy years of age, the five-star general had lost none of his famed bravado. And his extraordinary September 15 landing at Inchon bolstered his reputation as an audacious military leader. By Christmas 1950, however, MacArthur’s luster was dimming. After erroneously assuring President Truman that China would not intervene in the war, he drastically miscalculated both the enormity and potency of their army. MacArthur faulted “Washington” (i.e., President Truman) for prolonging the war by forbidding him from striking China itself—possibly even with nuclear weapons—and denounced the restriction as “an enormous handicap, without precedent in military history.” Truman, who was trying to prevent World War III, was incensed by MacArthur’s temerity. Although dissatisfaction with MacArthur’s judgment was growing in political and diplomatic circles as well, the general still had his supporters. A former press aide of MacArthur’s, the Filipino Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo, sent a message of encouragement to his old friend, and MacArthur replied with the following:
26 December 1950
Dear Carlos:
I am most grateful for your fine note of the 14th and the heartening loyalty it reflects.
The commitment of the military resource of China to war against the United Nations Command was of course a risk inherent in our decision to give military support to the Republic of Korea. That risk from the start hung over our heads like the sword of Damocles, and I realized that our only hope of avoiding it lay in speedily bringing the campaign to a close. In retrospect, it is now clear that the decision of the Chinese authorities was taken even before launching of the North Korean aggression on June 25th, and that nothing we did or could have done could exert the slightest influence upon that decision.
The campaign of vituperation initiated against me as a result of Red China’s entry into the war was not unexpected. I had warnings from various sources, all reliable, long before Inchon that such a campaign was being planned by the radical fringe. Success at Inchon caused the plan to fail to materialize, but the new situation created by the Chinese offensive was apparently seized upon as the most favorable opportunity for its revival and effectuation. Calm judgment on the issue in the long run will prevail and the understanding will govern that the cards were stacked against us from the start, and campaign strategy alone gave us timely warning of political decisions and military preparations, both aimed at the build-up of an offensive so powerful as to destroy the Command, if caught off guard, with one mighty blow. The Chinese failed to achieve this decisive result but their eleventh hour intervention did block our efforts to complete the prescribed mission.
The efforts through a shocking perversion of truth to shape public thinking along the line that the entry of Communist China into the war was responsive to incidents of the campaign has been scandalous. The dominant group spearheading the drive has of course been the Communists and their friends, but they have received powerful assistance from those who are so infatuated with the safeguard of Europe that they would sacrifice Asia rather than see any support diverted from Europe. My views, of course, are well known. I don’t believe either Europe or Asia should be abandoned if American resources can effectively assist toward their security, but the problem is a global one and must be considered on a global basis if it is considered at all. This group of Europhiles just will not recognize that it is Asia which has been selected for the test of Communist power and that if all Asia falls, Europe would not have a chance—either with our without American assistance. In their blind and stupid effort to undermine public confidence in me as something of a symbol of the need for balanced thinking and action, they do Europe the gravest disservice and sow the seeds to its possible ultimate destruction. Asia no less than Europe must be free if global peace is to be secured.
I see by the press that you are soon to return to Manila. Yours is a continuing and vast opportunity for public service, and I know that the free world may continue to look to you during these troubled times for wise and fearless counsel.
With warm regards,
Most faithfully,
Douglas MacArthur
On January 1, 1951—just six days after MacArthur wrote to Romulo—Chinese and North Korean soldiers charged across the Thirty-eighth Parallel and forced the already demoralized UN troops into a hasty retreat. The Americans had lost Gen. Walton Walker, commander of all ground forces, just over a week earlier when his jeep crashed into another UN vehicle on an icy road. General Walker’s replacement, Lt. Gen. Matthew Ridgway, mounted a formidable counterattack, and by March 1951 the revitalized UN troops had fought their way back to the Thirty-eighth Parallel. With a fragile equilibrium established, President Truman made preparations to negotiate a truce. Despite strict warnings to clear all foreign policy declarations with Washington, MacArthur issued an ultimatum on March 24 ordering the Chinese to surrender or risk “imminent” destruction. MacArthur had—intentionally or not in Truman’s view—ruined any chance of an early settlement. After MacArthur made several more incendiary statements, President Truman’s patience was exhausted. “I deeply regret that it becomes my duty as President and Commander in Chief of the United States military forces to replace you as Supreme Commander,” he began a terse message to MacArthur on April 10, 1951. “My reasons for your replacement will be made public concurrently with the delivery to you of the foregoing order.” The accompanying release stated:
In view of the specific responsibilities imposed upon me by the Constitution of the United States and the added responsibility which has been entrusted to me by the United Nations, I have decided that I must make a change of command in the Far East. I have, therefore, relieved General MacArthur of his commands and designated Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway as his successor.
Full and vigorous debate on matters of national policy is a vital element in the constitutional system of our free democracy. It is fundamental, however, that military commanders must be governed by the policies and directives issued to them in the manner provided by our laws and Constitution….
MacArthur, believing that Americans might receive him with indifference or possibly even hostility, instructed his aides to schedule his return to California at night; “We’ll just slip into San Francisco after dark,” MacArthur said, “while everybody’s at dinner or the movies.” Over 500,000 cheering admirers were waiting for him. Millions more turned out for ticker-tape parades throughout the country. And on April 19, 1951, he had the honor of addressing the full Congress, where he concluded with a line from the old ballad, “Old soldiers never die, they just fade away.” (Truman, now loathed by the general public and many politicians for firing MacArthur, was overheard calling the speech “nothing but a bunch of damn bull _ _ _ _.” After Senate hearings investigated MacArthur’s dismissal, Truman seemed more justified in his actions.) The war in Korea raged on.