Ambassador Graham A. Martin Dispatches Three Urgent Telegrams from the American Embassy in Saigon Pleading for More Helicopters

Early on the hot, humid morning of April 29, 1975, Bing Crosby’s wistful voice crooned “I’m dreaming of a white Christmas” over the U.S. military radio network in Saigon. The song was a prearranged signal to all Americans that the final evacuation of the city had begun. It was precisely the outcome South Vietnam’s president Nguyen Van Thieu had most feared. President Richard Nixon had promised Thieu that he would retaliate with “full force” if the North Vietnamese violated the peace settlement and tried to conquer the South. But as the Viet Cong gutted Thieu’s country from within and the North Vietnamese invaded from above, Nixon was powerless; he had resigned the presidency in disgrace in August 1974 after the Watergate scandal. His successor, President Gerald Ford, implored Congress to direct emergency assistance to Thieu, but Congress refused. As the North Vietnamese troops surrounded Saigon in late April 1975, mass pandemonium ensued. South Vietnamese citizens frantically tried to scramble aboard aircraft ferrying Americans out of the city. When the airport was closed, thousands of South Vietnamese, many of whom were U.S. allies promised safe passage out of Saigon, swarmed the American embassy where helicopters were airlifting evacuees to offshore warships. At 10:00 P.M. on the twenty-ninth, Ambassador Graham Martin rushed a cable to Brent Scowcroft, one of Ford’s national security advisors, requesting more helicopters. Predicting resistance, he appealed to Scowcroft from a public relations perspective. (Edited versions of these cables have been previously published; they are transcribed below uncut and exactly as they were originally typed.)

TO THE WHITE HOUSE
SECRET 291400Z APR 75 VIA SRF CHANNELS
CITE SAIGON

TO: FLASH WHITE HOUSE..

FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT

PERHHPAS YOU CAN TELL ME HOW TO MAKE SOME OF THESE AMERICANS ABANDON THEIR HALF VIETNAMESE CHILDREN, OR HOW THE PRESIDENT WOULD LOOOK IF HE ORDERED THIS.

FOR MORE THAN TTHAN 50 MINUTES THERE HAVE BEEN NO CH-53’S HERE, AND ONLY ONE CH46.

COMMANDER SEVENTH FLEET MESSAGED ME ABOUT HOUR AND HALF AGO. SAYING HE WOULD LIKE TO STAND DOWN ABOUT 2300 HOURS AND RESUME 0800 TOMORROW MORNING.

I REPLIED THAT I DAMN WELL DIDNT WANT TO SPEND ANOTHER NIGHT HERE.

FOURE HOURS AGO I TOLD NOEL THE NUMBER OF SORTIES WE NEED. NOW THE NUMBER IS 30 CH53 SORTIES. I DONT REALLY MIND GIVING DAO COMPLETE PRIORITY -- THEY WERE MORE EXPOSED THAN WE WERE HERE. I NEED 30 CH53’S SORTIES DAMN QUICK AND I HAVE RECEIVED NOTHING BUT SILENCE SINCE I ASKED FOR THEM.

I AM WELL AWARE OF THE DANGER HERE TOMMORROW AND I WANT TO GET OUT TONIGHT. BUT I DAMN WELL NEED AT LEAST 30 CH53’S OR THE EQUIVALENT TO DO THAT. DO YOU THINK YOU CAN? GET PRESIDENT TO ORDER CINCPAC TO FINISH JOB QUICKLY.

I REPEAT, I NEED 30 CH53’S AND I NEED THEM NOW!

WARM REGARDS.

Scowcroft replied: “DEFENSE PROMISES 30 CH-53S ON THE WAY.” A colossal helicopter, the CH-53 normally carried forty people but, during the evacuation, was often packed with more than sixty. (The smaller CH-46s, which held twenty-two persons, were being crammed with up to thirty-six.) It still was not enough. At 11:45 P.M. Martin wired:

SECRET 291545Z APR 75# VIA SPECIAAL CHANNELS CITE SAIGON

TO: FLASH WHITE HOUSE.

FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

SINCE MY LAST MESSAGE 19 REPEAT 19 CH46’S HAVE COME AND GONE. THEY CARRY ABOUT 2/5THS OF C-53 CAPACITY.

I NEEDED 20 C53’ SORTIES CAPACITY. I STILL DO. CAN’T YOU GET SOMEONE TO TELL US WHAT IS GOING ON?

WARM REGARDS

The embassy compound was growing more chaotic, and Martin sensed that time was running out. The small group of U.S. pilots shuttling back and forth between the embassy and the aircraft carriers were all dangerously fatigued. Weather conditions were abominable and there was no moonlight, increasing the possibility of midair collisions in the pitch-black night. Two pilots were killed when they flew into the sea. Martin was assured that another nineteen CH-46s were on their way, but they were nowhere to be seen. Just after midnight on April 30, he wired:

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
FOR ADMIRAL GAYLOR.
INFO GENERAL BROWN CJCS
BRENT SCOWCROFT, WHITE HOUSE.

THANKS FOR YOUR MESSAGE

19 CH46 SORTIES ARE MOST WELCOME. THER IS NOW ANOTHER LULL. NOTHING IN LAST 20 MIN. WE NEEDED THE CAPACITY REPEAT CAPACITY OF 30 C-53 SORTIES TO GET US OUT OF HERE. AS I RECALL, A CH46 HAS ABOUT 2/5THS THE CAPACITY OF A CH53.

WE STILL NEED THE CAPACITY RPT CAPACITY OF THE 30 CH53 SORTIES REQUESTED IN MY PREVIOUS MESSAGE.

IT NOW SEEMS I WILL SPEND PART OF APRIL 30 HERE—A VERY SMALL PART I HOPE.

BUT I SURE DONT WONT TO SPEND MAYDAY HERE.

WARM REGARDS

Patience was exhausted on both sides. The president and his advisers wanted all Americans out of Saigon immediately, and they were convinced that Martin was delaying his own departure so that he could continue demanding helicopters for the South Vietnamese. “On the basis of the reported total of 726 evacuees,” stated a terse message to Martin from the White House, “CINCPAC [Commander in Chief, Pacific Command] is authorized to send 19 helicopters and no more. The President expects Ambassador Martin to be on the last helicopter.” Less than two hours later Martin was whisked away. North Vietnamese tanks rolled into the city later that morning. South Vietnam had fallen to the Communists. Saigon was now Ho Chi Minh City.