“I observed to him there was no letter to Howe to acquaint him with the plan or what was expected of him in consequence of it.”1
— Undersecretary William Knox, March 1777
As the spring of 1777 dawned, George Washington was unsure of William Howe’s intentions for the fighting season. From New York City, Howe could move north along the Hudson River to form a junction with the Canadian army, he could move directly overland toward the American capital at Philadelphia, or he could board a portion of his army onto ships to sail to any number of American ports.
Lacking any significant naval force to monitor British movements, Washington was forced into a reactive strategy during the spring and summer months. If Howe pushed north, he would follow him and harass his rear. If the British used their ships, he would need to wait and see where they turned up along the lengthy American coastline. Washington’s defensive positions around Morristown, New Jersey, already placed him in a position to protect the overland route to Philadelphia.
During the maneuvering that led Washington to the banks of the Brandywine, he attempted to hinder British movements with militia and other troops while the main army (which was being reconstituted that spring) waited for the opportune moment to make a stand.2 Washington would later decide the favorable terrain along the Brandywine presented that opportunity.
The year 1777 was a major turning point in the American Revolution. While Washington remained on the defensive, the British high command formulated plans to take the initiative. Two British armies in North America were available to carry out the King’s strategy—one led by William Howe and the other by John Burgoyne. Although the latter’s army would not be directly involved at Brandywine, his campaign would have far-reaching repercussions on Howe’s efforts, and Howe’s on Burgoyne’s.
The previous year, until the middle of December, had gone dramatically well for the British forces in North America. Prior to withdrawing for the winter, the northern army had driven south to Fort Ticonderoga in what would become upper New York state, pushing the Americans from its path. William Howe’s army had captured New York City, mauled George Washington’s army, and pursued it across New Jersey by mid-December.
These victories made capturing Philadelphia an attractive and attainable goal. In the traditional European mindset, taking the colonial capital should end the war. However, doing so was not part of the original British strategic plan.
The British strategy for the opening years of the war had revolved around the New England colonies, targeting them as the core of the rebellion. The prevailing opinion was that New England should be isolated from the other colonies by seizing control of the Hudson River-Lake Champlain corridor. In the minds of the British leadership, dividing the colonies would mean victory. As early as late 1775, Howe had advocated the Hudson River plan. Using his main force at New York City, Howe would ascend the Hudson from the south to link up with Guy Carleton’s forces moving down from Canada, and together strike into Massachusetts from the west.
Lord George Germain, the powerful if largely ineffective Secretary of State for the American Department, backed Howe’s Hudson River plan.3 Germain, together with Lord North and others in the British government, wrongly assumed American troops could not defeat British troops, that the colonial war would unfold like the conflicts on the European continent, and that victory would re-establish allegiance. Because of the extraordinary distances involved, combined with his false assumptions and manner of handling things, Germain refused to dictate specific and clear orders. A memorandum later found in his papers outlined British thoughts on war strategy:
By our having the entire Command of the Communication between Canada and New York, which is both convenient and easy, being almost altogether by Water, the Troops from both these Provinces will have it in their power to act in Conjunction, as occasion or necessity may require. In consequence whereof, the Provinces of New England will be surrounded on all Sides, whether by His Majesty’s Troops or Navy, and liable to be attacked from every Quarter, which will oblige them to divide their Force for the protection of their frontier settlements, while at the same time all intercourse between them and the Colonies to the southward of the Hudson’s River will be entirely cut off.4
Following the British capture of New York City and the surrounding area in the fall of 1776, Howe proposed to direct the impetus of the main part of his forces north along the Hudson. Such a proposal was in line with the Hudson River plan. Howe wrote to Germain on November 30 outlining his thoughts. Based upon the difficulties Guy Carleton had encountered in 1776, Howe assumed that the column out of Canada could not reach Albany before September 1777. Therefore, Howe proposed a three-part plan to bring the war to a close by the end of the following year:
A 10,000-man army would operate out of Rhode Island, penetrate north into Massachusetts, and capture Boston. Lieutenant General Henry Clinton would command this force.