Another 10,000-man army would push north along the Hudson River to reach Albany and form a junction with the army coming south from Canada. Presumably, this force would fall under Howe’s personal command.
Lastly, another 8,000-man column in New Jersey would block Washington’s main army and threaten Philadelphia. Howe proposed to attack Philadelphia and Virginia in the autumn, “provided the success of other operations will admit of an adequate force to be sent against that province.”5
In summation, Howe’s idea was to use a force to hold George Washington’s Continental Army in New Jersey while sending two columns north for the New England campaign, one along the Hudson and the other out of Rhode Island. It was an ambitious, daring plan; however, at the time—with Washington reeling across New Jersey, desertion depleting his army, expiring enlistments further diminishing it as an effective force, and Carleton demonstrating that the American force along Lake Champlain was conquerable—the undertaking seemed doable.
To fulfill it, Howe requested 15,000 reinforcements, which he boldly proposed could be acquired from either Hanover or Russia. But while the British government had negotiated contracts for the use of regiments from the Germanic duchies the previous year, the skyrocketing costs of the war made the acquisition of additional Germanic troops, let alone Russian ones, unlikely. Recruitment for the British regiments of the line proceeded slowly, at best. Overall, the chances of Howe receiving anything close to 15,000 additional men were slim. Perhaps sensing Parliamentary resistance, Howe informed Germain that if “the force I have mentioned [were] sent out, it would strike such terror through the country, that little resistance would be made to the progress of his Majesty’s arms in the provinces of New England, New York, the Jerseys, and Pennsylvania, after the junction of the northern and southern armies.” Hinting at concerns over available horseflesh, Howe also requested additional mounts be sent across the Atlantic for the two regiments of light dragoons.6
Unlike other politicians and military men, men such as Lord Germain and Gen. Charles Cornwallis, General Howe believed the primary key to victory was the occupation of colonial territory rather than the destruction of the Continental Army. The more area the British forces occupied, so went this line of thinking, the more opportunity there would be for Loyalists to wrestle back control of their own affairs and enroll in provincial organizations. Rather than rely on costly battles, Howe intended to achieve victory by moving with “impressive strength through centers of rebellion, relying upon overawing the disaffected, animating the loyal, and demonstrating to the wavering the futility of resistance.”7 Howe conceptualized the war quite differently than did Washington, who throughout the conflict proved more willing to lose territory and key cities in return for the preservation of his principal field army.
Howe’s plan, however, was formulated before Washington fled west across New Jersey instead of north into the Hudson Highlands, and before Howe drove west across the Raritan River in pursuit of the American leader. Germain did not receive the dispatch proposing Howe’s plan until after the British disaster at Trenton on the day after Christmas, 1776. Before the letter even reached its destination, Washington’s actions changed the entire strategic landscape.
Germain’s response almost two months later was crafted without knowledge of the Trenton debacle. Germain thought Howe’s proposal a “well digested plan,” but went on to observe that the northern army would likely reach Albany sooner than Howe had calculated. The request for heavy reinforcements “really alarmed” Germain, who promised Howe 4,000 troops in the form of 800 additional Hessian jaegers, 1,800 British, and 1,200 Hessians. With these additions, Germain calculated Howe would have 35,000 troops with which to begin his spring campaign.8
Germain’s math, however, did not add up. Howe calculated that he had only 20,000 effectives. Even if detached men and the sick and wounded attached to the army were counted, few of them in an active campaign would be pulling a trigger. As a result, Germain’s 4,000 reinforcements would only give Howe about 24,000 men for the spring campaign. Howe’s strategy of reoccupying territory throughout the colonies as he advanced, however, would require troops to garrison areas in his rear.
It was Germain’s hope that, after the successes of 1776, the costs of the war could be trimmed back. He was unwilling to return to the Germanic duchies for more troops, let alone make a request to the Russians for troops to swell Howe’s ranks. As for the requested horses, Howe could expect only 100 because the expense of “sending to so great a distance is enormous, and the hazard of their arriving safe very great.” As far as Germain was concerned, Howe could acquire the horses he might need from the American countryside. How much Howe would have to alter his ambitious 1777 campaign remained to be seen.9
The distance and time required to coordinate colonial strategy with the authorities in England was on full display even before Germain’s letter reached Howe’s headquarters on March 9, 1777. By that time, Howe had changed his operational plans and had once again written Germain as much. On December 20, 1776, after Washington fled across the Delaware River, Howe abandoned the plan to move up the Hudson River and wrote to Germain that the next effort should be to capture Philadelphia. It was there, he explained, the principal American army was now gathered for its protection. Thus, Howe’s plan had already changed before his November 30 dispatch reached Germain, whose reply Howe would not receive until the following March.10
Howe’s new strategy was reinforced by the ease with which Washington was driven out of New Jersey and across the Delaware River. Convinced that American sentiment had changed, Howe decided that a quick strike into the middle colonies would bring about a decisive victory and perhaps end the war. British leadership remained convinced throughout the Revolution that, if given the opportunity, Loyalists in North America would rise in large numbers to support the British—and Philadelphia was thought to be a hotbed of Loyalism. Howe also believed that the preservation of Philadelphia was in many ways symbolic for Washington and his army and he was correct: One of Washington’s hopes in 1777 was to protect and hold the city. If Howe was going to bring Washington to battle, the easiest way to do so was to threaten Philadelphia.
As the largest American port and colonial seat of government (not to mention the third-largest city in the entire British Empire), Philadelphia was an attractive objective. Although it was established less than a century earlier, the city grew more rapidly than the older cities of Boston and New York. The founding Penn family’s offers of lucrative land deals, coupled with the province’s Quaker tolerance of all faiths, contributed to the heavy and steady influx of immigrants to both the city and the surrounding countryside. These new inhabitants included religious dissenters and settlers from the British home islands and central Europe, including a large number of German immigrants. In fact, so many Germans arrived that the village of Germantown was founded on the periphery of Philadelphia in 1683.11
Philadelphia was laid out in a grid pattern, with the north-south streets running parallel to the Delaware River (and for the most part numbered) and the east-west streets named mostly after trees and other plants. The streets were fifty feet wide, paved with cobblestone, and lined with sidewalks of brick or flagstone. An exception was High Street, a 100-foot wide thoroughfare with a market shed running down the middle of three blocks from the old courthouse at Second Street. Other than a scattering of church steeples and other cupolas, no building stood above four stories. By 1777, the city with between 30,000 and 40,000 citizens boasted more than 5,000 houses and some 3,000 other buildings including warehouses, merchant facilities, and small workshops. Nearly all of these mostly red brick structures were erected within one square mile.
Flour and lumber exports made the region quite wealthy. The flour industry alone demanded the production of thousands of barrels annually, which in turn required sawmills to make the barrel staves, forges to produce iron straps for the hoops, and coopers to assemble them all. Barrels were also shipped to the West Indies for the transportation of sugar, molasses, and rum. These same lumber and iron businesses were also capable of producing war materials for the American army. During the war, most of the trade goods entering the colonies through Philadelphia came from the West Indies in the form of booty captured by privateers.12
Being the largest port in British North America, Philadelphia had a large working-class population of rough dockworkers and laborers, as well as hundreds of small, independent craftsmen such as leatherworkers, shoemakers, printers, carpenters, and smiths of all kinds. Transportation of goods into and out of the city required porters, carters, draymen, and teamsters—tough, able-bodied characters who quenched their thirst at the more than 150 licensed taverns in the city. Others were more comfortable patronizing illegal taprooms populating back alleys and waterfront areas.
Politics firmly divided the population. The Scotch-Irish, Presbyterian protestants who had been driven from Northern Ireland by heavy taxes, were strongly in favor of American independence. Members of the Church of England, or Anglicans, were divided between loyalty to the Crown and their support for American independence. Half of Philadelphia was composed of Germans who were either neutral for religious reasons or supported the war effort. The members of the large Quaker contingent preferred neutrality, but were often “passively loyal to the crown.” The small number of Jews and Irish and German Catholics in the city kept a low profile.13
The lower Delaware valley and the farmlands to the south and west were rich centers of agricultural output and manufacturing that made a major contribution to the American war effort. The mid-Atlantic region supplied grain, horses, cattle, sheep, forage, cloth, lumber, and flour for the Continental Army. There were more than two dozen flour mills in the area. Five gunpowder mills in the area produced most of the army’s ammunition. Uncounted local iron forges and furnaces supported the war by manufacturing cannon, cannonballs, horseshoes, wagon parts, shovels, and swords. German artisans farther inland produced the coveted Pennsylvania rifle. Salt, a precious commodity in any age without refrigeration, together with other sundries such as soap, candles, medicines, and blankets were all produced in the Philadelphia region. The area had long been renowned for its paper mills, whose products were necessary for Continental money, regimental books, writing paper, and small arms cartridges.
The port was both a shipbuilding facility and a major hub for the importation of goods key to American military success. What little foreign trade Americans were able to nurture during the war was principally channeled through Philadelphia. Large quantities of French weapons and gunpowder were smuggled in from the Caribbean, while rice and other foodstuffs, together with liquor, tobacco, and indigo, arrived from the Chesapeake region. Philadelphia’s shipyards turned out small and large vessels for military purposes. The entire Pennsylvania militia navy, which answered to the province, was created in Philadelphia’s shipyards. In March of 1777, a foundry opened on the waterfront opposite Old Swedes Church to produce brass cannon. Even the yard of the State House (today’s Independence Hall) doubled as a muddy artillery park.
By 1777, the signs of war were visible everywhere in and around Philadelphia. Howe had good reason to want to wrest it from Washington’s grasp.
The young United States was rich in some goods, but hard currency was in short supply. Congress resorted to the printing of paper money, which almost immediately began to lose its value. Inflation set in quickly, and by 1777 the price of nearly everything had skyrocketed. A shortage of precious metals hampered colonial efforts, as did a critical shortage in lead. Congress tried to remedy the situation by ordering that lead down spouts be removed from buildings to make ammunition for the army.14
Unfortunately for the colonial cause, the spirit and enthusiasm within the city for the Revolution was waning. Alexander Graydon, a Philadelphia captain captured at Fort Washington and home on parole, described the mood. “I soon discovered that a material change had taken place during my absence from Pennsylvania,” he wrote, “and that the pulses of many that, at the time of my leaving it, had beaten high in the cause of Whiggism and liberty, were considerably lowered.” While this was true among urbanites, the majority of the people in the surrounding countryside remained enthusiastic about the war.15
Philadelphia’s disenchantment with the Revolution offered the British an opportunity to take advantage of their uncertainty. Pennsylvania’s people remained less militant than the New Englanders to the north or the Virginians to the south. Much of this was because of their diversified economy, which was less affected by Parliament’s taxation policies than other regions. Many felt they profited from the imperial connection. As far as these citizens were concerned, they already enjoyed the “kind of society that other Americans aspired to, and it had become a reality without needing a revolution.”16
Joseph Galloway, former speaker of the Pennsylvania Assembly, had led General Howe to believe that the Loyalists there would rise up to assist him. Galloway claimed that up to ninety percent of Pennsylvania’s citizens were loyal to the Crown, and informed Howe that they would reaffirm their allegiance to the King should a British army march upon Philadelphia.17 Howe was convinced. The people in the middle colonies, he argued, were “disposed to peace, in which sentiment they would be confirmed, by our getting possession of Philadelphia, I am, from this consideration, fully persuaded, the principal army should act offensively on that side, where the enemy’s chief strength will certainly be collected.”18
By the time Howe wrote his December 20, 1776, letter to Germain, he no longer intended to wait for the reinforcements he had requested in his previous letter. Instead, he would drive toward Philadelphia in the spring of 1777. A threat to Philadelphia would force Washington to stand and fight a pitched battle, and Howe intended to beat him decisively in the field. Such a victory, he believed would accelerate the war’s end.
In order to march into Pennsylvania, Howe’s earlier proposal would have to be stripped down considerably. The Rhode Island column originally slated to move north would have to be eliminated unless reinforcements were sent to him; a mere 2,000 men would remain behind to garrison Rhode Island. The proposed garrison for New York City would be reduced to 4,000 men, and only 3,000 troops would stay behind on the Lower Hudson to potentially assist the column marching south from Canada into upstate New York. After deducting these garrisons, Howe concluded he would have about 10,000 men for the advance into Pennsylvania.
Howe’s December 1776 proposal also reiterated his earlier thoughts about the northern army. It could not be expected in Albany before the middle of September. As far as Howe was concerned, the New England plan that had been in place since 1775 was no longer applicable due to changing strategic circumstances in North America. Thus, advancing up the Hudson River was no longer necessary, nor part of Howe’s strategic thinking. Howe projected that by the time Burgoyne arrived in Albany, he would be done with his operations in Pennsylvania or reinforcements from Europe would be available to move up the Hudson to assist Burgoyne. Howe’s dispatch to Germain basically tossed out the long-planned New England campaign, but it did not completely eliminate hope that a column of troops would be available to assist the northern army by September.
Understanding that Lord Germain might have other ideas, Howe asked him “to point out any general plans that may be thought most advisable, both with respect to the present strength of the army, and on the event of reinforcements, remarking the periods of times in which these troops may be expected.”19
Unfortunately for Howe and the rest of the British, this latest dispatch to London was constructed before the British disaster at Trenton, and as previously noted, Germain did not receive it until two months later. It was also based on an incorrect understanding of the situation. Historian Richard Ketchum wrote that Howe’s strategy showed an “unwillingness to recognize that the capture of Philadelphia, beyond its potential psychological impact on rebels and loyalists, could not in itself determine the outcome of the war.” Such a capture, Ketchum continued, “in strategic as well as geographic terms … led nowhere.” For Howe to win in 1777, he “must destroy Washington’s army, and seizing a piece of real estate—no matter how valuable—was no way to achieve that.” Washington, inspired by his victories at Trenton and Princeton, was emboldened to defend the city as long as it remained in American hands, but always knew it was more important to fight another day rather than be destroyed.20
A month later, following the double defeats at Trenton and Princeton, a dejected Howe again wrote to Germain. In his dispatch of January 20, 1777, Howe reported the setback and declared that the only way to achieve victory in 1777 was to bring Washington to a general engagement. Howe knew this would be difficult because the Americans move “with so much more celerity than we possibly can.” Needing to replace the losses incurred during the last week of December, Howe now increased his reinforcement request to 20,000 and—setting the stage for Burgoyne’s disaster in upstate New York—hinted for the first time of a desire to use the fleet to move some troops closer to the American capital. However, at this point Howe intended this movement to be an auxiliary one, and not the principal thrust. Nevertheless, if more men were sent, Howe hoped he could send a column north out of Rhode Island. This newest dispatch arrived in London a month and a half after it was written.21
Howe later explained his reasoning before Parliament:
The … suggestion is, that I ought to have gone up Hudson’s-River, in order to facilitate the approach of the northern army to Albany. What would have been the consequences of such an expedition? Before the object of it would have been attained, the forts in the Highlands must have been carried, which would probably have cost a considerable number of men, defended, as they would have been, by Washington’s whole force. But these forts being carried, how would the enemy have acted? In one of these two ways: He would either have put himself between me and New-York, or between me and the northern army. In either case I am of opinion, that the success of our efforts upon Hudson’s-River, could not, from the many difficulties in penetrating through so very strong a country, have been accomplished in time to have possession of Philadelphia that campaign.
But admitting I had at length reached Albany, what should I have gained, after having expended the campaign upon that object alone, that I had not a right to expect by drawing off General Washington, with the principal American army, from any operations on that side? When it is considered how invidious and how minute a scrutiny has been made into my conduct, and into the motives of my conduct, I shall not be thought to speak absurdly if I say, that had I adopted the plan of going up Hudson’s-River, it would have been alleged, that I had wasted the campaign with a considerable army under my command, merely to ensure the progress of the northern army which could have taken care of itself, provided I had made a diversion in its favour, by drawing off to the southward the main army under General Washington.22
Howe’s testimony hints at one of the greatest fears of eighteenth-century British commanders in North America. Although the British had troops all over the world, the recruitment and training of replacements for the British line regiments was an expensive and time-consuming process. Most commanders during the Revolution worried about engaging in assault tactics that would result in high casualties to soldiers who were difficult to replace. Howe had witnessed the appalling casualties suffered while attacking Breed’s Hill during the battle of Bunker Hill. Throughout his time in command, he resorted to flanking maneuvers to reduce the risk of casualties to his own army. In Howe’s mind, assaulting the fortifications in the rugged terrain of the Hudson Highlands, presumably with Washington’s entire army defending them, was out of the question. Instead, with Philadelphia in his sights, Howe continued to make his own plans.
Complicating British decision-making, and unbeknownst to Howe, John Burgoyne returned to London from the Canadian front early in December 1776. Once back in London on leave, Burgoyne attended the winter sessions of Parliament and conducted some family business. Of prime importance were his orders from Carleton, who charged Burgoyne with fulfilling the needs of the northern army. Carleton had jotted down some strategic ideas for the 1777 campaign, but allowed Burgoyne substantial discretion in its execution. Carleton expected to conduct the northern campaign without any assistance from Howe’s army at New York City.23
As the next several months passed, Burgoyne seemed to have forgotten that fact. During his voyage across the Atlantic, Burgoyne elaborated and expanded upon the thoughts Carleton had outlined for the spring campaign. When he met with both Germain and King George III, he presented his thoughts based upon the supposition that he would eventually make the Canadian army available for Howe’s use. The primary objective of his army would be to capture Fort Ticonderoga. Thereafter, argued Burgoyne, the “sole purpose of the Canada army [was] to effect a junction with General Howe, or after co-operating so far as to get possession of Albany and open communication to New York, to remain upon the Hudson’s river, and thereby enable that general to act with his whole force to the southward.”24
Burgoyne also presented an alternative. He proposed taking the Canadian army by ship to form a junction with Howe’s main army, bypassing the Lake Champlain-Hudson River plan altogether. While this proposal was rejected, Burgoyne throughout the planning process assumed an eventual junction with Howe. King George III reviewed Burgoyne’s proposals and for the most part agreed, at least in principle. Most importantly, he noted that Burgoyne’s “force [should move] down to Albany & Join at that place [with Howe’s army].”25
On March 26, 1777, Burgoyne received orders to lead the British army in Canada south along the Lake Champlain-Hudson River corridor to form a junction with William Howe’s army near Albany. Unbeknownst to Howe and Carleton, Burgoyne had been lobbying Germain, the King, and Parliament to supplant Carleton as the field commander in Canada and lead that army in 1777. The ambitious Burgoyne’s proposals for the campaign were in line with the longstanding plan to split New England away from the other colonies.
The orders to Burgoyne contained very important details. Once Burgoyne secured Lake Champlain, he was to proceed to Albany and “put himself under the command of Sir William Howe.” The orders made it clear that no matter what operations or contingencies arose during the campaign, Burgoyne was to never lose sight of the “intended junction with Sir William Howe as their [Burgoyne’s army] principal objective.” To ease his mind about Howe’s intentions, Germain told Burgoyne that he would “write to Sir William Howe” informing him of the campaign plans.26
Burgoyne assumed the Canadian army should advance in the general direction of Howe’s army, per the Hudson River plan, even though he seems to have been aware of Howe’s change of strategy. According to Piers Mackesy, Howe “must first clear the lower Hudson and help Burgoyne to establish himself at Albany…. Howe intended to favour Burgoyne’s advance in some degree with a detachment.” Therefore, Burgoyne formulated his plans based on the New England concept. He would drive down the Lake Champlain corridor while a diversionary column operated in the Mohawk River Valley. He assumed, despite the prize of Philadelphia, that Howe would somehow still aid him in the lower Hudson Valley.27
Although Germain had promised to inform Howe of the plans, in none of his letters to Howe in the spring of 1777 did he detail Burgoyne’s expedition and explain what Howe was expected to do in support of the operation. Germain’s oversight has been attributed to inconvenience. Germain had given instructions for the preparation of a letter to Howe detailing the approved Canadian operations, to be sent with a copy of Burgoyne’s instructions. On the way to his country retreat, Germain stopped at his office to sign the letter. “I observed to him there was no letter to Howe to acquaint him with the plan or what was expected of him in consequence of it. His lordship [Germain] stared and D’Oyley [deputy secretary] stared but said he would in a moment write a few lines. ‘So,’ says Lord Sackville, ‘My poor horses must stand in the street all the time, and I shan’t be to my time anywhere.’ D’Oyley then said he had better go, and he would write for himself to Howe and include copies of Burgoyne’s Instructions which would tell him all that he would want to know, and with that his Lordship was satisfied as it enabled him to keep his time, for he would never bear delay or disappointment.”28
The proposed letter was in fact completed, but unsigned and unsent in a pile of government paperwork. After all, since Howe was familiar with the longstanding New England plan, there seemed to be no pressing reason for Germain to outline it again. “It is clear that Lord George expected the armies to join, that he assumed Howe understood the general plan, and that he believed Howe could take Philadelphia and join Burgoyne in a single campaign.” Such an assumption was not unreasonable. The plan for conquering the Hudson Valley had been in place for a year and a half, and it was no mystery to Howe.29
Germain has received a great deal of blame for the confusing or absent orders issued in the spring of 1777. In an age before satellite images, GPS, Internet, email, telephones, or telegraphs, Germain was forced to rely upon face-to-face contact with his generals or dispatches sent across the Atlantic for vital intelligence. Sending dispatches to their destinations overseas via sailing ships took several weeks, and they were usually outdated when they arrived. Germain had no personal contact with Howe during this period, and was forced to rely on his letters for information. While both Burgoyne and Henry Clinton (a subordinate from Howe’s army) did sail to London during the winter, Germain had to take these self-serving officers and their information and opinions with a sizeable grain of salt.
When King George III approved Burgoyne’s Hudson River plan and at the same time approved Howe’s Philadelphia thrust, it was Germain’s duty to point out the contradictory orders to the King, or at least inform the two principal generals of the 1777 campaign of the difference between their orders. However, Germain had allowed Howe a great deal of latitude in the campaign of 1776, and “saw no cause to interfere with his plans for the next.”30
In March 1777, Germain informed Howe that the King felt that his changed plans were “solid and decisive.”31 Even though Howe would not receive this news until two months later, he had already decided that Philadelphia was more important than anything that might be happening on the northern front. Therefore, the advance from Canada was made with the full understanding that Howe would eventually support Burgoyne, but that he would not do so until the latter reached Albany.
Neither Germain nor King George III had ever commanded armies in the field, so they were unfamiliar with the logistics of moving an eighteenth-century army through a hostile countryside. What little knowledge they did possess related to recent warfare in Europe, where roads and farms could support large moving armies. In contrast, the North American wilderness lacked an extensive road network, and much of the countryside, especially on the northern front, was relatively wild. Also, even the more professional British officers rarely considered the American militia’s ability to harass, delay, and capture moving columns and supply trains. Lack of knowledge of the American front led Germain and the King to naively believe that Howe could, within a few months, capture Philadelphia and then return to the New York City area to assist Burgoyne along the Hudson. Unfortunately for the British, it would take Howe a few months just to get close to Philadelphia, let alone capture, fortify, and garrison the American capital.
Howe’s decision to risk everything on taking Philadelphia played a large part in the disaster that would engulf Burgoyne in upstate New York. However, at least one historian has argued, “it would be entirely mistaken to assume that Howe sacrificed Burgoyne either through indifference or stupidity.” Yet, it is clear Howe lacked enthusiasm for the Hudson River/New England plan. And “a lack of enthusiasm for it … leaves the impression that the failure of the government to send Howe reinforcements as numerous as he wished put him in a mood prejudicial to a sympathetic handling of the problem presented by Burgoyne’s advance.”32 Even if Germain had been more forthright in his dispatches to Howe, it is doubtful the general would have abandoned his Philadelphia operation. “As it was,” observed one writer, “Howe ignored Clinton’s pleas for a thrust up the Hudson as well as Germain’s instructions to Carleton.”33
Howe’s obsession with Philadelphia did not lead to quick and decisive action on that front. He spent two weeks sparring with Washington in northern New Jersey; another three weeks loading his army onto transport ships; more than a month moving the army to the upper reaches of the Chesapeake Bay; and finally, almost three weeks bringing Washington to battle along the banks of the Brandywine River.
Not until May 18 did Germain send a dispatch to Howe approving his plan to capture Philadelphia. Although the King would have preferred Howe take some action to affect New England, Germain endorsed Howe’s plan of operations. The letter also implied that Howe would return to New York in time to assist Burgoyne in the fall: Howe’s movement to Philadelphia was to be “executed in time for you to cooperate with the army ordered to proceed from Canada and put itself under your command.”34 A recent interpretation of the campaign leaves the impression that Germain never intended for Burgoyne to link up with Howe’s army. John Luzader believes Germain’s intention for 1777 was for Burgoyne to clear the Hudson River valley of rebels as far south as Albany. Once he reached Albany, he was to wait there for orders from Howe.35 In any case, Howe did not receive this latest directive until August 18. By that point, the bulk of his army had boarded ships, left New York, and traveled well up the Chesapeake Bay en route to Philadelphia.
Should Howe have assisted Burgoyne? Howe probably should have moved north, in keeping with the longstanding British strategy. Both the King and Germain were fully aware of Howe’s thinking by the spring of 1777: Howe was going after Philadelphia, and he might not return to New York in time to assist Burgoyne. At no time, however, did they send a direct order to Howe to assist Burgoyne. In a lengthy letter to Germain, Howe explained that he expected Washington to follow him south to defend Philadelphia. If he was mistaken, and Washington went north into the Hudson River Valley, Howe would be hard on his heels.36
Time would prove Howe correct. Washington would in fact move south to defend Philadelphia, negating the need for Howe to move north in pursuit toward Albany. Also, if Luzader’s interpretation is correct, Germain never intended Howe to do anything for Burgoyne before that officer reached Albany. Considering the amount of time it would take Burgoyne to reach Albany, Howe could perhaps have returned from Philadelphia with sufficient time to move north. Even if Burgoyne had been victorious at Saratoga, he could not have reached Albany before the end of October. By that time Howe had captured Philadelphia and perhaps could have been on his way back north, as intended in Germain’s dispatches.
The result of all this strategic thinking and re-thinking, political maneuvering, and bureaucratic communication errors was that William Howe determined to strike out for Philadelphia without anyone else in the British high command fully understanding his intentions, or what his actions—even his success—would mean for the overall fate of the British war effort in North America.