“I propose going up the Delaware, In order to be nearer this place than I should be by taking The course of the Chesapeake which I once intended.”1
— William Howe, July 16, 1777
On June 20, loyalist Nicholas Cresswell observed the fleet assembling to embark Howe’s army. “When we got through the Narrows [the strait of water between Brooklyn and Staten Island] we were entertained with one of the most pleasing and delightful scenes I ever saw before,” he wrote. “Four hundred sail of ships, brigs, schooners and sloops with five sail of the Line [large warships] all under-way and upon a Wind at once, in the compass of two miles. A gentle breeze and fine clear day added greatly to the beauty of this delightful view.” He concluded, “They are all bound to Perth Amboy, it is said, to take the Troops on board.”2
The rumors were accurate, for two days later Howe withdrew to Amboy, New Jersey, to begin loading the army onto transports for the voyage to the Delaware River. While the move puzzled many, Howe’s adjutant general, Stephen Kemble, retained confidence in his superior. The native of New Jersey and brother-in-law (and former aide) to Gen. Thomas Gage possessed both field experience and background including service in the French and Indian War, to offer a valuable opinion. “[I] think his measures right, for few can know his Reasons and judge of the propriety of the Steps he has taken,” Kemble scribbled into his journal. The army, he predicted, was headed by sea for the Delaware.3
While the British withdrew, Daniel Morgan’s riflemen and a portion of Anthony Wayne’s 1st Pennsylvania Brigade harassed their rear as they crossed the Raritan River. Troops under John Sullivan supported the operation. At times, the fighting was conducted at relatively close quarters. “By some late Accts.,” explained British officer Capt. John Andre, “I fancy the British Grenadiers got a pretty severe peppering yesterday by Morgan’s Rifle Corp; they fought, it seems, a considerable time within the distance of, from twenty, to forty yards; and from the concurring Acct. of several of the Officers, more than an hundred of them must have fallen.” Andre speculated the fighting killed and wounded about 20 soldiers and a woman, a grenadier’s wife. He was not far off the mark: British losses totaled about 30.4
A light infantryman at heart, Howe helped direct the rearguard during the withdrawal. “They skirmished with us for about half an hour,” recalled von Muenchhausen, “and would probably have continued if General Howe had not brought up two cannon and fired several grape shot at the riflemen, whereupon they retreated.” Once the patriots retreated, Howe “remained in this position for two more hours, showing the rebel gentlemen that he was waiting for them with this small corps. But since they showed no inclination to come and do battle, he proceeded with great caution and reached Amboy unmolested.”5
Cresswell, the loyalist who had set eyes upon the massive British fleet, described the aftermath of the retreat and the fighting among the men of Howe’s rearguard: “I never before saw such a shocking scene, some dead others dying, death in different shapes some of the wounded making the most pitiful lamentations, others that were of different parties cursing each other as the author of their misfortunes. One old Veteran I observed (that was shot through both legs and not able to walk) very coolly and deliberately loading his piece and cleaning it from blood. I was surprised at the sight and asked him his reasons for it. He, with a look of contempt, said, ‘To be ready in case any of the Yankees come that way again.’”6
Not only did Cresswell observe the wounded, but he also took the time to recall the devastation of the region. “All the Country houses were in flames as far as we could see. The Soldiers are so much enraged they will set them on fire, in spite of all the Officers can do to prevent it. They seem to leave the Jerseys with reluctance, the train of Artillery and Waggons extends about nine miles and is upwards of 1000 in number.”7
Howe’s withdrawal left Washington cautiously optimistic. “I cannot say that the move I am about to make towards Amboy accords altogether with my opinion,” wrote the army commander, “not that I am under any other apprehension than that of being obliged to loose Ground again, which would indeed be no small misfortune as the Spirits of our Troops, and the Country, is greatly reviv’d (and I presume) the Enemys not a little depress’d, by their late retrograde motions.”8
New Brunswick was not in good shape before the British occupation, but it was in much worse condition after the evacuation in June and the surrounding countryside was in a deplorable condition. The wear and tear of an occupying army contributed to the destruction of the town, as did purposeful vandalism. Lieutenant-Colonel William Palfrey, the paymaster general of Washington’s army and a former member of Washington’s staff, visited New Brunswick shortly after the British departure. “Never let the British troops upbraid the Americans with want of cleanliness, for such dog kennels as their huts were my eyes never beheld,” explained a shocked Palfrey. “Mr. Burton’s house, where Lord Cornwallis resided, stunk so I could not bear to enter it. The houses were torn to pieces, and the inhabitants as well as the soldiers have suffered greatly for want of provisions.” Artist Charles Willson Peale, who traveled with Washington’s army as a militia officer, recalled the destruction around New Brunswick: “How solitary it looked to see so many Farms without a single animal—many Houses Burnt & others Rendered unfit for use. The Fences all distroyed and many fields the wheat Reaped while quite Green.”9
During the move to the embarkation points, Howe continued to hope that his withdrawal would draw Washington down from the high ground. Elements of the Continental Army inched forward and occupied New Brunswick once Howe’s forces withdrew. An American division under Maj. Gen. William Alexander (Lord Stirling), however, took up a position on Washington’s left flank at Short Hills, several miles north of New Brunswick and east of Bound Brook. On June 24, other elements of the army moved about five miles closer to Howe’s forces at Perth Amboy and encamped at Quibble Town.10
If Washington’s move out of the mountains closer to the British lines did not provide Howe with the ideal opportunity he had been seeking, it at least offered possibilities worth exploring. In the middle of the night on June 25, Cornwallis led a column toward Short Hills by way of Woodbridge with the intention of cutting Stirling’s division off from the mountain passes. Another column led by Gen. John Vaughan, with Howe in accompaniment, moved back toward New Brunswick before turning north toward Scotch Plains. Much like the strategy he had used on Long Island the previous August, Howe was trying to catch a portion of Washington’s army in a pincer movement and destroy it.11
The front of Cornwallis’s column engaged Stirling’s pickets at sunrise. The fighting quickly escalated. By the end of the day, Stirling had been driven back after losing three artillery pieces in the process, and nearly being captured himself. Sergeant Thomas Sullivan of the 49th Regiment of Foot described the fighting and its outcome: “The Troops vying with each other upon this occasion attacked the Enemy so close, that, tho’ they were inclined to resist, could not long maintain their ground against so much Impetuosity, but were soon dispersed on all sides, leaving behind three Pieces of Brass Cannon.”12
After driving away Stirling and his division, the British troops moved on the road to Westfield. The lack of drinkable water, coupled with a miserably hot and humid mid-Atlantic summer day, resulted in the death by sunstroke of several British soldiers. Just as they had done during their withdrawal from New Brunswick, the British committed depredations during the advance. The march carried them as far as Westfield, plundering and burning houses and driving off what little stock that remained along the way.13
That night, the Crown’s forces camped at Westfield, where they desecrated the Westfield Presbyterian meeting house. “The Presbyterians and New England Congregationalists were Calvinist ‘Dissenter’ churches,” explained one historian, “which were anti-Anglican and as such were regarded by many as the chief instigators of the Revolution, so their meetinghouses were often targeted by British forces.” Washington’s adjutant general, Col. Timothy Pickering, later described the disgraceful act the British committed on the meetinghouse. The British, he wrote, marked their war with “the most wanton devastation, burning some houses and plundering others, breaking in pieces and destroying what was not portable. Places of public worship seem everywhere marked as objects of their fury and bigoted rage…. [T]he meeting-house was converted into a slaughter-house, and the entrails of the cattle thrown into the pulpit.”14
Pickering’s observations proved that Washington’s network of spies had failed him. It was inexcusable that the large British army, camped a mere eight miles away, could steal a march on the Continental Army. An opponent of Washington’s sitting in the Continental Congress ranted, “Was it not shameful to be surprised when the Enemy were within 8 miles? Nothing but Severity will introduce Discipline into our Armies, and dear bought Experience only can convince our officers & Men of its Utility, nay of its absolute Necessity.” Pickering also took note of what transpired at headquarters that morning: “It was surprising to the General, that of so many parties he had ordered out to watch the enemy, none gave him earlier notice of the enemy’s advancing.” The failure of Washington’s light troops, militia, and dragoons to inform him of an enemy movement would haunt Washington throughout the campaign, and its consequences along the Brandywine River would be sorely felt.15
After the mauling Stirling’s men received, Washington refused to offer Howe battle on the open plains, choosing instead to pull his men back into the mountains. Howe’s maneuver had almost worked. He inflicted serious damage upon an American division, and nearly lured Washington into an open-field fight. Scottish Gen. Grant was surprised by both of Washington’s actions, his advance and his retreat. “We thought He might probably march small bodies from the Mountains to keep up an appearance of acting offensively, but did not imagine, that He would wantonly run a Risk of disgracing his Army by exposing Himself to the possible Necessity of a precipitate Retreat,” wrote Grant, “which must have a bad effect upon his Troops, & discourage the Continent at large.”16
Whatever the impact upon morale, Washington knew better than to waste his army in a pitched fight against the cream of the British army. Alexander Hamilton, a future U.S. secretary of the treasury and a member of Washington’s staff, was in tune with his superior’s thoughts and actions:
We are continually strengthening our political springs in Europe, and may everyday look for more effectual aids than we have yet received. Our own army is continually growing stronger in men arms and discipline. We shall soon have an important addition of Artillery, now in its way to join us. We can maintain our present numbers good at least by inlistments, while the enemy must dwindle away; and at the end of the summer the disparity between us will be infinitely great, and facilitate any exertions that may be made to settle the business with them. Their affairs will be growing worse—our’s better: so that delay will ruin them. It will serve to perplex and fret them, and precipitate them into measures, that we can turn to good account. Our business then is to avoid a General engagement and waste the enemy away by constantly goading their sides, in a desultory way.17
Hamilton’s perceptive observations would be borne out in time. The army was indeed steadily increasing through the recruitment of additional soldiers and the formation of new regiments; the necessary training and discipline had yet to be instilled in them; and, “more effectual aids” from Europe would eventually arrive in the form of an alliance with France and the assistance of naval and land forces. Several months of active campaigning, coupled with another winter, however, would be required before the fruits of Washington’s strategy would bear significant fruit.18
The young and opinionated Alexander Hamilton gained Washington’s attention at Trenton and joined his staff in 1777. Hamilton was born an illegitimate child, probably in 1755, on Nevis in the Caribbean. After his mother died in 1768, he moved to New York, and four years later attended Columbia University. For a time he worked for Caribbean merchants, and never finished college because of the onset of war. Early on he commanded a New York militia artillery battery on Long Island and fought at Trenton and Princeton in that capacity. His outstanding abilities catapulted Hamilton onto Washington’s staff as an aide-de-camp in March 1777, where his fluency in French helped the army commander translate French documents. Hamilton and John Laurens also assisted Baron von Steuben in revising drill regulations the following year.
One of Hamilton’s contemporaries described him as “under middle size, thin in person, but remarkably erect and dignified in his deportment. His hair was turned back from his forehead, powdered, and collected in a club behind. His complexion was exceedingly fair, and varying from this only by the almost feminine rosiness of his cheeks. He might be considered, as to figure and colour, an uncommonly handsome face,” he contintued. “When at rest, it had rather a severe and thoughtful expression; but when engaged in conversation, it easily assumed an attractive smile. When he entered a room it was apparent, from the respectful attention of the company, that he was a distinguished person.” One of Hamilton’s many strengths was his initiative. “Washington tended to use him more for important military and political missions where superior intelligence, quick thinking, and aggressiveness were necessary,” explained historian Arthur Lefkowitz. Hamilton was probably 21 years old when he reached the banks of the Brandywine.19
After fighting at Short Hills and ravaging the village of Westfield, Howe’s men took a wide circuit the next day to Rahway, plundering along the way. According to a member of the New Jersey militia named William Clark, Howe used Clark’s father’s home in Westfield as his headquarters. When the British left, “the soldiers destroyed and took away all their movable property which damage was appraised at five hundred pounds.” The British Army camped that night along the Rahway River, six miles from Amboy. As on the previous day, the intense heat claimed a few more British and Hessian lives. American light troops followed Howe throughout his withdrawal, but stopping the plundering proved impossible. “Along the road where they went,” wrote one American officer, “[the British] stole sheep, cattle, and hogs, & robbed and plundered the houses as they went along, & committed such barbarities on the female sex as would make me blush to mention.” With the Americans once again harassing their rear, Howe’s columns on June 28 returned to their camps at Amboy. The short-lived jab at Washington was over.20
Washington tried to make sense of what had just happened. “Whether, finding themselves a little disgrac’d by their former move, they wanted to flourish off a little at quitting the Jerseys, or, whether by this sudden eruption they meant to possess themselves of as much fresh Provision as they could, plunder the Inhabitants; and spread desolation … I know not,” he wrote, “but certain it is they have left nothing they could carry off, Robbing, Plundering, and burning Houses as they went.” He may have been much closer to the truth than he realized. Obtaining sufficient provisions and forage for General Howe’s army had been (and would continue to be) a constant and acute problem throughout the war. Considering that nearly everything the British in North America needed had to come from England—and was often spoiled by the long voyage across the Atlantic by the time it arrived—obtaining fresh supplies from the countryside was critical to the health and well-being of Howe’s men.
Expecting the British to embark on their ships, Washington in the same letter expressed his concern about what came next. Where they would head with the fleet, he explained, “not I, can discover. By means of their Shipping and the easy transportation that Shipping affords, they have it much in their power to lead us [in] a very disagreeable dance.”21
Howe’s thrust inland had proven one thing: His army could march about the countryside at pleasure, plundering and pillaging as it went, and it seemed as if Washington could do little to stop it. But how could the Crown subdue the rebellion if Washington would not offer pitched battle? “How the business is to be brought to a Conclusion I know not,” expressed a frustrated British Gen. Grant. “We have no Friends & Lenity will not make our Enemys good Subjects—I have never varied from that opinion since I landed at Boston.”22
After resting for a day, on June 30 the British army pulled in its outposts, evacuated New Jersey, and returned to Staten Island, New York. Howe was right back where he had been nearly a year before when he landed on Staten Island the previous July in preparation for his assault on New York City. After a year of maneuvering, fighting, slaughtering, plundering, and pillaging, all he could show for his efforts was control of New York City and its immediate surroundings, along with Newport, Rhode Island. Washington and the Continental Army were once again in complete control of New Jersey.
Loyalist Nicholas Cresswell had seen enough and decided to leave for England. His distaste for Howe was no less bitter upon his departure, denigrating both the British general and the Washington in the same sentence: “General Howe, a man brought up to War from his youth, to be puzzled and plagued for two years together, with a Virginia Tobacco planter. O! Britain, how thy Laurels tarnish in the hands of such a Lubber!” Major Stuart of the 43rd Regiment of Foot was also completely disgusted. “The consequence of this last unlucky retreat is that we have more clearly united those who were disaffected,” explained Stuart. “[W]e have helped to increase and inspirit the rebel army, and we have begun a campaign, that well managed would settle the affairs of this country, with the stigma of a retreat.”23
Howe’s seeming failure dispirited some in his army and had failed to pull Washington out of the mountains, but as historian Matthew Spring concluded, “the Virginian declined to take the bait because he knew that Howe simply could not break contact with his bridgehead at New Brunswick. Indeed, over two months earlier, the British commander in chief had already committed himself to a seaborne invasion of Pennsylvania for the very same reason.”24
While his actions frustrated his own men, they baffled Washington, who was trying to grasp Howe’s overall intentions and deploy his command accordingly. The American leader began shifting small elements under his command. He ordered Brig. Gen. John Nixon’s brigade north to help stop Burgoyne’s invasion south into upstate New York. To replace Nixon’s men, he sent Brig. Gen. Samuel Parsons’ and Brig. Gen. James Varnum’s brigades into the Hudson Highlands. Washington worried Howe’s movement toward his fleet could be a feint “calculated to amuse and distract … to draw this Army to Peek’s Kills and move to the Northward, that General Howe may, with more facility turn his Arms against Philadelphia…. Our situation is truly delicate and embarrassing,” admitted the American leader.25
Washington was also becoming increasingly worried about a thrust across the Delaware and the agility of action Howe’s navy offered British arms, and he shared his concern with Congress. “I doubt not but you will have the most vigilant look outs, kept along Delaware Bay and proper expresses and signals for communicating the earliest intelligence,” he observed. “I think … some sensible, judicious men should be employed in that business, at this time, who would view things as they ought to be and from whose Accounts certain inferences and conclusions may be drawn, so as to form a proper line for our conduct. The most fatal consequences may flow from false information…. Things should be examined with all possible certainty. I shall not be surprised,” he warned, “to hear of several Ships appearing in or off Delaware, tho Genl Howe’s destination should be elsewhere. Their Fleet give them the most signal advantages, and opportunity of practicing a thousand feints.”26
On July 3, Washington moved the bulk of the army back to Morristown. Washington felt Howe would take a “considerable time to remove his Baggage and Stores back again [to Amboy], that we could be in our old Camp at Middle Brook long before he could effect this.” Morristown offered Washington the ability to shift his army north or south as needed. He had to be ready to block the Hudson or stop an invasion of New England, all the while with an eye on a heavy thrust by Howe to the south. On July 4, Washington moved John Sullivan’s division to Pompton, New Jersey, to be better able to foil Howe.27
With their army once again in complete control of New Jersey, Americans celebrated their first year of independence on July 4, 1777. A local newspaper reported that the celebration was widely observed in Philadelphia:
Last Friday the 4th of July, being the Anniversary of the Independence of the United States of America, was celebrated in this city with demonstrations of joy and festivity. About noon all the armed ships and gallies in the river were drawn up before the city, dressed in the gayest manner, with the colours of the United States and streamers displayed. At one o’clock the yards being properly manned, they began the celebration of the day by discharge of thirteen cannon from each of the ships, and one from each of the thirteen gallies, in honor of the Thirteen United States.28
John Adams also witnessed the celebration: “The wharves and shores, were lined with a vast concourse of people, all shouting and huzzaing, in a manner which gave great joy to every friend to this country, and the utmost terror and dismay to every lurking tory.” Later in the day, members of Congress, Continental Army officers, and city officials gathered at City Tavern for an afternoon of feasting and drinking toasts. “The toasts,” wrote one imbiber, “were in honour of our country, and the heroes who have fallen in their pious efforts to defend her.” Perhaps Hugh Mercer was toasted that night. After the general was brutally killed at the battle of Princeton in early January, his body was carried to Philadelphia and laid in state at City Tavern. Partaking in the celebration by parading through town and firing volleys for the crowds was a brigade of North Carolina Continentals on its way to join Washington’s Army in New Jersey.29
Outwardly, the city seemed fully behind independence. However, more than half the city’s population was either disinterested or loyal to the King. The large population of Quakers in Pennsylvania made it unique among the thirteen colonies. Their belief in nonviolence kept them politically neutral regarding the war. While many agreed with the patriot cause, the vast majority refused to take up arms or support the war effort in any way. Likewise, Pennsylvania supported a sizable number of Loyalists within its borders. The combination of Quakers and Tories put the patriots of Pennsylvania in the minority.
When the city’s patriots illuminated their homes and businesses during the independence celebration, many Loyalists found the dark windows of their homes shattered by the revelers. Unable to distinguish between the homes of Loyalists and those of the Society of Friends, many Quakers also had window panes shattered that night. Some Quaker shop windows were among those broken when the proprietors refused to close for the celebration. “The Town Illuminated,” local Elizabeth Drinker remembered, “and a great number of Windows Broke on the Anniversary of Independence and Freedom.”30
Circumstances on the northern front, however, were nothing to celebrate for the war there was not going well for the Americans. All indications suggested nothing was going to stop Burgoyne’s march south to Albany. Although Washington’s Army was unaware of it, the American garrison at Fort Ticonderoga in New York abandoned the position to Burgoyne on July 5. Two days later, the American rearguard fought a sharp and bloody holding engagement at Hubbardton (in what is now Vermont), but were outclassed by the elite troops Burgoyne sent against them.
The Reverend Henry Muhlenberg was the head of the Lutheran Church in North America, the father of Peter Muhlenberg, a brigade commander in Washington’s Army, and a prodigious writer. After enjoying the celebrations that momentous day, he noted in his journal that the British had abandoned New Jersey and moved to Staten Island. “Where the storm will turn now,” he scribbled, “no one knows as yet.”31
Howe had determined to his satisfaction that the overland route to Philadelphia was too well defended by Washington’s forces. However, he had an option unavailable to his opponent: complete naval superiority. What he could not do by land, he would readily do by water. Howe began embarking his army off Sandy Hook, New Jersey, on July 8 at Decker’s Ferry, Cole’s Ferry (the terminus of the main ferry between New York City and Staten Island, located on the eastern shore of the latter), Simonsen’s Ferry, and Reisen’s Ferry on Staten Island. The laborious process was finished by the end of the following day.
The decision outraged loyalist Joseph Galloway, who complained that there had been nothing to stop Howe from gaining the Delaware River that spring: “Pontoons were built, and the flat-bottomed boats prepared and put on carriages to pass the Delaware.” Howe justified his decision in a letter to Lord Germain on April 2, noting “the difficulties and delay that would attend the passage of the Delaware.” Howe considered Washington’s revitalized army too much of an obstacle in northern New Jersey, and claimed that going up the Delaware via the sea allowed him to stay as close as possible to the Hudson and to Burgoyne. Howe believed the movement by sea would force Washington to wait for further British developments before acting. Indeed, there were some who felt that the seemingly feckless beginning to the campaign had prevented Washington from sending troops to oppose Burgoyne’s advance south, and from preparing defenses at Philadelphia.32
Howe wrote to Gen. Carleton in Canada warning of the change in plans and stating that Burgoyne and his southbound army were essentially on their own:
Having but little expectation that I shall be able, from the want of sufficient strength in this army, to detach a corps in the beginning of the campaign to act up Hudson’s River consistent with the operations already determined upon, the force your Excellency may deem expedient to advance beyond your frontiers after taking Ticonderoga will, I fear, have little assistance from hence to facilitate their approach, and as I shall probably be in Pennsylvania when that corps is ready to advance into this province, it will not be in my power to communicate with the officer commanding it [Burgoyne], as soon as I would wish; he must therefore pursue such measures as may from circumstances be judged most conducive to the advancement of his Majesty’s service consistently with your Excellency’s orders for his conduct.33
Even though Howe warned General Carleton that Burgoyne should not expect assistance from him, the difficulties in communication meant no one in authority in Canada would read his words for weeks. The once-confident Howe also advised Carleton that he would not be able to end the war in 1777. “Restricted as I am from entering upon more extensive operations by the want of force,” explained the general, “my hopes of terminating the war this year are vanished.”34
Washington was not the only one left guessing about Howe’s intentions and purpose. While the Americans were celebrating the anniversary of their independence, discontent spread through the British ranks. Kemble, Howe’s deputy adjutant general, was well aware of the grumbling. “[I] [f]ind from the general tenor of Officers Conversation that they are not well pleased with Affairs, but they often speak without thought,” the staff officer wrote in his journal. “Asserted by severals that Guides offered to Conduct General Howe by a Road where he might Attack the Rebels in their Entrenchments to advantage, but that he took no Notice of it, this may be without foundation as well as the former, and the General is the best judge of his own Actions.”35
Conjecture as to future operations coursed through the ranks. Some believed Howe would move them up the Hudson River to form a junction with the Canadian Army, while others argued in favor of mounting an expedition to any number of New England destinations. Another potential course of action involved a shift of the the war effort south to Savannah or Charleston, while a different approach to capturing Philadelphia also remained on the table.
Opposite Staten Island on the south side of Raritan Bay was a narrow strip of land called Sandy Hook. At the far end of Sandy Hook stood an octagonal lighthouse 100 feet tall topped with an iron beacon and a copper roof. The lighthouse was guarded by loyalist militiamen, while New Jersey militia commanded by Gen. David Forman kept an eye on the lighthouse and its defenders. Forman’s position also allowed him to monitor the comings and goings of the British fleet. “They have a Number of Brigs, Schooners, and Sloops, prepared for taking Horses on board,” he passed on to higher command. “Their Stalls are all Cover’d and the Sides lined with Sheepskins with the Wool on to prevent the Horses Chafing—they would not make Use of Such precaution if they Intended up the North or East River.” If the fleet was bound for somewhere other than up the Hudson, where was it going? A couple of British deserters gave him additional information: “The Common report Amongst the Sailors and Soldiers is that the Fleet is going to [the] Delaware.”36
Washington gave Forman specific directions. “If the Fleet goes out to sea, I imagine they will stand off out of sight of land before they steer either Eastward or Southward, the better to hide their real intentions from us,” explained Washington. “[I]f they do this, it will not be worth your while to send an express to this distance merely to acquaint me that they have gone to sea. But if they tack shortly after they leave the Hook,” he continued, “and shape their Course either Eastward or Southward I shall be glad to know it.”37
When all was said and done, Howe loaded more than 260 ships. Counting only enlisted personnel, his army was about 18,000 strong; officers, servants, staff, and camp followers probably added another 5,000. No one below the rank of colonel was permitted to take a horse on the expedition, and officers who had to rid themselves of their mounts were ordered to sell them to the artillery or to the mounted jaegers.38
The following units climbed aboard the troop transports: four jaeger companies (one of which was mounted), two battalions of British light infantry, two battalions of British grenadiers, the British Brigade of Guards, three Hessian grenadier battalions, the Queen’s Rangers, Ferguson’s British riflemen, four British brigades of infantry, one Hessian brigade of infantry that included the remnants of the brigade destroyed at Trenton the previous December, some heavy artillery, a light dragoon regiment, and the 71st Highlanders.
No one other than perhaps the Howe brothers knew when the fleet would depart. Like nearly everyone else participating in the massive military operation, Capt. William Dansey of the 33rd Regiment of Foot speculated on the destination: “Yesterday we emark’d but where we are going to Lord knows.” Even Howe’s aide von Muenchhausen was unsure: “Everyone surmises that we are going to Philadelphia.”39
Meanwhile, those cooped up on the bobbing transports suffered from the intense summer heat. The conditions were nearly unbearable, and some regiments were gutted by sickness before they even departed the harbor. Those unlucky enough to be among the earliest to board spent three miserable weeks in that condition before the fleet departed. According to Maj. Carl Leopold von Baurmeister of Wilhelm von Knyphausen’s staff, “All the Hessian troops who had participated in the Jersey expedition were, unfortunately, embarked too early and had to ride at anchor before Staten Island for two weeks. Consequently,” he continued, “their store of fresh provisions diminished greatly, which was very unfortunate.”40
The torpor that seemed to have overtaken General Howe continued to be perceived according to differing viewpoints—as had almost everything else since the colonists began their quest for independence. From the time fighting erupted around Lexington and Concord in 1775, it created vast differences of opinion among the American population. When the Continental Congress opted the following year to escalate the war effort to achieve complete independence, further divisions within the population occurred.
Prior to the war, Philadelphia aristocrat Joseph Galloway was one of the most powerful politicians in Pennsylvania and a member of the First Continental Congress. An unusual series of events, coupled with his political aspirations, turned him against the American cause. Galloway was the son of a prosperous merchant who married into a wealthy family. He pursued a career in law and opened his own practice at the age of eighteen. One historian described Galloway as “aloof, overbearing, even imperious, and sometimes hot-tempered, a man [who] was esteemed for his talents, but never loved.” During the years between the French and Indian War and the American Revolution, Galloway (along with Benjamin Franklin) was a prime mover in the creation of the Assembly Party in Pennsylvania. The movement’s main platform was anti-proprietary. Proprietary party politicians wanted Pennsylvania to continue to be run by members of the proprietary family—the Penns. In contrast, men like Galloway and Franklin wanted Pennsylvanians to have more autonomy, were upset with how Indian relations had been handled by the proprietary family, and wanted the vast landholdings of the proprietors taxed and available for settlement. They also wanted the proprietary family’s control replaced by a royal government. “Rumors circulated as well that the Assembly Party’s leaders had a personal stake in royalization. Franklin, according to the buzz, was in line to become the colony’s first royal governor and Galloway its chief justice.”Galloway eventually rose to become the speaker of the Pennsylvania assembly, and the proprietary family soon lost majority control to the royalists.41
Tensions with Britain, meanwhile, continued to escalate. When Galloway took his seat in the First Continental Congress in 1775, most members held out hope for reconciliation. With exactly that thought in mind Galloway offered a “Plan of Union.” The proposal was vetoed and stricken from the record, an embarrassment that did not sit well with a man of his ambition and standing. Galloway considered the delegates in Congress to be divided into two camps: “One (‘men of property’) standing for American rights, seeking a remedy of wrongs but intent on avoiding sedition and violence; the other (‘Congregational and Presbyterian republicans, or men of bankrupt fortunes, overwhelmed in debt to British merchants’) bent on independence.”42
Once Congress pushed for independence, Galloway fled Philadelphia and retired to his country seat in Trevose, Bucks County, Pennsylvania. Harassed by threats of violence, he removed himself to New York City, where the main British Army was located at that time. Using his social standing, he worked through Ambrose Serle, secretary to Admiral Richard Howe, to gain an audience with General Howe. Galloway informed the general that 75 to 90 percent of Pennsylvanians were loyal and would form regiments and help provide garrison troops upon the appearance of the British Army. Galloway, explained one writer, “epitomized the lack of perception and the misunderstanding exhibited by Tory leadership.” Simply put, intentionally or otherwise, he and others exaggerated loyalist sentiment in the colonies. Nevertheless, Howe consulted with Galloway during the planning stages of his campaign to capture Philadelphia. When the British troops began their campaign in the late spring of 1777, Galloway was with them.43
General Howe did not share his plan to sail up the Chesapeake Bay with his subordinates, Guy Carleton, John Burgoyne, or even George Germain. The one man wearing a British uniform who was aware of his ultimate plan was his brother the admiral. Galloway later claimed to have learned about the plan from the admiral. “I met on the road accidentally Lord Howe,” he claimed. “From a conversation which passed between us, I suspected that Sir William was going with his fleet and army round to the Chesapeak.” Galloway jotted down his objections to such a route—distance, weather, and terrain—and presented them to General Howe through the army’s chief engineer, John Montresor. Howe summoned Galloway to his headquarters to question him. According to Galloway, Howe “asked me, How I knew he was going to the Chesapeak? I answered, I did not positively know it. He said, I did, from the paper in front of him, I replied, the paper was not positive, but conditional, supposing he intended to go there.” Apparently satisfied, Howe asked Galloway an intelligence question about the region. “He then asked, whether my objections rested on the difficulties of the navigation of the Chesapeak? I replied, they did not.”44
Although Admiral Howe knew where they were headed and Galloway had managed to figure it out for himself, everyone else accompanying the army seems to have remained in the dark. Virginia loyalist James Parker also traveled with the British Army, as a volunteer guide. “Formerly I had a very good spy of knowing things, ‘tis not so now,” Parker admitted, “every thing is Secret & mysterious.” Knowing how brutal the hot and humid summer days of Virginia and Maryland could be, Parker hoped Howe was not heading south. “The Army is in high health & Spirits now, I fear that will not long be the Case—if they go South in the dog days.”45
Many of the experienced British officers also feared the approaching heat of summer. Colonel Carl von Donop, commander of the brigade of Hessian grenadiers, jotted down his thoughts in the middle of July: “God knows whether we shall go south or north, but the heat which is beginning to make itself felt with the approach of the dog-days makes one wish that the general would choose north rather than south.” General Grant, who served in the French and Indian War and spent seven years as governor of East Florida, offered a different opinion. “The most intelligent are wide of the mark from a mistaken Idea of climate,” he insisted, “which is the same all over America in the Months of July & August. During that time the Heats are as great at Boston as at St. Augustine.” Grant firmly believed that the uncertainty of their destination had baffled Washington, who had “moved to Morris [County] to have it in his power to direct his course South or North.”46
Sir Henry Clinton, soon to be left in command of the New York garrison, argued with Howe against the voyage to Philadelphia. Clinton feared that a rump force left behind at New York would be vulnerable to attack by Washington and too small to assist Burgoyne if Howe did not return in time. According to Clinton, it was “highly probable, the instant the fleet was decidedly gone to sea [that] Mr. Washington would move with everything that he could collect either against General Burgoyne or me and crush the one or the other, as neither would be very capable of withstanding such superior force unless timely intelligence should fortunately bring the fleet to our relief.” Despite Clinton’s arguments, Howe preferred his own plan, “which he told me [Clinton] could not with propriety be laid aside on account of its having been approved at home.” Regardless of London’s approval, Clinton explained the disadvantages Howe’s army would face by heading south at that time of year. “I stated the probable risks and delays it would be exposed to from the sickness and southerly winds generally prevalent in that climate in the summer months,” wrote Clinton, “and with all deference suggested the many great and superior advantages to be derived at the present moment from a cooperation of his whole force with General Burgoyne on the River Hudson.”47
Having recently returned from London, Clinton knew that the King and Germain expected Howe to form a junction with Burgoyne. Although Howe argued that he had received no such order, Clinton assured him it was the intention of the British government. Germain had indeed approved the capture of Philadelphia, but he had not approved Howe doing so by going to sea, which promised to consume several more weeks of precious time. Both Galloway and Clinton offered persuasive reasons why Howe should reconsider his plan, to no avail; Howe was determined to reach Philadelphia by water.48
Clinton’s command consisted of only some 7,400 men. These troops included the 17th Light Dragoons, Germanic and provincial troops, and the 7th, 22nd, 26th, 35th, 38th, 43rd, 52nd, 54th, 57th, and 63rd Regiments of Foot. Clinton warned Howe that he would be left with a command too weak for offensive operations once he garrisoned all the defensive works around New York. “My force being barely adequate to the garrisoning the numerous and extensive works raised and raising, and posts on Long, Staten, and York Islands and Paulus Hook which, comprehending a circuit of considerably more than 100 miles, would afterward leave no surplus whatsoever for offensive operations,” complained Clinton. “And I had, moreover, but a scanty proportion of artillerymen, no chasseurs, and no cavalry which I was at liberty to use, the Seventeenth Dragoons being ordered to be held in constant readiness for embarkation.”49
The waiting continued. On July 13, five days after Howe began loading his army aboard transports, one of his aides complained, “No one seems to be able to figure out why we are waiting here so long, considering the fact that everyone, except Howe and a few officers, are aboard ship.” Von Muenchhausen was also concerned about the future of the campaign, and much of that concern centered around his lack of confidence in Howe’s officer corps: “General Leslie who commands the Highland Scots, has broken his leg. It is a pity that we have to leave behind this very able and upright general, the like of which the English have only a few…. General Howe is in a difficult situation because he has but few capable generals under his command here.” Spending so much time aboard ship gave men like von Muenchhausen time to speculate on the campaign and its possible outcomes. “It would have been better if we had not stayed here so long,” he admitted, “but had gone to Philadelphia four weeks ago—these are my ideas. We could then be returning by land to support Burgoyne.”50
The British fleet would remain anchored in the vicinity of Denys’ Ferry until July 19.
As Howe loaded his army onto ships and finalized his plans, the people of Pennsylvania remained confident that Philadelphia was safe. On July 11, however, confirmation of the abandonment and loss of Fort Ticonderoga reached Washington’s headquarters. The news convinced him to position his men near the New Jersey-New York border until Howe’s intentions became clear. The next day, Washington pushed much of the army north as he considered blocking Burgoyne. Washington had left New Jersey wide open for Howe to march overland to the Delaware, but the British general was determined to use his fleet and so had cast his eyes and intentions elsewhere.
Most of the Continental Army stopped near Pompton, New Jersey, where heavy rain brought marching to a halt for three days. General Sullivan was in the lead and arrived first in the area known as Smith’s Clove. Few lived in this narrow valley just west of the point in the Hudson Valley where iron chains stretched across the river from near West Point to near New Windsor, New York. Smith’s Clove was the most accessible route northwest of the river. Although it was still raining on July 14, the army moved eight miles north to Van Aulen’s. The muddy road made the march difficult and fatigued Washington’s men. The next day, the army moved another six miles into the Clove. Sullivan reached New Windsor with his division the same day.
Washington set up his headquarters at Suffern’s Tavern in present-day Suffern, New York, and waited for Howe to show his hand. Each passing day increased his concern. He eased Sullivan and his division farther north across the Hudson to Fishkill, where his command would remain for several weeks, separated from the main army. If Burgoyne swept south too fast, Washington would have no choice but to move north to intercept him, which in turn would leave Philadelphia vulnerable to Howe.51
Much of Washington’s increasing worry was the the result of his spy network’s inability to discern Howe’s intentions. John Adams offered a reason as to why: Howe, he insisted, did not have a firm plan. “It is impossible to discover the Designs of an Enemy who has no Design at all,” proffered Adams. “An Intention that has no Existence, a Plan that is not laid, cannot be divined.”52
While they had yet to uncover Howe’s intentions, Washington’s spies were bringing him information about the fleet. According to the reports coming into American headquarters, the British ships were being prepared for a longer voyage than a mere feint: “Small craft are constantly plying between New York and the [enemy] Fleet laden with Officers, Baggage and Stores put in packages and marked with their Names and Regiments, and that Transports are fitted up with Stalls over their main Decks for the Reception of Horses.” Fearing that the destination might indeed be Philadelphia, Washington warned Congress, “the Works upon and obstructions in the Delaware should be carried on with Spirit and compleated as far as possible lest they should visit that quarter.”53
Washington spread the Continental Army out to watch both the Hudson River and Howe’s army, and to keep an eye on the Delaware. Francis Nash’s North Carolina troops, the most recent unit to join the Continental Army, were ordered to Billingsport, New Jersey, along the Delaware on July 17. Lord Stirling’s division marched into Peekskill, New York, on July 20. Two days earlier, Brig. Gen. James Potter’s Pennsylvania militia brigade was ordered from Chester, on the other side of the Delaware, to Billingsport to join the New Jersey militia already present. These men would build an earthwork to strengthen the defenses along the Delaware, but at this point there was just a single row of chevaux-de-frise in the river.54 These obstructions consisted of large log bins with additional iron-tipped logs jutting outward and facing down river. The bins were connected with heavy, wrought iron chains and filled with stones to sink them below the water line. These sorts of obstructions later proved effective against the British fleet.
Washington’s shift of most of his army north from its winter encampments had brought it to an area known as Pompton Plains, a long valley that leads to the Hudson Highlands near West Point, New York. The army’s purpose there was to observe British movements and remain in a position from which it could either block the Hudson River or rapidly move south to protect the capital. The raw and largely new Continental Army had benefited from the extra time Howe had allowed Washington to rebuild and train. “It wou’d surprise you to see the vast number of soldiers, Horses, Waggons, Drivers, Cattle and Provision, tents, etc., that are here; yet everything goes smoothly on,” commented Col. Persifor Frazer.55
While the army was larger and at least partially supplied, it was still deficient in some areas. Colonel John Stone of the 1st Maryland Regiment noted some of the articles the army was lacking. Many soldiers, he observed, were without “Blankets or Tents, they must undoubtedly be lost. We are promised these necessary articles immediately. We have also suffered much for shoes, and I am afraid will suffer much more for that article this fall. We shall also be very bare of all kinds of Cloathing by the winter and unless we are furnished more than probable shall be in the same disagreeable situation we were last year. Much will depend upon having an army fit for the field this fall & winter.”56 The situation was so dire that civilians in the area were pressed to supply blankets for the army. Stone’s comments notwithstanding, the condition of the army was far better than it had been in December. Rather than leading an army that was melting away and on the verge of disintegration, Washington was now overseeing a growing Continental Army with new recruits arriving every week.
Numerous problems still plagued the army, however, including its command structure. The problem that rankled so many and flared more than a few tempers was one of rank, which was based not on ability or competence but on seniority. Officers who served well in 1776, for example, often could not be elevated to higher positions of authority due to their lack of seniority. The system was already archaic by 1777, and would plague the United States for at least another 100 years. As John Adams put it, Continental Army officers “[q]uarrell like Cats and Dogs. They worry one another like Mastiffs, Scrambling for Rank and Pay like Apes for Nutts.” Not only did the officers from different states argue amongst themselves, but there was also a great deal of dissatisfaction regarding the many foreign officers who had offered their services to the new United States. Many American officers felt slighted when French and Polish officers were appointed to positions of authority ahead of them. Many difficult decisions awaited Washington in the months ahead, and assigning proper generals and other officers would prove especially thorny.57
While some sources on the campaign claim that the delayed departure had to do with adverse winds, the real reason for it was Howe himself. On July 15, he received word that Burgoyne had captured Fort Ticonderoga. The Americans did not put up much of a fight for the fort. After the British placed artillery on Mount Independence, which towered over the fortification (but had been left unguarded by the Americans), Gen. Arthur St. Clair withdrew his garrison in the middle of the night and began a long retreat southward.
The news was indeed welcome, but Howe drew the wrong conclusion from the victory. The moderate success made the British in general, and Howe in particular, overconfident. The ease of retaking Fort Ticonderoga convinced him that Burgoyne would have no trouble reaching Albany, New York. If he could so smoothly capture such an important bastion, what would prevent him from reaching his destination? Not that he needed much of an excuse, but the general now believed it was more than safe to order the fleet to sea.58
The British fleet began moving out to sea on Sunday, July 20. Engineer John Montresor’s journal tells us that the fleet consisted of 266 transports and ships of war. Not only did the ships carry the troops with which Howe intended to assault Philadelphia, but also 300 rounds of ammunition for each cannon and provisions for each transport for three months.59
The fleet was divided into six divisions, as follows:
First: the Brigade of Guards, the British light infantry, the Queen’s Rangers, Ferguson’s riflemen.
Second: the four British infantry brigades.
Third: the 71st Highlanders and the supply ships.
Fourth: the 16th Light Dragoons.
Fifth: the artillery, engineers, jaegers, and Hessian grenadiers. Sixth: the Hessian infantry and more supply ships.60
Admiral Howe selected his flagship HMS Eagle to protect the front of the armada. Other warships, including HMS Liverpool, Raisonable, and Augusta joined the Eagle while the HMS Isis, Somerset, Nonsuch, Swift, and Dispatch brought up the rear. It was the largest armada ever assembled in American waters to that point, and would not be surpassed until the American Civil War.61
Just a few days before the ships departed, Howe wrote to Germain that he intended to ascend the Delaware River, not Chesapeake Bay. Howe began by explaining that Washington had moved his army toward the New Jersey-New York border. After noting that the farther north Washington moved, the harder it would be for the American general to return to protect Philadelphia, Howe assured Germain that he was leaving enough troops under Clinton to protect New York City. Taking a moment to consider Burgoyne’s position, he added, “If General Washington should march with a determination to force General Burgoyne, the strength of General Burgoyne’s army is such as to leave no room to dread the event.” Having assured Germain that Burgoyne could take care of himself, Howe declared that, “under the circumstances I propose going up the Delaware, In order to be nearer this place than I should be by taking The course of the Chesapeake which I once intended, or preferred to that of the Delaware provided the enemy had discovered a disposition to defend Pennsylvania.” It would be more than a month before Germain received Howe’s dispatch of his latest deviation from the original plan. By the time the letter was dropped on Germain’s desk, Howe and his fleet were just three days from landing in the upper reaches of Chesapeake Bay—nowhere near the Delaware River.62
As noted, Howe had sent a letter to Canada informing Carleton that the northern forces could expect little help along the Hudson from the direction of New York City. It took a long time for that message to arrive, but Burgoyne promptly responded when it did. The general leading the Canadian column southward stated that he intended to follow his orders—and that he hoped that Howe would do so as well. “I wrote a second letter to Sir William Howe, wherein I repeated that I was entrusted with the command of the army destined to march from Canada,” explained Burgoyne, “and that my orders were to force a junction with his excellency.”63 Howe, as stated earlier, never received a direct order to cooperate with the Canadian army. Even if Burgoyne forced his way through as far south as New York City, Howe would not be there to greet him.
The same day the fleet went to sea, Washington once again became convinced that Howe was moving up the Hudson. Accordingly, he moved the army 11 miles farther north into New York to the vicinity of an old log house not far from the New York-New Jersey border and south of Peekskill owned by a man named Galloway. Lord Stirling’s division moved slightly east to King’s Ferry at Stony Point, crossed the river to Verplanck’s Point, and moved on to Peekskill. Sullivan’s division was brought south to link with Stirling’s men at Peekskill. Unfortunately for Washington, Howe was not heading up the Hudson.64 The intelligence needed to confirm that reality would eventually come as a result of Washington’s earnest entreaty to American eyes and ears:
I am to request, that they will have a sufficient number of proper Lookouts fixed, at the Capes of Delaware, to whose accounts implicit confidence may be given, to make the earliest reports of the arrival of any Fleet, which Congress will transmit me by the speediest conveyance. As the enemy will probably make many Feints and have it unhappily but too much in their power, from their Shipping, I would advise, that the Look outs should be cautioned, to be extremely accurate in their Observations and Reports, mentioning with as much precision as possible, the Number of Ships that may appear. Our situation is already [truly] critical and may be rendered still more so, by inaccurate and ill grounded intelligence.65