“If there should be any Mills in the Neighborhood of the Enemy, and which may be liable to fall into their hands, the Runners [the millstones] should be removed and secured.”1
— George Washington, August 31, 1777
Once the all-day process of unloading the army from the troop transports was complete, the camp grounds were secured and prepared and Howe’s soldiers set about building shelters. Since the army’s baggage and camp equipment were still on board ships and had not yet been issued to the men, the troops resorted to building huts called wigwams. These structures, explained one writer, “were lean-to shelters that were easily and quickly constructed out of tree branches, fence rails, saplings, cornstalks, straw, sod, and other such materials. They served well in lieu of tents to shelter the men from the blazing sun and light rain, but did little in the case of heavy downpours.”2 Just as the men finished constructing their shelters, yet another “heavy storm of Rain, Lightning and Thunder” hit them. Howe’s army spent the next three nights in these conditions, “drenched to the skin by those torrents of rain common in the Southern climate.”3
Howe was fortunate Washington’s fresh army was not well positioned to greet him. His exhausted men had run out of fresh provisions well before they landed, and many of the horses needed to haul wagons, artillery, and serve as cavalry mounts had perished at sea. In addition, a significant percentage of the army’s ammunition supply had been damaged when rain and sea water soaked the black powder during the fitful voyage. Howe’s professionals were not ready to fight a battle.
The shortage of horses was the army’s most severe problem. “The Horses look miserably emaciated by this long Voyage,” explained Ambrose Serle, Admiral Howe’s secretary. “Many of them will be but of little Use for some Time.” During the army’s first morning on land, Montresor observed and later commented upon a number of critical issues affecting the army: the “roads [were] heavy [muddy], and the horses mere Carrion, the soldiery not sufficiently refreshed, and great part of their ammunition damaged.” While a number of horses died aboard the ships, quite a few more died immediately after the landing. The first night ashore, the unfortunate animals were turned loose in a cornfield, where they “ate until they dropt dead in the field.” According to Major Baurmeister, “During our passage twenty-seven men and one hundred and seventy horses died, and about one hundred fifty were disembarked totally unfit for duty—a natural consequence of spending more than five weeks on a voyage which in good weather can be made in six or eight days.” A couple of weeks later, after the army had an opportunity to replace many of its missing mounts, Capt. von Muenchhausen wrote, “the 120 horses that the Knyphausen Corps had gathered on its march … cannot compensate for the 400 horses that perished on our unfortunately long voyage, or after landing here. I was more lucky than most officers since I did not lose a single horse at sea, but two of mine have died since we landed.” The horses that survived the trip were simply too weak to be used for quite some time. “Neither baggage, supplies, cannon, nor ammunition could be transported without horses,” observed historian Samuel Smith. “Even officers were reluctant to move without mounts.”4
While the fodder for the horses had dwindled aboard ship, fresh food for the troops had also run out well before the army landed. Howe’s opportunities for obtaining provisions for his army after landing were limited. The army was often encouraged to provide for the troops from the countryside, but Howe’s commissary general, Daniel Wier, felt that depending upon North American supplies rather than shipments from England was proving an inadequate alternative. Wier, who had served as a commissary official in Germany during the Seven Years’ War and in both the East and West Indies, was an experienced supply officer. His service taught him that armies could live reasonably well off the land in Europe, but America was an altogether different proposition. A large portion of the provisions he brought from New York for Howe’s army was already spoiled. Of 2,000 bags of bread landed with the army, for example, “300 were condemned as unfit for Men to eat and of the 254 Bags carried on the March 50 or 60 were left on the way on the same Account.” Much of the food had been damaged or destroyed by rats and other vermin, while other provisions had been damaged through careless storage aboard the victuallers.5
With the British army ashore, it was now imperative for Howe to make his way to a connection with the Delaware River. The British spent much of the war desperately short of land transportation, which forced them to remain as close as possible to navigable rivers. One assessment concluded that “[t]he insecurity of overland communications restricted an army’s maximum operational range to about fifteen to twenty miles from navigable water.” The need to travel by water had affected Howe’s decisions in northern New Jersey, and it would affect his decisions now that he had landed in northeastern Maryland. He would never venture far from the fleet.6
Another factor affecting Howe’s decisions was the need to preserve his army’s fighting capacity. It was immensely difficult to replace troops lost in battle. The mechanism for creating replacements in England was archaic, and the 3,000-mile voyage across the Atlantic not only consumed time but lives as well. Howe had also witnessed the bloodshed wrought by frontal assaults against Breed’s Hill. All of these factors played a large role in his repeated use of flanking movements thereafter. The difficulty in replacing well-trained troops in the eighteenth century, wrote one historian, “manifested itself in a concern not to lose troops unnecessarily to sickness and desertion by exposing them to hardships like short rations and inclement weather. In turn this curbed a field army’s mobility by shackling it to magazines, bread ovens, and baggage trains.” Howe would therefore spend the next several weeks maneuvering to avoid a major battle with Washington and create and maintain a connection with the Delaware River, from which he could be resupplied by the fleet.7
Of course, Howe could have been well ahead of schedule had he simply landed a month earlier in northern Delaware. He had believed in (or at least advocated for) the importance of capturing American stores in York and Lancaster, Pennsylvania, over the occupation of Philadelphia. However, his need to create a link with the Delaware River dictated that he move away from those back country settlements and closer to the colonial capital. Howe was barely back on land when he made the decision to disregard his stated reason for ascending the Chesapeake—York and Lancaster were no longer his goal.
After being cooped up on ships during the hottest weeks of the year desperately short of fresh food and water, Howe’s men were more than ready to stretch their land legs and fill their bellies. The rampant pillaging they had so willingly inflicted upon northern New Jersey was about to be repeated in Maryland—despite Howe’s warnings that his army must behave. The following general orders were issued the first morning on dry land: “Commanding Officers are to have the Rolls of their respective Corps immediately called, to examine the Men’s Knapsacks and Haversacks, and Report to Head Quarters every Man in possession of Plunder of any kind.” The directive did little good. “In spite of the strictest orders,” recalled Major Baurmeister, “marauding could not at first be entirely prevented. Several men in the most advanced English troops were caught by General Howe. One of these marauders was hanged and six others were flogged within an inch of their lives.” John Andre, a British officer who would finish his short life at the end of a rope in 1780 for helping Benedict Arnold betray his country, agreed, adding, “no method was as yet fixed upon for supplying the Troops with fresh provisions in a regular manner. The soldiers slaughtered a great deal of cattle clandestinely.” The slaughter and waste of so much livestock, most of which simply rotted away, served to deny fresh meat to many of their comrades. “The houses in the immediate proximity of camp were plundered for more than simple necessities,” explained one of Howe’s men. “The criminal few were depriving a major part of the army sustenance for which it would have gladly paid.”8
While the British Army recovered its landlegs and Howe issued orders to prevent plundering, General Washington set about trying to determine his opponent’s intentions. Fully informed of Howe’s whereabouts, he had by this time gathered an army of nearly equal size to oppose Howe’s advance into northern Delaware. On August 26, all four divisions in the area (Greene, Stephen, Wayne, and Stirling) arrived at Wilmington. Washington was satisfied with his Continental Regulars, but the same could not be said for his militia, which was already sparring with Howe’s advance elements. These men often came and went on their own, and how many would be in the ranks on a given day was unpredictable. There were other issues, like the rain that damaged the American Army’s ammunition, much as it had ruined some of Howe’s. Later that day, Sullivan’s division reached Princeton, New Jersey, where the men quartered in the college buildings.9
On the same day his divisions gathered about Wilmington, Washington reconnoitered toward Head of Elk (modern-day Elkton) with Nathanael Greene, George Weedon, and Lafayette, accompanied by all his horse troops except Col. Elisha Sheldon’s regiment. The party rode down the King’s Highway to Newport and then on to Iron Hill near the Delaware-Maryland border, which the officers climbed to gain a view of the British Army. Iron Hill, which took its name from its blood-red soil, rose 200 feet above the sandy coastal plain of northern Delaware, but offered the Americans little in the way of visual advantage. The hill, explained Ewald, was “overgrown with woods, rising up like an amphitheater.” The disappointed party descended, crossed the border into Maryland, and climbed Grey’s Hill in another effort to observe the enemy. However, Washington and his lieutenants saw little else besides a few tents.10
Caught in a heavy rain near Head of Elk, the party ducked inside a farmhouse in the village. The decision worried Lafayette. “General Washington imprudently exposed himself to danger,” worried the Frenchman. “After a long reconnaissance, he was overtaken by a storm, on a very dark night. He took shelter in a farmhouse, very close to the enemy, and, because of his unwillingness to change his mind, he remained there with General Greene and M. de Lafayette. But when he departed at dawn, he admitted that a single traitor could have betrayed him.” The home they chose was that of Robert Alexander, a Maryland loyalist. Ironically, when the British moved into town the next day, Howe established his headquarters in the same house.11
The next morning, under clearing skies, Washington returned to Wilmington and began setting up defensive positions and digging entrenchments. He sent part of the army four miles west behind White Clay Creek, and advance posts even farther west to Iron Hill. Francis Nash’s nearly 1,000 North Carolinians arrived in Wilmington the same day. Meanwhile, Gen. William Smallwood, commander of the 1st Maryland Brigade, and Col. Mordecai Gist were sent into Maryland to organize the state’s militia. The Maryland militiamen were to collect at the head of the Chesapeake, “to fall in upon the rear of the Enemy shou’d they move towards Philadelphia.” Washington was also quick to point out that every able-bodied man was needed. “It is to be wished that every Man could bring a good Musket and Bayonet into the field, but in times like the present we must make the best shift we can, and I wou’d therefore advise you to exhort every man to bring the best he has. A good fowling piece will do execution in the hands of a marks man.”12
Aware that his own army was still considerably spread out, Washington needed to delay and closely monitor Howe’s advance. He dispatched elements of the Delaware militia under Cols. Evans, Daniel Hunter, and Daniel Undree to scout for the British advance to Christiana Bridge beyond the American positions behind White Clay Creek. The bridge was on the main road from Head of Elk to Wilmington. The move, hoped Washington, would also deny the British the ability to resupply their army from the immediate area. “The Enemy are in want of many necessaries,” he explained, with which disaffected persons “would undoubtedly supply them if a watch is not kept over them.” Other militia elements gathered at Georgetown, near the mouth of the Sassafras River, to help move cattle and other livestock farther away.13
While at Turkey Point, Howe issued a proclamation to the people of Pennsylvania, Delaware, and the eastern shore of Maryland. The plundering by the British had become a public relations nightmare. In his proclamation, Howe apologized for the past treatment of the people, offered a general pardon to all who came forward, and promised to punish any of his soldiers who plundered property.14
However, the German troops were not subject to British military discipline, so Hessian foraging expeditions continued. “We found waist-high grass, oxen, sheep, turkeys, and all kinds of wild fowl,” recalled a delighted Ewald. “Since we did not find any of the enemy, we skirmished with these animals, of which so many were killed that the entire Corps was provided with fresh provisions.” A British artillery officer commented on the lack of effectiveness of Howe’s strict orders: “General Howe has given strict orders against any kind of marauding, but it is not in anyone’s power to prevent this where there is so large an army and such a mixture of troops. The Hessians are famous and infamous for their plundering.” Nevertheless, at least two senior Hessian officers made an effort to curb the depredations of their troops. “Colonel von Donop and Lieutenant Colonel von Wurmb were praised in the orders … for maintaining the best discipline among their troops,” he continued. “General von Knyphausen made ten men of Stirn’s brigade run the gauntlet for some excesses. The best order and discipline have now been almost entirely restored.”15
Howe originally wanted to begin moving his army on August 27, but “[s]ince the heavy rain continues, and the roads are bottomless, and since the horses are still sick and stiff, we had to … countermand the order to march.”16 The next day, however, Howe decided otherwise and the British Army lurched forward. Hessian Gen. von Knyphausen crossed the Elk River to Cecil Courthouse with about a third of the army to forage for cattle and horses. After driving away some American militia, Knyphausen easily occupied the place. Most of the detachment moved along the Newcastle Road to establish camps. However, Knyphausen did order a column to the south as far as the Bohemia River to capture cattle and horses and gather wagons. The remainder of the army, led by a jaeger patrol, stepped off early that morning northeast toward Head of Elk. Besides the detachment under Knyphausen, Howe left some 2,000 troops behind with the fleet.17
The Jaeger Corps Journal recorded just how little the British knew about this part of America and just how deeply in the dark Howe was about the location of Washington’s command. “We had no reports about the enemy, and no maps of the interior of this land, and no one in the army was familiar with this area. After we had passed the city, no one knew which way to go.” Troops were dispatched, continued the journal, “in all directions until finally a Negro was found, and the army had to march according to his directions. This Negro knew nothing about the enemy army, himself.”18
Head of Elk was home to the Hollingsworth family, which controlled the local shipping businesses between Philadelphia and the Chesapeake region. The village, recorded an officer, contained “40 well built brick and stone houses.” Any discerning eye would have seen a number of ships’ masts at Elk Landing, a small commercial port. “Here was one of the key intermediary points of Chesapeake commerce, where goods traveling between Philadelphia and the Chesapeake region were transferred from land to water.”19
British troops deployed and attacked the village, which was defended by the militia. According to American Jesse Hollingsworth, after a march of more than seven miles, the jaegers ran into some militia at a bridge about 9:00 a.m. “My Brother H[enr]y had a small Skirmish at Gilpins Bridge … & was slightly wounded in the Cheek,” reported Hollingsworth. “We have several Deserters & near 100 Prisoners taken by our light Horse in Scouting Parties.” “According to Custom most of the Inhabitants have left their Houses & drove away their Cattle,” wrote Scottish Gen. Grant, who went on to offer a favorable, if backhanded compliment of the local militia by writing, “The Militia in Arms, to pop at Straglers, & pick up Marauders in which they are too successful.” Ewald recalled the American foot soldiers withdrawing “after an hour’s skirmish.” The militia destroyed the bridge they had been defending and fell back.20
Although the British army’s engineers had to rebuild the bridge, a “great part of the Army forded the Creek in about 3 feet water on a gravelly bottom.” Once across the creek, the jaegers fanned out south of the village. Once the bridge fell, the American militia hustled northeast from Head of Elk in the direction of Grey’s Hill. When the British light troops moved forward and occupied Grey’s Hill, the militia withdrew to Iron Hill. Captain Ewald, meanwhile, spotted merchant ships at anchor at Elk’s Landing and reported their presence to Howe. The ships contained indigo, tobacco, sugar, and wine, all of which was quickly confiscated. “The greater part of their cargoes,” wrote one eyewitness, “was distributed among the army, but the flour and corn were delivered to the English commissariat.” Behind the British advance stretched a ten-mile long line of wagons, horses, and men. Very few of the latter enjoyed the newly found acquisitions. Francis Downman, a Royal artilleryman, recalled the fatiguing march, bad roads, weak horses, and intensely hot sun, just before complaining about having “nothing to eat or drink but apples and water.”21
Once again, Howe settled down to forage. He was now about 50 miles from Philadelphia. Several streams and rivers stood before him and the capital, each of which he surely suspected Washington would use to defensive advantage. With both militia and Washington’s Continental legions lurking in the area, relaxing was impossible.22
While the British were still occupying Head of Elk, Washington rode out a second time to reconnoiter Howe’s army, just as the British commander was doing the same thing from his side of the field. From atop Iron Hill, Washington watched as the British took up positions on and around Grey’s Hill only a mile away. In a rather ironic twist, the two opposing commanders observed each other from the opposing hills. “We observed some officers on a wooded hill opposite us, all of them either in blue and white or blue and red, though one was dressed unobtrusively in a plain gray coat,” wrote von Muenchhausen. “These gentlemen observed us with their glasses as carefully as we observed them. Those of our officers who know Washington well, maintained that the man in the plain coat was Washington.”23
While the two most powerful men in North America eyed one another, the American Army was on the move. Nathanael Greene moved out from Wilmington and marched through Newport and Rising Sun to reach White Clay Creek, which sat in low ground that was not easily defended. Stirling’s and Stephen’s divisions joined Greene behind the creek. Wayne’s division remained at Wilmington erecting defenses. Sullivan’s errant division, meanwhile, passed through Trenton, crossed the Delaware River, and marched into Philadelphia during the day as it moved speedily to rejoin the main army.
In the midst of these chess-like maneuvers, Washington demonstrated some flexibility in command. He created the American light infantry brigade, consisting of “one Field Officer, two Captains, six Subalterns, eight Serjeants and 100 Rank & File from each brigade.” Washington put New Jersey Gen. William Maxwell, the senior brigadier traveling with the portion of the army under his direct command, in charge of the new formation, and the unit took position at Iron Hill. Its mission was a tall one: Block the road to Wilmington via Cooch’s Mill and Christiana. The absence of Daniel Morgan’s riflemen necessitated the creation of this unit. (Morgan had been detached to assist in the northern campaign, leaving the army in need of a replacement to fill the valuable role of scouting and sniping.) The new organization was soon supplemented by about 1,000 Delaware and Pennsylvania militiamen. Maxwell’s infantry unit had an immediate effect: One observer with Howe’s army thought the Americans quite numerous in the area, “The hills from which they were viewing us seemed to be alive with troops.”24
While Washington was moving into defensive positions and creating a new light infantry command, the British and German troops to their west were settling down for a few days of rest. “We will probably stay here today and tomorrow to give our horses, which suffered exceedingly because of the unexpectedly long voyage, a chance to recover, and also to shoe them,” came the explanation for the delay. The grenadier and light infantry battalions were posted at Grey’s Hill to protect the British camps. Lieutenant William Hale described the new living conditions: “For this past week we have lived like beasts, no plates, no dishes, no table cloth, biscuits supply the place of the first but for the others no substitute can be found; my clothes have not been off since we landed…. I have had only two fresh meals since quitting the ship, but the Pork is so good as well for breakfast as dinner, that I feel no want of beef or mutton.” Writing to his mother, Capt. William Dansey left a similar description of life on the road to Philadelphia: “We landed in this Country five Days ago with no other Conveniences than what we cou’d carry on our Backs…. I hope you will excuse, as also my present stile of Writing, as I am in an intire State of Illconveniency seated on the Ground at the Foot of a Tree, What a Savage Life ours is, I don’t expect to have my Cloths off or see the inside of a House on this side of Christmas but thank God I keep my Health well.”25
The complaining British officers at least had the help of servants to make life more bearable. The rank and file had no such conveniences, nor the freedom to find a shade tree outside of camp. They still discovered ways to deal with their plight, which despite the warnings and punishments implemented by Howe generally consisted of plundering the countryside. This pastime, however, was more dangerous now than ever before. “Several of our men very irregular in pursuit of fresh provisions, so as to fall into the Enemy’s hands…. 23 of our Troops, 3 of which Hessians missing, supposed to be taken by the Enemy plundering,” wrote one soldier. Ambrose Serle noted that “forty seven grenadiers, and several other Parties straggling for Plunder, were surprized and taken by the Rebels.” The Hessians, he added, “are more infamous & cruel than any.” John Peebles confirmed the harsh consequences for some of the unlucky wanderers when he told his journal, “2 men of the 71st. found in the wood with their throats cut, & 2 [Grenadiers] hang’d by the Rebels with their plunder on their backs.”26
Losing irreplaceable troops due to unrestrained plundering infuriated Howe, who issued a flurry of orders from headquarters on August 29. The commanding general authorized the provost marshal of the army “to execute upon the Spot all Soldiers and followers of the Army, Straggling beyond the out posts, or detected in Plundering or devastation of any kind…. The Commanding Officers of Corps are immediately to send out Strong Patrols along their front and beyond their advance Sentries, to take up all Stragglers…. The present Irregularity of the Men makes it absolutely necessary for no Officer to leave Camp without permission of his Commanding Officer.”27
Charles Stuart noted in a letter to his father that some 100 men had been lost while out plundering, and went on to describe the effect on the local populace. “A want of firmness in not enforcing orders,” he wrote, coupled with “a total relaxation of discipline has been the cause of our beginning the Campaign by plundering and irregularity of every kind; most of the people either through disaffection or fear had left their houses, and those that remained had the melancholy prospect of seeing everything taken from them and the regret left of not having followed the stream.”28
Unfortunately, the plundering problem would plague the army throughout the campaign. The seriousness of the problem is well-attested by the number of Howe’s officers who wrote letters or commented in their diaries and journals about the rampant pillaging. “A soldier of ours was yesterday taken by the enemy beyond our lines, who had chopped off an unfortunate woman’s fingers in order to plunder her rings,” wrote one officer. “I really think the return of this army to England is to be dreaded by the peaceable inhabitants, and will occasion a prodigious increase of business for Sir J. Fielding and Jack Ketch. I am sure the office of the latter can never find more deserving objects for its exercise.”29
Howe was attempting to curb the actions of his army and address these concerns when he learned of the disaster at Bennington, Vermont. This news was the first inkling that things were not going as well as they might on the northern front. Howe, however, was now in no position to assist Burgoyne in any way. More depressing news arrived with the absence of Loyalists, who were not flocking to the king’s standard as the British had believed they would. As noted, throughout the war the British overestimated the support of the local population. Howe had fully expected to raise several provincial regiments during his overland campaign to Philadelphia, and perhaps there was still time to do so. Unfortunately, the yield thus far had been much less than anticipated. “The prevailing disposition of the inhabitants, who, I am sorry to observe, seem to be, excepting a few individuals, strongly in enmity against us,” Howe complained to Germain. “[M]any having taken up arms, and, by far the greater number, deserted their dwellings, driving off, at the same time, their stock of cattle and horses.” While several British officers agreed that the decision to ascend the Chesapeake prohibited any support to the northern column, Howe later told Parliament that his inability to recruit these Loyalists was a reason for his failure to fulfill the king’s orders to support Gen. Burgoyne.30
Three loyalist concerns worked against British recruitment efforts. One was their personality traits: Conservative, cautious, and anti-violence. This explained why the Quakers were viewed as Loyalists. However, a second reason the local people came forward reluctantly, if at all, was the British reception of loyalist volunteers elsewhere thus far in the war. Rather than being granted British Army commissions and the permanence that came with them, they were given temporary provincial commissions. As a result, even though such Americans remained loyal to the king, the British viewed all Americans as inferior to themselves. Accordingly, provincial troops were used not for the more rewarding combat roles, but rather less rewarding tasks like scouting, foraging, and garrisoning rear areas. Lastly, the British had an established track record of abandoning Loyalists after they came forward. Thousands flocked to the British banner after the occupation of New York City and northern New Jersey, for example, only to see their families and homes abandoned when Howe’s army evacuated northern New Jersey. A related and just as serious issue was the treatment of loyalist property when the British Army was in an area. Despite Howe’s efforts, his men plundered the countryside indiscriminately. The British, recalled a Pennsylvanian named John Miller, spared “neither friend nor foe, burning, robbing, stealing all the way they went.”31
On August 29, while the British Army was recovering from the voyage and gathering supplies around Head of Elk, Washington’s main army moved from behind White Clay Creek northeast to a position behind its tributary, Red Clay Creek. The army marched over the Lancaster (Newport Gap) Road to reach the higher and more defensible ground along Red Clay. Once there, the new American line extended from Newport, Delaware, on the southeast to near Marshallton to the northwest, with the small town of Stanton in the middle of the American positions. Sullivan’s division passed through Darby and Chester and proceeded south to Wilmington, where it rejoined Washington’s main army. Sullivan’s unit had been separated from the army for a little more than seven weeks.32
While camped in northern Delaware keeping a watchful eye on the British legions to the west, Washington’s own men proved that they, too, were not above plundering—a fact that caused great “astonishment” and vexed the leader to no end. A passionate plea in the form of a general order was issued in an effort to curb the foraging. “Notwithstanding all the cautions—the earnest requests, and the positive orders, of the Commander in Chief, to prevent our own army from plundering our own friends and fellow citizens,” he wrote in the third person, “yet to his astonishment and grief, fresh complaints are made to him, that so wicked, infamous and cruel a practice is still continued—and that too in circumstances most distressing—where the wretched inhabitants, dreaded the enemy’s vengeance for their adherence to our cause, have left all, and fled to us for refuge!” He continued: “We complain of the cruelty and barbarity of our enemies; but does it equal ours?” He continued in this philosophical vein before pointing out the obvious, that “If officers in the least connive at such practices, the licentiousness of some soldiers will soon be without bounds: In the most critical moments, instead of attending to their duty, they will be scattered abroad, indiscrim[in]ately plundering friends and foes; and if no worse consequences ensue, many of them must infallib[l]y fall a prey to the enemy.”33
“We are doubtless a wicked generation, and our army too much abounds in profaneness and debauchery,” Washington’s adjutant general wrote his wife. “Nevertheless, our enemies do not fall behind us in vice, but rather, I believe, exceed us, and have besides none but the worst motives—the motives of tyrants—to steel their hearts against us; whereas we have a just cause, on which the happiness, not of innocent Americans only, but of the thousands of poor, oppressed people in every kingdom in Europe, depends, to point our weapons and brace our arms, to urge them against the mercenary foe. Such a cause Providence, I hope, will favor and succeed.”34
While plundering sapped the strength of both sides and terrorized the locals, several skirmishes during late August and early September set the tempo for the early days of the campaign. It was becoming increasingly clear to Howe’s officers that Washington was not going to let them have Philadelphia easily. “They say that [Washington] threatens to fight rather than give up Philadelphia. If he risks an engagement in any accessible situation it will be a sign that he thinks his cause in a very desperate situation, or that he is very little acquainted with the nature of the troops that are to act for and against him,” wrote Scotsman James Murray. “A month or two will enable us to judge with a little more certainty of the event, but I cannot help being still of opinion that the Cause of Liberty is in a very delicate situation: and I sincerely wish that it was over. It is a barbarous business and in a barbarous country. The novelty is worn off and I see no advantages to be reaped from it.”35
On August 31, a skirmish between militia and elements of the British army erupted at Gilpin’s Bridge, a crossing of the Big Elk. During its stay in the Head of Elk vicinity, the British Army’s primary purpose was to replenish supplies used and lost on the voyage. After the skirmish at Gilpin’s Bridge, however, Gen. Cornwallis pushed a detachment four miles beyond the camps, captured a mill village known as Iron Works, and destroyed a supply of stores and liquors.36
The terrain in northeast Maryland and northern Delaware was well suited to this type of warfare. An officer in Washington’s army, Walter Stewart, described the region as one “formed by Nature for defence, having a great quantity of woods, large morasses they must pass through, and many commanding hills, which the Militia may take post upon.” With quality terrain to defend, the army was “in amazing high spirits, and very healthy.”37
Washington wanted the militia to take advantage of these favorable conditions to continually harass British foragers “by alarming them frequently with light parties, beating up their Pickets, and intercepting as often as can be done, whatever parties they may send out to procure Supplies of forage, horses, cattle, provisions and necessaries of every kind.” In addition to removing livestock from the path of the British Army, Washington added another task to the militia’s duties. “If there should be any Mills in the Neighborhood of the Enemy, and which may be liable to fall into their hands, the Runners [the millstones] should be removed and secured,” he ordered. This “will effectually prevent the Enemy from using the Mills. Grain, too, should be carried out of their way, as far as circumstances will admit.”38
Beyond denying the British sustenance, Washington was starting to think ahead tactically. If he was forced to withdraw from Red Clay Creek, another position had to be prepared for defense. On August 31, Washington ordered elements of the Pennsylvania militia to Richling’s and Gibson’s Fords on the Brandywine River. As the army rearranged itself and prepared additional defenses, Washington announced to his men on September 1 that the siege of Fort Stanwix in New York state had been lifted.39
The British, meanwhile, were driving off stock and stores from Elk Forge, four miles north of Head of Elk, and reportedly heading toward Nottingham in southeastern Pennsylvania. It was also learned that Howe had sent his supply ships back around to the Delaware River. Knyphausen advanced to Carson’s Tavern on September 2 under a nagging rain amid muggy conditions, with Grey’s brigade farther ahead at Lum’s Pond.40
Howe’s lethargic, fitful movement was attributed to the continuing equine shortage, a problem of which Washington was well aware. “All accounts agree that [the enemy] are very much distressed for want of horses, numbers of which it is said died on the passage, and the rest are in exceeding bad order,” wrote the American commander. “[T]his will probably occasion some delay and give time for the militia, who seem to be collecting pretty fast, to join us.” Alexander Hamilton, a member of Washington’s staff, also commented on Howe’s “state of inactivity; in a great measure I believe from the want of horses, to transport his baggage and stores. It seems he sailed with only about three weeks provender and was six at sea. This has occasioned the death of a great number of his horses, and has made skeletons of the rest.” He hypothesized that Howe would be “obliged to collect a supply from the neighbouring country before he can move, unless he should be disposed to make a more hazardous movement, than he would ever be able to justify, unless by a degree of success he has no right to expect.” The upshot of the horse shortage was that Howe was willing to pay high prices for horses—any horses. This induced many American dragoons to desert to the enemy and sell their mounts to Howe.41
Despite many difficulties and vexations accompanied by much effort, the British Army was finally on the move.