Construction on the Ring house began around 1720, although details of its original construction are unclear. The structure was likely built in phases—a simple log structure followed by a two-story addition, with a kitchen added later. The house probably had a hipped roof at the time of the battle.
To what extent Washington and his staff used the house itself is open to debate. Washington may have stayed in the house or in a tent in the yard; the staff may have used the home. It may have also hosted war councils. There is evidence Washington and his generals ate at least one meal in the house. Based on Washington’s practices in other campaigns, the house was likely the scene of preparations while the yard was filled with the tents of his staff.
During a battle or campaign, Washington tended to avoid housing his men and supplies in civilian households, especially if he did not plan staying long. He had two basic motivations for this. First, he worried about the possibility of boarding with a family still loyal to King George III. Second, he disliked intruding into a family’s home and life. When he did use a home, Washington made it a habit to reimburse the owners for the use of the building and its furniture.
Washington and his staff almost certainly planned the Brandywine battle in the Ring house. In addition to the formulation of strategy, one would probably have found aides bent over their desks and tables drafting and copying letters and official orders for Washington to sign. As noted above, a meal was also likely served to the officers in the house following the day of planning.24
Major General Nathanael Greene’s First Division consisted of approximately 2,500 men.25 His two brigades were commanded by Brig. Gens. Peter Muhlenberg and George Weedon. Muhlenberg was the son of Henry Muhlenberg, the founder of Lutheranism in America. Peter, who was also a Lutheran clergyman, was educated in Germany and had served in the Prussian army. His brigade consisted of the 1st, 5th, 9th, and 13th Virginia regiments. Weedon was a native Virginian, a veteran of the French and Indian War, and an innkeeper in Fredericksburg before the war. He joined the Continental Army in the summer of 1775 and reached the rank of brigadier in February 1777. Weedon oversaw the 2nd, 6th, 10th, and 14th Virginia regiments, as well as the Pennsylvania State Regiment.
Greene’s division was not only the largest in the army but was also blessed with some of the best leadership. Greene was already considered the best tactician and strategist among the division commanders. His division was the best organized in the army, and Washington never hesitated giving Greene command on the hottest part of the field. Half of the army’s Virginia troops were in Greene’s division, and “by mid-1777, George Washington believed that the Virginia line of the Continental Army was full of convict servants.” A number of indentured servants had been enlisted into Virginia regiments as substitutes for their masters. For many, the enlistment period in the army was likely shorter than the time remaining on their indentures. Also, it was easier to desert from the army than to escape from their “ever-watchful masters.” In addition to indentured servants, many free blacks were now allowed into Virginia regiments, a decision that motivated escaped slaves to present themselves as free to recruiters. In addition, the slave masters often sent their slaves as substitutes for their own service. “By the middle years of the war, blacks constituted a significant minority in Virginia’s Line in the Continental Army. Because middling and upper-class whites refused to fight for themselves, and because even lower-class whites only reluctantly joined the army, necessity forced white Virginians to rely on blacks for their defense.”26
Given the responsibilities and stress that rested on his shoulders, it is not surprising that on the eve of the Brandywine battle, Greene wrote to his wife, “I am exceedingly fatigued. I was on Horse back for upwards of thirty hours and never closd my Eyes for near forty. Last night I was in hopes of a good nights rest, but a dusty bed gave me Astma and I had very little sleep the whole night, but little as it was I feel finely refreshd this morning.”27
With Benjamin Lincoln absent fighting with Horatio Gates in New York, his division at the Brandywine was under the command of Brig. Gen. Anthony Wayne. The 2,000 men were organized in two brigades commanded by Cols. Thomas Hartley and Richard Humpton. As the senior colonel, Hartley led the brigade in the absence of a general officer. He hailed from York, Pennsylvania, and was 28 years old when the army deployed along the Brandywine. During the previous year, Hartley oversaw, along with Benedict Arnold, the evacuation of the post at Crown Point in New York. He commanded the 1st, 2nd, 7th, and 10th Pennsylvania regiments, along with Hartley’s Additional Continental Regiment. A native of Yorkshire, England, Humpton was a 44-year-old former British officer who was also commanding his brigade in lieu of a general officer. The brigade contained the 4th, 5th, 8th, and 11th Pennsylvania regiments. Not only were both brigades commanded by colonels, but many of the regiments were led by lieutenant colonels and majors. In other words, a general lack of leadership and experience permeated the organization at all levels.28
The army’s Third Division was under the command of Maj. Gen. John Sullivan and consisted of approximately 1,800 men from the states of Maryland and Delaware, and Canada.29 Sullivan’s two brigades fell under the command of the Frenchman Preudhomme de Borre, who could barely speak English, and, presumably, Col. John Stone. Brigadier General William Smallwood, who normally commanded the other brigade, was on detached service raising Maryland militia and would miss the Brandywine battle.
Since Stone was the senior officer, he probably oversaw the brigade during the battle. It contained the 1st, 3rd, 5th, and 6th Maryland regiments along with Hall’s Delaware regiment. De Borre had served for 35 years in Europe before volunteering to fight with the Americans. He commanded the 2nd, 4th, and 7th Maryland regiments, the Pennsylvania German Regiment, and Hazen’s French Canadians. The German Regiment, heavily recruited from German communities in Pennsylvania and Maryland, was created to counterbalance British efforts to use German soldiers from Europe against the colonies.30
Brigadier General William Maxwell was unfamiliar with the area along the Brandywine, so 200 men of the 8th Battalion of Chester County militia under the command of Col. Patterson Bell were attached to his light infantry force. Bell’s men were equipped with their own guns and, more importantly were local residents who could provide Maxwell with critical information on local terrain conditions. Although these men had only organized themselves into a unit as recently as the 6th of the month in response to Howe’s approach, they were not short on experience. Many had served under Bell in 1776 during the fateful battle of Long Island.31
Elements of the 2nd Battalion of Chester County militia under Capt. Allen Cunningham were also across the Brandywine working with Bell’s men. The addition of Bell’s troops meant that Maxwell’s command now numbered about 1,000 light troops.32
Major General Adam Stephen’s division of two brigades contained approximately 2,100 Virginia troops under Brig. Gens. William Woodford and Charles Scott.33
Woodford was a native Virginian and veteran of the French and Indian War. When the Revolution erupted, he was appointed colonel of the 2nd Virginia Regiment before rising to brigade command. His command included the 3rd, 7th, 11th, and 15th Virginia Regiments. Charles Scott began the war as lieutenant colonel of the 2nd Virginia before gaining command of the 5th Virginia in May 1776. He rose to brigade command in April 1777. Scott’s brigade consisted of the 4th, 8th, and 12th Virginia Regiments as well as Grayson’s and Patton’s Additional Continental Regiments. (Colonel Alexander Grayson had served Washington as an aide earlier in the war.) While the brigades enjoyed admirable leadership, rumors that Stephen was often drunk left a cloud over his division.
The division led by Maj. Gen. William Alexander (Lord Stirling) consisted of about 1,400 Pennsylvania and New Jersey troops. The division’s two brigades were commanded by Brig. Gen. Thomas Conway and Col. Elias Dayton. Conway was born in Ireland and appointed brigadier general that May. He was disliked by many in the army for relentlessly drilling his brigade, which contained the 3rd, 6th, 9th, and 12th Pennsylvania Regiments and Spencer’s New Jersey Regiment. Dayton became colonel of the 3rd New Jersey in January 1776 and commanded just two regiments at the Brandywine, the 1st and 3rd New Jersey. Just a few months before, Dayton and his regiment had been at Fort Stanwix along the Mohawk River in New York helping repel St. Leger’s column moving to support General Burgoyne. The New Jersey brigade was understrength because two of its regiments had been left in northern New Jersey when the army shifted south. Lord Stirling was one of Washington’s best division commanders, but he commanded one of the smallest units in the army.34
The recently arrived North Carolina brigade of about 1,000 men was commanded by Brig. Gen. Francis Nash. Nash’s command was comprised of the 1st through 9th North Carolina regiments, many of which were short of their full complement of officers. Consequently, the brigade’s combat ability was questionable.35
The other units in Washington’s army consisted of the Light Dragoons Brigade and the Artillery Brigade. The Continental Congress did not authorize dragoon regiments until March 1, 1777—just a handful of months before the Battle of Brandywine. The legislation dictated that each of the four authorized regiments were to have six troops (companies), each consisting of a captain, lieutenant, cornet, and 41 enlisted men. Including regimental staff, each prescribed regiment officially numbered 280. However, due to supply shortages, expense, desertion, and occasional outright mutiny, these regiments rarely numbered more than 150 men. For example, the 4th Continental Light Dragoons was down to about 80 men by the middle of July of 1777. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that Washington had a dragoon brigade of four regiments, numbering no more than 150 men each, for a total of about 600 mounted personnel. Their commanders were Col. Theodorick Bland, Col. Elisha Sheldon, Lt. Col. Francis Byrd, and Lt. Col. Anthony White.36
Surprisingly little is known about the Artillery Brigade. Unfortunately, the primary records provide little information on the composition and number of guns with the army at the Brandywine. Commanded by Brig. Gen. Henry Knox, the brigade probably consisted of about 1,600 men in three regiments, plus seven independent companies. Each regiment was comprised of between eight and twelve companies.37 Portions of the artillery brigade were held in reserve, but artillery was assigned to each division. It is unclear which specific units were so assigned, and which remained with the general artillery reserve.
From the beginning of the Revolution, Washington believed the fledgling country needed a professional army to win the war, and that relying on militia was a losing proposition. Congress believed otherwise, with many of its members arguing that the maintenance of a standing army had been one of the chief American complaints against England, and that a militia was cheaper and easier to maintain.38
Washington’s experience with militia dates back to the French and Indian War, when he was exposed to this form of military organization as a young provincial officer. At that time, Virginia law required that every white male over the age of 21 join the local militia. During the mid-eighteenth century, the primary role of militia was the defense of the frontier against Indian incursions. When the French and Indian War broke out, British officials hoped these militiamen could augment regular British troops, but they had been so long out of service that, by that time, the mechanism for raising militia no longer functioned properly. According to historian Edward Lengel, “eligible men ignored the call to enlist, and county officials, who for years had neglected elementary record-keeping, did not know who lived under their jurisdictions.” Enforcement of the law was impossible. It was within this context that Washington was tasked with raising a force to defend the Virginia frontier. “Washington,” continued Lengel, “sulked for two weeks … waiting futilely for men to answer his call, before giving up and returning … in humiliation.”39
Washington’s experience as the commander of the Virginia provincial regiment contributed to his belief in the necessity of an established, well-trained military force. Washington believed soldiers fought best within the European system of warfare: professional management, supply stockpiles, plentiful transportation, and high standards for training and discipline. Washington was wise enough to know that there were ways to use militia effectively, but that professional soldiers ruled the battlefield.”40
After the American Revolution erupted and Washington was named commander in chief, he proceeded to the outskirts of Boston, where he once again had to deal with the militia issue. According to biographer James Flexner, Washington “quickly discovered that commonly no one gave or obeyed any orders. The militiamen, having elected their officers, expected due subservience to the sovereign voters.” Washington’s experience with the militia during and after the 1776 New York campaign did nothing to alter his negative opinion. On September 15, 1776, Gen. Howe launched his attack from Long Island to Kip’s Bay on Manhattan Island and the professional British soldiers easily dispersed the inexperienced American militia, who swept Continental Regulars away with them in their hasty flight to safety. The conduct disgusted Washington, whose desire for an army of professional soldiers only increased. In his eyes, depending upon one-year enlistments and militia was a recipe for failure.41
On September 25, 1776, Washington wrote a scathing letter about the militia to John Hancock, the president of the Continental Congress. “To place any dependence upon militia is assuredly, resting upon a broken staff,” Washington argued, before moving on in an effort to justify his reasoning: “Men just dragged from the tender Scenes of domestick life, unaccustomed to the din of Arms; totally unacquainted with every kind of Military skill, which being followed by a want of confidence in themselves, when opposed to Troops regularly trained, disciplined, and appointed, superior in knowledge, and superior in Arms, make them timid, and ready to fly from their own Shadows.” Washington wasn’t finished. “The Jealousies of a standing Army, and the Evils to be apprehended from one, are remote,” he insisted, “and in my judgment, situated and circumstanced as we are, not at all to be dreaded.” Washington concluded, “If I was called upon to declare upon Oath, whether the Militia have been most serviceable or hurtful upon the whole, I should subscribe to the latter.”42
One of the issues with militia regiments was the system of rotation practiced by most states. Only a portion of eligible men left for the front at a given time, and then rotated home after a few weeks or months and were replaced by others. What little discipline and training that had been instilled within these men was lost when they left the front for home. Since most of them had never seen combat before joining the army, whatever experience they gained during a campaign or battle was likewise lost when they rotated home. Ineffective militiamen who gained experience only to return to their farms and shops became a vicious cycle for the patriot army. As Washington ruefully acknowledged, “Men who have been free and subject to no controul, cannot be reduced to order in an Instant, and the Priviledges and exemptions they claim and will have, Influence the Conduct of others, and the aid derived from them is nearly counterbalanced by the disorder, irregularity and confusion they Occasion.”43
As Washington withdrew from New York and entered New Jersey in 1776, there was, according to a letter written to his brother John Augustine Washington, some hope of acquiring assistance from the New Jersey militia. Washington calculated he would be able to add at least 5,000 men to his defeated army.44 However, according to historian Arthur Lefkowitz, New Jersey’s militia were poorly organized and weak. In his history of the army’s retreat across New Jersey, Lefkowitz noted that New Jersey militiamen were not quick to leave their homes and families unprotected, did not turn out in large numbers to support Washington, and utterly failed to defend their own state.45
The insufficiency of New Jersey’s militia prompted Congress to vote in June 1776 to raise militia companies from Maryland, Delaware, and Pennsylvania. These companies were to form a mobile reserve called the Flying Camp. But as the New York campaign progressed, Washington began looking anywhere for reinforcements, and in desperation began drawing units away from the Flying Camp. “Washington,” wrote one historian, “came to the grim realization that these poorly disciplined and dispirited troops represented a significant portion of the men still available to him. It was not a comforting prospect.”46
In his study of the German troops who served in North America, Edward Lowell offered an apt description of the American militia. They were, he noted, “in some respects, more like the clans of Scotch Highlanders in the civil wars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries than like modern soldiers. They came or went, as patriotism or selfishness, enthusiasm or discouragement, succeeded each other in their breasts.” Lowell thought that even though they were “often intrepid in battle, they were subject to panics, like all undisciplined troops, and were such uncomfortable customers to deal with that it was equally unsafe for their generals to trust them or for their enemies to despise them.”47
Following the battle of Princeton, Washington continued to complain about the militia. The militiamen’s lack of discipline and sense of independence infuriated him. Just as Lowell would later observe, Washington himself wrote, “They come and go when they please.” He stressed again the importance of building a strong professional army that would be large enough to make the use of militia obsolete for the coming year.48
After Washington rebuilt his army during the spring of 1777 and found himself facing Howe’s campaign to take Philadelphia, it became clear militia would once again have to be involved in the effort. Congress passed a resolution recommending Maryland call out at least 2,000 men. It also resolved that Pennsylvania collect 4,000 of its militia to assist in repelling the threatened attack, and Delaware another 1,000. Virginia militia, too, was to report.49
Pennsylvania’s militia arrived without a good reputation. Due to the longstanding influence of Quakerism on the Pennsylvania Assembly, the colony had no official militia system until well into the Revolution. Militia were notoriously ill-trained and poorly disciplined, but the problem was compounded in Pennsylvania. Even compared to the failures of the New Jersey militia, the Pennsylvania militia was worse. “The militia of this country is not like the Jersey militia,” observed American division commander Nathanael Greene. “Fighting is a new thing with these, and many seem to have a poor stomach for the business.”50
Historian Gregory Knouff agreed in his analysis of Pennsylvania combatants. “Militiamen’s election of officers and activism in the day-to-day activities of their units shaped their lives as soldiers,” he explained. “Not surprisingly, relations between officers and enlisted men were far less authoritarian than those in the Continental army.” In other words, because the soldiers elected most of their officers, prospective officers needed to gain popularity among the rank and file. Discipline, as a result, suffered accordingly. “Officers,” Knouff continued, “could not afford to alienate their men by brutally punishing them.”51
The Pennsylvania Militia Act, passed on March 17, 1777, called for obligatory military service for the first time since the French and Indian War. The legislation required service from all white males between the ages of 18 and 53 able to bear arms. However, the act exempted Congressional delegates, members of the Executive Council, judges of the Supreme Court, masters and faculty of colleges, ministers of the gospel, and servants. The basic unit for organizing the militia was the county, but the organizational focus was the company. Eight companies formed a battalion. Under the Act, militia units were to train regularly, and when absenteeism became a problem, members would be fined for missing their training period. The Act also included a provision that allowed the Executive Council to activate portions of the militia in the event of invasion. However, the period of active duty was limited to a mere 60 days.52
Prior to the adoption of the Pennsylvania militia system, an informal “association” of concerned citizens forming an ad hoc militia organization had been in place. The effectiveness of the “Associators” varied during each campaign. Although they despised authority, these men bore significant hardships during the winter campaign of 1776-1777. Nevertheless, they lived down to Washington’s expectations and deserted in large numbers in 1777.53
The result of this checkered history was that by the time Washington’s army arrived in southeastern Pennsylvania along the Brandywine, a powerful undercurrent of distrust existed toward John Armstrong’s Pennsylvania militia. Armstrong, a native of Ireland and member of the Continental Congress, had the misfortune of commanding the least trusted organization attached to Washington’s army. His Pennsylvania Militia Division numbered about 3,000 men.54
And so the American force that mustered in Chester County, Pennsylvania, to meet William Howe’s professional army constituted a mixed bag. There were many talented and experienced officers within its ranks. However, despite recent augmentation and improvements, the militia was shaky at best, as was their organization, leadership, and training. The men were dedicated to Washington as commander in chief, but their attachment to the national cause—in competition with state, local, and family concerns—was a thin reed indeed. They were easily swayed and distracted by the supply deficiencies they experienced and the poor examples they saw around them. The result was that no one had any idea how the army would perform when looking across the intervening distance into the barrels of enemy guns.