“[The light infantry was] the most dangerous and difficult Service of this War, therefore you will rejoice with me in my good Fortune in being able to do my Duty as a Soldier in a line that must be of infinite Service to me here after, for the Preference in all Promotions is given to Light Infantry Officers.”1
— William Dansey, March 15, 1777
The professional European army approaching the Brandywine that September was similar in some respects to Washington’s American command, but significantly different in others.
The regiment was the basic unit of the British Army. However, “regiment” was an administrative rather than a “tactical” term. The administrative commander of a regiment was its colonel, with whom the king contracted to raise and equip the organization. With the exception of the various “Royal” regiments, the colonels literally owned their commands and intended, as one noted historian explained, to “profit financially and socially from that species of property by selling commissions, receiving a bounty for each recruit, negotiating lucrative contracts for uniforms, and retaining for each colonel the captaincy of one company.” The financial logistics of running a regiment all but guaranteed some level of corruption. The government provided the colonel with an annual sum intended to be used to pay the soldiers, buy clothing for the regiment, and enlist replacements. Any money left unspent found its way into the colonel’s pocket. Additionally, colonels often held the rank of general in the field. Generals, however, did not have a pay scale, so the salary of each such officer depended on his “being titular colonel of a regiment—that might or might not be part of his command as a general.”2
While “regiment” was the administrative term for British Army units, tactically the unit was called a “battalion.” For purposes of discussing eighteenth-century operations, however, the terms are synonymous since virtually every British regiment consisted of a single battalion. In the British army, colonels often functioned as generals in field armies and thus did not physically command their regiments (battalions) in the field. Because of this, the regiment’s (battalion’s) lieutenant colonel normally enjoyed that honor.3
Prior to the Revolution, the British army was composed of 70 regiments of foot (infantry regiments). However, the army was enlarged with the onset of war by creating new regiments and adding battalions to the existing regiments. In October 1775, the English government directed that every regiment in America, or slated for service there, be enlarged to provide stronger units for field service and to, as one historian put it, “enhance the recruiting and training infrastructure to accommodate wartime attrition.” By the end of the war, 105 regiments were on the rolls.4
Every British regiment was composed of eight battalion companies and two flank companies. One flank company was composed of grenadiers, and the other light infantry. On paper, each full-strength regiment consisted of a colonel, a lieutenant colonel, a major, nine captains, 14 lieutenants, 10 ensigns, one chaplain, an adjutant, a quartermaster, a surgeon and his mate, 36 sergeants, 36 corporals, 24 drummers, two fifers, and 672 privates, for a total of 811 men. In reality, the regiments were smaller because of attrition, illness, and other factors. Every British regiment that fought at Brandywine was understrength. The private soldiers wore plain black shoes with brass buckles, with heavy linen half or full gaiters over the top. Their breeches and waistcoat were of white linen or wool. Grenadiers were often specially trained for particular tasks, selected for their physical size, and were considered elite troops assigned unique headgear.
Within the battalion companies, privates were armed with the 15-pound flintlock known as the Brown Bess. This smoothbore musket was carried by most of the American and British soldiers. It fired a large .75 caliber lead ball. The musket’s 14-inch bayonet made it a fearsome close-quarters weapon but diminished its already limited accuracy. A dozen separate motions were required to fire the Brown Bess, during which the soldier used his teeth to rip away one end of a paper cartridge so he could sprinkle a small amount into the priming pan before using his ramrod to seat the cartridge and ball down the muzzle. A well-trained soldier could get off up to three shots a minute under combat conditions. Since the bayonet, once mounted, made the loading process more difficult, only a single effective shot could be depended upon. The inaccuracy of the weapon made the volley the officers’ preferred method of fire delivery; the difficulty in loading was one of the reasons the British made the bayonet charge their primary assault tactic.5
There is a common misconception that the British army fought in rigid lines of battle arrayed shoulder-to-shoulder. In reality, each line of battle consisted of two ranks (with a small interval between each), the men formed in open order about arms-length apart. However, even in open order the men were not spread out such that they operated independently. They still presented a solid mass (and thus a ready target), and delivered volleys at a similarly compact enemy formation at nearly point-blank range. The first two ranks were responsible for delivering the battalion’s firepower. Six paces behind them stood a rank of file closers ready to step up and fill the gap created by the wounded and the dead.
Since it was desirable to withhold firing until within about 50 yards of an enemy line, maintaining fire discipline was essential. The prevailing professional opinion at that time espoused that it was better to receive, rather than deliver, the initial round of fire, and thus sustain some level of casualies so that when the fire was returned your own men were “close enough to the foe to ensure that every shot found a mark.” The strict combat discipline of the British army was one of its greatest attributes.6
British soldiers rarely had the opportunity to pick their targets and fire at their own pace or will. Usually the men loaded and fired on command, with very little aiming at a particular person. Smoothbore muskets were very inaccurate, so there was little interest in target practice since the drain on lead and powder was not worth the expense and time. When a battalion delivered a volley fire, the “objective was to lay down a curtain of fire ahead of one’s troops at the desired rate of one shot every fifteen or twenty seconds, assuring at least two volleys before closing with the enemy,” explained the former historian of the Saratoga battlefield. “The men then resorted to clubbing with their muskets or stabbing with the bayonet, with which the British were famously effective.”7
Accuracy may have been superfluous, but organized, controlled speed in both firing and movement was essential to success. The faster the defenders could load and fire, the more damage they could inflict upon the approaching attacking force. Contrarily, the faster the attackers could close with the enemy while simultaneously maintaining unit cohesion, the fewer casualties they would sustain and the stronger they would be when they reached their objective. Since the cartridge boxes were usually limited to 30 or fewer rounds, uncontrolled fire would quickly exhaust the ammunition supply. Once the firing began, thick black powder smoke enveloped the battlefield, which compounded the difficulties of officers trying to maintain effective control of their men. The field music of beating drums and tooting fifes, coupled with flags waving above the center of the battalion, could usually be heard and seen above the chaos and thus helped maintain control.8
The strict discipline and often harsh living conditions that made life difficult for the average British soldier also molded him into a well-trained and formidable opponent. The monotonous and repetitive drill to which he was subjected created a soldier who “moved when he was supposed to move with predictable precision and speed,” wrote one historian of the era. The British generals lost several battles during the American Revolution, and eventually lost the war, but through no fault of the men in their ranks.
The officers who led these disciplined soldiers achieved their positions through either social rank or money. Commissions were purchased, and rising through the ranks from subaltern to colonel required either the death of an officer, an officer’s retirement, or the sponsorship of a higher-ranking officer or government patron. In other words, many officers owed their position to someone else. This system created officers devoutly loyal to certain colonels or generals, but who would also undermine others within the same army.
There was no official schooling for British officers. Although well-read in military literature, they obtained the vital knowledge of their profession through hard experience. Young subalterns learning the ropes in their teenage years were ably supported by senior sergeants in their companies, proving the old adage that sergeants are the backbone of the army.9
The eighteenth-century equivalent of elite soldiers were assigned to the flank companies of the various regiments. Throughout most of the Revolution, flank companies rarely served with their parent regiments, and were instead “brigaded” together to form battalions of light infantry or grenadiers.
The grenadier company was made up of the tallest and strongest men in the regiment. Originally, their function was to throw grenades into fortifications, but grenades were no longer in use by the time of the Revolution. The grenadier’s uniform included a short sword and a tall bearskin cap instead of the cocked hats worn by the battalion men. The light infantry company consisted of fit men who often functioned as rangers or scouts. Their coats were cut short, they wore leather caps and red waistcoats, and carried small cartridge boxes and hatchets.
Both the grenadiers and light infantrymen were typically armed with muskets like the regular soldiers. However, at least some of the British light infantry were armed with British short rifles. Only a limited number of these weapons were sent to North America, and there is evidence that each light company received a small number, but not enough to arm the entire company. While only a limited number of British light troops were so armed, all the German jaegers (the German equivalent of light infantry) were armed with a short jaeger rifle.
A corps of guides and pioneers under the command of Maj. Samuel Holland accompanied Howe’s army on the Philadelphia campaign. This unit moved at the front of the marching army to clear obstructions. Holland’s corps consisted of 172 men equipped with axes, saws, and shovels in addition to their muskets. They wore heavy leather aprons, gloves, and leather caps. They were permitted to wear beards, and a significant number of them were African.10
The field artillery of the British army was organized into four battalions of eight companies each. Each company consisted of six officers, eight noncommissioned officers, nine bombardiers, 18 gunners, and 73 matrosses, or privates. The British artillery system was somewhat unique in that the gunners and matrosses were enlisted men, but the drivers were hired civilians.11
Artillerymen were usually armed with carbines, which were shorter and lighter versions of an infantryman’s musket. Fusilier regiments, such as the 23rd of Foot (Royal Welsh Fusiliers), were originally formed to escort artillery, but served as infantry in North America.
Field guns ranged in size from the large 24-pounders to the small 3-pounders. Since 12-pounders required a large number of horses to haul them, and maintaining horses in North America was difficult, the British preferred using 6-pounders and 9-pounders. It was customary to allot two guns to each infantry regiment (known as battalion guns). However, some officers criticized this practice because it prevented a concentration of artillery fire.
Amidst the wide variety of artillery in the British service, the maximum range of the most powerful piece was about 2,000 yards, but no field gun was considered effective beyond 1,200 yards (and many of the smaller caliber much less than that). The guns were capable of firing solid shot, grape, or canister.12
Most field pieces delivered their fire on a fairly flat trajectory. Howitzers, however, fired projectiles along a high arc. Exploding shells were set to detonate just above an enemy position, raining shrapnel down upon opposing combatants. The howitzer’s shorter barrels, however, reduced their effective range of fire.13
By regulation, the British army operating in North America was to be primarily provisioned via shipments from England. The most important provisions received in this manner included beef, pork, bread, flour, oatmeal, rice, peas, butter, and salt. Less important provisions, such as cheese, bacon, suet, fish, raisins, and molasses, also found their way to American shores. In addition, many types of vegetables, including potatoes, parsnips, carrots, turnips, cabbages, and onions, were dispatched by sea, although they were not always fresh or even edible by the time they reached the men in the field. For the most part, they were intended for those recovering in hospitals. Onions, sauerkraut, porter, claret, spruce beer, malt, vinegar, celery seed, and brown mustard seed were used as anti-scorbutics to help ward off scurvy.
Commissary generals constantly complained of moldy bread, biscuits teaming with insects, rancid butter, rotten flour, worm-eaten peas, and maggot-ridden beef. Not surprisingly, men frequently attempted to supplement their diet by foraging (looting) in the American countryside, which in turn led to depredations against civilians.14
While the British high command hoped in 1777 that the army would not need to depend on supplies from Great Britain, the army’s commissary general often noted that North America could not be depended upon for supplies. The only alternative was the provision train. “No eighteenth-century commander raised in the European tradition would think of taking the field without such a train,” explained one historian. “Armies of the period tended to be small and expensive to the point that even victories attended by considerable losses were unacceptable. Aware of the problems of health and morale that accompanied poor and short rations, few commanders willingly trusted the feeding of their armies to the chance that sufficient food could be obtained along the line of march.” Long provision trains were simply a necessity.15
Provision trains, however, required healthy horses and lots of them. This, in turn, required tons of fodder, a precious commodity the British sought to obtain from the North American countryside, and even more horses to haul that fodder. During the planning for the summer campaign, Howe estimated he would need at least 3,662 horses—and all that went with them. Exactly how many horses Howe left with from New York is unknown, but we do know that many died and many more became ill during the voyage to the Chesapeake. While the exact number of horses Howe fielded along the Brandywine is also unknown, it was substantially fewer than the number that boarded his ships. The mobile workshops of blacksmiths, carpenters, harness-makers, and other tradesmen also required draft horses.16
As a result of all these needs, Howe’s army sat idly several times during the campaign while foragers roamed the countryside seeking food and horses. Even though Washington issued several orders to clear supplies out of Howe’s path, there was not enough time to completely achieve all that he desired. The result, observed R. Arthur Bowler, was that “in the first two months after the landings at Head of Elk, the [British] army fed almost every other day on fresh provisions from the well-developed farms of eastern Pennsylvania, long providers of food for the less well-endowed areas of the colonies.”17
By the time of the American Revolution, England had long had a standing army, which had long recognized the need for an entirely different kind of support: women. Each company had an authorized quota. The return for the British army in New York for May 1777 showed one woman present for every eight men. The presence of women reduced desertions and they performed useful work like mending, cooking, nursing, and laundering. The women who accompanied the army to North America were supposed to be the wives of the enlisted soldiers (the wives of officers rarely accompanied them on campaign). The marital status of these women was often questionable, for proof of a legal marriage was not always required. The women traveled with the baggage wagons on the march, and so did not accompany the men directly.
The German forces that served the British army were hired by King George III to support and aid the British war effort in North America. Great Britain was a global empire and so had military commitments throughout the world in Gibraltar, India, Canada, the Caribbean, the American colonies, and of course, the home islands of Great Britain. Military manpower was already stretched to its limits when the American Revolution began in 1775.
Despite popular belief, the German soldiers sent to North America were not mercenaries in the traditional sense, but rather armies from another country hired for use in the colonies. The individual soldiers were not paid by Great Britain directly, and received nothing more than their regular army pay and rations. Instead, England paid the various German princes for the use of their troops. The German soldiers were commanded by their own officers and often were not subject to British military discipline.
Six German rulers hired out their soldiers to Great Britain: Frederick II, Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel; William, his son, the independent Count of Hesse-Hanau; Charles I, Duke of Brunswick; Frederick, Prince of Waldeck; Charles Alexander, Margrave of Anspach-Bayreuth; and Frederick Augustus, Prince of Anhalt-Zerbst. Beceause the German troops sent to North America hailed from separate principalities, they were not all “Hessians,” though they have traditionally been referred to by that name. Among those German troops who fought at the Brandywine, however, all but one company of jaegers were in fact true Hessians.
One of the reasons King George III was able to acquire these troops was because he was from the royal house of Hanover. Frederick II (not to be confused with his more famous namesake) of Hesse-Cassel was married to George III’s sister. William, the oldest son of Frederick II, was not only the grandson of George II, but also the ruler of Hesse-Hanau. Duke Charles I of Brunswick had his son Prince Charles William Ferdinand marry a sister of George III. Beyond family obligations, Charles Alexander of AnspachBayreuth was so deeply in debt that he felt compelled to provide troops to England. The princes of Waldeck were known to raise men specifically for use by other countries, so providing men to England was merely an extension of an existing program. Frederick Augustus of Anhalt-Zerbst sent only a small number of men, and most of these had to be recruited from other provinces.
The British Parliament was not pleased about the hiring of auxiliary troops, and protests erupted in the House. The arguments expressed the supposed danger and disgrace of the foreign treaties involved, which acknowledged to all Europe that Great Britain was unable, either from want of men or their disinclination toward the intended service, to furnish a sufficient number of natural-born subjects for the campaign. Many argued that drawing off the national troops would leave Great Britain exposed to potential assaults and invasions of powerful neighboring and foreign nations, in general, and France and Spain in particular. “We have, moreover, just reason to apprehend that when the colonies come to understand that Great Britain is forming alliances, and hiring foreign troops for their destruction,” came one Parliamentary protest, “they may think they are well justified by the example, in endeavoring to avail themselves of the like assistance; and that France, Spain, Prussia, or other powers of Europe may conceive that they have as good a right as Hesse, Brunswick, and Hanau to interfere in our domestic quarrels.”18
Much like the staff Washington assembled to assist him in managing his army, a group of staff officers similarly served William Howe. Brigadier General James Paterson served as adjutant general, and Lt. Col. Stephen Kemble as deputy adjutant general. Brigadier General William Erskine was Howe’s quartermaster general.19 Captain Henry Bruen was his deputy quartermaster general, and Brig. Gen. Samuel Cleaveland was his chief of artillery. Daniel Wier served as commissary general, Capt. John Montresor his chief engineer, Capt. Archibald Robertson as engineer, and Capt. Robert McKenzie as military secretary. Howe had six aides serving him at the Brandywine battle: Majs. Cornelius Cuyler, Nesbitt Balfour, and William Gardiner, and Capts. Henry Fox, Henry Knight, and Friedrich von Muenchausen.20
Cornwallis’s division consisted of about 8,400 men in six brigades and various detachments. All of the troops under his command were veterans, and many of the organizations in which they served were considered the elite units of Howe’s army. The division consisted of the following units (with their approximate strength in parentheses): Maj. Gen. Charles Grey’s Third British Brigade (1,000); Brig. Gen. James Agnew’s Fourth British Brigade (1,400); Brig. Gen. Edward Mathew’s Brigade of Guards (1,000); the Light Infantry Brigade (1,300); the British Grenadier Brigade (1,400); Col. Carl von Donop’s brigaded Hessian grenadiers (1,300); Lt. Col. Ludwig von Wurmb’s Hessian Jaegers (500); Mounted jaegers (100); The 16th Light Dragoons, in two squadrons (200); and Royal artillerymen (200). Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Stirling’s 42nd Royal Highlanders (600) were attached directly to Howe’s headquarters, and therefore accompanied the column, bringing its total to about 9,000 men.21
Cornwallis and his officers would be called upon to play the leading role in the upcoming fight along the Brandywine, and his command was in good hands. Charles Grey, the commander of the Third Brigade, was born in 1729 in Northumberland, England. Since he was not the oldest son and could expect no inheritance, he pursued a military career. In 1744, he purchased a commission as ensign in the 6th Regiment and took part in suppressing the Jacobite rising. Grey spent time in Gibraltar and rose to captain, taking command of a company in the 20th Regiment of Foot. During the Seven Years’ War, he was an adjutant on the staff of Duke Ferdinand of Brunswick and was wounded at Minden. Grey participated in a number of other engagements during that war, including Campen, the capture of Belle Ille, Havana, and the repulse of the invasion of Portugal. In 1772, he was promoted to colonel and served as aide-de-camp to King George III. Grey would become one of the more infamous British generals during the Revolution. His brigade included the 15th, 17th, and 44th Regiments of Foot and the 42nd Highlanders, which was detached to serve as Howe’s headquarters guard on the day of the battle.
Brigadier General James Agnew, who led Cornwallis’s Fourth Brigade, was born in 1719 in England. It is not clear when he entered the military; he was married before the Revolution. Agnew arrived in Boston in 1775 as a lieutenant colonel, fought on Long Island, and rose to brigade command. Early in 1777 he took part in the raid into Connecticut to seize patriot supplies. He commanded the 33rd, 37th, 46th, and 64th Regiments of Foot at the Brandywine.
Brigadier General Edward Mathew was born in 1729 and became an ensign in the Coldstream Guards in 1746. By 1775 he was a colonel and aide-de-camp to King George III. When the Revolution erupted, he was made commander of the Brigade of Guards, which fought throughout the 1776 New York campaign. The Brigade of Guards Mathew led in America was a special composite force made up of 1,000 men chosen by lottery from the three regiments of Foot Guards. Fifteen men from each of the Guard’s 64 companies were selected to serve in America. During the eighteenth century, there were only three regiments of Foot Guards: the First Guards, also known as the Grenadier Guards; the Second, or Coldstream, Guards; and the Third Guards, or Scots Guards. Normally, these regiments were stationed in London or Westminster as bodyguards for the king. The unit was divided into two battalions of 500 men each and, unlike other British regiments, retained its own flank companies while on campaign. The Guards, who functioned much like a light infantry unit during the American campaigns, used common-sense, flexible tactics when faced with heavy gunfire. All of the Guards, officers and men alike, wore uniforms modified for campaign service, including shortened jackets without ornamentation and round hats, under which they wore cropped hair.22
The light infantry brigade was composed of the 1st and 2nd British Light Infantry Battalions. These battalions were formed by brigading together the various light infantry companies from regiments stationed in North America. The 1st Light Infantry Battalion, commanded by Col. Sir Robert Abercrombie of the 37th Regiment of Foot, was composed of the light companies of the following Regiments of Foot: 4th, 5th, 7th, 10th, 15th, 17th, 22nd, 23rd, 26th, 27th, 28th, 33rd, 35th, 37th, and 38th. The 2nd Light Infantry Battalion, commanded by Maj. John Maitland of the Royal Marines, was composed of the light companies of the following Regiments of Foot: 40th, 42nd, 43rd, 44th, 45th, 46th, 49th, 52nd, 54th, 55th, 57th, 63rd, 64th, and two companies from the 71st.23
Flank battalions in general and light infantry battalions in particular were filled with battle-hardened veterans who had already seen severe and successful service in the army. Most British officers were proud to serve in the light companies. William Dansey thought the light infantry “the most dangerous and difficult Service of this War, therefore you will rejoice with me in my good Fortune in being able to do my Duty as a Soldier in a line that must be of infinite Service to me here after, for the Preference in all Promotions is given to Light Infantry Officers.”24
The British Grenadier Brigade was composed of the 1st and 2nd British Grenadier Battalions. Much like the light infantry companies, the grenadier companies of the regiments stationed in North America had been consolidated into these battalions. The 1st British Grenadier Battalion was commanded by Lt. Col. William Medows of the 55th Regiment of Foot and was composed of the grenadier companies of the following Regiments of Foot: 4th, 5th, 7th, 10th, 15th, 17th, 22nd, 23rd, 26th, 27th, 28th, 33rd, 35th, 37th, 38th, and 40th. The 2nd Grenadier Battalion, commanded by Col. Henry Monckton of the 45th Regiment of Foot, consisted of the following grenadier companies: two Royal Marine companies, and those from the following Regiments of Foot: 42nd, 43rd, 44th, 45th, 46th, 49th, 52nd, 54th, 55th, 57th, 63rd, 64th, and 71st.25
Carl von Donop’s men were elite Hessian soldiers, and his brigade contained three grenadier battalions at the Brandywine: the von Linsingen, von Minnigerode, and Lengerke. Even though, as noted, Hessian units were often considered to be made up of elite soldiers, one British officer wrote the following, describing a commonly held belief about them: “They were led to believe before they left Hesse-Cassel, that they were to come to America to establish their private fortunes, and hitherto they have certainly acted with that principle.”26
Knyphausen’s division contained approximately 6,800 men in three brigades and various detachments. The division consisted of the following units (with approximate strength in parentheses): the First British Brigade (1,400); Maj. Gen. James Grant’s Second British Brigade (1,300); Maj. Gen. Johann von Stirn’s Hessian brigade (2,200); the 71st Highlanders (1,200); the 16th Light Dragoons, in a single squadron (100); Capt. James Wemys’s Queen’s Rangers (300); Capt. Patrick Ferguson’s rifles (90); and Royal artillerymen (200).27
General Knyphausen was also responsible for the army’s extensive baggage train, which traveled with his column. Marching with the baggage were 75 New Jersey Volunteers. The three battalions of the 71st Highlanders guarded the baggage train, one battalion marching to the right of it, another to the left, and the third bringing up the rear. It required 131 wagons and 524 horses just to carry a two weeks’ supply of hard bread and the other necessities of an army on campaign.28
The records are unclear about who led the two British infantry brigades with Knyphausen’s column at the Brandywine. However, Gen. James Grant was probably in overall command of the two brigades, as he had commanded an independent division until just before the battle. The First Brigade contained the 4th, 23rd (Royal Welsh Fusiliers), 28th, and 49th Regiments of Foot. The Second Brigade contained the 5th, 10th, 27th, 40th, and 55th Regiments of Foot.
Major General Johann von Stirn, commander of the Hessian Brigade, was born in Borken in October 1712 and entered the Hessian service in 1728. Rising through the ranks of the Regiment Prinz Friedrich, von Stirn was a major by 1757. By the time the Revolution began he was the colonel of the Leib Regiment Infanterie and in command of a brigade in the Hessian army. Through the New York campaign, von Stirn commanded a Hessian brigade under Howe and continued in that capacity in 1777. His brigade consisted of the Leib Regiment, the von Mirbach Regiment, the von Donop Regiment, and the Combined Hessian Battalion. The Combined Hessian Battalion contained the survivors of the fighting around Trenton the previous December from the von Lossberg, von Knyphausen, and Rall regiments.
Little is known about James Wemys other than that he was a captain in the 40th Regiment of Foot and he was in command of the Queen’s Rangers at the Brandywine. The Rangers were Americans recruited in 1776 from the loyalist population to serve the British army. British regiments of foot were clothed in the scarlet red coats for which they are famous, but the Queen’s Rangers wore green jackets with white breeches. Other units with Howe’s army were also dressed in shades other than red. All the Hessian regiments were clothed in blue coats with various levels of trim. The Jaeger Corps wore green jackets faced with red. At various times during the upcoming engagement, uniform colors would confuse men on both sides.
Patrick Ferguson was a 33-year-old Scottish officer and captain in the 70th Regiment of Foot’s light company. His rifle—the Ferguson Rifle—would play a pivotal role during the opening moments along the Brandywine. The Scotsman was serving with the 70th’s light company when he began building and experimenting with a breech-loading weapon he believed the British sorely needed. He sought a way by which a ball and loose powder could easily and quickly be inserted at the breech end of the weapon. To achieve this, he fitted a screw plug that passed vertically through the barrel and was attached to the trigger guard. As the trigger guard was rotated, the plug, cut with a large thread, was withdrawn to expose the open end of the breech. One turn of the trigger guard was sufficient to lower the plug; the bullet was then placed in the hole and the powder poured in behind it. A quick turn of the trigger guard screwed the plug back up, and, apart from the necessary priming, the weapon was ready for firing. A well-trained rifleman could fire up to six times a minute.
Ferguson field-tested one of his rifles for the British military in April 1776. After a demonstration for the royal family later that year, the Master-General of Ordnance stopped producing jaeger rifles and began producing Ferguson rifles instead. The British Ordnance Department ordered 100 of the rifles from four different gunsmiths (25 apiece).
Ferguson was placed in command of a special company of 100 men, whom he recruited mostly from the 6th and 14th Regiments of Foot. After an intense training period, Ferguson and his riflemen arrived in New York in March 1777. His rifles were far more accurate than the standard smoothbores carried by most of the men in the battle and could be loaded and fired while kneeling or lying down. Much like the Queen’s Rangers and jaegers, Ferguson’s men wore green coats.29
British troops were trained to fight with line-of-battle discipline and skills. In Europe, whatever guerilla activities occurred had remained a peripheral nuisance with little or no effect upon the outcome of a war. While some authors wrote about partisan combat in the 1740s and early 1750s, the British military refused during this period to adopt any formal changes to their tactics. They remained convinced that experience and training in European warfare would always prove superior when fighting others following another tactical doctrine. All of that changed when the Seven Years’ War reached North American shores.30
The Indians utilized small-scale or “guerilla” tactics and were not students of European warfare. Their war parties lived off the land, struck at vulnerable targets with extreme brutality, and then melted back into the woods before they could be attacked. The French, who had befriended many tribes through trade agreements, learned these tactics themselves. The rugged North American terrain lent itself to this style of warfare.
British overconfidence and an unwillingness to reassess their tactics led to disasters along the Monongahela and at Lake George during the French and Indian War. The Lake George combat in early September of 1755 proved that conventional warfare was not going to work well against an enemy determined to fight otherwise when a frontier trader recently appointed to be the British agent to the Iroquois attempted to fight his 1,500 troops like a Regular officer against a similar number of troops led by a European-trained French general who had adopted ambush techniques. The guerilla tactics adopted by the French caught British military leaders off guard, and although the fighting proved inconclusive, the lesson was there for anyone wise enough to see it: traditional European tactics were not effective against this new form of warfare in North America. These bloody experiences convinced the British to alter their routinized method of waging war to include irregular tactics.31
The army created new military organizations and developed frontier-style hit-and-run tactics (small mobile bands of backwoodsmen conducting surprise attacks) during and after the French and Indian War. The objective was to damage the enemy with the smallest force possible and retreat as necessary. Lord Loudon (John Campbell, the 4th Earl of Loudon), the overall commander of British armies during the French and Indian War, emphasized the importance of these units and took note that conventionally trained British Regulars were unsuited for such a task. Initially, the British relied on American frontiersmen distributed between Regular units in the hope they would acquire some discipline, and the Regulars some woodsmen skills. Many of the changes taking place during this period would impact the American Revolution.32
One of the first things the British did in their drive to adopt frontier tactics was authorize the creation of ranger units, the most famous of which was commanded by Robert Rogers. The Rangers’ status fell somewhere between a Regular and a Provincial. These units were composed of some of the most rugged North American frontiersmen, who were unruly and, at times, unreliable. However, for a time these Rangers filled a void by gathering intelligence, disrupting the French supply system, capturing prisoners, ambushing enemy advance units, and conducting diversionary raids. Ranger duty was difficult, and death and capture were constant threats. These men knew the advantage of spreading out when advancing through heavy woods, were always alert to an ambush, and were not afraid to take cover when attacked. “Woods-wise Rangers,” confirmed one historian, “had become widely recognized by regulars and provincials alike as among the most valuable of soldiers in the dangerous wilderness.”33
Lord Loudon hoped the Rangers could “deal with the Indians in their own way,” and while he understood the need for their services, he also began to doubt the capability of undisciplined units. The result was the creation of the Royal Americans, a corps of lightly armed mobile men who had learned unconventional tactics from Robert Rogers and others like him.34
Loudon also introduced light infantry units to Regular regiments. By the summer of 1758, all regiments had been trained to deal with ambushes, and the best marksmen had been issued rifles. The new Regular light infantry units were trained and able not only to do much of the scouting but also serve in regular lines of battle, where they were trained to impart their mobility to the line infantry around them. One British officer observed that the “art of War is much changed and improved here…. The Highlanders have put on breeches…. Swords and sashes are degraded, and many have taken up the Hatchet and wear Tomahawks.”35
The British officer responsible for revolutionizing British light infantry was George Howe, who had trained under Rogers himself. Howe was the older brother of William and Richard Howe. Regulars assigned to light infantry units were more lightly clothed and armed than others. Howe ordered the tails cut off their coats and the queues (ponytails) removed from their heads. They left their heavy packs behind, and wore leggings for added protection in the brush. Lastly, they browned their musket barrels to reduce the glint of the sun.
British army officer Henry Bouquet took Howe’s teachings a step further. Physical conditioning was implemented, including running long distances, leaping logs and ditches, and carrying heavy loads. Bouquet trained his light infantry to perform their drills on the run, and he made sure they could shoot while kneeling and lying down. Lastly, Bouquet taught them to disperse and rally in response to non-verbal signals.36
By the end of the French and Indian War, British infantry tactics had undergone a major transformation. British troops could no longer be stereotyped as fighting in rigid European lines of battle. The most important tactical lesson learned was the need for bushfighting, or skirmishing in heavy woods. This new tactic became the exclusive domain of specially equipped and trained regular light infantry. For the last three years of the French and Indian War, redcoats aimed their muskets at specific targets rather than merely leveling their weapons in the general direction of the enemy. “The army employed specialized units on a scale that would have been extraordinary in Europe,” confessed one writer. Fewer grenadiers were used in North America and many more light infantrymen. In fact, whole battalions of light infantry had been created. These spry men could quickly move through the woods to secure the flanks of heavy marching columns on the roads. This innovative creation of light infantry would eventually reform the British Army.37
The British continued to improve upon their light infantry system during the years between the French and Indian War and the American Revolution. In 1772, Lt. Gen. George Townshend issued new instructions to his light infantrymen while commanding in Ireland. The purpose of these instructions was to enable the light companies to skirmish in woods either independently, with their parent regiments, or as part of a light battalion. Townshend took a significant step away from the 1764 Regulations by adopting the two-deep firing line at open intervals. He also taught his men to maneuver and form by files and enabled his officers to maintain control over loosely deployed light infantrymen. Lastly, firings were to occur in pairs rather than in volleys.38
Just before the beginning of the Revolution, William Howe in 1774 issued a new light infantry drill. Howe’s drill focused on light battalions as opposed to Townshend’s individual companies. Much like Townshend’s, however, most of the maneuvers allowed the battalion to change its formations and facings with men moving by files rather than by wheeling entire ranks. Howe not only expected individual companies to detach themselves from the battalion to act semi-independently during combat, but also that the battalion itself would maneuver more quickly than its opponent so it could outflank an enemy line. The soldiers themselves were trained to break ranks when under fire and seek cover where available instead of remaining vulnerable to enemy lead.39
Hessian officer Johann Ewald later summarized the characteristics of light infantry. First, he noted, they were self-reliant and independent and comfortable with becoming isolated because they believed they were tactically better than their opponent. Next, these men could appreciate and adapt to different terrains—jungle, mountains, forest, urban settings and environmental changes—night, rain, snow—and use them to their advantage. Lastly, light infantrymen had to be able to improvise; when necessary, such men must be willing to adapt to circumstances rather than sticking to doctrine.40
Even though these instructions of the early 1770s seem to demonstrate that the British had learned their lesson in the previous war, it is unclear whether Regular line infantry was being trained in these tactics. The opening actions of the American Revolution leads one to believe they were not. Regardless of what doctrine preached, the British were never able to bring themselves to fully apply the lessons of the French and Indian War. When hostilities erupted in 1775, the British failed to put their new theories into practice, and for the most part never adapted to conditions in the colonies even as the war progressed. (In contrast, American colonists effectively used a type of guerilla warfare to harass their enemy from the very beginning.) Instead, British light infantry battalions generally fought in line of battle, using the same linear formations and bayonet-oriented tactics as the rest of the infantry. British leaders entered the Revolution confident that European soldiers led by competent officers possessed the cohesion to dominate untrained American militiamen in open terrain.41
Many British officers in North America believed that bayonet shock tactics were just as effective in heavy woods as in open fields. However, events soon proved otherwise during the fighting around Lexington and Concord, where the Americans used varied terrain and cover to harass and slaughter their opponents all the way back to Boston. As one writer noted, the deadly withdrawal proved that, “[u]nder certain favorable conditions a small force of well-armed and woods-wise colonists could rout a much larger, more ponderous formation of professional European soldiers.”42 Despite witnessing this for themselves, the British held to their outdated theories.
Nevertheless, Howe did order all units, including grenadiers and Regular infantry battalions, to fight in loose order beginning in 1776. As noted earlier, the men were to fight in two ranks and at arm’s length from each other, rather than shoulder-to-shoulder. Carl von Donop confirmed that Howe’s orders were still in effect at the Brandywine when he wrote just nine days before the battle, “I hope … that we … may be a bit more closely drawn together for the attack. For unless we are, I cannot yet reassure myself that infantry with its files four feet apart can capture intrenchments by escalade.” Von Donop, who had his doubts about the upcoming fighting, went on to state that the Americans were “drilled by French officers; and I am none too sure how our general is going to get himself out of this affair.”43
While the British failed to practice what they had at least sometimes preached, the Americans continued to show their frontier skills during the war by developing light infantry units armed exclusively with rifles. Their task was to scout ahead to help advance the infantry lines. Most American units were incapable of maneuvering and fighting against the professional British formations in open-field combat, but fighting in thick woods neutralized the principal weakness of the Americans. “In short,” concluded one historian, “all but the rebels’ best troops were probably most effective when they operated in loosely directed swarms in broken terrain.”44
British military development in North America during the eighteenth century is an interesting study in contradictions. Confronted with Indian-style warfare at the outbreak of the French and Indian War, British leadership realized the need for new tactics. Initially relying upon American frontiersmen to conduct guerilla operations, the British eventually created Regular units of light infantrymen to fight using these new partisan tactics. Following the peace treaty of 1763, the army continued to improve upon the light infantry system—indeed, entire drill manuals were written to effect substantive change. However, when the American Revolution erupted, the British remained convinced that the colonists were incapable of successfully fighting their professional soldiers.While the Americans used the guerilla tactics they had employed for decades to achieve success, the British steered away from their light infantry doctrines and attempted to fight a conventional war against the unconventional Americans.
Despite the teachings of William Howe and the innovations of men such as Patrick Ferguson, the British were incapable of overcoming their own prejudices against the American fighting man. While the British would eventually excel at light infantry tactics in the nineteenth century, they would largely forget during the American Revolution the lessons learned during the French and Indian War.