Who was at fault for the defeat along the Brandywine? Although George Washington as army commander was responsible (and deserved much of the personal blame for the loss) some politicians and civilians pointed the finger of blame at John Sullivan. Congress, which was already scrutinizing Sullivan for the manner in which he conducted his August 22, 1777, Staten Island raid, recalled Sullivan on September 14 pending an investigation. The move angered Washington, who was in the midst of a campaign and needed all of his officers. He delayed the recall the following day. Sullivan requested a court of inquiry to clear his name and Washington agreed, but told him the matter would have to wait until the campaign ended.
Congressman Thomas Burke of North Carolina led the attack against Sullivan and demanded he be dismissed from the army. On October 12, 1777, Burke penned a long letter to Sullivan outlining his discontent with the general’s actions at the Brandywine:
Sir: I was present at the action at Brandiwine and saw and heard enough to convince me that the Fortune of the day was injured by Miscarriages where you Commanded. I understood you were several days posted with the Command on the Right Wing, that you were Cautioned by the Commander in chief early in the day to be particularly attentive to the Enemys’ Motions who he supposed would attempt to cross higher up the Creek and attack your Flank, that you were furnished with proper Troops for reconnotring, and yet you were so ill informed of the Enemy’s motions that they came up at a time and by a rout which you did not expect. That you Convey’d Intelligence to the Commander in Chief which occasioned his Countermanding the Dispositions he had made for encountering them on the rout by which it afterwards appeared they were actually advancing. That when at length the mistake was discovered you brought up your own Division by an unnecessary Circuit of two Miles, and in the greatest disorder, from which they never recovered, but fled from the fire of the Enemy without resistance. That the miscarriages on the Wing made it Necessary to draw off a great part of the Strength from the Center which exposed General Wayne to the Superiority of the Enemy.—
I heard Officers on the Field lamenting in the bitterest Terms that they were cursed with such a Commandr and I overheard Numbers during the Retreat Complain of you as an Officer whose evil Conduct was forever productive of Misfortunes …
From these Facts I concluded that your Duty as a General was not well performed. Otherwise the Enemy’s motions on the Wing where you particularly Commanded would not have been unknown to you during great part of the day of action, nor could they have advanced by an unknown and unexpected rout, for you ought to have made yourself well acquainted with the Ground. Nor would you have brought up your Troops by an unnecessary Circuit and in disorder, which exposed them to be Surprised and broken.
I also concluded that the Troops under your Command had no Confidence in your Conduct, and from the many Accounts I had Officially received of your miscarriages, I conceived, and am still possessed of an Opinion that you have not sufficient Tallents for your rank and office, tho I believe you have Strong dispositions to discharge your Duty well—
I consider it as one Essential part of my Duty to Attend to the Appointments of the Army, and where I perceive that any person so unqualified as I deem you to be has got into a Command, where Incompetence may be productive of disasters and disgrace, it is my Duty to Endeavour at removing him. In discharge of this I gave to Congress all the Information I was able, carefully distinguishing what I saw, what I heard, and from whom, as far as I was acquainted with persons. I urged your recall with all the force I could, and thought it, and still do think it necessary for the public good because, in all your Enterprises and in every part of your Conduct, even as represented by yourself, you Seem to be void of Judgement and foresight in concerting, of deliberate Vigor in Executing, and of presence of mind under Accidents and Emergencies—and from these defects Seem to me to arise your repeated ill Success. These Seem to me to form the great Essentials of a Military Character—nor do I think you the only Officer in our army who is deficient in them—Nor were my Endeavours to free the army from Insufficient Officers intended to be Confined to you. I scarcely know your person, and was not conscious of any Injury from you.—for a particular Reason I should have had great pleasure in Justly forming a better Opinion of you, but no reason can induce me to overlook the defects of Officers on whom so much depends. Nor will any thing deter me from pursuing the measures Suggested to my own Judgement.
I have not related every thing which I acted with relation to you in Congress together with my motives—I have Set down every Intelligence, and the Opinion I gave concerning you. What Hills you struggled for what fires you Sustained, I neither saw or heard of. Your personal Courage I meddled not with. I had no knowledge of it, and I was Cautious to Say nothing unjust or unnecessary. My objection to you is want of Sufficient Tallents, and I consider it as your misfortune, not fault. It is my Duty, as far as I can, to prevent its being the Misfortune of my Country.
The purpose of this Information is that you may Indubitably know I gave Congress all the Intelligence and Opinions Concerning you here set down, and then to ask you in direct Terms if you meant the disrespectful Expressions in your later Letter to Congress on the Subject of your Conduct at Brandiwine to be applied to me? If you did Sir I must inform you, you are mistaken in the matter Contained in those Expressions. My demeanor was entirely void of parade and Ostentation, and entirely Simple and attentive. I did not Gallop my Horse at all but when I attempted to rally some of your flying Troops. The manner of those Expressions which I suppose you meant for Wit and Sarcasm are as unbecoming the Soldier as the Gentleman, and Inconsistant with that plain and dignified Simplicity which ought to be the Stile of persons in either rank.1
In addition to some of its factual inaccuracies, Burke’s letter interfered with Washington’s management of the army and unfairly accused Sullivan of matters outside his personal command and control. An incensed Sullivan replied in kind, triggering a heated exchange between Sullivan, Congress, and various officers of the army.
Sullivan methodically gathered evidence on his behalf from fellow officers and wrote a letter to John Hancock, the president of Congress, in reply to Burke’s charges. “I never yet have pretended that my Disposition in the Late Battle was perfect,” explained the general on September 27, 1777, who went on at length:
I know it was very far from it but this I will venture to affirm & appeal for proof to the Inclosed Testimonies it was the best that time would allow me to make—at half past Two I Received orders to march with my Division to Join & take Command of that & Two others to oppose the Enemy who were coming Down on the Right flank of our army. I neither knew where the Enemy were or what Rout the other Two Division were to take & of course could not Determine where I Should form a Junction with them. I began my march in five minutes after I Received my orders & had not marched a mile when I met Colo Hazen with his Regiment which had been Stationed at a Ford three miles above me who Informed that the Enemy were Close upon his Heels & that I might Depend that the principal part of the British army were there: although I knew the Reports Sent to head Quarters made them but two Brigades as I knew Colo Hazen & our Troops Still upon their march the Enemy headed us in the Road about forty Rods from our advance Guard. I then found it necessary to turn off to the Right to form & to get nearer to the other two Divisions which I that moment Discovered Drawn up on an Eminence both in the Rear & to the Right of the place I then was at.
I ordered Colo Hazens Regiment to pass a Hollow way File off to the Right & face to Cover the artillery while it was passing the Same Hollow way, the Rest of the Troops followed in the Rear to assist in Covering the Artillery the Enemy Seeing this did not press on but gave me time to form my Division on an advantageous Height in a Line with the other Divisions but almost half a mile to the Left. I then rode up to Consult the other General officers who upon receiving Information that the Enemy were Endeavouring to out Flank us on the Right were unanimously of opinion that my Division should be brought in to Join the others & that the whole Should Incline further to the Right to prevent our being out flanked but while my Division was marching out & before it was possible for them to form to advantage The Enemy pressed on with Rapidity & attacked them which threw them into Some kind of Confusion. I had taken post myself in the Centre with the artillery & ordered it to play briskly to Stop the progress of the Enemy & give the Broken Troops time to Rally & form in the Rear of where I was with the artillery. I sent off four Aid De Camps for this purpose & went myself But all in vain no Sooner did I form one party but that which I had before formed would Run off & Even at times when I though on Horseback and in front of them apprehended no Danger.
I then left them to be Rallied if possible by their own officers & my aid De Camp & Repaired to the Hill where our artillery was which by this time began to feel the Effects of the Enemy’s fire. This Hill Commanded both the Right & Left of our Line & if carried by the Enemy I knew would Instantly bring on a Total Rout & make a Retreat very Difficult. I therefore Determined to hold it as Long as possible to give Lord Sterlings & General Stephens Divisions which yet Stood firm as much assistance from the artillery as possible & to give Colo Hazens Daytons & Ogdens Regiments which Still Stood firm on our Left the Same advantage & to Cover the Broken Troops of my Division & give them an opportunity to Rally & come to our assistance which Some of them did & others could not by their officers be brought to do any thing but fly: The Enemy Soon began to bend their principal force against the Hill & the fire was Close & heavy for a Long time & Soon became General. Lord Sterling & General Conway with their Aid De Camps were with me on the Hill & Exerted themselves beyond Description to keep up the Troops: five times did the Enemy drive our Troops from the Hill & as often was it Regained & the Summit often Disputed muzzle to muzzle how far I had a hand in this & whether I Endured the Hottest of the Enemys Fire I Chearfully Submit to the Gentlemen who were with me—The General fire of the Line Lasted an hour & forty minutes Fifty one minutes of which the Hill was Disputed almost Muzzle to Muzzle in Such a manner that General Conway who has Seen much Service Says he never Saw So Close & Severe a fire—on the Right where General Stephen was it was Long & Severe & on the Left Considerable—when we found the Right & Left oppressed by Numbers & giving way in all Quarters we were obliged to Abandon the Hill we had So Long contended for but not till we had almost Covered the Ground between that & Bremingham meeting House with The Dead Bodies of the Enemy—when I found that victory was on the Side of the Enemy I thought it my Duty to prevent as much as possible the Injurious Consequences of a Defeat for which purpose I rallied my Troops on Every advantageous piece of Ground to Retard their pursuit & give them Fresh opposition how far I Exerted myself in this Congress will readily See by Consulting the Inclosed Testimonies: The Last partys that I assisted to Rally & post against them was between Sunset & Dark by this means the Enemy were So much Fatigued that they Suffered our whole army with their artillery Baggage &c to pass off without Molestation & without attempting to pursue us a step—I wish Congress to Consider the many Disadvantages I Laboured under on that Day—It is necessary in Every action that the Commanding officer Should have a perfect knowledge of the number & Situation of the Enemy the Rout they are pursueing The Ground he is to Draw up his Troops on as well as that where the Enemy are formed & that he have Sufficient time to view & Examine the Position of the Enemy & to Draw up his Troops in Such a manner as to Counteract their Designs: all of which were wanting we had Intelligence only of Two Brigades against us when in fact it was the whole Strength of the British Army Commanded by General Howe & Lord Cornwallis.
They met us unexpectedly & in order of Battle & Attacked us before we had time to form & upon Ground we had never before Seen under these Disadvantages & against Those unequal numbers we maintained our Ground an hour & forty minutes & by giving fresh opposition on Every Ground that would admit we kept them at Bay from Three of Clock till after Sunset; what more could be Expected from between three & four Thousd Troops against the Chief part of the British Army—I would now beg Leave to ask this warlike Son of Achilles who has Censured my Conduct whether it is proper for the Best officer in the world to make a perfect Disposition of Three Divisions of Troops to Receive an Enemy vastly Superior in numbers already formed and advancing … when he has not time upon the Swiftest Horse to Ride from the Right to the Left of the Line before he is attacked—But I need not Dwell upon this matter till Some future period may furnish me with a more proper opportunity.
I now beg Congress to Consider whether my Services in Political & military Life have Deserved So ill as to Render me Liable upon vague Reports & private opinions to have my Character Stigmatized by Resolves against me—Though I have never yet wrote or Said any thing in favor of myself I am Compelled for once to alter my Conduct. My Political Character is well known in most parts of America & the part I have taken in the present Dispute—I am Exceeding happy that in the Military Line I have witnesses of all my Conduct.2
A little over a week later, Sullivan sent another letter to Hancock explaining how he had warned Washington of the flanking movement:
Dear Sir: Since writing the letter which accompanies this, I have had no opportunity of forwarding my papers to congress & beg Leave to trouble Congress with Some remarks upon the severe & I think very unjust censure cast upon me respecting the intelligence sent by me to Genl Washington the day of the Battle on Brandywine: I wish only to acquaint Congress with the facts: It was ever my opinion that the enemy wou’d come round on our Right flank. This opinion I often gave the general. I wrote him that morning that it was clearly my opinion: I sent him that morning that it was clearly my opinion: I sent him two messages to the same purpose in the forenoon & the very first intelligence I received, that they were actually coming that way, I instantly communicated to him: After which the Genl sent me word to cross the Brandewine with my Division & attack the enemy’s left while the army crossed below me to attack their Right; this I was preparing to do, when Major Spear came to me & inform’d that he was from the upper country, that he has come in the Road, where the enemy must have passed to attack our right & that there was not the least appearance of them in that Qr & added that Genl Washington had sent him out for the purpose of discovering whether the enemy were in that Qr.
The account was confirmed by a Serjeant Tucker of the L. Horse, sent by me on purpose to make discoveries & had passed on as he said to Lancaster road. This intelligence did by no means alter my opinion wch was founded not upon any knowledge I had of the facts but upon apprehension that Genl Howe would take that advantage which any good officer in his situation would have done. I considered however that if my opinion or the intelligence I had sent the Genl had brought him into a plan of attacking the enemy on the advantageous heights, they were posses’d of & a defeat shou’d follow, that I shou’d be justly censur’d for withholding from him part of the intelligence I had receiv’d & therby brought on the defeat of our army; I therefore set down & wrote Major Spear’s account, from his own mouth & forwarded it to his Excy by a Light Horseman & order’d the major to follow himself. I never made a comment or gave my opinion the matter. Col. Harrison member from Virginia is posses’d of a copy of the letter as the Generals Aid-de-Camps inform me.
I beg Congress to see it & then judge whether I cou’d have been excused for withholding that intelligence merely because my opinion did not coincide with the declaration. Had the General crossed over; left his own advantageous post (where I considered to oppose an enemy in front) & found the whole british army well posted in his front & his Army put to the rout having a river unfordable in rear, except in one or two places & most of his troops pushed into it, which must inevitably have been the case if he was defeated: I say if this had all hap’ne’d (w’ch was at least possible & he had afterwards found out that I had received & withheld the intelligence, which might have prevented this misfortune & demanded my reasons I believe I never shou’d have been able to give on[e] which wou’d be Satisfactory to him to congress or to the world.
I know it to be part of my duty to give him every intelligence I received without withholding any part of it, because it does not coincide with my own opinion, and I as well know it is exceeding hard to be censured for doing my duty, which has been too much the case with me since I have been in the Army.3
Washington did not blame Sullivan for the defeat, and was in fact pleased he did not withhold any of the conflicting intelligence he received during the day of the battle:
Dear Sir: It ever has been, and I hope ever will be, a ruling principle with me, to endeavor to do impartial justice to every officer over whom I have the honor to preside. I shall therefore, in answer to the queries, contained in your letter of this date, readily declare.
That although I ascribed the misfortune which happened to us on the 11th. of Septr., principally to the information of Major Spear, transmitted to me by you; yet I never blamed you for conveying the intelligence. On the contrary, considering from whom, and in what manner it came to you, I should have thought you culpable in concealing it. The Major’s rank, reputation and knowledge of the Country, gave him a full claim to credit and attention.
His intelligence was no doubt a most unfortunate circumstance, as it served to derange the disposition that had been determined on, in consequence of prior information of the enemy’s attempt to turn and attack our right flank, which ultimately proving true, too little time was left us, after discovering its certainty, to form a new plan, and make adequate arrangements to prevent its success. Hence arose that hurry and consequently confusion which afterwards ensued. But it was not your fault, that the intelligence was eventually found to be erroneous!
With respect to your other quaere, whether your being posted on the right was to guard that flank, and if you had neglected it? I can only observe, that the obvious, if not declared purpose of your being there, implied every necessary precaution for the security of that flank. But it is at the same time to be remarked, that all the fords above Chads, which we were taught to apprehend danger from, were guarded by detachments from your division; and that we were led to believe, by those whom we had reason to think well acquainted with the Country, that no ford above our picquets could be passed, without making a very circuitous march.
Upon the whole then, no part of your conduct, preceding the action, was, in my judgment, reprehensible. What happened on your march to the field of battle, your disposition there, and your behavior during the action, I can say nothing about, no part ‘till the retreat commenced having come under my immediate observation. I can only add therefore, that the whole tenor of your conduct, so far as I have had opportunities of judging, has been spirited and active.4
On October 25, 1777, Sullivan once again addressed a letter to Hancock detailing the specific charges Thomas Burke had leveled against him:
In a Letter from Mr. Burk, Member from No. Carolina dated the 12th Inst: he informs me that he has represented to Congress that I was posted with the Command on the Right Wing of our Army previous to the Battle of Brandywine—
2nd. That I was early in the day cautioned by the Commander in Chief to be particularly attentive to the Enemy’s motions, who he supposed would attempt to cross higher up the Creek: And that I was furnish’d with Light Troops for that purpose which I neglected, & suffered them to come upon me by a Rout I never expected—
3rd. That I conveyed false Intelligence to the General, which caused him to Alter his dispositions, and brought on a defeat.
4th. That when the mistake was at length discover’d, I brought up my Troops by a Circuitous March, and in a disorder from which they never recover’d—
5th. That He heard my Officers lamenting in the bitterest terms, that they were cursed with such a Commander, whose evil Conduct was ever productive of misfortunes to the Army—
6th. That my Troops, had no confidence in my Conduct.—
7th. That I had not sufficient Talents for my Rank and Office, that I am void of Judgment & foresight in concerting of Deliberate vigor in Executing, and of presence of mind under Accidents & Emergencies—from which has arisen my repeated ill Success—
As the Gentleman has been generous enough to acknowledge the several points he has urged against me, it becomes my duty to remove ev’ry impression from the minds of Congress which those assertions might have made, and I doubt not Congress will indulge me in it while I treat with Decency the Gentleman who informs me that as a Member of that Respectable Body he made the representatives, as I wish freedom of speeches ever to be maintain’d in that August Assembly. I have the most sanguine hopes that the Person whose Conduct has been by mistake of a member misrepresented, may have every opportunity of removing the prejudice which those representatives may have made—
As to the first of those, it was so far from being true, that I was never sent to the Lower Ford, ‘til the Ev’ning before the Action, this was called Brenton’s Ford. I was ordered to take Post there, with my Main Body, to send a Guard to the next Ford, about a mile & half above me, another to Jones’s Ford, One & half miles still higher up, and another to Buffenton’s Ford, a mile above that, immediately upon my Arrival, I detached the Delaware Regiment to the first Ford, one Battallion of Hazens to Jones, & another to Buffentons—when I received those Orders, as I ever had been of opinion that the Enemy would endeavour to turn our Right, I enquired of His Excellency whether there were no Fords still higher up, to which, the persons who were then giving him information of the Country, replied there is none within twelve miles, the Roads leading to, & from which, are almost inaccesable—His Excellency also Observed, that all the Light Horse of the Army were Ordered on the right Wing to give Information, and of course I had no Orders, or even Hints to look at any other places, but those before mentioned, nor had I Light troops, or Light Horsemen furnished for the purpose, nor will any Person attempt to say it who knows the Facts. I had but four Light Horsemen, two of which I kept at the upper Fords, to bring me Intelligence, the others I kept to send Intelligence to Head Quarters—But to this Charge, as also to the Second & third, which the Gentleman has been pleased to Exhibit against me, I offer in opposition, His Excellencys Declaration Copy of which I enclose, and Congress must soon see how void of foundation they are—
The fourth Article of Charge I have fully answered in my State of the Affair of Brandywine—
As to the fifth & Sixth Articles of Charge I can only say, that I think the Gentleman much mistaken, as all the officers present in my division have sign’d the Contrary, except part of the officers in Hazen’s Regiment, the reason of which may easily be conceived. I take the opportunity of Inclosing a Copy of one from the third Maryland Regiment, but have not time to copy the Others, to forward them by this opportunity—I think the Gentleman had better taken more pains to inform himself before he made the representation, as I am confident he cannot find three in my Division that would to be from under my Command, not even the Writer of the Letter against me, who is every day expressing his sorrow for being the author of it. As to the seventh Article, I can only Observe that the Gentleman’s Judgement is so far superior to all the Generals, & other Officers, with whom I have served, and his opportunities of forming an opinion respecting my Abilities so much greater, that I dare not attempt to contradict him, but leave him to enjoy what opinion of me He thinks proper.5
One of the officers offering testimony in defense of Sullivan was Thomas Conway, the commander of a brigade in Lord Stirling’s division:
I do hereby Certify, that on the 11th Septr Major Genl Sullivan, shewed all the Bravery, and Coolness, that can be expected, from a man of Honour, during the Action, and all the possible Activity after the rout to rally the Troops. Genl Sullivan having come up with his division, when the Enemy was within half a mile of our front, the short time left to his troops in order to Form, was hardly sufficient, for well disciplined troops, and well exercised, and by no means sufficient for the troops of the Army, who appear to me to maneavre upon false Principles, and where I cannot discover as yet, The least notion of displaying Columns, and forming briskly upon all Emergencies. The Division of the Right had full time to form, the Ground upon which said Division was to draw up, was exceedingly favourable, and if part of the Division was not formed completely before the Engagement, The fault can not be imputed to Genl Sullivan, who altho: he had a right to take the right of the Line, took the Left, in Order to save time, a proof that the Division of the Right, had full time to form. That Lord Sterlings Division, which was next to it, was completely formed, when the Enemy appeared. This is my sincere Opinion, the true cause of the loss of the Battle cannot be known to all those who are acquainted with what passed that day, and two days before the Action.6
Lord Stirling’s aide, William Willcox, composed the following letter to Sullivan:
Sir: Your letter of the 24th instant has deprived me of the pleasure of doing an unsolicited favour, for antecedent to the reception of it, I had determined, so far as my influence, and knowledge of facts enabled me, to rescue your reputation from the undeserved calumny thrown upon you by the captious and ungenerous multitude. And to convince you, that my declarations are entirely uninfluenced by any thing which has passed between us, since the day of action, I have the further satisfaction to assure you, that in retiring from the field, I more than once expressed the highest sense of your personal bravery, and great activity in rallying the troops.
With respect to the arrangement of the army, you must be sensible, it was out of my province to know by whom it was commanded, and, of course, on whose shoulders the censure, if any was incurred, ought to fall. But this circumstance may undoubtedly be ascertained from Lord Sterling, and other General officers in the field. As your division took its place in the line, after you had seen them, I always supposed it to be the result of council.
The enemy by good luck, or perhaps policy, made their attack before the intended disposition of your division, which in my opinion was remarkably advantageous, could be carried into execution. It was therefore rather to be considered as unfortunate, as ill-judged, and not to be laid at the door of any particular officer. But sir, whatever turns the scale of victory (by the by, let me digress to observe, that the victory was ours, and the ground the enemy’s) whether accident or design—like the ancient usuage of the Jews—some sacrifice must be made to the people, and it is not less frequent than to be lamented, that in the Military Department, the man who may have embarked every thing in the common bottom, and bravely, but without success, defended in person his country’s cause, is more liable to become the victim than the fortunate coward or the clamorous pretender.
The place which I have the honour to hold in the army, naturally gave me the best opportunity of observing the behavior of every general officer, in the centre of the line, and to my great concern, I saw you and Lord Sterling, with General Conway, from the commencement of the action, until you was deserted almost by every man, ride from right to left, encouraging and driving the soldiers to their duty, till the enemy were pouring a severe fire on both flanks, and pressing on with charged bayonets in front. Sometime before this, I thought you had exceeded the bounds, both of prudence and courage.
Be assured, sir, that I claim little merit in the above narration, for I defy any man who was a witness of your conduct, to gainsay it. Whatever others may say, must be the effect of caprice, or ungenerous prepossessions.7
Alexander Hamilton and John Laurens wrote a joint letter on Sullivan’s behalf:
We have just received your favour of Yesterday, desiring from us a Testimony of your Conduct, so far as it fell under our Observation, the day of the Battle …
As we had not the pleasure of seeing you in the fore part of that Action, when the Line at large was Engaged, We are unable from our own Knowledge, to say any thing of your Conduct at that time;—But we can cheerfully testify in justice to your Reputation, that when we had an opportunity of seeing you, it was in circumstances which did you Honour.—This was from the time you rode up, and joined Genl Weedon’s Brigade ‘till your Horse was wounded.—You were employed in animating and encourageing the Men, to their duty, both by your Words and example; and in every Respect behaved, with becoming bravery, and Activity.8
Charles C. Pinckney (South Carolina) also submitted evidence supporting Sullivan:
In Compliance with the Request of General Sullivan, that I would mention what I saw of his behavior at the action of Brandywine on the 11th of this month, I declare when I saw him in the Engagement (which was in the Evening, about the time that General Weedon’s Brigade, was brought up to the Right) He appeared to me to behave with the greatest Calmness, and Bravery: And at that time I had Occasion to Observe his Behaviour, as I was then with General Washington, and heard General Sullivan, tell him that all the Superior Officers of his Division had behaved exceedingly well, after some other conversation with the General, General Sullivan turning to me, requested I would ride up to General Weedon, and desire him to halt Colonel Spottswoods & Colo Stephens’s Regiments in the Plough’d Field, on our right, & form them there; which I did, & on my return I was informed that General Sullivan while I was delivering his Orders, had his Horse shot under him.9
Major Edwards, an aide to Lord Stirling, documented Sullivan’s conduct:
Since the Battle of Brandywine, I have been sorry to hear very Illiberal Complaints thrown out, against the Conduct of Major General Sullivan—As I was present during the Whole Action, and being Obliged from my Situation, with Lord Sterling, to be near Genl Sullivan, of Course I had an opportunity of Discovering such Specimens of Courage as could not escape the attention of any one. ‘Tis with great Pleasure as well as Justice to His Character I can declare that his uniform bravery, Coolness, & Intrepidity, both in the Heat of Battle, rallying & forming the Troops when broke from their Ranks, appeared to me to be truly consistent with, or rather exceeding any Idea I had ever of the greatest Soldier.10
Finally, the Marquis de Lafayette testified to Sullivan’s courage:
Tho’ very far from thinking that Major Genl Sullivan cou’d ever want a certificate however it is with the greatest pleasure, that according to his own desire, I repeat here how sensible I have been of his bravery at the affair of Brandywine the 11th Septemr. I can assure him, that such courage as he show’d that day will always deserve the praises of every one.11
While Sullivan continued complaining to friends and colleagues about the charges leveled against him, he fired off one last letter to Thomas Burke:
I received your polite favor … in consequence of which have enclosed in a letter to Congress certificates from the commander in Chief & the officers of my division; which totally contradict those points you have urged to congress & upon which you have formed so strenuous an opinion: If you are that candid person you intimate in some parts of yr letter & wish to be convinced of yr error, you may call on one of yr colleagues for a copy of my last letter & the papers inclosed & you will have nothing left to support yr opinion but that prejudice which I think yr letter too plainly discovers—
As to yr opinion of my Military abilities, it can give me no uneasiness until you give me better evidence of yr Capacity to judge in matters of this nature. If you have sett yrself upon clearing the army of officers, who are unequal to the Task: I have only to lament that some of the Judges furnished by my country are so competent.
Your peremptory demand of an explanation of my letter to congress, must be as peremptorily denied; so far as you are conscious the Germent suits I have no objection to your wearing it; that part which does not fit, you need not meddle with; but give me leave to assure you, it is not the Last thing I shall say against those who have meddled with my character: As to my being within yr reach; the fault must be your own, If I am not, perhaps no man in America is more easily found than myself & I can assure you with truth that when you appear in the character you Promise, no man will be more rejoic’d to see you than yr Hum Servt.12
The court of inquiry Sullivan desired never took place, although why it did not remains unknown. There are three possible reasons: Washington interceded and put a stop to the process; the testimony Sullivan amassed was too overwhelming in his defense, or; Thomas Burke’s fellow congressmen decided to ignore his accusations against Sullivan.13