‘We live in a scientific age, yet we assume that knowledge of science is the prerogative of only a small number of human beings, isolated and priestlike in their laboratories. This is not true. The materials of science are the materials of life itself. Science is part of the reality of living; it is the way, the how and the why for everything in our experience.’
RACHEL CARSON
There is a neat phrase used by the philosopher Daniel Dennett: burden-tennis. In a 1988 review of a book by Jerry Fodor he wrote: ‘The book is a tireless exercise of that philosopher’s pastime, burden-tennis. Burden, burden, who has the burden of proof now?’ In many scientific debates, one side of the argument insists it is up to the other to prove its case, and vice versa. The onus is on you to show that I am wrong, says the professor who claims the moon is made of cheese, not on me to show that I am right. No, it is on you to show that I am wrong, says the professor who claims the moon is made of yoghurt, thwacking the burden of proof back over the philosophical net.
Much of the debate about the origin of the virus assumes that the laboratory-leak theory must prove itself. Natural spillover, by contrast, is the default assumption, which does not have to prove anything. The ball is in its opponent’s court. This holds any laboratory-leak theory to a higher standard of proof than any natural theory. The influential ‘Proximal Origin’ paper of March 2020 by Dr Kristian Andersen and his colleagues took this line, focusing on the lack of evidence for an accident rather than the evidence for a natural origin. A furin cleavage site could have arisen naturally, so it is up to those who think it was inserted to show otherwise – and so on. So too did the China-WHO joint study team in its February 2021 press conference, at which the team said that since they had not seen evidence for a leak, they therefore did not see the need to investigate the possibility further.
But why should the burden of proof be with those who posit a laboratory leak? True, there has been no major pandemic caused by a laboratory leak, so it would be a first. But we have entered an era when scientists are collecting, sequencing and manipulating viruses at unprecedented scale. There have already been numerous near misses around the world. Given the powerful circumstantial evidence that Wuhan was not a particularly likely place for a natural epidemic of a SARS-like virus to begin, but an obvious one for a laboratory-leaked one to start, it is surely reasonable to expect both hypotheses to be put to a similarly rigorous test.
We think that even if the burden of proof was on the laboratory leak initially, it has since shifted. That the closest relative of SARS-CoV-2, RaTG13, got to Wuhan via scientists shifts the burden of proof. So does the obfuscation and misdirection in the story of the Mojiang miners. So does the existence of the other eight SARS-CoV-2-like viruses from the mine. So does the missing database of more than twenty-two thousand entries. So does the long record of virus collection, coronavirus genetic engineering and animal infection experiments in Wuhan. So does the track record of scientists inserting furin cleavage sites into viruses and the failure to find a furin cleavage site in another SARS-like virus despite widespread searches in China and other countries. And so does the failure of the market spillover hypothesis to find any definitive evidence – no intermediate host, no immediate precursor to SARS-CoV-2, no animal samples found to be positive for the virus. These factors may not have proved the laboratory-leak hypothesis, but they have very clearly undermined the position of the natural spillover scenario as the default hypothesis.
Martin Brown
One question that both authors of this book have asked ourselves throughout the writing process and during our individual investigations is what would happen if definitive evidence were eventually found pointing in the direction of a natural spillover. In the words of the journalist Rowan Jacobsen, ‘Despite 15 years of coronavirus hunting and testing by the WIV, it was helpless to prevent a pandemic in its own backyard. If that’s a coincidence, it’s one of the great ironies of history.’ Nonetheless, it could be a cruel coincidence. Maybe one day the origin will be found to have been a farm of SARS-CoV-2-infected ferret-badgers or a shipment of traumatised pangolins that was quickly destroyed by the farmer or smuggler to avoid being blamed for a pandemic. Or perhaps it may emerge that the zoonotic origins had in fact been tracked down by Chinese scientists early in the pandemic, and covertly destroyed or covered up so that the Chinese government could try to sell us the frozen foods not-from-China origins hypothesis. In this case, we would have maligned the very scientists who are working painstakingly to prevent pandemics.
It is a sobering thought. Until that happens, though, the current circumstances and the sparse evidence available demand that natural and laboratory-based origins are both treated as likely. Even if advocates for an investigation into the laboratory-leak hypothesis are eventually found to be wrong, we still think that it is imperative that a true investigation take place for the many reasons discussed in our book. The warnings about gain-of-function research, the worries about bringing viruses from the field into urban laboratories where accidents do happen, the anxieties about disturbing bats and other wild animal populations in the name of science – these are all still valid even if SARS-CoV-2 did emerge without the help of research activities.
The possibility of SARS-CoV-2 having come from a lab has already stirred up chaos in the media and ugly spats between world leaders and governments. Indeed, it would have been much easier on scientists, science writers, journalists and the public if we could be sure that SARS-CoV-2 had spilled over into humans free of any laboratory involvement. If it is proven one day that SARS-CoV-2 somehow escaped from a laboratory, science’s reputation could suffer a huge blow. Research that was previously thought to be life-saving and pandemic-preventing could suddenly stand exposed as a source of pandemics. The almost two decades of research that followed the SARS epidemic failed to keep its promises of preventing the next pandemic and yielding broad-spectrum SARS vaccines or therapeutics in time for the Covid-19 outbreak. (Although, in June 2021, Dr Baric’s group published a proof-of-concept for a chimeric spike mRNA vaccine that can protect against various SARS-like virus infections in mice.) At best it left humanity with the agonising dilemma of Cassandra, the daughter of King Priam of Troy, who prophesied doom but went unheeded. At worst it was a Faustian bargain.
Virologists may find their grants terminated or at least diminished, their experiments banned or heavily regulated, and their reputations tarnished. Some might argue that science is generally regulated more tightly and conducted to higher standards outside China but that will not cut much ice with the general public especially considering the early vehement denials of the possibility of a laboratory leak by outspoken western scientists and science journalists. This backlash will also likely expand beyond the field of virology to impact other hotly controversial areas in science. Frankly, this reassessment will happen to some small degree even if laboratory science is fully exonerated in this case. Scientists, politicians, the media and the public have seen that even if it did not happen on this occasion, a dangerous virus could one day escape from a laboratory experiment. Experiments to alter viruses and make them potentially more dangerous, even unintentionally, need to be subject to a new round of review and debate.
Being fervent champions of science ourselves, we share the worries that scientists have. It has been demonstrated again and again – not least with the near miraculous development of novel, efficacious vaccines in 2020 – that science is vital to the future of humanity. For this precise reason, we knew that it was and is paramount for scientists to play leading roles in the investigation of the origin of the pandemic. This concern underlies our disappointment at the way some scientists closed minds and closed ranks against the lab-leak hypothesis so early in the pandemic, or at least showed far too little scepticism and curiosity on this issue. The world will have to negotiate a tougher and more transparent regime for regulating research on pathogens. And this cannot be done without scientists, alongside non-scientist stakeholders. The founding contributions from the internet sleuths and outsiders (several are scientists in their own right) cannot be denied, and should be celebrated, but it is scientists who must prove ourselves capable of credibly and transparently tracking the origins of SARS-CoV-2 – no matter where it leads us.
Nor do we think that finding the answer would be as damaging – to science and to international relations – as failing to find the answer. As Dr David Relman of Stanford University put it in November 2020: ‘A more complete understanding of the origins of COVID-19 clearly serves the interests of every person in every country on this planet. It will limit further recriminations and diminish the likelihood of conflict; it will lead to more effective responses to this pandemic, as well as efforts to anticipate and prevent the next one.’
There is also a far more serious implication for scientists and humanity if world governments and organisations like the WHO ignore or dismiss the laboratory-leak hypothesis. Regimes around the world that are carrying out military-civilian, dual-use pathogen research, and terrorists who are also considering the use of bioweapons, are paying attention to what has happened. Not only will they have noticed the vast scale of disruption caused by an epidemic; they will also have noticed how easily the Chinese authorities dismissed a laboratory leak and neutered an international investigation, with the willing help of many scientific experts worldwide. Nefarious actors may have learned that they can easily get away with the creation and release of dangerous pathogens – with an unpredictably large impact on their target populations. This is true whether or not a laboratory leak was actually responsible in the case of Covid-19.
Fortunately, the mood is changing. While we were researching this book, more and more scientists began shifting their positions to agree that a laboratory-leak hypothesis must be properly investigated at the very least to set a precedent. Despite representing a wide spectrum of opinions on the likelihood of a laboratory leak as the cause of the pandemic, many scientists have united to write open letters calling for a credible and rigorous investigation of both natural and lab-based origin hypotheses. Indeed, the growing calls for an investigation have stimulated renewed conversation around the types of pathogen research being conducted around the world and what scientists can do to make this work safer.
In February 1975, a group of scientists gathered near a beach in California, at Asilomar near Monterey, to agree to voluntary guidelines to ensure that recombinant DNA technology would be used safely. They agreed to draw up safe-containment procedures in the laboratory, to limit the experiments to strains of bacteria that were unable to live outside the laboratory, and to avoid working on highly pathogenic organisms. Designed to reassure the public that science was being transparent – not least in the febrile atmosphere that followed the Watergate scandal – the conference set the tone of the debate for years to come. For almost fifty years thereafter biotechnology was indeed reassuringly safe. But it has long since abandoned the cautious limits set at Asilomar. As this book has documented, pathogenic viruses have indeed been the subject of frequent recombination or engineering experiments. As the pandemic ends, a new Asilomar is vitally needed.
Even if we never discover the origins of Covid-19, engaging in the process of investigation will have yielded life-saving outcomes if the world adopts new policies and mitigation strategies to prevent outbreaks that result from natural spillovers or laboratory accidents. A growing number of voices have already started to say that, regardless of the origin of Covid-19, actions must be taken to prevent laboratory-based outbreaks and regulate high-risk pathogen research. It remains to be seen whether there is enough momentum to drive the organisation of a new international moratorium and biosecurity treaty focused on pathogen research.
On 26 May 2021, the US President Joe Biden issued a statement describing the findings of the US intelligence community and calling for a redoubling of its efforts to collect and analyse information that could determine the origin of Covid-19. The statement revealed for the first time that the intelligence community had ‘coalesced around two likely scenarios’ – that of the virus emerging ‘from human contact with an infected animal or from a laboratory accident’ – but did not have adequate information to assess which was more likely. Since that announcement, bipartisan hearings and Senate briefings in the US have been convened to hear from scientists and other relevant experts what is currently known about the origin of the virus and what an international response or investigation should look like. Following one Senate briefing, Kansas senator Roger Marshall said, ‘It would be utterly irresponsible to suffer through the worst pandemic in a century and not have the origins fully investigated.’ And New York senator Kirsten Gillibrand said, ‘We owe it to the American people to do everything we can to prevent future pandemics.’
We end this book with a tribute to those who made this change possible, especially the sleuths of Drastic, who laboured away for many months, mostly unrewarded with anything other than ridicule and insult. They dug deeper and darker tunnels than any scientist, into subterranean ores of data, in search of nuggets of truth about what happened in Wuhan and Yunnan in the years before 2020. People like the Seeker, Rossana Segreto, Francisco de Ribera, Yuri Deigin, Charles Small, Brian Reed, Billy Bostickson, Monali Rahalkar, Gilles Demaneuf, Moreno Colaiacovo and Babarlelephant – as well as others whose contributions we have not found the space to describe. Twitter was their only forum. Had they not persevered in their own time and at their own expense when all the well-funded forces of science, journalism, business and politics took little interest, we might never have had the chance to find as much truth as we have. That would have been a devastating insult to the millions who lost their lives to the terrible pandemic of Covid-19.
We also pay our respects to the whistleblowers in China who first sounded the alarm and hastened the global release of information regarding the novel outbreak in Wuhan. Some of them gave their lives and well-being to do so and are heroes in the truest meaning of the word. The impact of their bravery cannot be overstated. How many people would willingly jeopardise their safety and that of their loved ones to tell the world what little they know? The fate of the investigation into the origin of the pandemic still depends on courageous souls in China. There is hope that some of the few people who hold pieces of the puzzle within China’s borders will one day, even if decades later, be able to illuminate the story of how SARS-CoV-2 found its way into Wuhan. We have seen time and again that the truth often comes out many years later.
The reader may want to know what the authors of this book think happened. Of course, we do not know for sure. There is still too much uncertainty and too much that is concealed. In this book we have tried to lay out the evidence and follow it wherever it leads, but it has not led us to a definitive conclusion. At the start of the pandemic neither of us thought the virus came from a laboratory leak. We both thought that a natural event would soon emerge as by far the most likely explanation. In the first month of 2020, the story of Covid-19 seemed to follow the recipe of the first SARS outbreak, where a chain of infection from animals to people quickly became apparent. However, we now think it very possible that the pandemic did result from the work of scientists either when collecting samples in the field or when working with those samples in a laboratory. The lab-leak hypothesis transformed from a conspiracy theory to just barely a possibility, to a plausible hypothesis worthy of a credible investigation. The world deserves to know the truth.