Table 4.2. Strength of the Army of Northern Virginia in the Chancellorsville Campaign
The BMI now presented Hooker with a further gift, the refinement of the already reported enemy order-of-battle. On the 28th, Sharpe showed Hooker the fruit of Babcock’s diligence—a complete order-of-battle of the Army of Northern Virginia. It included an estimate of its strength (55,300), down to the division, which would prove within 2 percent of the actual returns for April (56,492), compiled after the war by John Bigelow to reconstruct the missing returns for that month. To the March returns he added the 1,500 replacements received in April to Lee’s divisions. Babcock also produced a detailed order-of-battle of Jackson’s Corp on May 1, in which the only change was a 1,600-man reduction in the strength of Rodes’s (formerly D. H. Hill’s) Division, from 8,300 to 6,700. That dropped Jackson’s estimated infantry strength to 33,500 without any explanation.45
The BMI’s estimate of the artillery of the Army of Northern Virginia was similarly accurate at 240 guns, an overcount of only 20 guns or only 8.3 percent. Of the 240 guns, 166 were identified as held by the batteries attached to brigades and the remaining 74 in the batteries of the artillery reserve.46
General confirmation of these figures arrived on May 1 from McPhail. As soon as the information arrived, Butterfield telegraphed Hooker: “Sharpe’s man from Richmond has returned. Reports 59,000 rations issued to Lee’s army.”47 Apparently Maddox had learned this information from a commissary officer. It included Lee’s infantry and artillery but not his cavalry. Adding the figure for the artillery in the March returns of the ANV and Babcock’s 55,300 estimate gives a figure of just about 58,000, within 1.7 percent of the Maddox figure. Maddox also identified the remaining forces in Virginia—10,000 men in the defenses of Richmond and Hampton’s and Jones’s cavalry brigades—all either too far away to intervene in the battle in time such as the cavalry or too vital to the defense of the capital to be detached. The identification of possible theater-level reserves operates at the operational level of war, rather than the tactical, which concentrates on only those forces likely to be immediately engaged.
Table 4.3. Accuracy of Babcock’s Order-of-Battle Compared to ANV Mar Return & Bigelow’s Estimated April Return
| % Compared to ANV March Return | % Compared to Bigelow’s est. April Return | |
| Longstreet’s I Corps | ||
| Anderson’s Division | 100.8 | 101.9 |
| McLaws’s Division | 75.0 | 77.8 |
| Subtotal | 88.0 | 89.7 |
| Jackson’s II Corps | ||
| A.P. Hill’s Division | 101.8 | 102.2 |
| D.H. Hill, Rodes’s Division | 95.1 | 85.9 |
| Early’s Division | 102.0 | 101.5 |
| Trimble’s Division | 104.1 | 102.0 |
| Subtotal | 100.6 | 95.0 |
| Total of Infantry Divisions | 94.0 | 96.1 |
| Stuart’s Cavalry Division | 78.9 | 133.0 |
| Artillery | no data | no data |
| Total w/o artillery | 94.5 | 98.0 |
A comparison of Babcock’s two reports of April 28 and May 1 shows a significant fine tuning of the understanding of the order-of-battle of Lee’s infantry brigades and regiments/battalions. They will be compared with the currently accepted Confederate order-of-battle shown in Stephen Sears’s Chancellorsville (1996). The report of the 28th covers Longstreet’s two divisions, Jackson’s entire corps, and Stuart’s cavalry. The report of the 1st covers only Jackson’s Corps. By April 28th, Babcock had identified 114 of 129 regiments and separate battalions (31 of 39 in Longstreet’s two divisions and 83 of 90 in Jackson’s Corps) and 25 of 28 infantry brigades in Lee’s six infantry divisions. The three missing brigades were O’Neal’s Brigade in Rodes’s Division (Longstreet), Perry’s Brigade in Anderson’s Division, and Kershaw’s Brigade in McLaws’s Division, both in Longstreet’s Corps. By the 1st, Babcock had refined his order-of-battle of Jackson’s Corps to count 89 of 90 regiments and separate battalions. Of course, not all the units on both lists were the same, but he had arrived at the exact overall number. As an example of Babcock’s accuracy, Appendix I shows his estimates of the order-of-battle for Jackson’s Corps. The list below, in Babcock’s handwriting, contains his estimates of the strength of the Army of Northern Virginia in the opening stage of the battle of Chancellorsville. It was found as a treasured souvenir of his war service in surviving papers which now rest in the Library of Congress. For a small organization that had only been created and had to start from scratch less than three months earlier, the results were nothing short of miraculous.
That could not quite be said of the BMI’s grasp of the enemy’s cavalry. Babcock, in his April 28 order-of-battle, had listed under Stuart’s Cavalry Division the brigades of Fitzhugh Lee, W. H. F. Lee, Wade Hampton, Mumford, and Jones. He had only a good understanding of the first two brigades, which had remained opposite the Army of the Potomac. However, the BMI analysts had missed the fact that Wade Hampton’s Brigade had moved far south early in the month to recuperate their spent horses.48 Mumford was John Mumford, colonel of the 2nd North Carolina Cavalry, in W. H. F. Lee’s Brigade. He had had an independent command in the Antietam Campaign, but by this time that brigade was commanded by Col. William E. “Grumble” Jones. “Cobb’s Legion and others” was the only information on the brigade’s composition, and that was wrong. Cobb’s Georgia Legion was in Wade Hampton’s Brigade. The entry for Jones’s Brigade refers to “Grumble” Jones and only identified the “6th Va [Cavalry] and others” for its complement. The 6th Virginia was indeed in the brigade which itself was in the Shenandoah Valley, with no opportunity to reinforce Stuart before the issue would be decided. Babcock’s report showed a total strength for Stuart’s Cavalry Division of 12,000, probably the BMI’s most inaccurate estimate made during the war. Only Fitzhugh Lee’s and W. H. F. Lee’s brigades were available to take part in the battle and their actual strength was only 4,291 troopers, though they were credited with 5,500, an overestimation of 28 percent.
Hooker’s optimism soared. Intelligence had allowed him to steal a march on Lee “the Incomparable”—the Confederate general’s popular epithet—and begin to close a trap that was classic in its conception and initial execution. Taking Stuart completely by surprise, Hooker pushed V, XI, and XII Corps across Kelly’s Ford on the evening of the 28th and morning of the 29th. He boasted on May 1, “The rebel army is now the legitimate property of the Army of the Potomac … the enemy is now in my power, and God Almighty cannot deprive me of them.”49 But this wild mood swing was indicative of a greater problem. A mind that could soar could also crash. Lincoln had noted this in his late April official visit to the army. Lincoln was impressed with the improved condition of the army but remarked that Hooker’s overconfidence was “about the worst thing I have seen since have been down there.”50
To Hooker his confidence seemed justified. He had indeed completely taken Lee unawares. It was hours before Lee heard of the crossing and another 12 before he realized its extent. That allowed Hooker’s three corps to deploy around the Chancellor House. By then, Lee was reacting with dispatch, moving McLaws to the north with Anderson to follow.
At this moment of excitement when the Army of the Potomac had been set in motion, Sharpe took the time to write a revealing letter to his uncle on April 28. Any dreams of martial glory seem to have receded as he realized what a sure fit he had found as chief of the BMI and what gift had so unexpectedly fallen into his lap.
I have not sought the position—but I did not feel like running away from it. A short time since I was offered a higher position—with the command of a Brigade which I declined, because it would take me permanently from my regiment—and there upon I was announced in orders as Dep PMar Genl of the Army.
I can still return at any time to my regiment—that is I suppose a request on my part to that effect would be complied with—after spending a few days in fitting another to take my place. A formal demand for my return, made by General Revere cmdg our brigade, was refused by General Hooker—but I presume I could effect it. It is not my intention to remain permanently away from the regiment unless I can do something for it; although I have reason to believe that nothing but my own action can take me from my present position or prevent my proper advancement from it. I have always believed that those positions which come and are not sought, are apt to be of the most permanent benefit—and I have not sought this chance.51
It took a steady hand on the BMI for it to function so well given the dramatics and tensions in the very small and often riotous army headquarters. Hooker’s flamboyant personality has already been alluded to. So notorious was his weakness for the ladies and the bottle that his headquarters was called a cross between a bar-room and a bordello. He freely surrounded himself with political generals and cronies such as Butterfield and Sickles. He was abnormally indiscrete, but his indiscretion had a more political edge. He so frequently stated that the country needed a dictator, with little doubt as to the proper candidate, that it earned Lincoln’s famous rebuke that only successful generals could become dictators and that he would risk the dictatorship if Hooker would only bring him a victory. It is a testament to Sharpe’s good sense that, despite his daily proximity, he avoided being dragged into this toxic atmosphere or tainted by an association that would ruin other officers identified as Hooker’s cronies. At the same time he was able to maintain a professional relationship with Hooker such that they would remain cordial after the war.
Even as the march began, Hooker’s intelligence elements continued to serve him well. The balloonists and signalmen strung out along the river were actively reporting the movement of Lee’s forces to contact. At Fredericksburg, in particular, the Balloon Corps was providing real-time tactical reporting of the fighting, communicated to Hooker’s headquarters by the telegraph line that the general had specifically ordered strung for that purpose with the telegrapher in the balloon itself. One observer noted that the balloons “were up and down like jumping jacks.” Sharpe was also supporting Sedgwick by sending several “colored” men, residents of the Chancellorsville area, to serve as guides for the general’s pincer movement on that place from the west.52
Yet Babcock was able to answer a vital question about Longstreet’s whereabouts. He personally directed the interrogation of prisoners taken at Fredericksburg by Sedgwick, which revealed that neither of Longstreet’s divisions had arrived from Richmond. But that issue was not entirely closed. Late at night on May 1 Butterfield passed on to Hooker, “Colonel Sharpe … advises me that deserters from Early’s division had heard their captain say on Wednesday that Hood and Pickett would be here in time for the fight.”53
Intelligence collection by technical means was having its own problems. Night effectively put a stop to the work of the signalmen and balloonists, and the new and insufficiently tested short-range military telegraph system chose that time to begin breaking down. Hooker’s refusal to properly prepare his staff for the operation due to excessive security had prevented the Signal Corps officers from ordering enough wire to support the attack.
At this point, when everything seemed to be going according to plan, Hooker uncharacteristically began to take counsel of his fears. Unfortunately, as he himself was to say later, “For once I lost confidence in Hooker, and that is all there is to it,” just when he needed to close the trap with swift and decisive action. After successfully surprising Lee by deftly crossing the Rappahannock with four corps, Hooker’s boldness evaporated. He hesitated with his army caught in the tangles of the Wilderness. He seemed to shrink from the last step that would take his army into the open ground where his numbers would have overwhelmed the Army of Northern Virginia, seemingly intimidated by the reputation of one man. Unbeknownst to Hooker, another part of his plan was falling far behind schedule. The Cavalry Corps, due to Stoneman’s seemingly bewildered leadership, which does not seem to have been much informed by his orders, was nowhere near the RF&P. Lee had received no reason to worry about his communications being cut with his base of supply.54
That freed him to strike, and he suffered no such indecision as Hooker. As soon as the extent of Hooker’s surprise dawned, he reacted with his typical speed and daring. McLaws’s and Anderson’s Divisions were already in contact with Hooker and had fixed his attention. He left only Early’s division and one additional brigade to delay the Union corps facing him at Fredericksburg and sent Jackson’s II Corps on its immortal flank march that would end in a crushing blow on Hooker’s own hanging right flank. The absence of his cavalry deprived Hooker of his deep field reconnaissance and security arm, which allowed Jackson’s maneuver to succeed. As Jackson was moving, Hooker inexplicably ordered his corps, which had been roughly handling McLaws and Anderson, to return to their positions of the previous day and fortify them. He had clearly thrown away the initiative which Lee had deftly caught.
The telegraph burnt up on the 1st, between Hooker and Butterfield, with information on the enemy as it was gained. There is no better illustration of the seeming chaos of intelligence reporting that this, trying to sort out the grain from the chaff, identifying the errors, misinformation, and deceptions. Making it difficult was the voluble penchant for Southern prisoners to pass on any rumors they had heard as well as engaging in outright deception measures. A perfect example is the report wired from Butterfield to Hooker at 2:05 p.m.:
I have two deserters just from Hays’ brigade of Early’s division. They report A. P. Hill left here this morning to move up to our right. Hood’s division arrived yesterday from Richmond. The deserter was from New York State originally; an intelligent man. He said he knew it was Hood’s division, for he asked the troops as they passed along. He reports D. H. Hill, Early, and Trimble in front of Sedgwick. Anderson, McLaws, A. P. Hill, and Hood would therefore be on your front.55
The first deserter accurately reported the departure of A. P. Hill’s Division and its intended destination. The second deserter, whose reliability was probably considered enhanced since he was a native New Yorker, was dead wrong in reporting the arrival of Hood’s Division. That he said he had actually spoken to them when they were, in fact, hundreds of miles to the south at Suffolk, indicates at best a tall tale and at worst outright deception. Lee was known to send deserters over to the enemy primed with disinformation. A probable example of the latter, according to Bigelow, was found in the report sent by courier from Butterfield to Hooker of 5:30 that morning:
From a deserter just in learn that Jackson’s whole corps is opposite Franklin’s Crossing. Camp rumor that Longstreet had gone to Culpeper; that Lee has said it was the only time he should fight equal numbers; that we had about 80,000. Some of Trimbles’ division told him they had to march to Culpeper to-morrow. They all knew that we had crossed 40,000 men above.56
Everything the deserter said was not only wrong but misleading, except the last statement which may well have been designed to let Hooker know that Lee knew what he was doing. Jackson was no longer above Fredericksburg; his command had departed at 3:00 a.m. Putting him still at Franklin’s Crossing was a perfect cover for his departure. It would be in Lee’s interest for Hooker to believe they were still there. Placing Longstreet at Culpeper to the west of the growing Union salient and Lee’s statements that he had equal numbers would have been designed to make him appear stronger than he was. Identifying Culpeper on Hooker’s opposite flank as the concentration of Longstreet’s and Trimble’s divisions would have had the Union commander looking over his shoulder to the west while Lee was concentrating to the east. Of course, there is nothing more than the internal logic of the statement to support the speculation that it was a deception, but it could not have been better designed if it were a deception.
This sort of ambiguity fed right into Hooker’s nervousness about his chief intelligence gap—what was happening with Longstreet’s divisions based at Suffolk. Now, report after report passed on the news of the imminent arrival of Hood’s and Pickett’s divisions. Sharpe and Butterfield remained in almost constant communication with Maj. Gen. John J. Peck, commanding Union forces besieged at Suffolk by Longstreet. By 7:30 that night Peck was able to assure them, “Hood’s and Pickett’s divisions, of Longstreet’s corps, are in our front, so reported by deserters and prisoners captured to-day. This will leave nothing of Longstreet’s command in your front but Ransom, if he is there.”57
Perhaps Hooker and Sharpe would not have been surprised to know that, on the 29th, Lee had already wired Richmond, “All available troops had better be sent forward as rapidly as possible by rail and otherwise.” That request had been immediately forwarded to Longstreet as an alert. The next day Longstreet received the order, “Move without delay with your command to this place to effect a junction with General Lee.” It was the logical decision Lee would have been expected to make. However, he fully expected Stoneman to be so effective in destroying the RF&P that it would make Longstreet’s arrival in time to affect the battle impossible. In fact, Longstreet would be delayed even more by collecting his trains, which were dispersed over three counties collecting provisions, and would not break the siege of Suffolk until late in the evening of May 3.58
Yet, bit by bit an accurate picture of the enemy was emerging. Butterfield wired Sedgwick that “Deserters just received from Early’s division, Hays’ brigade, Jackson’s corps. Their division relieved A. P. Hill, who marched up to our right. You have, I should judge from their statements, one less division to-day than yesterday in your front when they left.” The next sentence was an enormous compliment to Sharpe and Babcock, underscoring how reliable their order-of-battle estimates were considered. “The table of regiments, &c, given you is confirmed by all statements yet received.” It also indicates that such order-of-battle tables were routinely distributed to corps commanders.59
Hooker’s Corps had initially moved aggressively east to drive back the Confederates that had rushed to stop him. Then, inexplicably, he ordered them back to occupy their original positions, to the consternation not only of his corps commanders but of the troops who had been successfully driving the enemy. Also on the 30th, Hooker ordered III Corps to march to join the others in the Wilderness.
Sharpe spent the day and night of May 1 interrogating prisoners. The next day he was able to wire Babcock, “we have evidence that Anderson, McLaws, Rodes & Trimble [Colston] are in front of us… I think only Early and A. P. Hill are left down there.” He had accurately captured the enemy’s dispositions, missing only the fact that A. P. Hill was on the move to Hooker’s front. What led him to make that mistake is unknown, since several prisoners taken the day before had stated that Hill’s Division was on the move to Hooker’s front as shown in the report above. Fishel points out that Hill’s position in the rear of Jackson’s Corps ensured that none of his men would be captured. Also, the new and largely untested short-range field telegraph system introduced for this campaign was malfunctioning. Messages never arrived or arrived garbled or late, contributing significantly to the failure to keep Hooker in the west and Sedgwick in the east fully informed of each other’s actions, as Butterfield admitted when he wrote to Hooker by courier, “the telegraph had been interfered with and has not been in working order.” The result was the breakdown in the passing of intelligence information between Babcock and Sharpe.60
Still, the worry on the whereabouts of Longstreet’s divisions hung over everything. Butterfield added that “it was reported by officers at Hamilton’s Crossing that Pickett & Hood were coming by way of Gordonsville.” Purportedly a prisoner from Pickett’s 30th Virginia had been forwarded to Babcock. Sharpe wanted him interrogated again.61 That day he wired Babcock, “Send me by orderly all you know of the organization of Pickett & Hood…”62 Against this was the back and forth communications between Butterfield and Peck at Suffolk. Peck wired Butterfield that he had prisoners taken the day before, who insisted they had seen Pickett and Hood that day and that no brigades had been sent from the command.63 Butterfield wired back his account of two enterprising deserters from Pickett’s Division who claimed to have left him on the Blackwater in the siege of Suffolk only on April 30. Apparently this pair had taken the train to get there in only two days, a reproach for the Confederate provost martial authorities.64
The absence of cavalry to warn of Jackson’s concentration against Hooker’s right wing was compounded by the failure of XI Corps commander, Major General O. O. Howard, to credit the reports flooding in on the morning of May 2 from pickets and experienced officers of the evidence of their own eyes. Hooker had even given Howard a direct order to refuse his flank, which he ignored.
Early on the morning of May 2, Lee wired Jefferson Davis a remarkably well-informed estimate of the situation:
I find the enemy in a strong position at Chancellorsville and in large force; his communications extend to the Rapidan, at Germanna and Ely’s Fords, and to the Rappahannock, at United States Mine Ford. He seems determined to make the fight here, and, from what I learn from General Early, has sent up troops from his position opposite Fredericksburg….
Lee had accurately described Hooker’s strategy and his grouping of forces. His own intelligence collection means had served him well. Then he reviewed his options. He was clearly worrying about his communications. If successful, he wrote that Fredericksburg would “be saved and our communications retained.” If he determined the enemy too strong, he would have to abandon Fredericksburg and fall back. Interestingly, he stated that he would have to fall back, not by the RF&P, but back to the Orange and Alexandria Railroad or the Virginia Central Railroad and would thus be able to “contest the enemy’s advance upon Richmond.” Falling back to those railroads would take him in a southwest direction away from Richmond, whereas the RF&P was the direct route to the Confederate capital. It was too early for him to have heard of Stoneman’s ambling in the direction of the RF&P. What he feared was that the Union forces, in facing Fredericksburg, would cross the river, drive off Early, and then sit upon his communications along the railroad and attack west to trap him against Hooker. Had that happened his stated line of retreat would have made perfect sense.
He also stated, “I have no expectations that any re-enforcements from Longstreet or North Carolina will join me in time to aid in the contest at this point…” He then states that his forces had driven Hooker’s men back, “on all the roads back to Chancellorsville, where he concentrated in a position remarkably favorable for him. We were unable last evening to dislodge him. I am now swinging around to my left to come up in his rear.” Jackson was on his immortal march.65
No better example can be given that emphasizes the role of the commander as the final consumer of intelligence. Sharpe had provided Hooker with more and better intelligence than any American commander had ever received. Hooker’s initial use of it to plan and move his army was flawless. Then, when everything was falling into place, he counseled his fears and froze. Lee, on the other hand, after being taken by one of the most complete surprises in military history, quickly gathered and processed his rapidly accumulating tactical intelligence into a clear and insightful understanding of the enemy’s situation. He then used it to order one of the boldest maneuvers in military history, in sending Jackson around Hooker’s right flank.
Fishel observed tartly that Hooker “had created a competent intelligence service, but evidently failed to impress on his subordinate commanders the basic point that they were all part of an intelligence system. This would be the beginning of disgrace for the “Half-Moon” (their corps badge was a half-moon) men of XI Corps. Recruited largely from German immigrants under Maj. Gen. Franz Sigel, they had boasted in fractured English, “I fights mit Sigel.”66 Patrick and Sharpe were with Hooker when the blow fell. Patrick believed that “All was working admirably and I believed the game was all in our hands … when the whole mass opened and the 11 Corps ran away to ‘fight mit Sigel’ in the rear.”67 Jackson rolled up XII Corps as well. From that point on Lee held both the initiative and the moral ascendancy over his opponent.
Early on the morning of the 3rd, Hooker withdrew Sickles’s III Corps from its central high position of Hazel Grove, which played right into Lee’s plans to unite the two separated wings of his forces. His attacks were savage as they hammered the Union salient from both sides, magnificently supported by his massed guns on Hazel Hill. It was the most costly day of the battle, but finally the Union position collapsed, and the Confederates surged forward.
The crash of battle shook Hooker out of his funk. He was always a physically brave man and rallied his shaken corps, riding up and down the firing line on his white horse. Upon returning to his headquarters at the Chancellor House, at 9:15 a.m., a cannon ball struck a column against which he was leaning. The column split lengthwise in two with one piece striking Hooker along the length of his body. He was unconscious for an hour and was clearly badly concussed when he finally came to. Despite this manifest state, no subordinate moved to relieve him, nor would he turn his command over to another officer. From this incident arose the rumors that Hooker had been drunk. It was an easy rumor to spread, considering Hooker’s reputation for drink in camp. On campaign, however, Hooker was as temperate as Carrie Nation. Sharpe, who had accompanied Hooker and was in his presence during the entire battle, was vehement in denying allegations of drunkenness, saying, “Whoever says that General Hooker was drunk at the battle of Chancellorsville lies in his throat.”68
At the same time, Stoneman had finally debouched upon the RF&P and accomplished next to nothing. He had delayed so long that the authorities in Richmond had time to send forces to defend key elements of the railroad. Regiments were sent to Hanover Junction and to the bridges over the North and South Anna Rivers.69
Stoneman tried to destroy the masonry of the James River Canal, which was not on his target list but could not figure out how to attack such a structure. A regiment under Col. Judson Kilpatrick fell upon the Hungary Station, burned the depot, and tore up 2 miles of track. Their technique was simply to pull the spikes and throw the rails aside; a track crew could put the line in order in about the same time it took the raiders to dismantle it. A group from the 12th Illinois reached Ashland Station, “cut the telegraph line and ‘tore up half a dozen rails’ and burned a trestle so small that it was not on the BMI’s list [of ] RF&P’s bridges.” After this group had left, Brigadier General Gregg arrived at Ashland Station and detailed 200 to burn the 600-foot South Anna Bridge. The bridge guards, reinforced with the troops and guns from Richmond, easily drove them off. Not a single trooper got near Hanover Junction itself. In two days the damage to the RF&P was repaired by Confederate track crews. Stoneman then took his command across the RF&P to the safety of the Peninsula, also forgetting his primary orders to block or harry any attempt by Lee to retreat down the railroad to Richmond.70
All of the BMI’s painstaking efforts to lay out the vulnerabilities of the two railroads had been wasted. Stoneman behaved as if he had not even read his own orders. Those orders gave him specific types of targets to be destroyed and instructed him to obtain the materials and expertise necessary for his work of destruction. The amateurish behavior of his subordinates showed that they approached their work in complete ignorance. Neither had Stoneman kept Hooker informed of his activities or whereabouts. The army commander was so sure that Stoneman was having a field day of destruction that he worked on that assumption.
Pursuant to Hooker’s order of the evening of the 2nd, Sedgwick crossed the Rappahannock that night, took Fredericksburg, and the next morning drove Barksdale’s Brigade from Marye’s Heights, above the town. Now, if he moved fast enough, as Hooker desperately hoped, he could strike Lee in the rear. Hooker had not reckoned with “Uncle John” Sedgwick’s caution, much increased by Hooker’s failure to communicate his commander’s intent for the battle. Deprived of that, Sedgwick was not able to exercise informed initiative.
Already at that morning, Butterfield was chiding Sedgwick for allowing an enemy deception to slow him down. Citing information from a deserter, he wrote, “the enemy formed column yesterday to frighten us. No great force there. Jackson’s corps went above on Plank road. If an attempt had been made last night, we could have carried the heights.”71 Babcock had crossed to the southern bank as soon as the pontoon bridge was built. He immediately reported that a contraband servant of a Confederate officer had said the unit on Marye’s Heights was in great fear of being cut off from Richmond. That might have given a false hope that Stoneman had cut the railroad to Richmond.72 By 3 p.m. he was reporting the first interrogations from the prisoners taken on the Heights and able to identify the force as comprising only Barksdale’s Mississippi Brigade from McLaws’s Division, the rest of which had already departed to join Lee. The rumor was rife among them that Longstreet was momentarily about to reinforce them. They were also anxious about rumors that Vicksburg had fallen. Prisoners from the Washington Artillery from Louisiana were also much put out that their battery commander had been captured, a mortification the unit had never endured before.73
By 5:30 Butterfield was wiring Hooker a summary of what Babcock had found out from his interrogations:
Captain of the Washington Artillery, captured, reports Hood’s and Pickett’s divisions as expected to-night. Another (North Carolina officer) prisoner says General Lee telegraphed last night to their right down here that he was driving us on our right, and if they would hold the place down here he would have reinforcements to-night. The general impression of the prisoners seems to be that we shall hear from Hood before long.74
Again the specter of Longstreet’s imminent arrival on the battlefield hovers over the reporting. What emerges is a fog of rumor unsupported by any identifiable fact of the presence of any of Longstreet’s men. That was understandable, because at this time Hood’s and Pickett’s Divisions were marching through a driving rain in southern Virginia toward a railroad that would take them north. They would not climb onto those cars until May 6.75 Amid this rumor clutter, however, was the gem reported by a North Carolinian officer that Lee was hammering Hooker and would detach reinforcements to strike Sedgwick’s Corps before long. In either case, the report, if shared with Sedgwick, would only serve to heighten his caution. Rather than catching Lee in a vice, a Confederate vice would seem to be pressing on him.
Later in the day, however, Babcock cut through this Gordian knot of confusion. Clearly the reoccurring stories of Longstreet’s approach were a case of the wish being father to the thought by desperate men: “Nothing definite can be ascertained from the prisoners brought in to day in reference to reinforcements from Richmond or elsewhere. Some of them report Longstreet has arrived with 20,000 men, that he arrived at Hamilton’s crossing night before last… I can find none of them who have seen any of the reinforcements spoken of.”76
May 4 saw Lee take advantage of the moral ascendency he had over Hooker. He detached the divisions of Anderson and McLaws from Hooker’s front, sure that the Union commander would remain passive. His forces were still heavily outnumbered, yet he felt secure enough to divide them to strike at Sedgwick’s slowing approaching force.
Sedgwick found himself assailed by Anderson and McLaws on his front, as Early overran Marye’s Heights in his rear and cut him off from his line of retreat over the pontoon bridge at Fredericksburg. Although he gave a good account of himself in the subsequent action, any thought of fighting his way to Hooker’s relief quickly evaporated as his main concern became to save his command. What is striking is that Hooker—who apparently was informed of what was happening to Sedgwick and of the departure of two of Lee’s five divisions on his front—did not seize the opportunity to now attack the few remaining Confederate divisions facing him and march to Sedgwick’s relief. Late afternoon of the day before, the signal station on the north side of the Rappahannock had reported the beginning of Lee’s move, noting a large force with seven regimental battle flags marching east. Butterfield, in his transmission of the report to Hooker, pointedly asks if this force is meant to attack Sedgwick, already alerting the army commander that forces were leaving his front.77
On the 5th there is a cryptic reference in a wire from Babcock to Sharpe that suggests he was aware of the forces closing in on Sedgwick when he mentioned only the divisions of Early, Anderson, and McLaws and stated he would send the “regiments by Manning.” The message was probably in response to Sharpe’s request for information. The fact that Babcock was sending them by hand was another indication of the failing field telegraph system.78
May 4 would not have been complete without the continuing merry-go-round of telegrams between Butterfield and Peck over the location of Longstreet. Butterfield cited the cavalry report that 20,000 of Longstreet’s men had arrived at Gordonville. Peck responded by stating that he had the hard intelligence from captured documents and intercepted telegrams of May 2 that D. H. Hill and his division were in the process of joining Longstreet in the siege of Suffolk. One wonders how long Butterfield was going to keep on refusing to take no for an answer.79 The next day Babcock was communicating with Sharpe on the same subject once again:
Am daily making examinations regarding re-enforcements from Richmond. None have arrived, to my belief, in our front. We have prisoners from about Fredericksburg at all hours of the day, and many taken late last evening. None from Hood’s, Pickett’s, or Ransom’s divisions have yet been found. If they are up, they have gone over in your direction toward Culpeper.80
The non-arrival of Longstreet’s three divisions on the field at Chancellorsville was surely the most famous dog that didn’t bark in the Civil War.
The same message revealed that Stoneman’s cavalry had done enough temporary damage to the railroads to make the near-term arrival of 20,000 men by rail an impossibility. Whatever damage had been done, however, was repaired within two days, not enough time to deplete what supplies Lee had on hand. Nor did it disturb Lee’s equilibrium. Whatever he learned about damage to the railroad was not serious enough to distract his focus on going for Hooker’s jugular. Babcock had sent out the scout, William Chase, who had secreted himself in a good observation post near Guiney Station, 12 miles south of Fredericksburg on the RF&P. He reported to Sharpe that there was no traffic on the line except for two small engines that only made short trips, indicating the line to the south had been cut. Babcock took this opportunity to state that among the numerous prisoners he had been examining, none were from Longstreet’s three divisions.81
By this time these issues had become moot. The game was up. Pressed against the Rappahannock, Sedgwick saved his command by crossing the river at U.S. Ford on the 5th. Informed of this, Hooker threw in the towel. Despite a council of war’s recommendation to stay and fight it out, he ordered his forces back across the river. He was so eager to escape that he abandoned the severely wounded to the clemency of the enemy. The army crossed on the night of the 5th–6th.
Lee had been planning a killing blow for the 6th. He was much put out when he discovered that Hooker had flown.
Back across the river, almost the first thing Hooker did was to send a message to Lee requesting permission to send physicians and medical supplies to care for the wounded left behind. He offered to replace any medical supplies the Confederates had used to treat his wounded. Lee graciously agreed to assist, but the rain-swollen Rappahannock could not be crossed by ambulances to carry offany of the stricken men.82
The stunned Army of the Potomac settled into back-biting recriminations over a battle that should not have been lost. Desperately trying to put a good face on the disaster, Hooker issued General Order No. 49: “We have taken from the enemy 5,000 prisoners; captured and brought off seven pieces of artillery, fifteen colors; placed hors de combat 18,000 of his chosen troops; destroyed his depots filled with vast amounts of stores; deranged his communications; captured prisoners within the fortifications of his capital, and filled his country with fear and consternation.”
Two days later Patrick met with Hooker, who told him that Dix had captured a dispatch of Lee’s that admitted he had suffered 18,000 casualties, the origin of his claim. Patrick wrote, “I don’t believe it at all.”83
Behind the scenes, Sharpe and Babcock were working on calculating Lee’s actual losses. Less than a week after the battle, they obtained a copy of the Richmond Whig, in which a surgeon claimed a loss of 900 killed, 7,000 wounded, and 1,200 missing, for a total of 9,100 casualties.84 That was the first piece of information they had, but it was probably believed to be too low. It took the rest of the month collecting more information, weighing and comparing it all, before Babcock was satisfied. His letter of May 30 estimated that Lee had suffered 14,348 casualties. Lee had in fact reported only 13,460, a difference of only 7 percent.85 By then the armies were in motion to a place called Gettysburg.
Renewing the work they had done to prepare for the Chancellorsville Campaign, Sharpe had also put McEntee to work to draw up another analysis of the fords over the Rappahannock Rapidan which was finished on May 13, in a report in the captain’s hand but signed by Sharpe.86 Sharpe did find time to arrange a meeting, either in camp or in Washington, with his old friend and former Congressman John Steele.87
Although the armies were recuperating from their bloodbath, Sharpe’s staff continued to work, interrogating the occasional deserter. To prove that serendipity is also a factor in intelligence, Brigadier General Patrick was surprised to find in the correspondence he received from the other side “under flag of truce” a letter from Jefferson Davis to a Mississippi colonel.88
Patrick had a problem closer to home. His paymaster, Capt. George D. W. Clinton, had just been arrested in Washington by Lafayette Baker, head of the War Department’s Secret Service, for selling commissary stores. Knowing how powerful Baker was, Patrick noted, “I shall not interfere, in any way, in these operations of Bakers.” Eventually, Clinton would be cleared. As Provost Marshal Department paymaster, he was responsible for paying the BMI. Apparently, for reasons unknown, he would come to harbor some grudge against Sharpe.89
The great intelligence gap of the battle was still unanswered. Had Longstreet joined Lee yet? Longstreet had indeed personally reported to Lee at noon on May 9; his divisions were in Richmond.90 On the 10th Sharpe forwarded a report of the interrogation of a deserter, James McMillem from 2nd South Carolina, Kershaw’s Brigade, McLaws’s Division. He stated that no reinforcements had come up during the battle and that Hood and Pickett were still south of Richmond. The scouts were kept busy on their own to discover if and when Longstreet arrived. On the same day that McMillem was interrogated, Sharpe dispatched scout Ernest Yager. “You had better go to Culpeper before coming here. Learn whether Lee’s Army has been reinforced or not—and if so, by whom and which way they have come. Learn also position & strength of Cavalry. Then come to us.” Yager would not be heard from for four days.91
Apparently, Sharpe was receiving information that Longstreet’s three divisions had left Suffolk, sufficiently credible for Hooker to wire Lincoln as part of a lengthy message on the 13th: “I am informed that the bulk of Longstreet’s force is in Richmond. With the facilities at hand, he can readily transfer it to Lee’s army…”92 Late on that same day Sharpe reported the seemingly credible interrogation results of a deserter. Hooker immediately wired President Lincoln at 10:30 p.m.: “A deserter from the Third Alabama reports Pickett and Hood arrived. The provost-marshal’s department [read BMI] seem to place confidence in his statement. I have not seen him.” The late hour of the telegram meant the information had not gone through Sharpe, who was detached on a special mission.93
Yager returned on the 14th with definite news. “Longstreet’s forces are guarding the Rapidan. The bridge will be done by to-morrow. They expect Longstreet’s division [Corps] at Culpeper soon.” This report would have been forwarded either by McEntee or Babcock to Butterfield since Sharpe was still absent.94 Yager’s observations were only a little premature. Longstreet’s two divisions had left Richmond. Hood was approaching Gordonsville with Pickett a day’s march behind. The identification of Culpeper as Longstreet’s destination revealed that his corps would not return to its old positions around Fredericksburg but would be deployed further north along the Rapidan. It was the first inkling of Lee’s plans to invade Pennsylvania through the Valley.95
Even though no longer in day-to-day command of his regiment, Sharpe remained ever solicitous of the welfare of its men. The day before he had written to his uncle to discuss his transfer of his regiment’s payroll to the Kingston bank from which their families would be paid:
I now write & enclose a check for ten thousand one hundred & thirty nine Dollars ($10,139) being a part of the pay of my regiment. The whole amount sent home this time is about $18000—the balance being forwarded by other officers—principally by the Major. The regiment was very badly paid—the payment having commenced after the beginning of the march on the late move. Four companies were paid before going into battle—and this money I managed to send back from the field to Wash.
I hope you will charge for collection only the actual cost, and let me be informed what it is; when I can be repaid out of the regimental fund.
Like most every other married man in both armies, he missed his wife. In the same letter, on a more personal note, he wrote that he looked forward to seeing his wife again shortly. She had stayed in Washington and would leave soon, as the weather warmed oppressively. “I am expecting to go to see Carrie now every day—and after that I suppose she will make her way home—as the weather has already become very warm here. I hear from her nearly every day.”96
Isaac Silver had less to look forward to. On May 1 he found his home was in the middle of the fighting for that day as “Confederate troops swept across his fields and camped on his property that night.” They stripped his farm of posts, rails, and stored planks for their campfires. Had they known he was a Union agent far worse would have happened. Instead, he boldly put in a claim to the army for damages. A board of officers visited his farm to investigate the claim, ruled that Silver should be paid for his fencing, and ordered the quartermaster to pay him $923. Silver claimed he could not identify the units that had damaged his farm because he “was taken by the Yankees.” A pass dated May 8, for him and fellow Unionist Jackson Hardinge, written by Sharpe and signed by Patrick indicates that he had been at army headquarters during the battle.97
A week after the Army of the Potomac had trudged back over its pontoon bridges over the Rappahannock, Hooker turned to Sharpe for what was probably the last act in the Chancellorsville Campaign—retrieving the large numbers of severely wounded Union soldiers abandoned to the Confederates. He had been advised by Dr. Letterman that the army “should lay a bridge at the United States Ford for the passage of our ambulances after our wounded in the vicinity of Chancellorsville.” A Union officer sent to make arrangements to retrieve the wounded was told that the flag of truce for such matters had expired.
Hooker, on May 13, then appealed to Sharpe to try. “I would like to have you go, but I cannot ask you to,” Hooker told him, an admission from the army commander that the mission was so hazardous that it called for a volunteer. Sharpe saw his expected leave with his wife evaporate and accepted on the spot.98 His orders were hurriedly drafted and read:
I am directed by the commanding general to say that he learned, through Drs. Letterman and Taylor this afternoon, for the first time, that we should be allowed to lay a bridge at the United States Ford for the passage of our ambulances after our wounded in the vicinity of Chancellorsville. Instructions have been given to throw a bridge across the river early to-morrow morning at the United States Ford, and the commanding general wishes you to make whatever arrangements may be necessary with the officer commanding the Confederate forces at the ford with regard to laying the bridge, and to have it taken up when no longer required for the purpose indicated.99
Sharpe was obviously becoming the man for those special missions that come up at headquarters that no line officer seemed suited for. There was no doubt that Sharpe was the officer in charge of this operation vested with the full authority of the army commander.
The next morning Sharpe and his orderly found a rowboat and were crossing the river, thinking that Hooker had arranged with Lee for an extension of the truce, when a bullet whizzed overhead. When they landed, they were taken prisoner. A Confederate colonel informed him that the truce no longer protected him and that they were bound for the infamous Libby Prison in Richmond.
Sharpe now had only his wits between himself and spending the rest of the war in that infamous hellhole. His knowledge of the grim state of Confederate rations now served him well. He said, “Well if we must go to Richmond, let us have one good square meal first and perhaps you will be willing to enjoy it with us. I have on the other bank some extra fine porterhouse steaks and a basket of champagne. If you will allow my orderly to row back and bring them over, together we will have a good supper.” The Confederate readily agreed, and as they ate steak and drank champagne Sharpe discoursed on the humanity of treating the wounded of war properly. His captor resisted Sharpe’s suggestions through the first bottle, worrying about his authority and the prospect of court-martial, but the second bottle had a wonderful effect upon his fears. He finally exclaimed, “Damn the authority, whether I have it or not, those wounded and dying men shall be cared for. You may use the pontoon, but at five o’clock in the morning they must be taken up.”
That night, by lamplight, Sharpe scribbled a note to Hooker. Such was the seat of the pants nature of this operation that Sharpe could only find small scraps of paper on which to write to the army commander:
I have been over the river. The Confed officers do not object to our using the ford but the ford is now impracticable. A horse would now have to swim, ambulances would be swept away. The river is falling now, but 2 hours of rain would raise the ford again. We may possibly be able to use it in the morning, but it is doubtful. The work here is very slow. Almost 250 came over today. The Confed officers say there are 1000 of our men there yet—our surgeons say there are 800 or more. The two pontoons at Banks ford were sent for this A. M. but have not yet arrived. I shall send to see what is the matter & in the morning will try the ford again.
We might have a bridge or in default of it, 6 more pontoons, so as to make 3 more rafts. There is only one raft here now. I beg you will send a fresh orderly back to me saying what will be done.
I shall be during the night with the ambulances of the 3rd Corps, after daybreak at the river.100
The next morning he sent another scribbled note on a small piece of paper:
Shall be beyond the cliffs in this side of the river. I tried the ford this a.m. The water was high—I got over one ambulance as an experiment safely, but they were picked horses & behaved well. Otherwise it would not have succeeded & the jolting in the water would have been most painful for the wounded. I managed to have the ford well reconnoitered when the shower visibly raised the water this p.m., it would have been impracticable. The bridge will save many a life. I will try to send word to our nearest force of about the time when the bridge will be “beyond the cliffs.” We might finish today, but they object to our working after sundown.101
By 3:30 p.m. he was writing from U.S. Ford that the situation was under control and proceeding smoothly:
The pontoon bridge was completed at 2 ½ p.m. The delay was due to the [word indistinct] state of the road in the woods between the Warrenton and the high ground here, & I think was unavailable. Things are going grandly now, but we can hardly expect to get all over tonight. I hope we shall have the pontoons up and started down by noon tomorrow. We have a written memorandum of the truce under which the bridge is laid, in duplicate. I have no paper to send you a copy, but the stipulation on my part is that the bridge shall be inviolate and the truce shall not cease until the bridge, ambulances, attendants etc. [last part missing.]102
Sharpe coordinated the movement with army headquarters which ordered the Cavalry Corps commander to “direct your forces in that vicinity to cover the river, and prevent any passage, except under proper authority, after Colonel Sharpe, now in charge there, has ordered their withdrawal.”103 In the end, 1,200–1,500 severely wounded men were brought back. Sharpe’s performance of duty was such that today he would have been awarded the Distinguished Service Medal, the highest non-combat-related military award. Hooker was to say, “Sharpe you are the best man I know that could successfully accomplish that business. I am sure that you would get into a scrape, but I was just as sure that you would wriggle out of it.” Speaking in later years, Sharpe would say often that the act in which he took the greatest satisfaction was the rescue of all those wounded men.104