Private & Confidential
OFFICE OF THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL
ARMIES OPERATING AGAINST RICHMOND
City Point, Feb. 23. 1865
Lieut Col Bowers,
Asst. Adjt. General &c.
Colonel,
With reference to the several communications from persons in the north, that have been referred to me, calling attention to the fact, that it is believed, by various people who have communication with or have left Richmond, that the city is undermined for the purpose of blowing up our troops when they shall take possession, I have to say;
Inquiry has been directed to the point, and we cannot learn from our friends in Richmond that there is any foundation for the same, within their knowledge, except that it has been known for a long time that Libby Prison was in a condition to be blown up if necessary, and that the York River Rail Road, about half a mile from Rockett’s old field and near the powder magazine below Blakey’s Mill, has been tunneled or undermined. The object of this tunnel is not understood by our informants, but we are told that these are the only facts to which they can point as a foundation for the opinion referred to. The inquiry will be prosecuted, and we except other messages on the subject.
Since Mr. Ruth, superintendent of the Fredericksburg R.R., has removed the suspicion leading to his late arrest, and been returned to duty, he has been asked to direct his attention to what might be said by persons in the employ of the Danville R.R. Co., in reference to preparations for the evacuation of Richmond. He says the opinion of the clerks and employees of the Danville R.R. is that we [the enemy] are about to evacuate. They say “we seem to be drawing in; getting everything ready.”
At one time there were numerous facts pointing to the evacuation of Richmond, but I am bound to say that the best informed of our friends in Richmond do not believe that such is the plan of the Confederate authorities. They think that whatever removals of machinery and workshops have taken place from Richmond and the Bellona Arsenal have simply been steps of prudence and not of preparation. They say that the Confederate authorities believe, that by holding four or five points, one of which would be Danville, another Lynchburg, another some point on the north of Richmond—perhaps Gordonsville, another Richmond itself, that such a sweep of country can be controlled as will enable General Lee, for a long time to come, to support his army. Richmond will not be evacuated because it is the capital of the Confederacy, and so long as they retain their capital, they are as much of a country as they have ever been. Richmond is also the means of communication between Lynchburg and Danville—as circuitous as it may be—because the country between Danville and Lynchburg is crossed by no railroad or other great line of communication, and from its character is not susceptible of such. The country about Lynchburg, and between it and Danville, is a great grain bearing section. Every pound of forage that now reaches Richmond comes from Lynchburg. General Lee’s army is mainly composed of Virginians and North Carolinians, who are expected to fight better in those states than in any other; and it is believed that by holding the points named, the enemy will be able to move their troops upon the lines of Railway connecting them, with such rapidity as always to meet us in strong force at the most greatly threatened points.
That negro regiments are to be raised is now settled. Two hundred thousand will be the number attempted to be raised, and it is for us to consider whether, if some steps are not taken toward their disorganization, as fast as they are prepared to be put in the field, they will not be able by this accession to prolong the war to an indefinite extent. Out of this number, by taking fifty thousand negro troops and placing them in the intrenchments south of Richmond and Petersburg, with the assistance of white officers, and a few white troops in their rear to control and embolden them, cannot the present line of the enemy be held, and will not General Lee then have at his disposal all or nearly all of the white forces left under his command for a movable column to throw upon any threatened point, or for unexpected and diverting attacks? If the same policy be followed out and the other points named, Danville, Lynchburg, Gordonsville, etc., be intrenched, will not negro troops, under like government, be able to hold those points; and will not the white forces still under the control of the Confederacy be substantially free, for supporting and aggressive movements?
If there be anything of this, is it not well for us to consider whether we have not the means of disintegrating and disorganizing negro regiments before, by habit, discipline and experience with arms, they shall have grown to that aptitude of a soldier’s which will bring them to obey orders under any circumstances? We must have among our negro troops, colored men from most parts of Virginia, and many parts of North Carolina, and other states. They know the character of like men who will be put into the ranks of the enemy; they will recognize many of them as their former associates, friends and relatives; and can we not select some good field officers, who can now get together a carefully selected number of negroes from the different regiments in our command and elsewhere, who by preparation would be able, at the earliest moment, to go into the negro ranks of the enemy and bring them over in bodies to us? I believe that a reasonable body of colored men could not be put to any better use, and that if officers with the faculty of organization, and at the same time of secretiveness, can be set at this work, we shall have the material ready to our hands, in the spring, to be sent into the enemy’s lines, and here and there to raise perhaps our own flag, and with it march in bodies into our lines. The publication of an order of like nature with the one issued by the Lieut. General for the benefit of deserters and refugees, comprehending the purchase of arms and other property brought by the negroes, with other rewards, is suggested. Perhaps it might not be well that this order should be made public, but that being printed it should be put into the hands of the negroes, selected as hereinbefore suggested, who of course should be able to read, and who could then expound it, as negroes are fond of doing, to their compatriots on the other side. The negroes are an eminently secretive people; they have a system of mutual understanding amounting almost to free masonry among them; they will trust each other when they will not trust white men; and I believe that some plan, marked out by a wise hand, could be made to produce great results.
It is understood, of course, that the forgoing suggestions are crude. I have as yet been able to give them little consideration; but believing it to be the duty of a staff officers to submit such observations as his specialty may bring before him, I have the honor to forward them.
Very respectfully
Your obedient servant
George H. Sharpe [signature]
Col &c