FEBRUARY 22, 23, 1847
Samuel E. Chamberlain, 1st Dragoons, was an exuberant sort of lad when reporting dramatic events. His evaluations of his contemporaries, however, were usually harsh. Even though he was a new recruit himself, he had quickly adopted the attitudes of the 1st Dragoons, a regular army unit, and developed a contempt for the volunteers that would have been unbecoming even had he been an “old soldier” himself. And in contrast to most of his contemporaries, who held Zachary Taylor in affection and awe, Chamberlain’s admiration for his commanding general was grudging at best. His greatest venom, however, was reserved for Lieutenant Colonel Charles May, who had been awarded a double brevet some months back for his putative capture of General La Vega at Resaca de la Palma. Chamberlain never forgot that May had received unjustified credit for that capture. In Chamberlain’s accounts May is always referred to sarcastically.
As the 1st Dragoons lined up at General Taylor’s tent at daylight, February 20, 1847, Chamberlain felt a surge of pride. The force that Taylor was sending to reconnoiter the country south of Agua Nueva, he crowed, “embraced the very elite of the army,” three hundred dragoons, Ben McCulloch’s company of Texas Rangers, and a section of Washington’s six-pounders—the best. Unfortunately it was commanded by the “Murat of America,” Charley May.1
Having reported to Taylor, May led his command south on the San Luis Potosí road, past the pickets of the Kentucky regiment, through the Paso de los Pinos. After six miles the road turned left. After three hours at a trot, the unit stopped and rested for an hour. When a captured Mexican lancer refused to give information of the enemy, he was turned over to McCulloch’s men to be “put out of the way.”
Several more hours passed. Then Chamberlain’s platoon, acting as the advance guard for the command, reached the top of a hill overlooking a long mesa at the base of which stood the Rancho Hediona. As Chamberlain’s platoon neared the ranch they sighted men running into a ravine, and in the distance rose the vast clouds of dust that could mean either a large army or simply a herd of cattle. Lieutenant Sam Sturgis, commanding the platoon, turned it over to the second in command with orders to occupy the hacienda. He, with his orderly, went forward to pursue the group of fleeing Mexicans. Shortly thereafter Chamberlain heard shots. The lieutenant did not return.* The Mexicans who had remained in the hacienda were taken prisoner and confined. The cloud to the south fixed Chamberlain’s attention; he was certain that it foreshadowed a large army.
Soon May caught up with the advance party and set about preparing to defend the hacienda, although he himself was sure that the dust clouds had been raised only by herds of cattle. The captured Mexicans were put to work preparing breastworks; the artillery was wheeled into place; the horses were unsaddled, groomed, watered and fed; cattle were herded in and killed—the troops ate well for supper.
All of a sudden horsemen appeared on the horizon a mile off, the fading sun glittering on their lances. It was impossible to determine their number, but May, convinced he had come upon Santa Anna’s main body, prepared for defense. He ordered the excess animals released and shouted orders—fortunately obeyed—to shoot the captured Mexicans. By ten that evening scouting parties returned without encountering any enemy troops, but reported finding a spot where enemy cavalry had camped. May ordered “To horse!” and the command began moving back to Agua Nueva, the buglers blowing the call in utter defiance of May’s orders.
The trip back was not easy. Horses fell in prairie dog holes; the artillery bounced along the rough road; snakes rattled; owls hooted; men cursed. Gunfire rumbled in the distance, and a line of horsemen appeared far off on the Americans’ flank, apparently intent on an ambush at the Paso de los Pinos. The only fire that May’s men received, however, came from their own frightened pickets. Going through the pass, May ordered the command to take up a gallop. At Agua Nueva the “long roll” beat the alarm; guards fired and ran.
May’s four hundred rode straight to the general’s tent. Old Zack, standing unconcernedly by a log fire, simply remarked, “Doggone them pickets, I knew it was you that was coming.” It was now early morning. The camp would have no need for the usual reveille. Having ridden eighty miles in twenty-four hours without sleep, May’s men were given a chance to rest.2
The Mexican cavalry that May’s force had encountered was part of Miñón’s cavalry, scouting up ahead of Santa Anna’s army. At the time Santa Anna’s main body was concentrating at Encarnación, the next watering hole below Agua Nueva. Aware of Taylor’s position, the Mexican general had debated as to which route he should take to attack. As one choice he could take the Hedionda route, which May had scouted, a secondary road leading around to the east of Agua Nueva. Following it would cut Taylor off from Saltillo—a tempting prospect for Santa Anna—but it would be difficult, requiring an extra couple of days to cover the distance. Santa Anna therefore settled on sending Miñón along that route toward Saltillo, keeping his main force on the major road. On February 21 Santa Anna began marching, and his lead elements camped that night at Carnero Pass, six miles from Taylor.3
In Santa Anna’s haste to leave Encarnación, he and his officers had been too preoccupied to notice a strange presence lurking in the Mexican camp. That figure was Ben McCulloch, who had audaciously managed to blend in with the scene. Slipping off at an opportune moment, McCulloch made his way back to Taylor about midday, February 21, to report that Santa Anna was nearing Pasos de los Pinos. Taylor now knew he had a battle on his hands.
Monterrey had not shaken Taylor’s confidence in his ability to fight the Mexicans in the face of numerical odds, and he was ready to battle it out right there in the pleasant valley of Agua Nueva. Though both of his flanks could be turned in that position and the flat ground would allow the Mexicans to exploit their superior numbers, Taylor was reluctant to withdraw. However, Wool insisted that the army drop back to the Angostura (the Narrows), an ideal defensive position just in front of the Hacienda de Buena Vista. Taylor, who respected Wool’s ability and his seniority, finally assented. He detached the Arkansas Cavalry to remain at Agua Nueva to pack up his supplies. It was Taylor’s only retreat before an enemy in the war,† and it caused him some pain.
The Arkansas Cavalry Regiment, under Colonel Archibald Yell, soon sent for assistance that evening in loading the baggage at Agua Nueva,‡ so a battalion of Kentucky Cavalry and two companies of the 1st Dragoons were sent. When they arrived at midnight, huge stores of supplies were burning, with long trains of wagons empty. The Kentuckians and dragoons pitched in, and twenty wagons were trundled back to the rear by the time the first of the Mexicans, Miñón’s cavalry, descended upon them. The volunteers fled in a near stampede and the dragoons stayed only long enough to set the torch to the remaining supplies and buildings before following the rest in haste. They arrived “in good order” at the Angostura Pass the morning of February 22.§
Santa Anna arose at Carnero Pass the morning of February 22, expecting an easy victory that day. If he was angered by the refusal of the women to stay behind at Encarnación, he took no action. And when he discovered the American camp at Agua Nueva in flames, he quickly concluded that Taylor’s entire army had panicked. Thus exhilarated, he pushed his parched and exhausted troops on to La Angostura, hardly allowing them time to fill canteens.‖
As Santa Anna neared La Angostura, he began to realize that victory would be costly in this restricted valley. At Agua Nueva the ground had been “formed of extensive and broad plains,” ideal for exploiting a vigorous frontal attack and making maximum use of his “beautiful cavalry.”4 But La Angostura would be different.
Once Taylor had decided to withdraw from Agua Nueva to La Angostura, he left the field to Wool and, accompanied by May’s dragoons, rode back to Saltillo. Wool was completely capable of organizing the defensive position—probably better at it than Taylor himself—but Taylor was by no means certain that Santa Anna would continue on the main road and hit him frontally at La Angostura. The region, while hilly and even mountainous, afforded many secondary roads, and Taylor had every reason to expect an envelopment in his rear by Mexican cavalry, possibly even by a portion of Santa Anna’s main force. As it turned out, the battle of Buena Vista was fought at La Angostura, but the potential battlefield was much larger.a
Taylor remained at Saltillo until, on the morning of February 22, he was convinced that nothing of importance would happen there. He thereupon departed once more for Buena Vista, six miles away.
• • •
John E. Wool, left to establish the position south of Buena Vista, had only some 4,750 men at his disposal, including the sick, organized as follows:
| 1st Illinois Infantry 580 | Col. John J. Hardin |
| 2d Illinois Infantry 573 | Col. William H. Bissell |
| 2d Kentucky Infantry 571 | Col. William R. McKee |
| Indiana Brigade 1253 | Brig. Gen. Joseph Lane |
| 2d Indiana Infantry | Col. William A. Bowles |
| 3d Indiana Infantry | Col. James H. Lane |
| 1st Mississippi Rifles (Regt) 368 | Col. Jefferson Davis |
| 1st Arkansas Cavalry Regiment 479 | Col. Archibald Yell |
| 1st Kentucky Cavalry Regiment 305 | Col. Humphrey Marshall |
| 1st Dragoons 133 | Capt. Enoch Steen |
| 2d Dragoons 76 | Lt. Col. Charles A. May |
| Texas Ranger 61 | No commander specified |
| McCulloch’s Spy Company 27 | Maj. Ben McCulloch |
| Battery, 4th Artillery 117 | Capt. J. M. Washington |
| Battery, 3d Artillery (150 | Capt. Braxton Bragg |
| Battery, 3d Artillery (150) | Capt. Thomas W. Sherman |
| General Staff 41 | Taylor/Wool5 |
It was, by and large, a green army. Its artillery, including some eighteen guns,b were all regulars, as were the dragoons; but only 700 of the nearly 4,800 men had seen previous combat—the Mississippi Rifles, the 2d Dragoons, and the artillery.
But the terrain that Wool and Taylor had selected was ideal for defense, and Wool organized it in a masterly way. Essentially, the ground provided only three feasible avenues of approach from the main San Luis Potosí road into the American position: the main road to the front and two ridges leading around Wool’s left flank.
Wool’s first priority, of course, was the main Saltillo–San Luis Potosí road, along which Santa Anna’s army was known to be marching. It was, however, the easiest one to defend, as it necked down to a passageway only forty feet wide, limited on the east by steep bluffs and on the west by a small river sliced up by gullies so steep as to be impassable for artillery. (Wool’s position faced south, so the bluffs were on his left flank and the river and gullies on his right.) To defend that position, Wool placed three guns of Washington’s artillery battery almost on the road, protected by Hardin’s 1st Illinois, part of which took position on the nose of the bluff on his left and the rest on a small knoll on his right. To back up that position, Wool placed Lane’s 3d Indiana on a small hill just behind Washington’s battery.
The second avenue of approach, the most dangerous, consisted of a broad plain to the east of the main road, leading to the nose, occupied by part of the 1st Illinois, overlooking Washington’s battery at the Narrows. This plain, known as the Plateau, was wide and flat, standing about fifty feet above the San Luis Potosí road, accessible to artillery and cavalry only by way of a gully about a mile and a half east of the Narrows. Santa Anna could (and actually would) use that gully for access to launch his main attack on Taylor’s left flank.
To protect the Plateau, Wool posted, from left to right: Bowles’s 2d Indiana Infantry (with three guns from Washington’s battery); Bissell’s 2d Illinois (with two guns from Bragg); and McKee’s 2d Kentucky (with three guns from Sherman’s battery). But since these regiments were facing the expected direction of attack in an oblique way, the 2d Indiana would probably be hit first.
The third avenue available to Santa Anna led around Wool’s position, straight to Buena Vista in the Americans’ rear. This ridge, beyond the Plateau, was relatively narrow (1,500 feet) and long, entailing a journey of some four miles for an attacking force (in contrast to the mile and a half along the Plateau). For the moment, this avenue did not, in Wool’s judgment, constitute an immediate threat, and he did not garrison it at the outset.
Washington’s birthday, an occasion so important to Taylor’s patriotic volunteers, would see only the sparring preliminary to the great battle. Santa Anna’s men were exhausted by their last sixty-mile march, and not yet in position.c His army was organized about the same as it had been when it had left San Luis Potosí (minus some 4,000 men) except for the appearance of a couple of new formations. Ampudia, his period of disgrace after Monterrey now suspended, commanded an independent brigade of light infantry. And another formation, a reinforced engineer regiment under General Santiago Blanco, had attained the status of a major maneuver element, a fourth division.
Santa Anna’s initial plan followed sound military practice. He placed Blanco’s division on the left, heading straight down the main road into the Narrows. His main attack, to be executed by Lombardini’s and Pacheco’s divisions, was to advance down the Plateau, east to west, hitting Wool’s left. Ortega’s division would follow the main attack along the Plateau. But putting these troops into position took time,d and the main effort was not yet ready by the close of February 22.
In the meantime, however, Santa Anna’s scouts had detected that the high mountain east of the Plateau was unoccupied. Possession of those rugged slopes might afford Santa Anna a position for artillery and even set up an end run around the Plateau. Santa Anna, therefore, sent Ampudia’s light infantry brigade and Julian Juvera’s cavalry brigade around noon to occupy the heights.
At 11 A.M., February 22, Taylor reappeared, and the men cheered. Competent Wool certainly was, but Taylor was their hero. Hardly had Taylor arrived than a messenger came through from Santa Anna under a flag of truce:
You are surrounded by twenty thousand men, and cannot in any human probability avoid suffering a rout and being cut to pieces with your troops; but as you deserve consideration and particular esteem, I wish to save you from a catastrophe, and for that purpose give you this notice, in order that you may surrender at discretion, under the assurance that you will be treated with the consideration belonging to the Mexican character; to which end you will be granted an hour’s time to make up your mind, to commence from the moment when my flag of truce arrives in your camp.… God and liberty!6
Taylor reacted strongly—witnesses say profanely—but his written reply was mild, though tinged with sarcasm:
In reply to your note of this date, summoning me to surrender my forces at discretion, I beg leave to say that I decline acceding to your request.7
The battle began at 3 P.M. that day with the exchange of fire between a brigade of Blanco’s division and the Americans at the Narrows. It was of little import. Up on the mountain, however, Ampudia’s men were soon scaling the Sierra, and Taylor belatedly dispatched the Arkansas and Kentucky cavalry regiments, plus a battalion of the Indiana infantry brigade, all under the command of Colonel Humphrey Marshall, Kentucky Cavalry. Marshall’s men met Ampudia’s, and an indecisive firefight sputtered all afternoon. Finally the American force, outflanked, withdrew to the base of the mountain. At nightfall Taylor was satisfied that his position was strong. The 2d Indiana and the 2d Illinois were in place on the Plateau, ready to meet the enemy the following morning—if, as expected, Santa Anna’s main attack should come from that direction.8
Then, still concerned about his open rear, Taylor rode back again to Saltillo. The first day’s battle, such as it was, had ended.
After a bitterly cold, windy night, with a slight drizzle at an altitude of six thousand feet, both the Mexicans and the Americans were on edge by morning. The Americans, outnumbered three to one, had the more reason.
In the Mexican camp, Santa Anna ordered reveille to be sounded at a different time for each unit in order to emphasize the impressive size of his army. Then he drew his infantry and cavalry up in one long line while massed bands played religious music. Priests in splendid robes passed benedictions along the lines; the smoke of incense filled the air. Even from that distance the Americans could admire the elaborate Mexican uniforms—red, green, yellow, crimson, and blue—a striking contrast to their own ragged outfits, and the deliberate movements of the Mexican units were impressive. The rolls of vivas portended a battle with a formidable foe.9
The day’s action began with a simultaneous attack at the Narrows and on the Plateau. At the Narrows Blanco’s division was quickly repulsed by Washington’s battery and the 1st Illinois, but on the Plateau Santa Anna enjoyed more success. Yell’s Arkansas and Marshall’s Kentucky cavalry regiments, both of which had reascended the Sierra that morning, soon broke in confusion. Then Pacheco hit Bowles’s 2d Indiana, and after some heavy fighting Bowles astonished all by ordering his regiment to withdraw. The volunteers of the 2d Indiana, astonished or not, were unstoppable once they were headed back for the rear. Wool’s left flank was now open.
Success now seemed within Santa Anna’s grasp, even though disorder reigned in his army also. Manuel Lombardini’s division (now commanded by Francisco Pérez, Lombardini being wounded) soon caught up with Pacheco’s men and the intermingled forces concentrated on Bissell’s 2d Illinois. But the Mexicans passed prematurely around Bissell’s left, thus exposing their own flanks to the massing American artillery. A hail of grape halted the Mexican infantry for the moment, though the cavalry continued to pursue the 2d Indiana and the Arkansas and Kentucky cavalry.10
At this time, about 9 A.M., Zachary Taylor arrived back on the field, none too soon. When he reached the Plateau, a downcast Wool reportedly remarked, “General, we are whipped,” to which Taylor replied, “That is for me to determine.” He thereupon ordered Davis’s Mississippi Rifles, who had been back with him at Saltillo, to rally the fleeing 2d Indiana and hold the crumbling left flank. Forthwith Wool sent Lane’s 3d Indiana to reinforce Davis.e
Davis’s men held, and even moved forward, with the attached artillery causing havoc among the Mexican divisions. At this time, however, Mexican lancers passed a full half mile beyond the American flank toward Buena Vista. Taylor dispatched four companies of dragoons, under May, with two companies of Arkansas Cavalry, to intercept them. Passing behind Davis’s men, May’s troopers reached their destination in time. The combined American cavalry was able to repel and disperse the lancers. And the withering fire of American artillery created such confusion that Pacheco’s and Lombardini’s divisions withdrew to the north. Santa Anna, in the vicinity, had a horse shot out from under him. A battery of sixteen-pounders, drawn up on the Sierra by the San Patricio battalion, was no match for Taylor’s flying artillery.11
Thus ended the first phase of the battle. Santa Anna had (1) enveloped Taylor’s left, (2) decimated three units—the Arkansas and Kentucky cavalry and the 2d Indiana, (3) secured an advantageous position at the head of the Plateau, and (4) cost the Americans dearly. Taylor still had an army on the field, however, and he had lost no terrain vital to his defense.
With the Americans strong on the Plateau, Santa Anna determined to send his uncommitted division, Pacheco’s, along the third avenue, the ridge on Taylor’s extreme left, which would envelop the American position, the Plateau being surrounded on three sides. Taylor saw Ortega, led by cavalry, as it started out, and he immediately sent the Mississippi Rifles and Lane’s 3d Indiana to intercept it. Those regiments, with Bragg’s artillery, clambered up to the far ridge and awaited the Mexican charge. The two regiments formed up in an inverted V, holding their fire until the Mexicans reached a point only seventy yards away, and then all fired at once. The Mexican lines crumbled. The Mississippians viciously put their eighteen-inch bowie knives to work on the Mexican wounded. The Mexicans recoiled into the adjacent ravine, and only a sudden thunderstorm saved them from suffering more dead than they actually did.
It was now 1 P.M., and Taylor was preparing to attack the cowering survivors of Pacheco’s division. At that moment a small group of Mexican officers approached with a flag of truce. Their question was strange: “What did Taylor ‘want’?” Puzzled, Wool himself took a white flag and rode forward to the spot where Santa Anna was believed to be. But Mexican fire did not cease, and Wool returned to American lines. The lull had allowed the bulk of Ortega’s division to escape.12
The Mexicans now seemed vulnerable, and Taylor, in his zeal, ordered an attack. Hardin’s 1st Illinois, on the upper reaches of the Plateau, moved forward with six companies. The Mexicans, seeing the small size of the force, stopped and rallied; Bissell (2d Illinois) and McKee (2d Kentucky) saw Hardin’s plight and ordered their regiments forward to his support. At that moment unexpected numbers of Lombardini’s men began emerging from a broad ravine. The Americans fell back, but many of their officers stayed behind. Hardin, of Illinois, was killed while wielding his saber to the last. Henry Clay, Jr., ordered his men to the rear while he, wounded, remained. Clay was the son of a man whose protest against an aggressive policy toward Mexico probably cost him the presidency. Ironically, the younger Clay fought his last, firing a pistol from the ground, in a battle of which his father roundly disapproved. McKee, Clay’s commander, was also killed.f
Again Taylor was saved by his artillery. As the remnants of the American infantry fled down the Plateau, Washington’s battery, now redeployed, turned on the pursuing Mexicans, tearing them apart. Bragg’s and Sherman’s wheeled around in support. The last attack of the day was history.
Zachary Taylor’s army had held the field, but it was in desperate straits. The men were exhausted; his ammunition was low; he had lost 673 officers and men and some 1,500 or more had deserted.13 To reinforce his army he returned a third time to Saltillo, once more taking along the Mississippi Rifles. (Davis’s was the only regiment that had not at least once turned its back to the enemy.) Taylor planned to leave Davis to garrison Saltillo while he moved forward the six companies of Illinois and Mississippi infantry that he had previously left. And other reinforcements were coming in response to previous messages. Two regiments, in fact, reached Buena Vista the night of February 23. With these reinforcements Taylor’s army was now as strong as it had been, numerically, before the beginning of the battle.g And Taylor’s critical supply situation, much to his relief, would be eased the next morning by the arrival of forty wagons. So the Army of Occupation would be ready to fight another day.
As the sun rose behind the Sierra, Taylor’s men braced themselves. But they could discern few Mexicans on their front. Soon they discovered that Santa Anna’s fires had been kept burning all night but Santa Anna was gone.
A murmur, slight at first, became a shout. Taylor and Wool, tears in their eyes, embraced each other.14
Santa Anna had held a council of war the previous evening, the results of which had convinced him that supplies on hand could not sustain another day’s attack. He paused at Agua Nueva, rationalizing that he was luring Taylor to more open ground. That may have been so, for he still had superior numbers, even after suffering 2,100 casualties.h But Taylor did not bite.
From Taylor’s side the close squeak was soon forgotten, and dispatches to Washington reflected nothing but satisfaction. On March 1, once more at Agua Nueva, he wrote the adjutant general: “No result so decisive could have been obtained by holding Monterey.…”15
Taylor would have been more candid had he described the Battle of Buena Vista as Wellington described Waterloo: a “near run thing.” But his actions said it for him. He fell back on Monterrey and stayed there. He had fought his last battle against Mexico.
* Samuel D. Sturgis was a Mexican prisoner for eight days. He served with distinction as a brigadier general, USV, during the Civil War. See DAB.
† “General Taylor was for fighting where we were, not from any military advantage of the place, but because his inflated pride would not listen to anything like retreat. ‘No,’ he said, ‘I’ll be d—d if I run away!’… General Wool, after a consultation with the leading officers, stated that he would take the full responsibility on himself; that he would not see the army sacrificed but would march them back to Buena Vista, and leave the result to the battle and the War Department. ‘Rough and Ready’ raved and told General Wool to ‘go to h—l in his own way,’ and rode off for Saltillo on Old Whitey.…” (Samuel Chamberlain, My Confession, pp. 110–11). this story, written years later and not repeated by any authentic source, was undoubtedly exaggerated, to say the least. Nevertheless, even Taylor’s report treats the withdrawal with a certain apologetic overtone (Taylor to TAG, March 6, 1847, Exec. Doc. No. 1).
‡ “The Arkansas Cavalry refused to work in loading up the waggons …” Chamberlain, p. 111.
§ R. S. Ripley, The War with Mexico, vol. I, p. 386. Chamberlain (p. 112), says the Arkansas Cavalry were “panic stricken.” However, the same caution regarding Chamberlain’s propensity for telling a good story must be exercised here.
‖ Ramón Alcaraz, The Other Side, p. 121. Alcaraz claims that the cavalry went on, without stopping for water, in obedience to Santa Anna’s orders.
a The military-history buff will recall that First Bull Run would later be fought in only a corner of the potential battle arena. The same with Waterloo in 1815. And the parallel between Taylor’s successful stand at Buena Vista and the unsuccessful stand of Leonidas at Thermopylae (480 B.C.) is striking. In the case of Leonidas, the Persian access to his rear by way of a secret route caused his defeat and annihilation.
b Estimate by the author, based on three companies of the standard six guns each. There may have been a few more, as Washington’s battery had a total of eight. Justin Smith, vol. I, pp. 388, 450.
c Alcaraz (p. 122) says that some men, rugged though they were, had actually died of fatigue, rather than of thirst or hunger.
d Even if his whole army was closed up in a single parade-ground column, four abreast, the time-length of 14,000 men would still be over an hour. And that rough terrain was no parade ground.
e Cadmus Wilcox, History of the Mexican War, p. 224. The troops Taylor left back at Saltillo were four companies of Illinois volunteers, two companies of Mississippi Rifles, and two 24-pound howitzers (p. 217). The authority for the Taylor-Wool exchange is Lieutenant R. S. Garnett, quoted in Wilcox, p. 223. The threat was Miñón’s 1,500 cavalrymen.
f Justin Smith, The War with Mexico, vol. I, 393–5. Pérez had been commanding Lombardini’s division, since the latter was wounded early in the day.
g Wilcox, p. 235. Brigadier General Thomas Marshall, previously at Rinconada Pass, and even Colonel George W. Morgan, of the 2d Ohio, at Cerralvo.
h Justin Smith, The War with Mexico, I, pp. 397–98. Santa Anna’s casualties broke down to 1,800 killed and wounded, 300 captured.
