NOVEMBER 1846–MARCH 1847
On March 12, 1847, Major General Winfield Scott penned an exultant report from a beach south of Veracruz:
Sir,—The colors of the United States were triumphantly planted ashore, in full view of the city and its castle, and under the constant fire of both, in the afternoon of the 9th instant.… The whole army reached shore in fine style, and without direct opposition, accident, or loss.1
That message marked the end of the first step of a long, hard, bloody campaign. But though only a beginning, the landing was a feat in itself, worthy of a moment’s gloating.
Planning for the landing at Veracruz had begun months before, in October 1846, when Scott had begun his campaign with Polk and Marcy to secure approval of the operation—with Scott himself as commander. The three memos that Scott had written to encourage approval had been so complete in themselves that they had formed the basis for planning and procurement.
Scott’s general concept never changed: (a) that Mexico City must be approached from Veracruz rather than from Taylor’s position at Monterrey;2 (b) that speed was necessary because of the seasonal onslaught of the dreaded vómito (yellow fever) in the vicinity of Veracruz; (c) that the need for speed precluded the use of any port other than Veracruz; (d) that Fort San Juan de Ulúa, guarding Veracruz from the sea, could not be assaulted directly; (e) that the city could be taken by landing an army some distance away and then reducing its defenses by assault or siege; and (f) that special boats, or scows, should be constructed to land his force outside the range of the enemy’s guns.
Scott’s memos varied in details, however—or, rather, became progressively more refined. At first he estimated that ten thousand or so men would suffice; the first wave would consist of twenty-five hundred men, plus two light artillery batteries; the cavalry and artillery horses would come ashore in subsequent waves. At first he hoped that the expedition could be fitted out by New Year’s Day, 1847, and that reinforcements would eventually bring his total to twenty thousand men.*
A little over two weeks later, a more confident Scott had trimmed his requirements a bit, in anticipation of help from Conner’s blockading Home Squadron, specifically—drawing some twelve hundred men for the purpose of the landing itself. And to meet his estimate of twenty thousand men total, he proposed to take the bulk of the necessary troops from Taylor. Scott estimated Taylor’s total strength, including Wool’s troops, at twenty thousand men, so he could take nine thousand and still leave Taylor eleven thousand. Scott urged that sea transport be gathered at once, and that construction of landing craft begin soon.3
Scott’s final memo, four days later, added a significant assumption: that nine additional volunteer regiments, a total of 6,750 men, would be inducted into United States service. And he specified his shipping requirements: 50 ships of 500 to 750 tons each and 140 flatboats, enough to carry five thousand men in the first wave.4
Scott’s campaign to secure the Veracruz command for himself reached its emotional climax three days later in his memorable meeting with Polk. When Scott hastily departed Washington on November 26, he was then hoping to have his entire force afloat on January 15, or, at the latest, February 1, 1847.5
…
Scott had proposed the largest amphibious invasion yet attempted in history. He had the men and supplies he needed, but success in collecting adequate sea transport, that bugaboo of amphibious operations,† would always hang in the balance. The fifty sea transports, fortunately, already existed, as the standard merchant sailing vessels of the time would suffice. Only a portion of the necessary transports belonged to the government, however; the rest were still at sea plying the merchant trade, and arrangements for chartering them had to be made in person at the various ports, as no telegraph was yet in place between ports. Fortunately for Scott, the man responsible, Quartermaster General Thomas S. Jesup, was an independent and resourceful man, and he approached his challenge with confidence. In order to begin chartering vessels in time, Jesup left Washington for New Orleans even before Scott. Since the seagoing vessels were going to be needed at the Brazos and Tampico in two months, both Jesup and Scott would suffer much suspense during the next few weeks.
The matter of flatboats, the craft that would deliver men from the decks of the transports, was easier, in a way, because they were to be constructed in the ports under the direct control of Jesup’s own men. The instructions for their design were exacting,‡ a fact that may have accounted for the eventual shortfall in production. Of the 141 landing craft ordered, only sixty-five would arrive in time for use.
Though Scott’s army would travel on its own chartered ships and land in craft belonging to the War Department, Scott had always counted on the assistance of the U.S. Navy. From New Orleans he wrote Commodore David E. Conner, who was blockading Veracruz, requesting help and advice.§ He was not disappointed in his request, for Conner, though aging and sick, was determined to assist Scott in any way he could. In answering Scott’s letter, Conner initially advised that five thousand men could bring about a bloodless surrender of Veracruz in a siege of ten days. He would be there to help, and in order to facilitate coordination he recommended that Scott direct his flotilla toward his own headquarters at Anton Lizardo, near Veracruz. On Scott’s arrival, Conner could point out the sites he considered feasible for the landing. And, most important, Conner urged speed. “The present would be the most favorable time for the contemplated attack.…”6
But the attack could not be mounted at the time recommended by Conner—or even close to that time. Scott’s first transports would not even reach the Brazos before the middle of February, almost a month after Conner had penned his letter.
By now Scott was no longer euphoric about his relationship with the President. As he was about to leave New Orleans for the Brazos, a stranger sidled up to him with word that Polk had requested Congress to institute a new military rank, the supergrade of lieutenant general.7 If Congress should authorize such a position, everyone in Washington supposed that it would be filled by Senator Benton. Scott at first refused to believe such a thing, preferring to assume that any such new rank would be created for himself. He therefore continued to maintain a friendly as well as an official correspondence with Marcy. As time passed, however, Scott came to realize that his earlier predictions were coming to pass: he was indeed being fired upon from his rear.‖
Scott’s army was assembling in two places; troops coming directly from the United States were assembling at the Brazos and the units being transferred to his command from Taylor were arriving at Tampico. The two bodies of troops needed to be united before moving on Veracruz. But how? A rendezvous at sea would involve too many imponderables, and the harbor at Tampico was too small to accommodate the whole fleet.
Scott therefore decided to stage his army on the sandy coral harbor of Lobos Island, located about sixty miles south of Tampico. Scott went personally to Tampico, and then, accompanied by the bulk of his troops, he sailed on to Lobos, arriving in mid-February 1847.
At Lobos Scott found that some of the volunteer regiments and some of the requisitioned ships had already arrived, but the landing craft had not appeared. He therefore spent two tense weeks drilling his troops and organizing his command structure on the hundred-acre island. Time passed slowly for the troops on that diminutive coral reef.
By March 2, 1847, adequate numbers of Scott’s landing craft had finally arrived and he had completed the organization of his twelve thousand men. Therefore, on that day, he issued orders for them to move.a Scott loved pageantry, and he made a point of standing bareheaded on the deck of the steamer Massachusetts as it took its place at the head of the sailing fleet. Scott’s own blue flag advertised his presence—as if that had been necessary—and “peal after peal of cheers resounded from ship to ship.… The sailors broke into their hearty songs; the sails filled gracefully; and the fleet stood away.”8
…
For two days the pace was slow, but for the last part of the trip a northerb pushed the fleet on. By March 5 Scott’s men beheld the spires of Ciudad Veracruz—City of the True Cross—with the formidable fortress of San Juan de Ulúa guarding it from the sea. On the horizon, about fifty miles inland but visible in the clear air, stood the 15,000-foot peak of Oriziba. Just off the Isla Verde, five miles seaward of the city, the Massachusetts was greeted by the sloops Albany and John Adams, whose pilots were to guide Scott’s ships into the lagoon of Anton Lizardo. Scott’s fleet of transports anchored between Anton Lizardo and the island of Salmadia, some twelve miles from Veracruz.
For the next two days, officers from Conner’s Home Squadron assisted Scott’s men in launching, inspecting, and arranging the flatboats in accordance with Scott’s organization plan.9 By now Conner had narrowed down his choices for Scott’s landing beaches to two. Conner personally favored the smooth beach called the Collada, as it was near the city and sheltered from northers by the nearby Sacrificios Island, but that site was too small to handle Scott’s transports. Conner had therefore devised a plan to deal with that deficiency: if Scott would agree, Conner could land the army from his naval vessels, whose great size would reduce the number of ships necessary to enter that small area. Scott tentatively accepted Conner’s offer at once. If the beach appeared satisfactory, the Navy would put the Army ashore.10
To afford Scott the chance to examine the beaches for himself, Conner arranged for Scott and his staff to accompany him aboard a small ship. On March 7 Scott, satisfied with the site, concurred in Conner’s plan. The outing would have been unremarkable had the ship not ventured too close to the Fort of San Juan de Ulúa and drawn several Mexican shells. The Mexican gunners scored no hits, but a few shots splashed close by. A lucky round might have sunk the vessel and the United States would have lost not only Scott and Conner but all of Scott’s general officers, plus critical members of his staff. George Meade, one of the members, wrote home disapprovingly that “one shot, hitting the vessel … might have been the means of breaking up the expedition.”11 And nobody could have foreseen the effect of such a mishap on the American Civil War, still years in the future. The two men destined to command the Union and Confederate armies at Gettysburg were aboard, Meade and Robert E. Lee, along with Joseph E. Johnston and P.G.T. Beauregard.
The landing at Collada had been planned for the next day, March 8, but in the previous evening a norther hit and disrupted all activity that day, deferring the landing until March 9. The maneuver itself was involved, as it required all of Scott’s troops to be transferred from their own ships to Conner’s naval vessels and then transferred again to the flatboats. The first stage was performed during the morning, near Anton Lizardo; then the fleet sailed behind Sacrificios Island in the afternoon, and the troops clambered into the flatboats. Each boat, commanded by a naval officer, carried seventy soldiers; sailors manned the oars.
Near sunset of a picture-perfect day, Scott’s men cheered as they passed him, still on the steamer Massachusetts. With his brigade leading the army, William J. Worth was the first man on the beach. Fire from the city and San Juan was negligible, and to Scott’s surprise, only a few ineffective skirmishers greeted the first wave of 5,500 men as they splashed ashore. By evening the rest of Scott’s nearly twelve thousand men had been landed. It was a remarkable operation, both for its size and for the efficiency with which it was carried out.c
Veracruz was a crowded city. Although home to fifteen thousand people, it occupied very little land. Essentially it was shaped like a half-moon, its straight “diameter” running southeast to northwest along only a mile of beach. The city was surrounded by a wall, along which stood Fort Santiago on the southeast corner and Fort Concepción on the northwest, with others in between.
Scott had already decided to reduce the city by siege rather than by assault despite protests from Worth and other impatient officers. To keep his troops at a safe distance from the Mexican artillery, he selected a trench line running along a ridge of low sand hills about two miles from the city. To hammer the city with his artillery, he planned to place four batteries far out in front of his infantry—with infantry protection, of course. The line of dunes was long, about eight miles, and merely to occupy and organize it would require a great deal of effort. Two weeks would pass before Scott could begin active operations.12
Without tents, Scott’s men spent an uncomfortable first night ashore; and the next morning Worth began pushing inland to occupy all of his preplanned positions. Though no Mexicans stood in his way, he was hampered by the nature of the terrain. The soft sand dunes were covered with thorny mimosa and prickly pears, forming a nearly impassable chaparral, which the soldiers had to cut with axes. Between the dunes lay stands of water to be forded or detoured. Nevertheless, Worth’s men pushed on vigorously.13
Scott planned to position his troops by “skinning the cat.” Worth’s division, in the lead, was to hack its way only about a third of the distance and then stop. Patterson’s volunteers would pass through to occupy the center. Twiggs’s division would then continue to fill the gap from Patterson to the northwest anchor at a town called Vergara. Twiggs’s task would have been easier, of course, had he landed somewhere near Vergara, but no beaches existed at that end of the line. In any case, the onerous task of cutting the chaparral was distributed as evenly as possible, and the whole position was occupied at the end of the third day.
Scott retained his headquarters near Collada at the southeast end of the line, where he could supervise the flow of supply from the beaches and remain in contact with Conner.
Another norther hit on March 13, forcing the naval vessels to seek safety in open waters, and communications between Scott’s army and Conner’s squadron were cut off. But some work continued on land, despite the wind-driven sand that filled holes almost as soon as they were dug. Only when the gale abated were the sailors able to begin landing the first of the mortars, artillery, and horses. The animals were particularly welcome to Twiggs’s men up at Vergara, whose supplies were delivered a long distance overland.14
Scott now turned his attention to emplacing his artillery. He had two possible firing areas to consider. One possibility was on the water in Worth’s sector, called Point Homo. This position, though exposed to Mexican fire, was close in and fairly well sheltered by the ground. Scott’s engineer,15 however, soon found another that seemed preferable because it was safer and could still bring fire on the city. Scott’s men began preparing this position for occupation by his ten mortars (organized into Batteries 1, 2, and 3) and later for his four twenty-four-pounder howitzers (Battery 4).
By March 18, however, Scott was becoming distraught because his heavy mortars had not arrived as he had expected. There was nothing he could do, of course, except to write Marcy in a bitter tone, pointing out that it had been “stipulated and agreed” the previous November that all his mortars would arrive at the Brazos by mid-January. “My disappointment and chagrin,” he concluded, “may be imagined.”d Scott was depending on those heavy mortars to pound the city into surrender.
Conner now made another offer: he could supply some heavy guns from his ships to reinforce Scott’s fire on land. Scott, however, stalled on that proposition, partly because of pride, no doubt, but more because of the work necessary to move the guns ashore. Scott hoped that this expedient would not be necessary.16 On the evening of March 19, with his artillery in place, Scott notified Conner that firing might begin the next day, in which case he would inform the commodore so that his ships could join in.17 But again Scott delayed a couple of days, and finally, on March 21, he decided to accept Conner’s offer of naval guns to join in the bombardment from the land.
Scott’s reluctant request for artillery help reached Conner just as the commodore was about to turn over command of the Home Squadron to Commodore Matthew C. Perry, in accordance with orders from the Navy Department.e Scott’s officers were disturbed by the change because of the high degree of mutual regard and cooperation that had been developed between Scott and Conner. Every one of Scott’s officers who could be spared from pressing duties paid a call on Conner, and those who could not sent notes.
Fortunately, Commodore Perry continued Conner’s policy of close cooperation and support, and his immediate response, on receiving Scott’s request for heavy guns was to assent, provided the artillery was manned by his own gunners. That arrangement being quite acceptable to Scott, the engineer troops began dragging the six monstrous guns across the sands and chaparral to their selected position. Captain Robert E. Lee, who had nearly met death at the hands of a careless sentry the night before, directed their emplacement. So well was the movement concealed behind the dunes that the Mexicans were completely unaware of it.f
Scott did not wait for the naval guns, however. On March 22 he issued an ultimatum to Mexican General Juan Morales to surrender both the city and the fort. Morales answered defiantly, and even the foreigners in the city chose to ignore Scott’s warning. Scott therefore cut all communication between the city and the various neutral ships observing from the Gulf. That evening he opened fire with his mortars and howitzers.
By the next evening, March 23, the naval battery opened fire under the personal command of Captain J. H. Aulick, second in command of the Home Squadron. But the Mexicans were adept at handling heavy coast artillery, and once they recovered from their surprise, they responded. The American seamen, who had spent months of boredom blockading a country that had no navy, were delighted with the idea of fighting. They were undaunted even when a shell killed four of their number, and Commodore Perry rotated the crew daily so as to give more than one group a chance to share in “the glories.”18
By March 25 Scott’s 24-pounders were also brought into action. Thus, as of March 25, ten 10-inch mortars, four 24-pounders, two 8-inch siege howitzers, three 32-pounders, and three long 8-inch Paixhans were pounding Veracruz and its walls.
Civilians bore the brunt of the suffering in the city. Day and night the mortars, howitzers, and Paixhans bombarded the town, supplemented by broadsides from the small naval vessels. So many shells hit the Cathedral of San Augustín and the powder magazine that the Mexicans accused the Americans of concentrating on these targets. The batteries at Forts Santiago, San José, San Fernando, and Santa Barbara returned the fire, as did those of San Juan de Ulúa. Mexican observers reported, however, that the Americans were able to keep four to six shells continually in the air.19
The effect of the bombardment was decisive. That same afternoon, March 25, the consuls of England, France, and Prussia sent a message to Scott, asking him to suspend the bombardment while the foreigners, as well as the Mexican women and children, left the city. Pointedly recalling his warning of the twenty-second, Scott refused,20 at the same time happy that he had earlier decided to forgo an infantry assault in favor of a siege.g The sneers of Worth and others had turned out to be empty.
The foreign consuls in Veracruz had had enough. On receiving Scott’s refusal of their request, they immediately cornered General Morales, asking him to surrender. Morales feigned sickness—a traditional ploy to avoid unpleasantness—and turned over command to his deputy, General J. J. Landero. Landero, who knew what was expected of him, sent Scott a message proposing that both sides appoint commissioners to arrange a “convention.” Scott ordered his batteries to cease fire, and the representativesh met for the first time on the afternoon of the twenty-sixth.
The ensuing negotiations sounded like a dreary repetition of the commissioners’ haggling at Monterrey, but they were shorter. At first the Mexicans demanded that their garrison of three thousand men be allowed to march out, without parole, carrying arms and accoutrements. That refused, they met again the next day with new instructions. The snag now lay in the fact that Morales, as Scott had suspected, had not given Landero authority to surrender Fort San Juan. But Scott’s patience was running out, and when it became obvious that Scott was about to recommence the bombardment, the Mexicans signed the agreement. It was 9 P.M., March 27, 1847.
Considering the relative positions of the two sides, the terms granted the Mexican garrison were generous to the Mexican garrison. Both the city and Fort San Juan de Ulúa were to be surrendered with all arms and officers, but men were to be paroled until regularly exchanged. The garrison could march with full honors to the field where arms would be turned over. The rights of the people of Veracruz, both religious and civil, were to be respected.i
On receiving the news of the signing, an exultant Winfield Scott nearly tore the messenger from his horse to give him a hearty embrace.
* Scott to Marcy, October 27, 1847, Exec. Doc. No. 59. The ten thousand would be broken down into two thousand cavalry, six hundred artillery, and the rest infantry. All the artillery and half the cavalry would be regular troops.
† Nearly a century later, planning for the cross-Channel invasion of France (Overlord) would encounter the same difficulties, the shortage of landing ships (LSTs).
‡ There were to be three types of boats, one size forty feet long, another forty feet nine inches, and a third thirty-five feet nine inches. The breadth of each boat was specified exactly, as were the depth (four feet four and a half inches for the largest), the number and size of oars, and the weight of the anchor (150 pounds). Each large boat was to weigh 6,280 pounds, the materials for each part being specified in detail. One hundred forty-one of these boats were ordered. The price, considered exorbitant, was $795 per boat, though the price was to be reduced by $10 for every day each boat was late. Temple, WG, pp. 60–62.
§ This move seems obvious. It is mentioned because Conner’s son, Philip Conner, had the impression that Scott had originally planned to ignore the Navy in conducting his expedition. See P.S.P. Conner, The Home Squadron Under Commodore Conner in the War with Mexico.
‖ Winfield Scott Memoirs, vol. I, pp. 399–400. Scott’s suspicions of Polk—reciprocated, of course—were confirmed by the case of Colonel William S. Harney, commander of the 2d Dragoons. Harney had been headstrong and insubordinate as part of Wool’s command, and had caused losses and embarrassment. And when Scott ordered him to return to Monterrey, Harney refused to leave. Worth, in temporary command, placed him under court-martial. Scott then remitted the sentence and restored Harney to command, but not before Polk had concluded that Harney’s only fault lay in his being a Democrat. The incident was damaging to mutual trust between president and general. Justin Smith, The War with Mexico, vol. I, pp. 268–69, 364–65; James K. Polk, Diary, February 20, 1847, p. 198.
a Organization as follows (noted in Emory Upton, The Military Policy of the United States, p. 211)
Worth’s Division
Artillery: 9 companies, 2d Art.; 4 companies, 3d Art.
Infantry: 4th, 5th, 6th, and 8th infantries.
Twiggs’ Division
Artillery: 12 companies, 1st Art.; 6 companies, 4th Art.
Infantry: 2d, 3d, and 7th infantries
Regiment of Mounted Rifles
Patterson’s Division
Infantry: 3d Illinois, 4th Illinois, New York
Regiment, 1st Tennessee, 2d Tennessee, Kentucky
Regiment, 1st Pennsylvania, 2d Pennsylvania,
South Carolina Regiment, Mounted Tennessee
Volunteers
Army troops. 1st and 2d dragoons (6 companies), Engr Co., Ordnance Co.
b A “norther” is a very strong wind from the north. It is usually not accompanied by any precipitation, but its effect on the water and on the sandy beaches is dramatic.
c Scott, pp. 419–20. P.H.P. Conner (p. 36) claims that two ships, the Raritan and the Potomac, carried over five thousand men between Anton Lizardo and Sacrificios Island, where they met the flatboats.
d Scott to Marcy, March 18, 1847, Exec. Doc. No. 60, p. 222. He wrote Jesup an even sterner letter the next day (see Exec. Doc. No. 60, p. 913).
e The timing was regrettable in that it implied some dissatisfaction with Conner. Actually, his tour had been extended, based on the premise that the siege would occur in February.
f Raphael Semmes, Service Afloat and Ashore during the Mexican War, p. 134. These guns, claimed to be the heaviest “ever before mounted in siege,” would greatly augment the fire that Scott could bring to bear on the city. Three of these 6,300-pound monsters fired solid shot of 32 pounds each, sufficient to soften the walls of the forts around the city; and the other three, called Paixhans, fired 62-pound explosive shells with exceedingly heavy casings that allowed considerable penetration before explosion.
g “We, of course, gentlemen, must take the city and castle before the return of the vomito—if not by headwork, the slow scientific process, by storming—and then escape, by pushing the conquest into the healthy interior. I am strongly inclined to attempt the former unless you can convince me that the other is preferable. Since our thorough reconnoissance, I think the suggestion practicable with a very moderate loss on our part.
“The second method would, no doubt, be equally successful, but at the cost of an immense slaughter to both sides, including non-combatants—Mexican men, women, and children—because assaults must be made in the dark, and the assailants dare not lose time in taking and guarding prisoners without incurring the uncertainty of becoming captives themselves, till all the strongholds of the city are occupied. The horrors of such slaughter, with the usual terrible accompaniments, are most revolting. Besides these objections, it is necessary to take into account the probable loss of some two thousand, perhaps three thousand, of our best men in the assault, and I have received but half the numbers promised me. How then could we hope to penetrate the interior?” Scott, vol. II, pp. 423–24. Scott was writing this, it must be remembered, nearly twenty years after the fact.
h R. S. Ripley, The War with Mexico, pp. 40–41. Americans: Worth, Pillow, and Totten. Mexicans: Colonels Herrera, Villaneuva, and Robles.
i In the last phase, Captain Aulick, representing Commodore Perry, signed as a fourth commissioner.
U.S. Congress, Exec. Doc. No. 1, p. 237. The five thousand Mexican soldiers in the city and fort were commanded by five generals, eighteen colonels, thirty-seven lieutenant colonels, five majors, ninety captains, and 180 lieutenants. Of these Scott “as an act of grace and policy,” released one general, two colonels, four lieutenant colonels, one major, ten captains, and twenty lieutenants. He sent them to Mexico City “to use a peace influence, if they will.” Hitchcock, p. 247.
