JULY–AUGUST 1847
Scott remained at Puebla for three months, far longer than he had ever intended to. His original plans had been based on the assumption that he would receive reinforcements to replace the troops he had lost in early May, but the new regiments he had expected had been diverted by Polk and Marcy to Taylor during that period (March 1847) in which Taylor was presumed to be in peril at Saltillo. Though Taylor was safe after the battle of Buena Vista, those volunteer regiments were now too far away to do Scott any good. Scott would have to await the next contingent of volunteers and “new” regulars.
But Scott, a survivor, spent the time constructively. While occupying Puebla he established order and confidence, effected a reconciliation with Trist, developed a system of local supply and intelligence, and did his best to make peace with Santa Anna. Though this last enterprise came to naught, the effort was worthwhile.
Scott’s first task, that of restoring his authority over the troops and the civilian populace, was distasteful, especially since any action he took would reflect on Worth. But Scott could not avoid the issue. Worth, on approaching Puebla in mid-May, had apparently been carried away by the friendly reception he had received, and had responded by granting extremely liberal terms for the surrender of the city. In particular he had granted the Mexican courts the right to try the cases of civilians accused of murdering American soldiers. The Mexicans had quickly abused that concession, and the morale of Worth’s troops had suffered accordingly. And Worth’s continual and unnecessary alerts, triggered by fears of nonexistent enemy threats, had become so frequent that the beating of the drums had become known in his command as “Worth’s scarecrows.”1 Little wonder that the troops welcomed Scott’s arrival and assumption of command nearly as heartily as they had in April, just before Cerro Gordo.
Scott attempted to restore order in Puebla with the least possible public display. To reverse Worth’s concession regarding the power of Mexican courts, he simply dusted off General Order No. 20, originally issued at Veracruz, in which he had established martial law.2 And to stop the needless calls to arms, he reversed the policy of taking off in hot pursuit anytime the enemy molested one of his outposts. But even after Scott arrived, Worth issued an unfounded warning to his division that a plot was afoot to poison the drinking water, and the Mexican population was insulted. When Scott requested Worth to withdraw the offending circular, Worth became so incensed that he demanded a court of inquiry. The court, consisting of Quitman, Twiggs, and Persifor Smith, found Worth at fault and recommended a rebuke. Scott limited the distribution of the court’s findings to the division commanders, but from that day on all semblance of friendship between Worth and Scott was gone.3
Despite these difficulties, which were more attributable to American mismanagement than to Mexican hostility, relations between the two nationalities were not bad. Puebla was a center of religious culture, and its streets abounded with priests and nuns. And since the Catholic Church was tilted against Santa Anna, its discipline kept the atmosphere quiet. And an indication that not all Mexicans were hostile was that Hitchcock was able to recruit a band of irregulars as a spy company. The company was composed largely of outlaws, and its members were despised by the Mexican populace, but whatever its virtues and shortcomings, this group provided Scott with valuable information.4
In July 1847, Scott began to receive some reinforcements at Puebla. The first contingent, commanded by Gideon Pillow, now a major general, arrived on July 8.* Pillow’s total party, nearly 4,500 men, was actually composed of three detachments that had left Veracruz beginning in early June. The first of these had been under Colonel J. S. McIntosh and the second had been under Brigadier General George Cadwalader. The first two, which had early consolidated as protection against further guerrilla attacks, had been held up at Perote by order of Pillow, who was the third in line. No harm had resulted from the pause at Perote except that the delay had temporarily deprived Scott of the much needed $200,000 in specie that McIntosh had been carrying.
After Pillow and Cadwalader, no more reinforcements reached Scott for over three weeks. The next one marched in on August 6, 1847, under the command of Brigadier General Franklin Pierce, a New England politician who six months earlier had refused the post of attorney general of the United States in order to enlist as a volunteer. Though Pierce’s force was strong—about 2,400 men—Scott was sufficiently concerned for his safety that he sent Persifor Smith’s brigade back to Perote to escort Pierce in. The difficulties were such that Pierce had found it necessary to leave many sick and some wounded at Perote.5
In the meantime, happily for the Americans cause, Scott and Trist had patched up their feud; in fact, the two men had now become warm friends. Trist had remained a member of Quitman’s mess for some time without even meeting with the general-in-chief. This interlude gave the two men time to reconsider their respective positions, neither one of which was too secure, and to realize that they had work to do together,† On June 24, 1847, Trist received encouraging news from the Mexican government through the British minister, Charles Bankhead, and Bankhead’s representative, Edward Thornton. Santa Anna, it advised, viewed negotiations favorably, provided some lubricant in the form of gold was applied to his palm. Trist pondered this and decided that it was worth the gamble, but he needed Scott’s cooperation if only because Scott held the necessary money in his possession. Trist therefore wrote Scott a civil letter explaining the situation, together with a copy of his authority to act as a commissioner.6 Scott quickly responded to Trist’s overture with a cordial note, and then, as Trist was still ailing, sent a box of guava marmalade to him by way of Persifor Smith:
My dear sir:
Looking over my stores, I find a box of Guava marmalade which, perhaps, the physician may not consider improper to make part of the diet of your sick companion.
Yours very truly
Winfield Scott7
These gestures provided the rationale for the two men to meet personally, and when they did, they discovered that they liked each other. So by late July Trist was writing to Buchanan of Scott’s “purest public spirit,” and a “fidelity and devotion which could not be surpassed … in regard to the restoration of peace.”8 And Scott, not to be outdone, was writing to Marcy asking that his former letters describing Trist as “the personification of Danton, Marat, and St. Just all in one” be disregarded. Scott now directed that Trist be treated as the American Minister, not as a mere clerk. All the guards in the headquarters were to be turned out upon Trist’s approach, and he was to be tendered appropriate honors on all occasions.9
But the issue that had brought Scott and Trist together, Santa Anna’s not-so-indirect demand for a bribe, was a touchy one. Indulging in bribery, even for the loftiest of causes, was recognized as dangerous business. The two men conferred on the subject several times, and they finally decided that the potential benefit of acceding to Santa Anna’s demand was worth the risk. As a result, in mid-July Trist was summarizing their thoughts by writing, “We are both convinced that the only way in which the indefinite protraction of this war can possibly be prevented … is by the secret expenditure of money in Mexico.” Ten thousand dollars’ down payment would be required, to be followed by another million when a treaty was ratified.
Scott, though he agreed, was uncomfortable. He rationalized the bribe on the basis that Santa Anna, in requesting it, had put the onus upon himself. And precedent existed; the United States government had sanctioned the secret expenditure of $500,000 in the negotiations over the northeastern boundary with Canada; furthermore, contrary to popular American belief, the United States had habitually given tribute to the Barbary pirates at the beginning of the century.10 Thus reassured, Scott proposed that Trist request the needed million dollars from him, and he would in turn sign a draft on the Treasury in Washington to come out of the funds of the army.11 The initial ten thousand Scott was able to provide on the spot out of his fund for secret expenses.
Nevertheless, Scott deemed it advisable to secure the support of his generals, of whom at least Pillow, Shields, and Quitman were influential Democrats. The support of Pillow was particularly desirable, so when he arrived from Veracruz, he was soon brought in on the matter. Pillow was at first reticent, but as the discussion proceeded he began to withdraw his objections. Quitman doubted that the move would sit well at home. Shields, as a former supreme court justice of Illinois, had misgivings but refused to commit himself. He would, he said, leave the matter completely in Trist’s hands. But out of friendship for Scott, Shields hoped that the general could be disassociated with the decision, confining his role to that of Trist’s agent for procuring the money.12
By now the troops who had been at Puebla the entire three months were rested and drilled, and those who had just arrived had at least been introduced to hardship. And since the negotiations with Santa Anna were too indefinite to affect Scott’s plans to move on to Mexico City, he went about organizing his army for its final campaign against Mexico City.
The army now comprised some 14,000 men, of whom 2,500 were sick and 600 more convalescing.13 He organized his force into four divisions: the 1st Division (Brevet Major General Worth), the 2d Division (Brigadier General Twiggs), Major General Pillow’s Division, and Brigadier General Quitman’s Division. Three of these were considered “regular,” as Pillow’s two brigades (Cadwalader and Pierce) consisted of recruits who had recently signed up for the duration of the war. They were, however, officered mostly by volunteers.‡
With this force Scott was ready to combat a Mexican army estimated at that time to be 36,000 men and one hundred cannon.14
The deal that Santa Anna had proposed to the United States government—to sign a favorable peace in exchange for a million-dollar bribe—was never consummated. At some convenient point Santa Anna “discovered” the Mexican law of April 20, 1847, that declared it high treason for any official to treat with the enemy. So he simply pocketed the $10,000 advance.
Perhaps Santa Anna was influenced in the withdrawal of his offer by the increasing evidence of Scott’s difficulties in maintaining any sort of communication with the coast. So with his usual optimism, Santa Anna again set about to destroy the hated invader,§
Rallying the people, however, was not easy, for they had been bewildered after the rout at Cerro Gordo. But once Santa Anna had occupied Mexico City with troops, he could count on Mexican pride to support its defense. According to the Mexicans, “… it was much more glorious to submit fighting, than to leave the gates of Mexico City open, without firing a gun at the North Americans.”15 So the people pitched in. Bells and old ordnance from the Castle of Chapultepec were melted down to cast new cannon; new muskets, sold by foreigners at Mexican ports or through Guatemala, were produced; other small arms were shaken down from the closets of the populace. Mortars, bayonets, and projectiles were feverishly produced. And always behind the effort was the mind and will of Santa Anna.16
The building blocks for reorganizing a respectable army were also in being. To begin with, some four thousand veterans of Buena Vista had remained at San Luis Potosí under the command of General Gabriel Valencia. Valencia was an unreliable subordinate, but so long as “the new patriotism” burned, he would probably behave himself. So on Santa Anna’s order Valencia arrived at Guadalupe Hidalgo on July 27.17
Valencia’s backbone of regular troops would be supplemented, of course, by nearly 10,000 men from the National Guard. In addition, Santa Anna had brought 3,500 men back from Puebla, and some 10,000 troops were already in Mexico City. Juan Alvarez’s Army of the South provided 2,500, and Canalizo still had a few thousand. All together, Santa Anna could total up a force of some 25,000 men, possibly 30,000.18
Despite his advantage in numbers, however, Santa Anna’s strategy still called for remaining on the defensive. Some criticized him for timidity, but he was realistic. His army lacked cohesion and discipline, and it would find offensive maneuvers difficult. But far more important, the Valley of Mexico was so marshy that large-scale, cross-country movement for any army, even Scott’s would be impossible. Though seven thousand feet above sea level, Mexico City lay at the lowest point of a flat tableland, the ground always soggy but now worse because the Mexicans had flooded it. The soil could not carry artillery and horses. Any movement in the valley would be questionable, and approaches to the city itself were limited to the several built-up causeways. Numbers of men could not maneuver between them. So with those restrictions on maneuver, Santa Anna would be unable to take full advantage of his numerical superiority. On the other hand, he could afford enough troops to garrison each causeway. Each causeway force could defend like Horatius at the bridge.
As Santa Anna began planning his defense he preferred, of course, to meet Scott as far from the gates of Mexico City as possible, taking advantage of the limited road net, broken up by lakes, for distances of many miles. Since only one road crossed the mountains from Puebla to Mexico City, Santa Anna knew where Scott would be coming—up to Buena Vista, a town about thirty miles east of Mexico City. Once Scott reached that town from the east, he would have the choice of continuing westward over any one of three smaller ones, one of which led directly to Mexico City while the other two followed more circuitous routes.
These three branches were each canalized by three large lakes to the east of the city. The largest, Lake Texcoco, stood east and northeast, extending so far north that nearly everyone, certainly Santa Anna, considered the road around its far shore infeasible. The other two lakes, Xochimilco and Chalco, were lined up east to west, both of them south of Texcoco. Of these, Xochimilco was closer to the city; indeed, one nose, at Mexicaltzingo, extended to a point only about five miles from the San Antonio gate. East of Xochimilco, of course, was Lake Chalco, a corner of which reached almost to Buena Vista. Between Lakes Xochimilco and Chalco was a narrow isthmus with another road, making it possible for Scott to go between the lakes to approach the city from the south.
Of the three approaches, Santa Anna’s eyes were fixed on the direct one, the National Highway from Puebla, which ran from Buena Vista to the San Lazaro gate, just south of Lake Texcoco. Santa Anna decided to block that road at El Peñón, a conical hill about ten miles from the city. As the defense at El Peñón would represent the “post of honor,” Santa Anna placed his National Guard troops on that position. Obviously he was playing politics: favoring those troops most identified with the people was calculated to fan their ardor. Thus the toughest fighting, should Scott attack from that direction, would fall to the troops least trained for combat.
To make the most of this gesture, Santa Anna established El Peñón amid great pageantry. On August 10, 1847, the first brigade, that of General Anaya, marched through the streets of Mexico City, with the Grand Plaza filled with people, the balconies and roofs of the city crowded with citizens. Band music of the 11th infantry “filled the air with its inspiring martial sounds; a thousand vivas answered it, and the National Guard marched, bearing with them the good wishes of all.”
The brigades had impressive names: the Victoria, the Hidalgo, the Independencia and the Bravos. Each unit represented its own walk of life, and each had its enthusiastic partisans amid the cheers. Military utility was subordinated to the show. Anaya’s brigade, for example, “entered the Palace: then twice displayed through the central streets of the city; and the ladies ran to the balconies at the sound of that musical strain which converted the polka into a hymn of the Guard.” But emotions were mixed; enthusiasm, grief, tenderness, solicitude, each found its place.
Later that morning, Santa Anna rode out to El Penon, accompanied by a large staff and brilliant escort. “They saluted him with the musical beats of honor and with enthusiastic vivas. A crowd then collected and began building grocery stands, eating-houses, stores, and liquor shops, and at once a portable city sprang from the earth. Enterprising souls soon converted the ditches at the side of the road into canals to bring furniture, war materials, and curiosities of all kinds by canoe. All made their way easily along, by keeping time with favorite songs.…”19
Thus the Mexicans set about to defend their capital.
Scott’s leading division, Twiggs’s, marched out of Puebla on Saturday, August 7, 1847. Pierce’s men had arrived only the day before, but they would have a few days’ rest, as Scott was sending his army out one division at a time. To keep each segment within reasonable reach of one another, he directed that one division would leave each morning but each would make only a half day’s march daily. Thus no unit would ever be more than a half day’s march from support, from both the division ahead of it and the one behind. To his regret, Scott was forced to leave his sick and wounded behind at Puebla. The army itself would advance, “with naked blade in hand.”‖
This march into the Valley of Mexico was risky. As was observed from over the seas, the difficulty of capturing Mexico City would be exceeded only by the almost unthinkable alternative of marching back to Veracruz. But for the first five days, at least, Scott encountered little resistance, though he had halfway expected Santa Anna to defend at the Rio Frio, just to the west of Puebla. Thus the most memorable feature of this arduous march was the scenery. The climax for each soldier occurred on the third day, when each unit would reach the crest of the high ridge that lay at the base of Popocatépetl (Smoking Mountain). There before them spread the Valley of Mexico.
Witnesses vied in describing the view, certainly one of the most magnificent in Mexico. At an altitude of ten thousand feet—three thousand feet above the flat valley—the viewer could take in the entire plain, spread before him like a map. The valley was hemmed in by “a circle of stupendous, rugged, and dark mountains, forming a most perfect combination of the sublime and the beautiful.” The circumference of the basin itself was estimated as 120 miles long, and in the clear air all was visible to the glance.
The towers of Mexico City, twenty-five miles away, stood out clearly. The large green plain was almost devoid of trees except around the city itself, “dotted with white churches, spires, and haciendas.” The three great lakes—Texcoco, Chalco, and Xochimilco—appeared as great sheets of water; the soldiers understood that once upon a time they covered the entire basin. Pocopocatépetl and its brother giant, Iztaccíhuatl, lay twenty miles away, though the clear air made the distance appear to be only two or three miles.20
Winfield Scott, never one to play down the drama of a situation, described it years later as “the object of all our dreams and hopes—toils and dangers;—once the gorgeous seat of the Montezumas.” Filled With “religious awe,” Scott exulted: “That splendid city soon shall be ours!”
* Ripley, The War with Mexico, vol. II, pp. 130–39; Justin Smith, the War with Mexico, vol. II, pp. 76–77. The two accounts vary slightly on the dates. These come from Smith, who wrote the later, more accurate account. Pillow marched his men so hard that six of them died of exhaustion along the way. Niles Register, July 10, 1847, quoted in Charlie W. Elliott, Winfield Scott, p. 489.
† Buchanan, on June 14, 1847, wrote to Trist. Agreeing that Scott’s letter had been “extraordinary” and “well calculated to wound your feelings and excite your indignation,” he implied that much of the fault lay with Trist’s secretiveness: “This letter surely never would have been written, had he awaited your arrival at his head-quarters and read the instructions and the project of a treaty with Mexico, which you were authorized to communicate to him confidentially. The perusal of these documents must have put to flight the unfounded suspicions, in regard to your mission, which seem to have pre-occupied his mind and influenced his conduct.” It then went on to remind Trist that he had been instructed to exercise “no further agency” after Buchanan’s letter to the Mexican foreign minister had been “placed in the hands of General Scott.” Buchanan to Trist, Jun 14, 1847, Exec. Doc. No. 60, pp. 826–27.
‡ 1st Division (Worth) Garland’s brigade: 2d Art., 3d Art., 4th Inf. Clarke’s brigade: 3d, 6th, 8th infs.; Co A, 2d Art., Light Art. Bn.2d Division (Twiggs) P. F. Smith’s brigade: 1st Art., 3d Inf., Rifle Regt. Riley’s brigade: 4th Art., 2d and 7th infs, Engr. Co., Ord. Co, Light Co. K, 1st Art. Pillow’s Division Pierce’s brigade: 9th, 12th, 15th infs. Cadawaler’s brigade: Voltiguers, 11th and 14th infs, Light Co. I, 1st Art. Quitman’s Division Shield’s brigade: New York Regt., South Carolina Regt., Marine detachment. Watson’s brigade: 2d Pennsylvania Regt.; H Co., 3d Art.; C Co., 3d Dragoons. Harney’s brigade: 1st Bn., Cavalry; 2d Bn., Cavalry. The above list appears in Emory Upton, The Military Policy of the United States, p. 214.
§ Charles W. Elliott, Winfield Scott, p. 500. Scott (Memoirs, p. 466) described Santa Anna thus: “His vigilance and energy were unquestionable, and his powers of creating and organizing worthy of admiration. He was also great in administrative ability, and though not deficient in personal courage, he, on the field of battle, failed in quickness of perception and rapidity of combination. Hence his defeats.”
‖ Scott, Memoirs, vol. II, p. 466. Sequence was Twiggs, Quitman, Worth, and Pillow.