AUGUST 1920, 1847
On August 12, 1847, Brigadier General David E. Twiggs’s advance guard passed the crossroads at Buena Vista and pushed on a couple of miles to the small town of Ayotla. Ahead loomed the fortified position of El Peñón, and just behind it lay Mexico City itself, the shining objective of the whole campaign. Twiggs’s arrival at this point meant that the moment of decision had come for Winfield Scott, who was at a crossroads both literally and figuratively. For now Scott must decide once and for all whether to continue the last twenty miles on the National Highway—assaulting the formidable El Peñón along the way—or turn south of Lake Chalco and approach Mexico City indirectly.
Scott had been anticipating this moment of decision a long time. Back at Puebla, he had assigned two officers, Major William Turnbull* and Captain R. E. Lee, to study his various options. In a fatherly way Scott had supervised them, at first pitting them against each other and then allowing them to pool their efforts. By combining their respective intelligence sources, Turnbull and Lee had garnered a great deal of information on the situation around Mexico City, particularly the defenses of El Peñón and the road net around the lakes. Basing his plans on their work, Scott had tentatively decided to leave the main highway and to take one of the roads south of Lake Chalco instead.1
But a map study conducted from seventy-five miles away had its limitations; studying the ground in person was also necessary. Scott could not perform his reconnaissance himself, but he had come to trust Lee, and on Lee’s shoulders he placed the responsibility of checking the various routes in person. Lee set out at once.
Lee decided that his first requirement would be to confirm the intelligence he and Turnbull had gathered about the Mexican position at El Peñón. Making full use of the whole engineer detachment, he soon concluded that his earlier information had indeed been true: El Peñón was the principal Mexican defense, defended by about seven thousand men and thirty cannon. So he began the search to find another way, one that would encounter lighter resistance. First he considered a small road that branched off to the left of the National Highway a couple of miles short of El Peñón and led to the small village of Mexicalcingo. But that road was too restricted,2 so Lee turned to another, which had heretofore been unreported, that led around the south of Lake Chalco and was “quite good, although narrow and rough.”3 If passable, that road would eventually join the Acapulco Road at San Agustín, directly south of Mexico City. The Acapulco Road would provide the new axis for Scott’s advance.
Lee reported these preliminary findings to Scott, who in turn ordered Worth, now located at the town of Chalco, to reconnoiter the San Agustín route that Lee had suggested. Lee accordingly sent all the information he had to James Mason, Worth’s division engineer.4
Worth apparently preferred to depend on his own people rather than on Scott’s engineers, so he gave the reconnaissance task to James Duncan, now a brevet lieutenant colonel. Duncan found the road to be excellent, “not easily obstructed or defended.” He so reported to Worth that same evening.5
That was enough for Scott. The next morning he moved Worth’s division south and then west toward San Agustín, followed by Pillow’s and Quitman’s divisions, leaving Twiggs at Ayotla to threaten El Peñón for one more day. As Twiggs was marching off he was attacked by a cavalry force of twice his numbers, but he beat it off without much difficulty. The Mexican unit was Alvarez’s cavalry, part of Valencia’s force, which was on its way down from Valencia’s previous station north of Mexico City to a new position.†
On August 18, Scott’s army, after a march of twenty-five miles through the mud, closed in on San Agustín. The Acapulco road would be Scott’s new axis of advance toward Mexico City, from the south rather than from the east.
As early as August 14 Santa Anna had been aware that Scott was considering a movement to the south. Scouts had discovered and reported the American reconnaissance parties along the Chalco route. Further, his spies had picked up rumors of such a move. But these indications could not be counted on as conclusive, and Santa Anna did not want to believe them. Reluctant to evacuate El Peñón, he remained there, confining his actions to harassing Twiggs and to laying plans for his eventual defense to the south. His lethargy made Scott’s march easier; the few small raids the Americans encountered along the way were quickly brushed off.6
By the seventeenth of August, however, Santa Anna was forced to acknowledge that Scott had moved south and that he would have to remove his force from El Peñón and assume positions south of Mexico City. He executed the move amid the grief of a population that had cheered Peñón’s occupation a few days earlier. And many were more than “mournful”; they were frightened. Hordes left the city, leaving their doors and balconies closed: “The sight alone of the deserted city inspired sorrow and a shudder. It resembled beauty without life, and the naked bones of a skull where lovely eyes had sparkled.”7
But Santa Anna, always looking to the future, energetically went about setting up his new defense line. The terrain was favorable for defense: the Churubusco River, running southwestward from Mexicalcinco, provided a reasonable obstacle between the town of Churubusco and Lake Xochimilco, and Santa Anna placed his forces behind it. To the southwest, however, he ran his line a bit forward, assigning Valencia (with 5,500 men) a position at San Angel; Francisco Pérez (with 3,500) at Coyoacán two miles east; and Nicolas Bravo at Churubusco three miles to the east of Pérez. These units, only five miles from end to end, could reinforce one another readily. And unwilling to abandon El Peñón entirely, Santa Anna left General Manuel Rincón on that hill as a reserve. He established his own headquarters with that of Bravo at Churubusco.
Santa Anna’s defending force was counted at twenty thousand, twice that of Scott.8
On August 18, 1847, Scott sent Worth’s division northward from San Agustín toward Mexico City. Harney’s dragoons, in the lead, ran into heavy cannon fire from a strong position at San Antonio, some three miles south of Churubusco. The first round from Santa Anna’s cannon killed the luckless Seth Thornton, whose capture at Matamoros sixteen months earlier had precipitated the war. In the face of heavy hostile fire, Worth paused and sent the engineers out to evaluate the position. They returned quickly, advising that San Antonio could not be outflanked because a formidable lava field called the Pedregal lay to the west and to the east the water was too deep. Rather than attacking up the San Antonio causeway, therefore, Scott ordered Worth to halt, threaten the position, and wait.9
Scott’s situation was now decidedly uncomfortable. The horses lacked forage; rations were short and growing musty. When Scott inspected his troops, waiting in the ditches beside their wagons and horses, his face looked grim. It was now morning of August 19, 1847, and the time had come for the general-in-chief to act decisively.
General Gabriel Valencia, commander of the Army of the North, was not the kind of subordinate that Santa Anna would have selected if given a free choice. The two men were so hostile toward each other that Santa Anna habitually kept Valencia as far from Mexico City as possible. He also tried to keep Valencia from gaining too much in the way of military laurels. Sometimes the result of this effort had been expensive, as at the battle of Cerro Gordo, which Santa Anna had fought with Valencia sitting inactive at San Luis Potosí. Valencia was more than a difficult commander for Santa Anna to cope with; he was also Santa Anna’s political rival. Back in 1841 Valencia had been an ally of sorts when he had joined with Lombardini and others to help Santa Anna oust President Bustamante. But Valencia, with Alvarez, had later been among the officers who had deposed Santa Anna in late 1844. Valencia’s latest political activity had been to assist Paredes in overthrowing Herrera during the winter of 1845.
Valencia was heavyset, bullnecked, and blue-eyed. Further, he has been described as a “conspirator, a drunkard, a dolt, and a volcano.”10 But Valencia possessed a certain panache, and his division, the elite of the army, followed him willingly. Now, with the population only tolerating Santa Anna, Valencia saw his opportunity approaching. So confident was he of overthrowing the president that he carried with him the names of men he would appoint to his cabinet when he came to power.11
In an army consisting of allied warlords, Santa Anna could not replace Valencia, but neither could he enforce his orders on Valencia. As soon as Valencia arrived at San Angel, on the right (west) of Santa Anna’s new defensive line, he immediately scorned that inconspicuous position and pushed forward to a hill about five miles down the road, near the town of Contreras. There Valencia could fight his own, independent battle. This move, if successful, just might give him such recognition as to catapult him into power, displacing the discredited Santa Anna. So when he received Santa Anna’s orders instructing him to remain at San Angel, he ignored them and, instead, moved his four thousand veterans on to a position between the Indian village of Padierna and Contreras.12
When Santa Anna learned of the move, he immediately sent orders to Valencia on the morning of August 18 to withdraw back to San Angel.‡ Valencia answered in a deferential tone but did not comply. His arguments were persuasive, at least to him: his position was “auxiliary”; if the Americans should attack in force at San Antonio, he could attack their rear. But if the Americans should attack him, then Santa Anna could hit their rear at San Antonio. Eventually, Santa Anna gave up. He would, he declared, “leave Valencia to act on his own responsibility.”13
Valencia, out on a limb, had given Scott the chance to rescue his waning fortunes.
The battles of Contreras and Churubusco, both fought on Friday, August 20, 1847, were actually two parts of one battle. The towns were only seven miles apart; they were fought within a few hours of each other; and most of the troops involved at Churubusco had participated in some way at Contreras.
The key to the two battles was the great, supposedly impassable lava bed called the Pedregal. This forbidding obstacle was oval-shaped, with its longer axis running east to west about five miles across, its shorter about three miles from south to north. Santa Anna’s base, Churubusco, lay on the northern rim of the oval; Scott’s San Agustín, on the southern rim. Both towns were a little east of the oval’s north-south axis. The most direct route between Churubusco and San Agustín, therefore, was the generally north-south road that bent around to the east of the Pedregal, running through San Antonio. But that position was strongly defended, and the only possible alternative way for Scott to reach Churubusco would be to encircle the western edge of the Pedregal, provided sufficient roads existed.
Since the San Antonio position would be expensive to reduce, Scott now began to give serious thought to following the roundabout route to the west. So to determine the feasibility of the roads in that direction, Scott turned once more to Lee, and on the eighteenth Lee took an infantry regiment and two companies of dragoons to check it. Essentially, the trail followed the southern edge of the Pedregal, and though rough, it was feasible for infantry. With some work, it could be made to carry artillery. After three miles Lee and his men reached the top of Mount Zacatepec, where they encountered Mexican guerrillas. That meeting was enough to convince Lee of the route’s feasibility: if the Mexicans could reach this point from the west, the Americans could follow the path they had taken. Lee and his men returned to San Agustín.14
That evening Scott held a council of war. As was his custom, he listened carefully to the various reports without committing himself. Mason, the engineer who had scouted the road to San Antonio, recommended assaulting that position; Lee believed that casualties could be minimized by crossing to the west. Both presentations were impressive, and Scott deferred his decision. By morning, however, he had decided to take the road that Lee had scouted across the Pedregal. He would envelop Churubusco and San Antonio from the west.
Scott was unaware at this time that Valencia had set up a substantial position in his path, and he expected little or no resistance. He therefore remained back at San Agustín. Five hundred men, he ordered, all from Pillow’s division, would constitute a work party to make the Pedregal road fit to carry artillery. Twiggs’s division would protect the road builders15 and “brush the enemy away” should they become “impertinent.” But then, if any action should become serious—which Scott did not expect—Pillow was to join in the fight with his whole command, and at the same time assume the command.16 Scott would, in that case, be soon on the ground.
Twiggs was unhappy to be subordinated to the unpopular Pillow, nearly thirty years his junior, but he set out on the morning of August 19. Since Worth’s division at San Antonio was earmarked to follow the route blazed by Twiggs and Pillow, Scott had committed three of his four divisions to the movement around the Pedregal. Only a disappointed Quitman was left in reserve at San Agustín.
Under Lee’s supervision, Pillow’s men worked hard all morning and into the early afternoon. Gradually they hacked across the “raging sea of molten rock”17 until they had fashioned an acceptable road past Mount Zacatepec to a point overlooking the small towns of Padierna in front, San Geronimo to the right, and Contreras to the left.§ Because of a strange shape of the ground, Scott could actually see San Geronimo from the roof of his house in San Agustín.
In early afternoon, after the road was nearly completed, Twiggs’s lead units came under fire as they descended the forward slopes of Zacatepec. Perhaps hoping to destroy the opposition without having to call on Pillow, Twiggs instantly sent two batteries of artillery forward to unlimber and begin firing. For a while the artillerists, under Captain John Magruder, held their own against twenty-two heavy Mexican guns, but eventually, outgunned, they were forced to withdraw. At that moment Pillow arrived to take command.
Pillow apparently intended to run this battle without sending for Scott, for he sent word to Colonel Riley, in the lead, to proceed down the banks of the river, cross over, and seize San Geronimo on the other side, thereby cutting this Mexican position off from its lifeline, the San Angel road. Riley, a suspicious old soldier, first asked if his own commander, Twiggs, had been made aware of this order. Pillow assured Riley, correctly, that he had, and a staff officer from Twiggs rode up and confirmed his word. Riley then dismounted and at the head of his men struggled down the rugged banks, across the river to Padierna, to the Ansaldo orchard,18 and finally to San Geronimo, which he found deserted. On the way, he was threatened at times by lancers, by Torrejón’s cavalry, and finally by artillery fire from Valencia’s position. He was not, however, attacked by infantry, as Valencia was preoccupied with the duel that was raging between his artillery and Magruder’s battery to the east.
Soon Pillow realized that Riley, isolated at San Geronimo, was in danger. Accordingly he sent Cadwalader and then the 15th Infantry under Colonel George W. Morgan, both from his own division.19 Later in the day, having been reinforced, Riley began scouting the rear (western) side of Valencia’s position. Valencia did nothing to stop him, his eyes still on the artillery duel. At the end of the day, with Magruder’s guns withdrawn, Valencia believed he had repulsed a major American attack. He happily declared victory and began to celebrate by boasting, promoting all his officers, and getting drunk.20
But Riley, Cadwalader, and Morgan were in a precarious spot, for now they were able to detect a major Mexican force coming down the San Angel road. The 3,500 Americans, isolated between Valencia and what would turn out to be Santa Anna’s main body, were ripe for slaughter. But Pillow did nothing to extricate them other than issuing and then rescinding an order for Riley to retire.21
Enter Persifor F. Smith, the Princeton lawyer from New Orleans, veteran of the Florida war and hero of Monterrey. This unassuming man, who lacked the flamboyance, the ego, and the pretensions of Pillow, Scott, Worth, and others, was destined in the next twenty-four hours to rescue the doubtful fortunes of Scott’s army.
Smith’s brigade had been in the vanguard of Twiggs’s division when the first rounds had come in from Valencia’s position, and when Magruder’s batteries were placed into position to return the fire, Smith’s brigade had been put in place so as to give them infantry protection. Smith had been kept in that position, as Riley, Cadwalader, and Morgan had been committed. Now Smith’s was the only brigade on hand that had not been in the fight.
From his position supporting Magruder, Smith could see the plight of the three units across the stream and saw that he should go to their assistance. But Valencia’s position was straight across the stream from him, its heavy artillery still pointed in his direction. Smith quickly concluded, therefore, that a frontal attack would be expensive; furthermore, an attack to the left toward Contreras (Valencia’s right) would do nothing to cut Valencia off from the reinforcing army. Therefore, on his own, with no orders from Pillow, Twiggs, or Scott, Smith determined to move out to the right, along the general route followed by the others. After making an effort to find some senior to confirm his course of action, he called his battalion commanders together, told them what he planned, and ordered Magruder to recommence firing to cover him. He then led his men off by the right flank.22
Smith debouched from the Pedregal at the rear of Morgan’s 15th Infantry at about an hour before sunset. There he could see the considerable Mexican force drawn up between him and San Angel. Taking command of Cadwalader’s and Morgan’s units—Riley was out of contact—Smith set up a defensive position. Soon, however, he received word that Riley had been located beyond the village, and he began preparing to attack northward. Cadwalader, however, was finding difficulty with the terrain to his front and seemed unable to understand his orders. With these complications, and with darkness coming on, Smith canceled his assault. He still had no inkling at the time that the force between him and San Angel was commanded by Santa Anna in person.23
Santa Anna, on his part, was remarkably lethargic. It was late in the day, and before him lay a difficult ravine. So he failed to attack the Americans between him and Valencia—a missed opportunity. No explanation for this failure is completely satisfactory. Possibly his pique against Valencia was the reason. Santa Anna, of course, had personal and political differences with most of his generals, and those differences were generally forgotten on the battlefield. But Valencia’s case was special, for even if Santa Anna crushed the Americans under those circumstances, Valencia could claim credit, with some reason, for having chosen the site of victory.‖ On the other hand, Santa Anna was never very quick or perceptive on the battlefield, and his failure may have stemmed simply from that failing. Whatever the reasons, he brought disaster upon himself.
After Persifor Smith had canceled his late-afternoon attack, he began pondering his next move. Riley, who had now been located up ahead, volunteered that his engineers had discovered a way around to the rear of Valencia’s position. Smith, without seeing the ground, seized on the opportunity to surround Valencia on three sides and attack the position at daybreak. Scott was too far away to give his permission, but Smith wanted Scott informed. But how? Lee quickly solved the problem by volunteering to make the hazardous trip back to Scott, who was last heard of at Zacatepec. Smith accepted Lee’s offer and added an additional message: his command would move out to attack Valencia at 3 A.M. with or without orders, but to support him he requested Scott to order a diversionary action on Valencia’s front.
Lee made his way, with a few men, through the blackness of the night over the desolate Pedregal. The night was becoming stormy, and he was forced to depend on his own acute sense of direction, guided by occasional bursts of lightning, to find his way. On reaching Zacatepec, however, Lee discovered to his disappointment that Scott had returned to San Agustín for the night. So the weary engineer continued the remaining three miles, arriving at Scott’s headquarters by 11 P.M., to find Scott calmly writing his report of the day’s operations, confident but glad to receive news.24
Scott had been concerned about Smith’s situation, so concerned that he had sent seven officers out to find Smith; all of them had returned unsuccessful. On receiving Lee’s news, therefore, Scott was relieved, and he sent Twiggs and Lee out to scrape up troops for the morning demonstration. Before long they located Franklin Pierce’s brigade, temporarily commanded by Colonel T. B. Ransom, of the 9th Infantry.a
At Padierna, Smith was preparing to attack Valencia at daybreak. Riley’s brigade moved out shortly before 3 A.M., and Cadwalader’s brigade, following, was split, with two of his regiments going with Riley and the other two staying to face Santa Anna’s force. Morgan’s 15th Infantry was to follow Riley but be prepared to face Santa Anna if necessary. Shields, who had joined him the previous night, was to remain in San Geronimo.b Riley’s path was difficult, and it was broad daylight, three hours later, before he and Cadwalader’s regiments were in position. Two imponderables had assisted them: (1) the cold storms during the night had caused the Mexican pickets around Valencia to retreat to shelter, and (2) Santa Anna had withdrawn northward from his advanced position to San Angel. Smith need not worry about his rear.25
Valencia’s men, shivering and cold, sat up all night expecting Santa Anna to reinforce them. When dawn came, they looked toward San Angel and saw that Santa Anna had retired. In a panic, some of the men began to desert; the rest were disheartened.26 Then the Americans hit.
The assault lasted only seventeen minutes. Valencia’s men broke and ran, many intercepted by Shields as they attempted to escape toward San Angel. Santa Anna could see the rout from the distance but, instead of coming to Valencia’s rescue, continued retiring toward Churubusco. Valencia himself escaped the American trap and made his way northward alone, giving San Angel a wide berth after learning that Santa Anna had issued an order for him to be shot.
The Americans showed no mercy, pursuing to the best of their capacities all the way to San Angel amid the confusion. Just as they were entering the town Persifor Smith encountered Pillow,27 who had arrived just after the battle to assume command.
So much for Padierna/Contreras, a battle that Scott had never expected to fight. Scott had committed 4,500 men against 7,000, “with 12,000 more hovering in sight.” Of these, Scott claimed to have killed 700, with 813 prisoners, including four generals.c Santa Anna had missed a great opportunity to deliver a devastating blow against an enemy who could not afford a defeat, but at least most of his army was still intact.
But not for long. Scott, who received word of the victory as he was halfway between San Agustín and Padierna, took immediate action to pursue. Perceiving correctly that the collapse of Valencia’s position would signal a Mexican retreat all along the line, he halted the movement of Worth’s and Quitman’s divisions toward San Angel and ordered them back. Worth, he directed, should wait until Pillow’s division, converging upon Churubusco from San Angel, cut the Churubusco-San Antonio road from the rear. Then Worth was to pursue as the enemy retreated. Scott himself continued to the San Angel road. When he reached Cayoacán, a few miles beyond San Angel, he caught up with Pillow and Smith. There, amid the cheers of his troops, he resumed direct control of his army.28
Worth, however, did not wait for Pillow to come to his support. Instead he sent Clarke’s brigade westward through the Pedregal to the rear of San Antonio, and that threat caused the garrison on his front to flee in panic. Worth pursued them up the road toward Churubusco. Both main roads to the Rio Churubusco, from San Angel and San Antonio, were now open, both the scenes of hot pursuit.
Santa Anna, meanwhile, had regained his composure somewhat and decided to bring what troops could be saved back within the walls of Mexico City. To do so, however, he knew that he must keep the Churubusco bridge across the river open for his fleeing troops.
The bridge at Churubusco, over the river of the same name, was protected by two main defenses. One was the formidable tête de pont protecting the main bridge itself, and the other was the massive and heavily defended San Mateo Convent, about five hundred yards to the southwest. Santa Anna ordered these two positions held at all costs. To some the order seemed superfluous. In both the tête de pont and the convent were artillerymen who had deserted the U.S. Army as far back as Matamoros. The men of the infamous San Patricio Battalion, aware that capture would mean the gallows, would form the backbone of any defense.
Unfortunately for his men, Winfield Scott acted hastily. Unaware of the strength of the two positions at Churubusco, and for once careless of the need for reconnaissance, he ordered all-out attack upon both positions. He was aware of two other bridges across the Rio Churubusco, one of which crossed between the road hub of Coyoacán and the rear of Churubusco. Across that bridge he sent Shields, reinforced by Pierce, toward the town of Portales, north of Churubusco. Had Scott known of the strength and determination with which the convent and the tête de pont would be held, he probably would have bypassed them, sending the bulk of his forces behind Shields. As it was, he pursued—as any other commander would have—headlong.
The Battle of Churubusco, which began around noon of Friday, August 20, 1847, really consisted of three independent actions: (1) the main attack (Worth and Pillow) on the Churubusco bridge, (2) the attack on the Convent (Twiggs), and (3) the turning movement to Portales, north of the Churubusco bridge (Shields and Pierce). In so allocating his forces, Scott had committed all his brigades, and his power to affect the battle was limited. Thus, when Lee reported to him that Shields and Pierce were in trouble at Portales, Scott was forced to raid Twiggs’s reserve, sending the Mounted Rifles and one company of dragoons to their aid. It was a small reinforcement, but it arrived in time to turn the tide for the left wing.29
The first position to give way under American attack was the tête de pont at Churubusco, turned from the east. Clarke’s brigade (5 th, 6th, and 8th infantries) and Cadwalader’s brigade (11th and 14th infantries), supported by Duncan’s artillery battalion (2,600 total), converged on this position of between seven thousand and nine thousand of the enemy. When the works were carried, by the bayonet, even the professional Worth felt his mind “filled with wonder,” and his heart “filled with gratitude.”30 The feat on the part of officers and men had been spectacular.
Once the tête de pont was reduced, Worth was able to turn his fire on the Convent, and its fate was doomed. Captain Edmund B. Alexander, commanding the 3d Infantry, was the first over the rampart, and once more the bayonet was the final, decisive weapon. Twenty minutes later, after a battle of two and a half hours, the Convent of San Mateo fell.31 What was left of the San Patricio Battalion was captured.
On the north, at Portales, Shields had been faced with heavy odds. His final triumph was muted, for just as the enemy was breaking and scattering, Worth’s triumphant men came charging up the road from Churubusco. The pursuit began again but was ineffective, by and large, because of the restriction to the causeways. The pursuing cavalry was unable to envelop the fugitives.
One small episode remained. It would probably have gone unnoticed by history except for the future prominence of the two dragoons involved. Not hearing Harney’s order to halt, Captain Philip Kearny and Lieutenant Richard S. Ewell continued the chase all the way to a gate of Mexico City. Here they dashed into heavy Mexican musket fire, Kearny suffering a mangled left arm that had to be amputated. Almost exactly fifteen years later, the two comrades would both be casualties near Bull Run, Virginia. Kearny would be killed fighting for the Union; Ewell seriously wounded fighting for the Confederacy.d
Santa Anna was devastated. In a single day, he had lost an estimated four thousand killed or wounded. Among the three thousand captured were eight generals (two of them former presidents of Mexico). And none of his organizations survived as entities.
But Scott had suffered also. By his own admission, he lost 1,053 officers and men that day, of whom 139 were killed.32 He could have taken the city.
But he did not.
* Chief topographical engineer.
† Scott report, August 19, 1847, Exec. Doc. No. 1, pp. 303–4. Alcaraz, The Other Side, p. 266, says that the attack was made by Alvarez, the cavalryman attached to Valencia: “… at dawn on the [16th], General Alvarez was on the rear-guard of the enemy, who discharged a few cannon without any result.”
‡ Actually, Valencia was ordered to take his infantry back to Coyoacán and send his artillery to Churubusco. Alcaraz, p. 270; R.S. Ripley, The War with Mexico, vol. II, quoting official Mexican correspondence, p. 208.
§ The towns are regularly confused. Scott’s map (Exec. Doc. No. 1, p. 304) mistakenly calls San Geronimo Contreras. Hence the erroneous name for the battle. The real Contreras never saw an American soldier, at least not until later.
‖ Justin Smith (The War with Mexico, vol. II, p. 106) seems to have had no doubt. “Santa Anna, devoured by passions and perplexities, now” ordered Valencia “to retreat at once. Not long afterwards two of Valencia’s aides reached San Angel, bringing news that, instead of being exterminated, thousands of Americans were established in the San Geronimo woods. Don’t talk to me, Santa Anna cried to the aides, who endeavored to excuse the situation; Valencia is an ambitious, insubordinate sot; he deserves to have his brains blown out, and I will not expose my men to the storm for him; let him spike his guns, make the ammunition useless, and retreat.” It should be noted that the incident Smith reports occurred at the end of the day, after the opportunity had been missed.
a Douglas Freeman, R. E. Lee, pp. 264–65. Pierce had been injured in a fall from his horse the previous day. All in all, his Mexican War career was unimpressive. However, U. S. Grant, in his Memoirs, vol. I, p. 147, wrote, “The next day, when Pierce’s brigade … was ordered against the flank and rear of the enemy … General Pierce attempted to accompany them. He was not sufficiently recovered to do so, and he fainted. This circumstance gave rise to exceedingly unfair and unjust criticisms of him when he became a candidate for the Presidency. Whatever General Pierce’s qualifications may have been for the Presidency, he was a gentleman and a man of courage.”
b Ibid., pp. 100–101. Smith, though junior to Shields, retained command of the forces. Perhaps neither man was aware of his dates or rank; perhaps, in view of Smith’s far greater familiarity with the terrain, Shields chose to ignore it. But Smith later expressed appreciation of Shields’s magnanimity, and in any case it was a wise arrangement.
c Scott report, August 28, 1847, Exec. Doc. No. 1, p. 308. Being written so close to the event, the report can be accepted only as approximate. Great rejoicing accompanied the recapture of two artillery pieces from the 4th Artillery, taken by Santa Anna at Buena Vista.
d Ewell, with Jackson, lost his leg at Groveton, August 29, 1862. Kearny was actually killed at Chantilly, just after the Second Battle of Bull Run, September 1, 1862.
